



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

Report of Investigation

REPORT BY: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

FILE NO: 2405-C-118-B--15882111171250

PERIOD OF REPORT: 27 Apr 09 - 1 Sep 11

DATE OF REPORT: 4 Sep 11

SUBJECT: AHMED GUL; Male Born: 1965, Bldg 100, Afghan National Army, Kubal International Airport (KAIA), Afghanistan (AFG); Tarakhil, District 4, Taimani Street 2, Kabul, AFG

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INCIDENT	OFFENSE DESCRIPTION	SUBJECT	VICTIM
2016QZC9	MURDER: INTENT TO KILL/INFLICT GREAT BODILY HARM	GUL, AHMED	BROWN, TARA R
2016QZC9	MURDER: INTENT TO KILL/INFLICT GREAT BODILY HARM	GUL, AHMED	BRODEUR, DAVID L
2016QZC9	MURDER: INTENT TO KILL/INFLICT GREAT BODILY HARM	GUL, AHMED	BRYANT, FRANK
2016QZC9	MURDER: INTENT TO KILL/INFLICT GREAT BODILY HARM	GUL, AHMED	NYLANDER, NATHAN
2016QZC9	MURDER: INTENT TO KILL/INFLICT GREAT BODILY HARM	GUL, AHMED	RANSOM, CHARLES
2016QZC9	MURDER: INTENT TO KILL/INFLICT GREAT BODILY HARM	GUL, AHMED	AUSBORN, JEFFREY
2016QZC9	MURDER: INTENT TO KILL/INFLICT GREAT BODILY HARM	GUL, AHMED	AMBARD, PHILIP
2016QZC9	MURDER: INTENT TO KILL/INFLICT GREAT BODILY HARM	GUL, AHMED	ESTELLE, RAYMOND
2016QZC9	MURDER: INTENT TO KILL/INFLICT GREAT BODILY HARM	GUL, AHMED	MCLAUGHLIN, JAMES

STATUS: Closed

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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COL, USAF

Commander, AFOSI 24 EFIS



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SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 27 Apr 11, AFOSI Expeditionary Detachment 2405, Bagram Air Field (BAF), Afghanistan (AFG) was notified that at approximately 1010 hours on 27 Apr 11, SUBJECT entered the Air Command and Control Center (ACCC) in the Headquarters (HQ) Afghanistan National Air Force (ANAF), Kabul International Airport (KAIA), Kabul, AFG, and shot and killed eight U.S. Air Force (USAF) members and one civilian contractor.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Through witness statements, AFOSI determined SUBJECT acted alone during the following chain of events. On the morning of 27 Apr 11, DECEASED BRODEUR, DECEASED BRYANT, DECEASED AUSBORN, and DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN were in the ACCC to conduct the daily 1000 hours scheduling meeting that took place each Saturday through Wednesday. The DECEASEDS were mentors for Afghan personnel, to include SUBJECT, assigned to the ACCC. DECEASED AMBARD, DECEASED RANSOM, DECEASED BROWN and DECEASED ESTELLE had just arrived to the ACCC to receive training from DECEASED AMBARD on a communications encryption system. DECEASED RANSOM and DECEASED ESTELLE were on temporary duty (TDY) to KAIA and arrived the day prior to receive the necessary training to take back to their deployed locations to implement. DECEASED BROWN was in the ACCC because DECEASED BROWN worked for DECEASED AMBARD and wanted to learn as many communication systems she could. SUBJECT entered the ACCC with his issued Smith and Wesson 9 millimeter (mm) pistol on his belt holster. SUBJECT pulled out his pistol and opened fire. SUBJECT shot each of the Americans in the room multiple times, including one shot to each of the DECEASEDS' heads, except DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN. The investigation was unable to reveal who SUBJECT shot first. All DECEASEDS died at the scene except DECEASED BROWN; American first responders transported her to the French hospital emergency room where she died. Some of the individuals at the ACCC for the scheduled meeting were in the conference room adjacent to the ACCC when SUBJECT started to shoot. The individuals in the conference room fled into the hallway and out of the HQ ANAF Building. Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), 440th Air Expeditionary Advisory Squadron (AEAS), KAIA, AF, and Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438th AEAS, KAIA, AF, stood guard with their weapons drawn. Once all the individuals were out of the room, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) exited the conference room. DECEASED NYLANDER returned and assisted (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). As SUBJECT exited the main door of the ACCC, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and DECEASED NYLANDER fired at SUBJECT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then exited the HQ ANAF Building using the front entrance. First responders found DECEASED NYLANDER just outside of the rear glass doors of the HQ ANAF Building. SUBJECT received gunshot wounds during the exchange of gunfire with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and DECEASED NYLANDER. SUBJECT then wrote in blood on opposite walls of the hallway, "God is one" and "God in your name" in Dari (an AFG dialect). SUBJECT went up the stairway in the main lobby to the G-2 intelligence office on the second floor. SUBJECT fired a round into one of the closed doors from the G-2 reception area. SUBJECT sat down on a couch and inflicted two apparent self-inflicted gunshot wounds to his torso and chest. Lab results on SUBJECT's camouflage uniform blouse were consistent with the upper left chest shot being at close/intermediate range.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interviews of SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) revealed SUBJECT and his (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) lived in Pakistan for approximately 18 months between 2006 and 2008 and returned to AFG and military service approximately three years prior. SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know why SUBJECT killed the Americans, but did say he had a mental condition as a result of a helicopter crash in approximately 1996.

(U//~~FOUO~~) SUBJECT's co-workers said SUBJECT was routinely late to work but his superiors did not have any disciplinary problems with him. One co-worker said SUBJECT would get very angry at seemingly minor problems; however, none of the co-workers believed SUBJECT was a religious radical.

NARRATIVE

Background

2-1 (U//FOUO) This investigation was initiated on 27 Apr 11, at approximately 1130 hours based upon information received by Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Combined Joint Intelligence Human Intelligence (CJ2X), Kabul International Airport (KAIA), Afghanistan (AFG), of a shooting at an Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) compound on KAIA, AFG.

Interviews

2-2 Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Air Command and Control Center (ACCC), Headquarters (HQ) Afghanistan Air Force (ANAF) Building (Bldg) 101, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 28 Apr 11/ Bldg 101, ACCC, KAIA, Kabul, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD), EDET 2405, Bagram Airfield (BAF), AFG; SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) EDET 2405, BAF, AFG

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a planner who DECEASED BRODEUR mentored in the ACCC, worked on his daily tasks when a linguist identified as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438th Air Expeditionary Advisory Group (AEAG), KAIA, AFG, asked (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to come and speak with DECEASED BRODEUR. The discussion pertained to a flight task that (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received but (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) failed to pass the task to the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the conversation was not an argument just a discussion. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said DECEASED BRODEUR tried to see what he could to ensure (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) passed the tasks to the intended individuals. While the three discussed the topic, SUBJECT entered the room and stood behind (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and DECEASED BRODEUR for approximately three to four minutes and listened to the discussion. SUBJECT remained quiet and appeared to be normal. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) remembered SUBJECT's facial expression turned to anger and he pulled an unknown type of gun from the front upper portion of his Afghan National Army (ANA) uniform top. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT shot and killed DECEASED BRODEUR first. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) dove to the floor and pretended to be dead. SUBJECT continued to move and shoot around the room and when (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard SUBJECT leave the room, he got up and dove under the conference table located in the northern end of the ACCC. SUBJECT returned to the ACCC and continued to fire approximately four more rounds. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled cell phones ringing and he turned his off so not to draw attention to where he hid. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not see SUBJECT because (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) hid his face and was scared to move. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) thought he heard SUBJECT walk south down the hallway so he got up from under the conference table and went into the cipher room at the northwest corner of the ACCC and locked the exterior and interior door. After an unknown amount of time passed ANA guards entered the room and started to kick the door (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was behind. After the ANA guards and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) spoke several sentences through the locked door, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) unlocked the door and the ANA guards escorted him out.

2-3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Date/Place: 28 Apr 11/Bldg 10 Ward 3, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 1

(U//FOUO) On 28 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who worked in the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on the second floor of Bldg 101 verbally and in a written statement (attached) detailed the following information with the assistance of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (AKA) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Linguist. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went to work on 27 Apr 11, at 0700 hours, in the Operational Section of the G-2 Intelligence Office in Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) worked in the room where first responders found SUBJECT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

stated he first learned of the incident because of the sounds of gunfire in the Bldg. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) remained in his office, located in the south end on the second floor of Bldg 101, until a rush of people ran into the office yelling "Here he comes, here he comes." Everyone in the office thought it was a suicide bomber. An unidentified individual in the office broke the window and instructed people to jump out the window. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) jumped from the window and broke his right leg when he landed on the ground. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) helped (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to the ANA clinic where they treated his injury.

2-4 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Parf 3 Khais Khaish, Kabul, AFG
 Date/Place: 28 Apr 11/Role 3 Hospital, KAIA, AFG
 Agent(s): SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 2

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with the assistance of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) which related the following: (b)(6) (b)(7)(D) arrived to his at approximately 0710 hours on 27 April 2011. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) worked in the G-2 office located on the second floor of Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated a rush of people came into the office and then he heard a gunshot, as people yelled there was a suicide bomber. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) moved into a smaller office located in the G-2 office and waited approximately three to four minutes before he moved a desk in front of the small office door. SUBJECT opened the main door to the office and yelled "Intelligence, where is Intelligence?" (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then heard one gunshot and jumped out the window in the small office. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) made his way to the ANA clinic where the clinic treated him for a sprained ankle.

2-5 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Queen Elizabeth Hospital - Woolwich, Stadium Road, London, United Kingdom (UK)
 Date/Place: 28 Apr 11/US Embassy (USEMB), 24-36 Grosvenor Square, London, UK
 Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD), DET 541, London, UK and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Assistant Legal Attaché, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), USEMB, London, UK

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a self identified distant (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) member, provided the following information regarding SUBJECT: SUBJECT drank alcohol, partied, and was not a religious person. In the late 1980s, SUBJECT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and became more religious. In 1991, when the Mujahedeen were in AFG, SUBJECT's religious practices remained the same. In 1995, SUBJECT started to follow the teachings of the Taliban, becoming a very strict Muslim. He attended Mosque for each prayer time, grew a beard, had (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and practiced an authoritarian approach when seeing other individuals who did not practice Islam to his liking. In 2001, the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) started to see SUBJECT as the "chameleon" he was because he would change his attitudes to suit his surroundings. SUBJECT was very authoritarian but would change depending on who he was interacting with. During this time, SUBJECT wanted to relocate with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to a northern European country. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed this might have been Norway, but it did not happen and SUBJECT moved (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to Hayatabad, Pakistan (PK). SUBJECT stated that he moved to PK because he was upset that foreigners had invaded his country. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not recall if SUBJECT wanted to do anything to retaliate; he just wanted to get away from AFG. When (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) members asked SUBJECT why he wanted to return to AFG to work for the AFG government, SUBJECT responded he "wanted to kill Americans." The (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not take any action on this statement as they did not believe it.

(U//FOUO) In 2007, when SUBJECT lived in military housing in Hayatabad, PK, SUBJECT developed a very close relationship with an unidentified prominent figure who SUBJECT met at a local Mosque. SUBJECT was a frequent visitor to the Mosque, attending daily prayers five times each day. During that time, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed SUBJECT's attendance at the Mosque radicalized him. SUBJECT always had

religious ideals but they increased during this time. Also at this time, there were rumors in (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that SUBJECT wanted to become a suicide bomber. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not believe him due to his "chameleon" like attitude. Sometime in 2008, SUBJECT moved with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) back to AFG. When asked by the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) why he was going back he replied "he wanted to kill Americans." Again, the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) members did not believe him. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) learned from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that SUBJECT appeared to relax his religious attitudes but still argued his religious opinions with members of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) as well as others. He cut his beard, stopped wearing his headdress and acted as though he embraced the ideas of the current Karzai administration.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) usually only saw SUBJECT during social gatherings with the rest of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that since 2001, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had concerns about SUBJECT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed SUBJECT showed signs of depression but was not schizophrenic. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) based this on what he observed of SUBJECT and what (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told him about SUBJECT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) felt that something happened to SUBJECT while he was in PK and attended the local Mosque.

(U//FOUO) In response to questions regarding SUBJECT's financial situation, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) advised SUBJECT sold his residence one year ago in order to pay off some debts. Previously, SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not own a vehicle but purchased one with the remaining proceeds from the sale of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) house. SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) lived in this vehicle, which was parked at another (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) residence.

(U//FOUO) On the morning of 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) telephoned multiple (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and learned of the shooting. During the phone calls, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) learned that the night before the shooting, SUBJECT had prayed all night and cleaned his gun. In the morning, SUBJECT departed without saying anything to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2-6 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438th Air Expeditionary Advisory Group (AEAG), KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 28 Apr 11/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for AFG, Base Hospital, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD), SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 3

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed sworn statement (attached) that related the following: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was a linguist for three ACCC mentors, DECEASED BRYANT, DECEASED BRODEUR, and MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 4th Fighter Wing (FW), Seymour Johnson AFB, NC. On 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) got to work at approximately 0815 hours and read the news on the computer located on the southeast side, front row of the ACCC. At approximately 1000 hours, DECEASED BRODEUR with an ANA soldier, later identified as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) approached (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) from the north end of the ACCC and asked (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to translate for them. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) faced the main door to the ACCC, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) faced the front (south) of the ACCC, and DECEASED BRODEUR stood to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) left, facing (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). The discussion pertained to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who received a flight tasking from the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and passed the information to his boss, later identified as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) instead of the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted this conversation was, in no way, an argument between the two individuals. While (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) translated for the two individuals, SUBJECT entered the ACCC via the main door from the hallway at the south end of the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted SUBJECT looked normal when he entered the room and did not speak to anyone. SUBJECT walked approximately ten feet into the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw SUBJECT's facial expression get very mad. At this same time, SUBJECT pulled his black pistol from his right side holster located on his waist and started to shoot in the direction of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and DECEASED BRODEUR, who stood in the middle of the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) quickly fell to the floor and believed he hit his arm on something as he felt a sharp pain. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) realized later that SUBJECT shot

him in his left arm. SUBJECT moved quickly into the room while shooting continuously in multiple directions. Once SUBJECT walked passed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) quickly ran out the main exit of the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not believe SUBJECT observed him leave nor did he think SUBJECT shot in his direction while he ran out. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran outside of the main entrance located on the west side of Bldg 101.

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had not seen SUBJECT prior to the time SUBJECT walked into the room and started to shoot. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know SUBJECT well but knew SUBJECT greeted people when he saw them. SUBJECT was not very sociable around the ACCC.

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the following individuals were in the ACCC at the time of the incident: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in the room the entire time and received a shot in the arm and stomach. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said the time and day when many US mentors and other people were within the ACCC was everyday at 1000 hours when the scheduling meeting took place.

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not see what happened to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) or DECEASED BRODEUR once SUBJECT began to shoot. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also did not see SUBJECT shoot anyone while he was in the room prior to running out.

2-7 Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), Aircraft Maintenance Section, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 28 Apr 11/Ward 3, ISAF Base Hospital, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who had very little interactions with the DECEASEDs and SUBJECT provided a verbal statement with the assistance of linguist (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who related the following: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived at Bldg 101, ANSF Compound, KAIA, AFG, at approximately 0700 hours and did not see SUBJECT there. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated 1000 hours was a busy time within the ACCC because of the daily meeting in the adjacent conference room. The meeting was to discuss the flight missions for the upcoming day.

(U//~~FOUO~~) At approximately 1005 hours, SUBJECT entered the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not see SUBJECT as he was doing his computer training and had learned to filter out all the other people within the room. SUBJECT shot one round and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) looked up from his computer to see where it came from. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw SUBJECT with a black handgun, aimed at some of the mentors as SUBJECT fired another shot. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not identify the mentors who SUBJECT shot with the first two rounds. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) crawled under his desk to hide from SUBJECT, as did (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) linguist, KAIA, AFG. An unidentified mentor to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) tried to hide with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) but SUBJECT saw the mentor, came over and shot him (later identified as DECEASED ESTELLE). Once SUBJECT shot the mentor, SUBJECT aimed at (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and shot him in the arm and stomach, with one shot. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) played dead so SUBJECT would not shoot him again. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not believe SUBJECT targeted mentors because SUBJECT shot him. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed SUBJECT shot all the rounds in one magazine and reloaded before he started to shoot the second magazine. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed SUBJECT expended at least two magazines within the ACCC before he left. SUBJECT left the ACCC and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard gunshots in the hallway outside of the ACCC. When the shots were distant, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) closed the doors to the hallway and conference room so SUBJECT could not re-enter if he wanted to. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then proceeded to the northern end of the ACCC to hide behind a huge AFG map along with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) linguist, KAIA, AFG. When (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran to the map, he noticed approximately four Americans lying on the floor. Once he was behind the map, he heard what he described as painful breathing from approximately three mentors but (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not point out and

identify who the mentors were. While (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was behind the map, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) got up from the floor and ran into the cipher room at the rear of the ACCC and locked the door. Shortly after ANA quick response force (QRF) went to the main ACCC door and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opened it. The ANA QRF cleared the room and escorted the Afghans out of the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went to the hospital. His gunshot wound went through his wrist and skimmed his stomach. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said SUBJECT was never at work and had no personal ties within the section. SUBJECT had only worked in the section for approximately three months.

2-8 Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 316 Wing, Andrews AFB, MD
Date/Place: 29 Apr 11/438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a helicopter flight scheduler, worked with DECEASED BRYANT on mentoring ideas provided the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was the Rotary Wing Commander who helped advise the ANAF helicopter pilots. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) addressed an issue dealing with the ANAF prior to the incident. A new process within the ACCC was being developed to ensure ANAF flights were officially tasked through a legitimate ANAF process rather than the current process of the ANAF leadership dictating what flights go where, possibly directing flights for personal gain or illegitimate purposes. On 25 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) pulled U.S. mentors off of ANAF missions because they were not properly scheduled and it did not fit the process for tracking flying hours and maintenance. On 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) talked to DECEASED BRYANT about an upcoming mission in which the ANAF 11th District Commander wanted to fly around to all their checkpoints. DECEASED BRYANT suggested cutting the ANAF fuel, so ANAF could only fly scheduled missions and if they wanted to fly on their own they would have to pay for the fuel.

2-9 SSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 156 Military Police Det, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 29 Apr 11/Bldg 200, Rm 2, KAIA, AFG
Agent(s): SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 4

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed sworn statement (attached) detailing the following: On 27 April 2011, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was off work and began his out-processing from the base when he heard an alarm. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went to his office to see if he could help and met up with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) CJ2X ISAF Command, KAIA, AFG. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to go to the ANA side of the base because there was an attack in progress. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI) and TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI) all drove to the ANA compound. Once they arrived at the compound the Belgian QRF let them proceed into the area where the attack took place. They arrived at Bldg 101 and noticed a large number of ANA soldiers and civilians standing around the front of the building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed broken glass and bullet holes in the windows of the front of the building. The personnel in (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) vehicle exited and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) proceeded into the building with the French Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) team. Once inside an ANA Colonel (NFI) confirmed that there were seven US members killed in action (KIA) inside the building. Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) US Army (USA) Military Police (MP), 134 Calvary Regiment, Camp Phoenix, AFG made contact with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and led him north down the first floor hallway toward the ACCC room where the shooting took place. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was instructed to post security outside the door of the ACCC room and while standing security approximately 15 ANA soldiers made their way toward him down the hall. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated they looked like they were curious and wanted to see inside the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated on individual tried to push past him into the room and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had to physically push the ANA soldier back. An unknown ANA Col noticed the large group of ANA soldiers and told them to leave the hallway, which they did. After a few more moments the Belgian QRF showed up in the hall and secured the hall so (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) made his way into the ACCC room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed the room had a three

tier design with three large steps going up toward the back of the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) witnessed a US officer in a tan flight suit (DECEASED BRYANT) and another US officer in the Airman Battle Uniform (ABU) (DECEASED AUSBORN) next to each other in the middle of the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then noticed a US civilian (DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN) who between the East wall and a cubicle wall. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then made his way toward the back of the room and saw a blood trail which led to another US officer (DECEASED BRODEUR) in a tan flight suit on the Northwest side of the room. They were all deceased. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he remembered seeing two more US members (DECEASED ESTELLE, DECEASED RANSOM and DECEASED AMBARD) in the Northeast corner of the room as well. After (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) made his way around the room he recalled a group of higher ranking US officers (NFI) entered the room and began planning to move the KIA's out. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled seeing shell casings in the rear of the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) overheard a conversation between a linguist (later identified as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)) and another individual (later identified as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)) where the linguist stated he was in the ACCC when the shooting took place and he hid under a table next to the civilian contractor and once the SUBJECT left the room he got up and got away.

2-10 PFC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I-17 Field Artillery Regiment (FAR), 75th Field Brigade, KAIA, AFG
 Date/Place: 29 Apr 11/Bldg 200, Rm 12, Kabul, AFG
 Agent(s): SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD), 24th Expeditionary Field Investigative Squadron (EFIS), Al Udeid Air Base (AUAB), Qatar (QT); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Det 241, AUAB, QT

Exhibit: 5

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed sworn statement (attached) detailing the following: On 27 April 2011, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in his office located on the ISAF side of the base in a common area known as the Thunder Lab when SSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I-17 FAR, 75th Field Brigade, KAIA, AFG, ordered (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to grab his vest and helmet and meet Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI) for further instruction. At approximately 1020 hours, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ordered (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to secure the north side of the compound. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took his position on the stairs of a tower located in north eastern side of the compound. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled hearing gunshots but could not provide any details of how many, or the sequence of rounds fired.

2-11 MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 49th Security Forces Squadron (SFS), Holloman AFB, NM
 Date/Place: 29 Apr 11/Bldg 200 Rm 02, KAIA, AFG
 Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 6

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who was friends with DECEASED BROWN and DECEASED AMBARD provided a verbal and signed, sworn statement (attached) which related the following: On 27 Apr 11, at approximately 1000 hours, while (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) worked outside of her KSPAN (the work and living areas on the Afghan Side of the base) she received a phone call from DECEASED BROWN (Note: The distance between (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) KSPAN and Bldg 101 is approximately one quarter of a mile). DECEASED BROWN screamed through the phone "ACCC guys shooting need help" (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard DECEASED BROWN and perhaps others screaming in the background and heard gunshots. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) tried to keep DECEASED BROWN on the phone; however, the cell phone battery apparently lost power. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had her M4 on her and quickly loaded a round into the chamber and yelled at personnel located outside to get into their buildings. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) started to run towards where she believed DECEASED BROWN was and MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAS, KAIA, Kabul, AFG; Deployed from 9th Airlift Wing (AW), Dover

AFB, DE, went along with her. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed ANA members running towards her and she decided to head in the direction they came from. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) got closer to Bldg 101 and heard what they believed to be shots from an AK-47 and the rounds hitting the flag pole located west of the main entrance of Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived at the Afghan clinic and provided security around the Bldg. MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG, deployed from 55th Aerospace Medicine Squadron (AMS), Offutt AFB, NE (refer to paragraph 2-16), and one other unidentified person came out of the clinic and told (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that there were wounded Americans inside Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) got a team together consisting of Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 SFS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 5 SFS, Minot AFB, ND, MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 96th Civil Engineering Squadron (CES), Altus AFB, OK, and PO3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW), KAIA, AFG; Deployed from USS Enterprise CVN (carrier, vessel, nuclear power) 65, and a couple of unknown individuals (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not have body armor on so (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stayed within the middle of the team. They approached Bldg 101 from the south and tried to enter the Bldg via the first floor south entrance. The door was padlocked from the inside and the team could not gain access into the Bldg. They went up the staircase located at the southern end of the Bldg and gained access via the second floor south entrance. Once inside Bldg 101 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed a trail of blood on the floor and followed it. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered the G-2 intelligence office where the blood stopped, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not see anybody inside the room (Note: the ANA QRF had already removed SUBJECT). At that time, Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANA, HQ ANSF Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG, was inside the Bldg, signaled to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and told her the Americans were downstairs (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and the team followed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) down the stairs and got in front of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). Once downstairs, the team turned and looked down the north hallway and an unknown ANA member signaled the team down the hall. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and her team proceeded down the hallway into the ACCC and the adjacent conference room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard a team member yell from the ACCC that "they are in here". (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered the ACCC and immediately saw two individuals, later identified as DECEASED BRYANT and DECEASED AUSBORN lying on the first tier (Note: The room had three step up tiers so the rear of the room was higher than the front of the room). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted DECEASED AUSBORN was dead because of bullet holes within his head. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) knew DECEASED BRYANT was dead because someone else in the room had checked his vitals (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were in the back of the ACCC and yelled to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) not to go to their location because they found DECEASED BROWN and she had vitals. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) checked the vitals of a body lying on his back near DECEASED BROWN, later identified as DECEASED RANSOM. DECEASED RANSOM did not have any vitals so she grabbed his handgun and placed it within her pocket. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not find DECEASED AMBARD's weapon and believed it was underneath his body. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) cut DECEASED RANSOM's M4 sling and gave the weapon to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted DECEASED RANSOM had both hands on the M4. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not remember weapons on DECEASED BRYANT or DECEASED AUSBORN but noted an individual, later identified as DECEASED BRODEUR, had an empty holster and DEAN could not locate the handgun at that time. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) began to take some form of identification from the deceased individuals so (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took as many name tapes as she could find. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) picked DECEASED BROWN up and carried her out the room, down the hallway, out the main entrance and to the Afghan clinic. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled DECEASED BROWN had her handgun within her holster when (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) carried her out of Bldg 101. On the way to the clinic, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated DECEASED BROWN was responsive and moved her feet, squeezed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) hand and, at one point, looked at (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and smiled. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed DECEASED BROWN had been shot twice, once in the head and one in the upper chest. Once at the Afghan clinic, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not get an ambulance to take DECEASED BROWN to the ISAF hospital (Note: The French ambulance was on site but they could not find the ambulance personnel to transport DECEASED BROWN and with little time nobody looked for the drivers) so they found a government owned support utility vehicle (SUV) and put DECEASED BROWN in the rear of the SUV, on a stretcher. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was upfront in the passenger seat with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) driving and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) in the backseat holding onto DECEASED BROWN as they were unable to close the rear hatch of the SUV due to the length of the stretcher. When the team arrived at the ISAF hospital, medics took DECEASED BROWN.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated it was out of the ordinary for DECEASED BROWN and DECEASED AMBARD to be in the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went on to say DECEASED AMBARD sometimes worked with the higher ranking ANA soldiers within Bldg 101 and DECEASED BROWN usually worked from the Communications Bldg. DECEASED BROWN's job was to train the Afghans on how to run a communication helpdesk and fix computer issues. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed DECEASED BROWN and DECEASED AMBARD were in the ACCC to show two individuals, later identified as DECEASED AUSBORN and DECEASED ESTELLE, how a communication encryption system for the ANA worked. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted all deceased personnel had magazines within their weapons except for DECEASED RANSOM's M4, in which a magazine was next to the weapon. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed everyone's handgun was still within their holster.

2-12 Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from operating location Air Force Element (AFELM) Joint Flying Training, Training Squadron 31, Navel Air 31, Corpus Christi, TX
Date/Place: 29 Apr 11/KAIA, Kabul, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 7

(U//FOUO) On 29 Apr 11, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who provided a signed sworn statement (attached) that related the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in attendance for the 1000 hours meeting in the Conference Room located next to the ACCC Operations room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated the meeting was running about fifteen minutes late as the 18 to 23 attendees present awaited a call from the MOD. Additionally, the call always initiated the start of the meeting, which would be an integral part of the tasking of flying squadrons for the next day. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relayed SUBJECT was not at the meeting as of 1015 hours when he last looked at his watch, but it was not unusual for SUBJECT to be late due to the lax culture. SUBJECT was the Cargo and Passenger Management Officer and attended all of the 1000 hours morning scheduling meetings. Other members (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) remembered in attendance were as follows: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) POI (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG, deployed from Naval Airfield (NALF) San Clements Island, Naval Base Coronado, CA (refer to para 2-49), Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Planning Division, HQ ANAF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Deputy of Operations, HQ ANAF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG and Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF Helicopter Maintenance Squadron, KAIA, AFG. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated he did not know all of the people in attendance due to the seating arrangement. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard a gunshot at approximately 1017 hours. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) described the first shot as a very loud "POP", followed by a nonstop barrage of gunfire which followed in the next several minutes. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) linguist, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (AKA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG, kicked over his seat and fled the room directly after the first shot. About one second later, the second round of shots began, and then it became a constant volley of gunfire. The remaining attendees sitting at the conference table suddenly reacted and surged toward the front entrance of the conference room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) fell over backwards in his chair as he reached for his handgun, which (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said was jammed in his holster due to sand and dirt. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relayed DECEASED NYLANDER, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Lt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 538 AEAS, KAIA, AFG, ran over (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) as they exited the room as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) tried to charge a bullet into the chamber of his weapon.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had one magazine in his weapon due to the recent implementation of the "Amber" carrying policy (Note: the policy was the weapon could have a full magazine but could not have a round in the chamber). After (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) charged his weapon, he regained his footing and took a tactical position in the corner of the room opposite of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who kept an eye on the adjoining door between the ACCC and Conference room. Approximately 25 to 30 seconds after the initial shot, non-stop gunfire still erupted next door in the ACCC Operations room. After everyone else ran out of the room,

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) departed as well while SUBJECT continued firing shots next door. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opined he and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were the only people who drew their weapons inside the conference room.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sprinted out the front door when everybody was out of the conference room except (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and himself. When exiting out the conference room into the hallway, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took a direct left toward the front entrance of the building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) "lost" (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) as he fled the room, but later learned (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took approximately five shots down the hallway toward an Afghan, whom (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) thought had a weapon in his hand upon exiting the ACCC room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) proceeded to sprint approximately 100 meters to his work section, the Rotary Bldg. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) still heard rapid gunfire as he arrived back to the Rotary Bldg.

2-13 Major (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), 438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 29 April 11/ Bldg 200, Rm 2, Kabul, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 8

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed sworn statement (attached) that related the following: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was the Director of Operations for the 438 AEAS and as the mentor/pilot to the Afghan Presidential Air Service (PAS). The Afghan PAS provides very important person (VIP) transportation to President HAMID KARZAI and visiting Heads of State.

(U//FOUO) The meetings that occurred the morning of 27 Apr 11, were both scheduled for the first floor in the ACCC ops Center and ACCC conference room. The meeting in the ACCC ops center was for the purpose of planning MI-35 rocket box patrols (security over Kabul city) on 28 April and maximum mentor participation was requested. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was notified of the meeting that morning and stated it is not a recurring meeting. The second meeting in the Air Corps building takes place in the ACCC conference room adjoining to the ops center and occurs daily at 1000 for the purpose of planning out the next day's schedule. Involvement in this meeting is usually 5-7 US mentors and approximately 12-15 Afghans.

(U//FOUO) At approximately 0920 hours, on 29 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reached the Rotary Bldg and began mission planning for an air assault on 28 Apr 11, with ANAF pilots and Croatian mentors. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related at 1030 hours, he heard (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) run into the office with his 9 mm drawn. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) shouted there had been a shooting in the ACCC Operations room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) looked outside and noticed several people, to include uniformed ANAF, US contractors, and individuals dressed in civilian clothing, moving away from the Air Corps in a panicked state. All personnel filtered into the hallways, closed doors to avoid line of sight from windows, and posted a two-person security team at all six buildings' exits. After security was established, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) assumed control of the land mobile radio (LMR) and maintained visibility on Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated individuals began to sporadically come out of Bldg 101 during the next 10-15 minutes and a small Afghan cordon unit set up security around the perimeter. At this time, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed an individual with a long gun on the second floor, third window from the Southwest corner of Bldg 101. Shortly thereafter (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed muzzle flashes and started preparations to possibly deal with barricaded shooter/hot hallway scenarios. Reports of multiple Afghans wounded and one US critical in the Medical Clinic, Bldg 305, saturated the radio net. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 538 AEAS, KAIA, AFG and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) in a white van to assist at the clinic due to the delayed QRF response, perceived ineffective Afghan cordon, and urgency of the medical situation.

(U//FOUO) After entering the clinic, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) encountered (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who had set up a triage for four Afghans wounded in action (WIA). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked if any of the injuries were critical, and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) replied, "No." (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) discovered DECEASED NYLANDER was KIA. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) immediately viewed the body, which was under armed guard control, uncovered the blanket and confirmed no vital signs/no pulse and noticed a single gunshot wound to the left rear of the skull with no exit wound. At that time, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) moved back to the Afghan patients while several other US soldiers prepped DECEASED NYLANDER's body to relocate to make room for potential casualties. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then consulted via cell phone with Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 52 AMS, Spangdahlem AB, Germany, who requested DECEASED NYLANDER's body be transported to the French hospital as soon as possible. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) departed Bldg 305 with DECEASED NYLANDER, his IDs and weapon.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reached the open gate at approximately 5 mph, dismounted, and placed his hands in the air and shouted, "US critical patient." (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) performed this action to dissuade being misperceived as possessing a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) since the airport was now on high alert and guards were likely to react to uncharacteristic behavior. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated Emergency Room (ER) doctors promptly unloaded DECEASED NYLANDER from the vehicle after (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reached the hospital, but they were unable to resuscitate DECEASED NYLANDER in the ER.

(U//FOUO) From this point, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) monitored the situation from either the ISAF hospital or Kabul Command post. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) learned shortly after delivering DECEASED NYLANDER to the ER there was a second patient inbound, identified as DECEASED BROWN. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard over the LMR that five Americans, identified as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered Bldg 101 upon learning from exiting Afghans there were still Americans inside. Their initial actions were to begin clearing the Bldg until an ANAF soldier gestured to them where the Americans were located. They located several bodies and only one critical patient in the ACCC. While pulling ID cards off the KIA, the Fire team found a responsive DECEASED BROWN and ultimately delivered her to the ISAF hospital with weak vitals. DECEASED BROWN expired shortly after admittance to the ER primarily due to a fatal gunshot wound to the back of the head.

(U//FOUO) After all the KIA arrived at the Afghan hospital, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) began the task of cataloging personal effects and acquiring weapons from the hospital armory for later exploitation. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW/CV, KAIA, AFG, subsequently appointed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) as the weapons custodian to ensure safe storage of all firearms and weapons throughout the investigation process.

(U//FOUO) In addition to the signed, sworn statement, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) verbally related the following information: At no time did (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observe another potential shooter exit Bldg 101, although he admitted it would be impossible to differentiate between who was who at a range of approximately 300 meters (the distance from Bldg 101 to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Bldg, referred to as the Rotary Bldg). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related it would have been very easy for an additional enemy to exit the scene, as it was nearly 15 minutes after the initial shots before any effective perimeter defense was established.

2-14 Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 440 AEAS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 755th Intelligence Materiel Squadron, Wright-Patterson, AFB, OH
Date/Place: 30 Apr 11 11/Bldg 200 Rm 2, Kabul, AFG
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibits: 9

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided two signed, sworn statements (attached) detailing the following: On 27 Apr 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) attended the 1000 hours scheduling meeting held at Bldg 101 on the ANAF compound in the ACCC Conference Room. Inside the meeting (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DECEASED NYLANDER and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sat in his seat for approximately five minutes and heard what sounded like gunshots coming from the ACCC next door to the conference room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stood up and drew his 9 mm Beretta pistol, chambered a round and put the weapon on fire. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) covered the door which connects the ACCC Conference Room and the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had his weapon trained on the door while all the personnel located in the room began to run out into the hallway and out the main exit of the building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) backed out of the conference room toward the main conference room exit and met (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who also had his weapon drawn. They both exited into the hallway and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) immediately pointed his weapon North down the hallway to cover the main entrance of the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated an Afghan male approximately 5'9-5'10 about 200 lbs (later identified as SUBJECT) exited the ACCC into the hallway with what appeared to be a weapon in his hand. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) fired approximately eight rounds from his weapon. Before he fired, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed DECEASED NYLANDER standing next to him; (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed DECEASED NYLANDER fired shots as well. After the individual in the hallway fell to the ground, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) turned and ran down the hallway and out the main exit of the building and ran to the MXG (NFI), building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) verbally stated he thought DECEASED NYLANDER was running behind him out of the building as well.

2-15 MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW/Operations, KAIA, AFG
 Date/Place: 1 May 11/Bldg 200 Rm 2, KAIA, Kabul, AFG
 Agent(s): SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 10

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) detailing the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained the day to day operations of the ACCC room located in Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated mentors have worked with the Afghans for approximately three years trying to teach them basic computer skills and functions of day to day operations of military aircraft movement. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relayed the mentors had made no real progress until recently. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived to KAIA, AFG on 29 Jan 2011 and up to early Apr 2011 there was little to no improvement to the operations at the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed the removal of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) the former (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and replacement of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI) in early Apr 11 changed the mindset of the Afghans he and the other mentors worked with. The ACCC provided operational control of flights and cargo transported in and out of the KAIA. The mentors normally consisted of flight officers, Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO's) and their linguists. They assisted the ANA members with monitoring what was allowed to fly and not fly due to weight, space and availability. The ACCC cancelled flights if they do not meet the mission requirements. Many ANA officers opposed the restrictions that came out of the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed there was a lot of corruption because the aircraft whose flight the ACCC cancelled could call any high ranking Afghan and their flight would go out at the last minute. The Afghan would then receive money for the change; it was a business to them. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opined the standup and monitoring of flights by the ACCC would hurt some Afghan's monetary gain and cause them tension. The mentors started to enforce the rules made by Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG and DECEASED BRYANT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and DECEASED BRYANT trained efficiency, transparency, and effectiveness. DECEASED BRYANT talked about threatening to take away fuel for the planes if the ANA would not cooperate with the rules set by the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related, as of 30 Apr 11, no one has taken fuel away. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related, on 11 April 2011, Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANA, KAIA, AFG had a meeting with the ANA key workers (NFI). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed the meeting regarding changes that would affect the ACCC mission. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not provide any further information on the meeting. The following day, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed considerable changes in the ANA soldiers who worked in the ACCC. The workers worked and applied the lessons taught by the mentors in the past and worked the entire day (before the meeting the office personnel worked from 0830 hours to lunch and did not return until the following day). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not provide any information pertaining to SUBJECT's daily interaction besides attending the 1000 hours

daily meeting. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did state that if the ACCC enforced the rules and had the ability to cancel flights, it could impact SUBJECT's income if he took payments for arranging flight and cargo movements.

2-16 MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from, 55 AMS, Offutt AFB, NE
Date/Place: 1 May 11/Bldg 200, Rm 2, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 11

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) detailing the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was a first responder to Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard shots at approximately 1000 hours which prompted him to set up security around the Medical Clinic, located approximately 100 meters to the southeasterly direction from Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was at the clinic triaging bodies as they came in from the mass shooting. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed people jumping out of the windows and realized the severity of the situation. After he verified the status of the first four casualties, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) grabbed an Afghan body armor vest and left for the Bldg 101 to help since he heard there were possibly several Americans injured. Upon arrival at the rear of Bldg 101 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw DECEASED NYLANDER lying on the ground outside Bldg 101 rear entrance. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) dragged DECEASED NYLANDER approximately 200 yards to an ambulance. The ambulance transported DECEASED NYLANDER to the Afghan Medical Clinic adjacent to Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) performed resuscitation efforts in the ambulance and at the clinic. Medical personnel pronounced DECEASED NYLANDER dead at 1034 hours. DECEASED NYLANDER's body was placed in the records room in the clinic and guarded by MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from, USAF Expeditionary Center, Ft. Dix, NJ in an effort to make room for more casualties.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated ANA soldiers brought SUBJECT, unresponsive, to the hospital in his uniform. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) cut SUBJECT's uniform off his body and subsequently attempted life saving measures such as chest compressions and intubation; but failed to obtain an airway, and pronounced SUBJECT dead at 1100 hours. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) identified three shots in SUBJECT's chest and one shot in the left forearm area.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) decided to go back Bldg 101 and attempted to retrieve more Americans. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) accompanied (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on his second body retrieval mission. The fire team entered the ACCC room and noticed what appeared to be bodies lying "all over." (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) scanned the room and determined seven of the eight victims were dead. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard breathing from the right rear corner of the room and ran back to discover a living female (DECEASED BROWN), and two deceased males (DECEASED RANSOM and DECEASED AMBARD). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated there were three large pools of blood, one which came from DECEASED BROWN and the others from DECEASED AMBARD and DECEASED RANSOM, both of whom lay directly next to DECEASED BROWN on the floor. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) picked up DECEASED BROWN and placed her on (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) shoulders to carry DECEASED BROWN from the Bldg en route to the ambulance where she was placed on a litter. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed DECEASED BROWN's right side was still functional, but her left side was completely limp. DECEASED BROWN had a pulse and a strong grip on (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) hand while in the ambulance during the ride to the clinic. Upon arrival to the Medical Clinic, DECEASED BROWN's grip weakened and she let go of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) hand. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) cut off DECEASED BROWN's ABU uniform as resuscitation efforts began and medical personnel administered epinephrine in efforts to revive DECEASED BROWN. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed apparent gunshot wounds to the back upper left shoulder region and the left rear of the neck. DECEASED BROWN responded positively to the medication, regained a pulse, and immediately grabbed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arm. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated DECEASED BROWN had no visible weapons throughout her

transport from Bldg 101 to the Medical Clinic. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) transported DECEASED BROWN to the ISAF Hospital along with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 440 AEAS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 58th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, Kirtland AFB, NM, and TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 732nd Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, Moody AFB, GA, proceeded back to Bldg 101 to the ACCC where they found two more DECEASED that they missed on their prior response (DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN and DECEASED ESTELLE). Both individuals were in the right front of the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) wrote "7 KIA" in ink along with his name on the entry door to show that someone was already performing the emergency response. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received a response from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who stated there was a possibility of "bombs" being in Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) replied to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and relayed the number of KIA and subsequently left Bldg 101 en route for the Afghan clinic. Upon return to the clinic, all US personnel were ordered to report to the Thunder Lab for accountability and decompression.

2-17 Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF Helicopter Maintenance Squadron, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 1 May 11/ G-2 Office, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 12

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided the following information in a statement (attached): On 27 Apr 2011, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) attended the scheduling meeting and sat next to his mentor, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). A few minutes into the conversation they heard gunshots. Initially the shots confused everyone then rapid gunfire began and everyone got out of their seats and began running toward the conference room door. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said when they heard the shots, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stood up, drew his weapon and covered the door that joins the conference room and the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) exited the conference room together and once they got to the hallway, they ran side by side out of Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran to the flight line and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran to his unit. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not shoot his weapon in the hallway. (Note: The investigation, through interviews and forensic evidence, supported (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) account of his actions during the shooting. It is possible (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had already fired his weapon when he departed Bldg 101 with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C).

2-18 TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 1 May 11/KAIA, AFG
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Joint Counterintelligence Unit Afghanistan (JCIU-A), Bagram Airfield (BAF), AFG

Exhibit: 13

(U//FOUO) In a written statement (attached) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) an Intelligence Air Advisor, relayed the following information: On 27 April 2011 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) worked in the Wing Operations Center (WOC) at KAIA. While in the WOC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) operated the radios and monitored radio traffic during the incident. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a copy of the log (attached) he kept. The log shows the call-signs for the individuals involved in the events of 27 Apr 11.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) verbally provided the following information: He stated he heard multiple reports over the radio about three unidentified individuals that were running around the ANAF compound. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had made one radio call in which he stated he believed there was more than one shooter. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) made this statement in conjunction with his radio call at 1120 hours when he advised he cleared Bldg 100. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also provided the name of an individual who may have more information on

the incident, Intelligence Specialist Third Class (IS3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Intelligence Advisor, 451st AEW, KAF, AFG.

2-19 Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 1 May 11/Bldg 200 Rm 5, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD)

Exhibit: 14

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) JCIU-A, KAIA, AFG interviewed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) an US advisor for the ANAF compound. Although (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was not in Bldg 101 at the time of the shooting, he provided a signed sworn statement (attached) detailing the events of 27 April 2011.

2-20 Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Planning Division, HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, KAIA AFG
Date/Place: 1 May 11/Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD), JCIU-A, BAF, AFG

(U//FOUO) Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who was SUBJECT's office supervisor and co-worker with DECEASED BRYANT, DECEASED BROEDUR, and DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN, provided the following information: While he prepared for the conference he heard one gunshot followed by several more in rapid succession. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed all the shots came from the same weapon. He thought the door was open about 18 inches and noted he heard no noise come from the room until the shooting started. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated everyone in the conference room initially froze in place and then took off running out the main conference room door. The group from the conference went left out the door and continued down the hallway and again turned left; running away from the Bldg's main entrance and exiting the Bldg through the back door. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) made his way to a nearby Bldg, called MOD, and informed them someone compromised their security. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT was a pilot and he had known him for 20 years. They had graduated the Afghan Air Force Military Academy together. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT did not follow the normal military standards; he was irresponsible, stubborn, and insistent. He would get mad if things were not going his way. The two had a break in contact because of being in different locations. SUBJECT was assigned to his current post 10 months prior and Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had noticed drastic changes in SUBJECT's way of life. He had become more religious and had drastic changes in his Islamic views. It appeared SUBJECT's views were boiling over and extreme to an extent. Even with these changes, SUBJECT would look at pornographic materials on the internet. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated it was not normal for ANAF Officers to get issued a pistol right away, but SUBJECT obtained a pistol within four months of his arrival (Note: Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANSF, KAIA, AFG, confirmed SUBJECT was issued his weapon and ammunition, ref para 2-62) . Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) restated this was not normal. SUBJECT would come and go as he pleased and was not a punctual person. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) felt, because of these actions, SUBJECT could have possibly had "top cover" from a higher ranking officer in the MOD. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) knew SUBJECT attended a Mosque on Second Street in Damien District (NFI). (Note: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not name who the Mullah was because he did not attend that Mosque and referred to the Mosque location as on 2nd street because house or Bldg numbers are not normal for that area, only street numbers). The Mullah in this Mosque was extremely anti-American and pro-Pakistan. SUBJECT always drove to work and on the day of the shooting, SUBJECT did not drive to work. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) further explained SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had called ANAF Internal Affairs office on multiple occasions informing them SUBJECT was mentally and financially unstable. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know the name of SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI).

2-21 Re-Interview of Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Date/Place: 1 May 11/HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) JCIU-A, Kabul, AFG

(U//FOUO) Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided the following information: Everyday a video teleconference with the MOD was held to update MOD on the ANAF flying status. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated at 0950 hours they had experienced technical problems and resorted to having just a teleconference instead. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated while he prepared for the conference he heard one gunshot followed by several more in rapid succession.

2-22 PO3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 2 May 11/Bldg 200 Rm 2, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 15

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a Public Affairs Advisor, responded to Bldg 101 with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed sworn statement (attached) detailing the events of 27 April 2011. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) statement provided no new pertinent information to the investigation.

2-23 Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 2 May 11/Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Agent(s): SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with the assistance of Cultural Advisor (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) JCIU-A Kabul Team, KAIA, AFG, provided the following information: Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) the Officer in Charge of Transportation Control Curriculum, stated he was not at work on 27 Apr 2011. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he received pay the day before so he was accomplishing chores at home and running errands around town. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he did not know SUBJECT very well. The only personal information Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) knew about the SUBJECT was he had (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). On a professional level, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT appeared to be unusual and reserved. SUBJECT would say hello to everyone to include the US mentors, while other ANAF members would joke around, conduct small talk and "high five" the mentors. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) added SUBJECT was not disrespectful just quiet toward the mentors. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said he believed SUBJECT had a connection to a terrorist cell because the attack was too coordinated to be a random act. In the limited contact with SUBJECT, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not notice any indications of changes in SUBJECT.

2-24 Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), HQ ANAF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 2 May 11/HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 16

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a scheduler, provided a hand written statement (attached) that provided the following information: On 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in the ACCC working next to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). While (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) worked at his desk, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard four gunshots and immediately (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) dropped under a desk to hide. SUBJECT fired shots around the room and turned toward (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and fired one shot at (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) which struck the ground next to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) face.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know how many shots SUBJECT fired and did not hear him reload. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT left the room; at which point, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran out of the room and across the hall to the bathroom. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran into the ACCC conference room and exited through the window. As (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) exited the room he witnessed what he believed to be a body of a Lt Col (later identified as

DECEASED NYLANDER) and did not see any other victims. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said normally there were three to four mentors in the ACCC on any given day. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) described SUBJECT as the type of person who was a loner and would greet people but not have any discussions with people. SUBJECT was always late and never made it to work at the prescribed start time of 0700 hours.

2-25 Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 2 May 11/ HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Deputy of Operations, provided the following information: Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was an ANAF helicopter pilot since approximately 1983, and moved to the KAIA base approximately two and a half years earlier. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he had known SUBJECT since he entered the ANAF in 1983 but stayed away from SUBJECT due to SUBJECT's frequent use of hashish (marijuana). Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided SUBJECT was a very vibrant and happy person in his younger years but since SUBJECT moved to his post at KAIA, approximately five to six months earlier, SUBJECT became very quiet and generally kept to himself. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) only had professional contact with SUBJECT since his arrival at KAIA. SUBJECT displayed no disrespect, hostility nor arrogance toward his Coalition Forces (CF) mentors that Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) witnessed. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not elaborate on SUBJECT's personality or changes in his recent behavior because his contact was purely professional and very brief. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided he last saw SUBJECT on 26 Apr 11. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT displayed nothing out of the ordinary and attended the regularly scheduled video teleconference with the MOD. SUBJECT presented his portion of the material for that briefing.

2-26 SMSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 87 Medical Group (MG), McGuire AFB, NJ
Date/Place: 2 May 11/Bldg 101, Rm 2, KAIA, AFG
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 17

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) with the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) volunteered to recover Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG and Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG, from their location near the scene and bring them back to the 438 AEW Bldg, known as KSPAN3. Upon arrival to the ANSF side of the base, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) spoke to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who relayed there were seven confirmed dead Americans on scene.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) proceeded to the crime scene and noted the following details: There were Afghan military members surrounding the entrance to ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated file cabinets and desks were scattered around. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated DECEASED BRYANT and DECEASED AUSBORN lay dead, with gunshot wounds to the head. Immediately to the left and on the next level of the three-tiered floor was DECEASED BRODEUR also with a gunshot to the head. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) continued and related directly to the right and still on the second tier was DECEASED ESTELLE, who was behind a desk. DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN was between the desk and the wall. Army Criminal Investigative Division (CID) informed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN had a gunshot wound to his ribcage. DECEASED RANSOM and DECEASED AMBARD were on the top level. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related medical personnel pronounced DECEASED RANSOM and DECEASED AMBARD at approximately 1600 hours. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) left the ACCC to set up a recovery team.

2-27 Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 52 AMS, Spangdahlem AB, GE

Date/Place: 2 May 11/Bldg 200 Rm 2, KAIA, Kabul, AFG
 Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 18

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) detailing the following: At approximately 1000 hours, on 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard an announcement regarding shots fired. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) immediately put on Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) loaded his weapon and took security measures at the Medical Office located on the ISAF side of the base. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 49 AMS, Holloman AFB, NM provided updates via radio while personnel took security measures. MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 92nd Medical Support Squadron (MSS), Fairchild AFB, WA, called (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) via cell phone and stated DECEASED NYLANDER was transported to the Afghan Medical Clinic with a gunshot wound to the head, was unresponsive and not breathing. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) instructed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to start CPR. At approximately 1053 hours, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) called (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) via cell phone and stated they stopped Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) on DECEASED NYLANDER at approximately 1044 hours. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the ISAF ambulances had trouble getting onto the ANSF compound and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) instructed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to obtain a vehicle and drive DECEASED NYLANDER down the flight line to the Role 3 (referred to as the French main hospital located on the NATO side of the base). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stayed in touch with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and reported DECEASED BROWN was at the Afghan Medical Clinic and was badly wounded as well. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) again instructed them to obtain a vehicle to transport DECEASED BROWN due to the lack of ambulance support. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then reported that several Americans were in the Bldg and were KIA. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) called (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who was in the ACCC room, and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) counted the number of KIAs over the phone to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C).

(U//FOUO) As soon as Bldg 101 was cleared and deemed safe (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and a team responded to Bldg 101 to officially pronounce the DECEASED. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) identified DECEASED BRYANT and DECEASED AUSBORN in the middle of the room, DECEASED BRODEUR on the left side of the room, DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN behind a cubicle on the right of the room, DECEASED ESTELLE on the right side of the room and DECEASED RANSOM and DECEASED AMBARD at the rear of the room on the right hand side. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then assisted in loading the bodies into body bags loading them on stretchers and followed them to ISAF hospital.

2-28 MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 9 AW, Dover AFB, DE
 Date/Place: 2 May 11/Bldg 200 Rm 2, KAIA, AFG
 Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) AFOSI 4 FIS, Vogelweh, GE

Exhibit: 19

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a sign sworn statement (attached) with the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) chambered a round in his 9 millimeter handgun subsequent to the notification of the situation in the ACCC room, which was approximately 300 meters from the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) work center. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) helped secure his Bldg, ANSF Bldg 106, and prepared for a potential mass casualty situation.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) witnessed two Afghans exit the front entrance of Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also saw what he believed to be a gun barrel through the third window of the east side of the Bldg on the second floor. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relayed mass chaos continued as numerous people ran from the Bldg and into nearby bunkers. The Afghan QRF arrived as people fled the Bldg and ran for safety. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) realized the severity of the situation and requested permission to leave his Bldg and proceed to the Medical Clinic to

help, due to his past experience as a Medical Services Technician and the fact the gates between the ISAF side and the ANSF sides were locked and security was not letting anybody through. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Commander, Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG (Note: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was not interviewed only mentioned by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) as one who gave him permission to leave the Bldg) gave (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) authority to go assist with the casualties. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) proceeded to the Afghan Clinic accompanied by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C).

(U//FOUO) Upon arrival to the Clinic, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) notified (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) of DECEASED NYLANDER's death. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered the room where DECEASED NYLANDER was and saw DECEASED NYLANDER's body, co-located with SUBJECT's body. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also relayed there were at least ten Afghans taking photos with their cell phones and standing around SUBJECT's body. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) made the Afghans leave the room and proceeded to secure DECEASED NYLANDER's weapon, which he saw earlier by DECEASED NYLANDER's foot on the gurney. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated DECEASED NYLANDER only had one round left in his weapon. Further, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated "the round was jammed, halfway chambered, with the slide back." (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) maintained the bullet, which had an indentation marking which showed the part of the bullet that was jammed. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) subsequently double-checked for a pulse and moved DECEASED NYLANDER's head in the straight forward position. DECEASED NYLANDER was taken to the main ISAF Hospital. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) remained at the Afghan Clinic and continued to assist (b)(6) (b)(7)(C).

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) acquired a LMR and overheard there were two wounded Americans remaining in the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) located an armored vehicle and proceeded to Bldg 101 to attempt to extract the wounded Americans. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) encountered (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). The group proceeded to Bldg 101 however they were unsure of the ACCC's location and went to the second floor to clear the rooms and look for the Americans. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed blood on the walls, blood spatters, and large smears on the stairs. Arabic writing was on the walls as well as on the floor along with broken glass. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) instructed the Afghan soldiers to find some gurneys as the group entered the first floor hallway.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) proceeded to enter the conference adjacent to the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) cleared the conference room and proceeded into the ACCC from the main entryway where he noticed the first two bodies identified as DECEASED AUSBORN and DECEASED BRYANT in the middle of the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) assessed DECEASED AUSBORN first, primarily because DECEASED AUSBORN was (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) pilot from his unit. DECEASED AUSBORN had no pulse or respirations due to gunshot wounds, one to the stomach and one to the head. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related DECEASED AUSBORN was on his right side with his eyes wide open.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) assessed DECEASED BRYANT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) described his wounds as neck/head wounds and upper chest trauma with no pulse or respirations. DECEASED BRYANT lay on his back with his eyes open. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated both heads were facing north toward the conference room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed an empty shiny nickel plated hand gun clip next to DECEASED BRYANT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also recognized DECEASED BRODEUR, who was on his back next to the wall, with his body affixed partly underneath the conference table at the rear left corner of the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opined DECEASED BRODEUR had no pulse or signs of life. At this time, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) exclaimed "We have a live one!" (later identified as DECEASED BROWN). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) assisted DECEASED BROWN onto (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) shoulder and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) carried DECEASED BROWN out of the Bldg. DECEASED RANSOM and DECEASED AMBARD were next to DECEASED BROWN's location. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted DECEASED RANSOM had his M-16 with him. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) double-checked all the bodies for vitals, however, there were none. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) cut off identifications and ran out of the Bldg to the Afghan Clinic.

2-29 CMSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 75th Air Base Wing (ABW), Hill AFB, UT
 Date/Place: 2 May 11/ Bldg 200, Rm 02, KAIA, AFG
 Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 20

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Command Chief, provided a sworn signed statement (attached) that related the following information: On 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) completed his daily 0900 hours meeting with his counterpart (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Afghan Command Chief equivalent, HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG, at Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and his linguist, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG, exited the Bldg after the meeting with EID and met up with DECEASED ESTELLE, DECEASED BROWN, and DECEASED RANSOM. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled having a small conversation and telling them it had been good to see them. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) proceeded back to the Bldg 101 on foot. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related at approximately 1000 hours, he was in his office when he heard Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEG, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from HQ Air Combat Command (ACC), Langley AFB, VA, yelling there were shots at Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relayed this information Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from HQ Air Mobility Command (AMC), Scott AFB, IL. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) immediately formed a battle staff, a lockdown of the facilities and 100% accountability of personnel.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) chambered a round in his 9 mm handgun and ensured the 438 AEW Bldg had 360 degree security. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled hearing over the radio they had wounded US mentors and DECEASED NYLANDER was one of them. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) made contact with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who related the Bldg was secured and the shooter had been terminated or was in custody. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also received information that DECEASED BROWN had wounds. There were reports coming in of more possible shooters and possible explosives in Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relayed that the Battle Staff requested assistance from the NATO Forces on the other side of the airport to sweep Bldg 101. At approximately 1230 hours, the Battle Staff received reports that DECEASED BROWN and DECEASED NYLANDER were at the Afghan Clinic where (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) treated their multiple gunshots.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) decided to get two armored Humvee's to the scene and get the American Airmen out of the location and secure them. A team, consisting of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) LCDR (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Accounting Ops, 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG (Note: DEIDS reflects Personnel Support (PERSUPP) Det PSC 451 Box 500 as home unit), and PFC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 571 CSCO Fires Battalion, Ft Sill, OK (Note: DEIDS did not provide the spelling of the acronyms) proceeded in two armored vehicles to Bldg 101. Once they arrived and were outside of the Bldg area, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) approached (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and informed him that seven were dead in the ACCC room located inside Bldg 101. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Accounting Ops, 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG (Note: DEIDS reflects PERSUPP Det PSC 451 Box 500 as home unit) assembled at Bldg 101 and entered the Bldg. Upon entry into the first floor, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed Arabic script on the wall in blood and blood on the walls leading to the ACCC room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) met them and pointed out the seven dead. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) proceeded to identify the DECEASED bodies, while (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) verified they died. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) requested a team to retrieve the dead. The team entered the ACCC room and placed the bodies into body bags and removed them on litters to an awaiting van that transported them to the main ISAF hospital.

2-30 Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF, KAIA, AFG
 Date/Place: 2 May 11/KAIA, AFG
 Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a verbal statement which related the following: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was a flight planner within the ACCC along with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF, KAIA, AFG and Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) AAF, KAIA, AFG. On 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived at the ACCC at approximately 0725 hours to practice his English on one of the computers within the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated most of the computers in the office were not assigned and used on a first come first served basis. At approximately 0950 hours, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered the conference room for the 1000 hours meeting. The conference room door leading to the hallway usually stayed closed, however, right before the meeting someone will usually opened it. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) remembered the conference room door was opened. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sat at the corner of the conference room table with his back facing the door leading to the ACCC. To (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) left sat Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) the leader of the meeting. To (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) right sat an advisor, later identified as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) tried to start the VTC meeting when they heard the first few shots. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled everyone in the room got nervous and scared. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard someone from the ACCC yell "suicide bomber" but could not recall if the voice was in English or Farsi. More shots started and everyone from around the table stood up and immediately headed for the door leading to the hallway. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not recall any details of people within the room. He just ran out of the room and headed for the main entrance. Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) AAF, KAIA, AFG and Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were also present in the room.

2-31 Lt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) QRF, KAIA, AFG
 Date/Place: 3 May 11/HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
 Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he worked at the security post for an upcoming monthly celebration at the meeting hall across from the main gate leading into the ANSF side of the base. Someone entered and said a shooting was going on and six foreigners had been killed at the Department of Transportation and Control. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated when he approached the Bldg he saw SUBJECT with a pistol in his hand at Bldg 101's main entrance. SUBJECT yelled "good Muslims please stay away" or "Muslims don't come close or you will be killed." SUBJECT then returned to the Bldg. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not see SUBJECT shoot his weapon outside of the Bldg or see anyone return fire into the Bldg at SUBJECT. After ten minutes, as a member of the QRF, Sgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) QRF, ANA, KAIA, AFG, ordered (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to secure the interior of Bldg 101. When he entered the Bldg he noticed a dead American, later identified as DECEASED NYLANDER, by the back door of the Bldg. The team began to secure the lower floor with no weapons. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated someone exited a room saying there were two more dead Americans. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered the room and saw seven or eight dead Americans. After the team secured the lower floor Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Deputy G1/Personnel, ANAF, KAIA, AFG, ordered the QRF to secure the second floor. When (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reached the top of the stairway on the second floor, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went to the right. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) got to the end of the hallway and noticed a door open about six inches on the left side of the hallway. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered the room and saw SUBJECT's body lying on the floor next to a couch with two pistols on the floor next to his head. The QRF pulled the body into the hallway and out the emergency exit. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked if (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had seen the body on the couch and he responded "no the body was on the floor when I entered the room." After the QRF removed SUBJECT's body they continued searching the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know the SUBJECT on a personal or professional level.

2-32 Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 SFS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 5 SFS, Minot AFB, ND
 Date/Place: 3 May 11 /KAIA, Kabul, AFG
 Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 21

(U//FOUO) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) detailing the following: At approximately 1000-1030 hours (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) radio started to receive a lot of transmissions. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) ran to the northeast corner of KSPAN2 and met up with (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and MSgt (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) 438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 341 SFS, Malmstrom AFB, MT. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was there for a few minutes and heard rapid gunfire. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) called (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and told him she was in a bunker near Bldg 101 and was relaying what she witnessed. The Afghan QRF surrounded Bldg 101 on the outside and (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stayed where he was for about ten minutes. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) told (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) they were going to move toward the Bldg to get a better visual of what was happening. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) relayed to (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) there was an injured U.S. member and (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) radioed KSPAN9 to request a French Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC). (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and members maneuvered to (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) location and all the members moved from the bunker to the Afghan Clinic parking lot southeast of Bldg 101. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) received radio transmission that DECEASED NYLANDER was inside the Afghan Clinic in critical condition but alive. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) located French Medics and relayed to them that there was a US WIA in critical condition. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated 15 minutes passed before they moved to help the WIA. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) approached (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and told him that DECEASED NYLANDER had died and (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) then approached (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and told him there was two more US WIA inside Bldg 101. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) assembled a fire team which consisted of (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) himself and (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). The team reached the staircase leading down to the first floor located in the main lobby of the Bldg; they went downstairs and noticed a blood trail that led to the ACCC. Once they approached the ACCC the team stacked on the door and made entry. When (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) entered the ACCC, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) noticed two bodies (DECEASED AUSBORN and DECEASED BRYANT) in the center of the room, one body (DECEASED BRODEUR) on the left side of the room and two bodies (DECEASED AMBARD and DECEASED RANSOM) in the back right corner of the room. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) checked for signs of life on the individuals. The team located DECEASED BROWN in the northeast corner of the room and she was still conscious. As the team assessed DECEASED BROWN's injuries, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) noticed two different types of shell casings on the floor of the room and saw two Beretta magazines near the entrance of the ACCC, one empty and one with one or two rounds left in the magazine. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) retrieved identification off the casualties and proceeded to DECEASED BROWN's location. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) picked DECEASED BROWN up off the ground and put her on (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) back and (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) fireman carried DECEASED BROWN out of the ACCC. As the team exited the room (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) noticed writing on the wall in the hallway written in Dari. The team exited out the main entrance of the Bldg and loaded DECEASED BROWN onto a litter. The French Medics passed the team and they were headed into the Bldg so the team decided to acquire a vehicle and transport DECEASED BROWN to the main hospital on their own. The team got a Prada SUV and loaded DECEASED BROWN into the vehicle and transported her to the main hospital on KAIA. Once the team arrived back at Bldg 101, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) noticed US Army CID was in the ACCC processing the scene so he pulled security at the front of the Bldg. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated DECEASED BROWN's weapon was loaded with a round in the chamber. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) received a phone call from DECEASED BROWN when the shooting first began and DECEASED BROWN said "They are shooting at us."

2-33 Col (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Afghan (CID), HQ ANSF, Bldg 101 KAIA, AFG
 Date/Place: 3 May 11/ HQ ANSF, Afghan CID Office, Bldg 101
 Agents: SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) EDET
 2405, Bagram Air Field (BAF), AFG; SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) Col (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Chief of Afghan CID, provided a verbal statement through linguist (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) which related the following: On 27 Apr 11, Col (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was in his office at approximately 1000 hours when he heard one gunshot. After hearing the first shot, Col (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) exited his office and opened the main Afghan Criminal Investigations office door to the north hallway. Col (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) saw men running south out of the ACCC yelling "suicide bomber". Col (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) heard the number of shots increase so he ran back into his office and called the next door legal advisor. Col (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) got a hold of the legal advisor via handheld radio and the legal advisor told Col (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) they were outside of the

Bldg across the street. The legal advisor told Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to get out of the Bldg quickly. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opened his office window and jumped out. After some time went by, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was able to return to Bldg 101. He immediately went into his office and retrieved some gloves and his camera. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went to the ACCC and noticed a CF team already inside taking pictures of the scene. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received permission from the CF to take some pictures of the scene but they did not allow him to touch anything. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took some pictures and left the ACCC. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then decided to collect evidence that was not within the ACCC. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) picked up expended shells from the main hallways leading north and east as well as the second floor G-2 main office reception area. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also found what he thought was a belt in the main hallway but later learned it was a cut weapon sling. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) found two live rounds in the hallway of the east entrance of Bldg 101. He took a bloody notebook out of a trash can and a Common Access Card (CAC) reader with a CAC card inside from the ACCC area. (Note: The CAC card was issued to DECEASED BRODEUR) (Agent note: This interview was cut short due to time.)

2-34 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Joint Document Exploitation Center-AFG (JDEC-A), Camp Souter, Kabul, AFG; Deployed from 14 Ford Cir, Annapolis, MD
Date/Place: 3 May 11/Bldg 200, Rm 2, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 22

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed sworn statement (attached) detailing the following information: On 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received a call to proceed to NKAIA to exploit cell phones involved in the shooting incident at Bldg 101. GS-13 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) NATO Special Ops Command, KAIA, AFG, (Note: Not enough information was provided to look up members home unit) and Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Special Operation Forces Fusion Cell (SOFFC) Director of Operations; Deployed from USAE Special Ops Command, Europe, Stuttgart, Germany, accompanied (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered the Bldg and met with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and explained they were present to exploit the Afghan cell phones. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) directed them to the second floor where first responders had found SUBJECT (later identified as the G-2 Office). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) photographed two areas with writing on the wall of the stairwell to the second floor and a large blood spatter on the stairwell, which noted a blood trail. At the top of the stairwell, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted numerous doors that had holes kicked in them. There was no blood trail or spatter noted in the area. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) returned to the stairwell, picked up the blood trail, and went to the G-2 Office.

(U//FOUO) The G-2 Office also had holes in the doors and evidence of barricading inside the doors. There was no blood spatter or trail noted near these doors. The couch where first responders found SUBJECT showed two holes, which (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) assumed were from bullets. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) collected a blood swab for DNA and sent it to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Biometrics Analyst, NATO SOFFC, KAIA, AFG.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked an unidentified Afghan soldier to take them to the body, which was in the Afghan Clinic, located approximately 200 meters from Bldg 101. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANA Surgeon General, KAIA, AFG, met (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) at the entrance of the Afghan Clinic. He escorted (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to the rear of the Clinic and gave him access to SUBJECT's body. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took two sets of fingerprints from SUBJECT, using a Crossmatch Secure Electronic Enrollment Kit (SEEK). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) only took flat prints because rigor mortis had set in and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know how to loosen the fingers. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also captured an image of SUBJECT's right iris. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted what appeared to be two entry wounds on SUBJECT's chest: one at the right clavicle and the other on the inside of the left breast. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated the body also discharged a lot of blood out the back when repositioned for access to the hands, but (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not have access to see a wound in the back.

(U//FOUO) After (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) collected the biometrics, they returned to their unit where the JDEC-A analyzed two Nokia cell phones and one Apple iPhone. Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (Note: No further information was provided by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to identify (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) first name or unit) from Combined Joint Intelligence (CJ2E) was also present and photographed a Smith and Wesson pistol, a Beretta pistol, and other pocket litter as evidence.

(U//FOUO) The Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) Agent and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (Note: No further identifying information was provided by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to identify (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) unit) wanted to return to the G-2 Intelligence Office to search in the couch for rounds. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) accompanied (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). Wearing gloves, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recovered the rounds by cutting open the couch and feeling through the padding. The rounds were bagged separately and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opined the rounds appeared to be 9 mm. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took custody of all the evidence.

2-35 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 3 May 11/Bldg 200 Rm 2, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibits: 23 and 24

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) and sketch (attached) detailing the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was a linguist for DECEASED BRYANT and DECEASED BRODEUR. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was present in the ACCC Operations Room for the 1000 hours meeting. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) primary job was to translate documents and dialogue between the Americans and Afghans. DECEASED BROWN arrived at ACCC to learn about the communications issues in the ACCC. DECEASED BRYANT, DECEASED BRODEUR, and DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN were already present in the ACCC and had been since approximately 0950 hours. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sat in the second row of the ACCC on the right-hand side on the aisle. At approximately 1000 hours, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard the first of what he described as a series of shots fired by SUBJECT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted SUBJECT had two very shiny silver colored magazines in his left hand and a handgun in his right hand. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related SUBJECT's shirt was opened from when SUBJECT pulled the handgun out of his shirt. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT was in the middle of the first tier of the room when he took his first shot. After the first shot, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) hid underneath the desk directly behind him along with Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANA, HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) hid the entire time and SUBJECT did not see them. SUBJECT did not utter one word during the shooting. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated the only words he heard were "Please do not shoot me!" According to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DECEASED BROWN repeated it at least three times before SUBJECT shot her. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related DECEASED BROWN was to the rear right corner of the room, also referred to as the "chai" or tea area.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed DECEASED BRYANT and DECEASED BRODEUR were the first people SUBJECT shot. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was unsure who was shot next due to his hidden position. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted SUBJECT went around again for a second round of shooting to make sure the Americans were all dead. After approximately 15 to 20 minutes of shooting, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related SUBJECT departed the room and apparently went down the hallway. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated gunfire continued in the hallway and that was the last time he encountered SUBJECT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) quickly ran to the door to lock it from the inside in fear SUBJECT would return to ACCC to kill him and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) barricaded the door just in case.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard very heavy breathing coming from DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN, who was lying between the wall and a work cubicle. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opined DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN was very

dark in the face and very near death, but both (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were hesitant to touch DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN or any of the other seven bodies for that matter.

2-36 Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 3 May 11/HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, ACCC, Kabul, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 25

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a flight planner, provided a statement (attached) that related the following: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) walked SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) through the ACCC to recount his recollection of what happened on 27 Apr 11. At approximately 1000 hours, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was on the phone in the ACCC with his back facing SUBJECT when he heard a gunshot, turned towards the front of the ACCC and saw SUBJECT in the middle of the room, shooting everywhere. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ducked under his desk and heard many shots in the ACCC. When he was underneath his desk, he glanced up and saw SUBJECT's legs (SUBJECT was on the top tier in the northern part of the room). SUBJECT shot one round at (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) which struck very close to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) face and caused a piece of the floor to chip up and strike (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) in the face. SUBJECT continued to move and shoot around the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said there was a lot of shooting within the room and did not hear any other person shooting; however, it was very loud with SUBJECT shooting. SUBJECT left the ACCC and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) got up to leave the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed a Major, later identified as DECEASED BRODEUR, lying on the floor very close to him. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) remembered DECEASED BRODEUR was shaking but did not know if he was deceased or not at that time. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said DECEASED BRODEUR was shot before (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) dropped to the ground. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stepped over DECEASED BRODEUR and saw people lying in the middle of the room (DECEASED AUSBORN and DECEASED BRYANT). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stopped at the ACCC door which lead to the hallway and looked down the hall to see if anyone was there. He could not see anyone in the hallway so (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran directly across the hall and hid in the bathroom. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then heard Afghan QRF in the hallway so (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) yelled to them who he was and not to shoot him. The QRF told (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to put his hands out of the bathroom and slowly exit. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) put his hands out of the bathroom and slowly brought his body out. The QRF shot at (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and missed. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went back into the bathroom and yelled at the QRF. Again, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was told to come out of the bathroom. The QRF pointed their weapons at (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) as he came out the bathroom. Once (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was out of the bathroom, the QRF escorted him out the east entrance of Bldg 101. The whole time the QRF pointed their weapons at (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). Once outside, the QRF told (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to take off his uniform top. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took his top off and then he saw a friend of his who told the QRF to let (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) go. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) picked up his top and went to the clinic because his face was bleeding where the piece of floor hit him.

2-37 Sgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Protection Corps, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 3 May 11/HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, G-2 Office, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a verbal statement which related the following: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was providing security in the General Hall (a large room for gatherings) due to either a promotion or new member to the unit. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was unsure of which. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard a gunshot and people started to run everywhere. Over the radio (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard the threat was at the ACCC within Bldg 101. Upon arrival at Bldg 101, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard the threat was of a suicide bomber. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) positioned two Humvees near Bldg 101, one being located on the northwest corner of Bldg 101 and the other located at the southwest corner of Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was proceeding to enter the Bldg and clear the threat in the northern hallway when (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard SUBJECT yell out the first floor window (the first window north of main entrance), "Don't come close".

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT shot at one of the Humvees located on the northwest corner of Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sought cover from the shooting. Approximately five minutes later, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and his men identified as Soldier (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) QRF, ANA, KAIA, AFG, Soldier (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) QRF, ANA, KAIA, AFG, and Soldier (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) QRF, ANA, KAIA, AFG, entered the Bldg through the main entrance. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) passed the stairway and turned left to go down the northern hallway toward the ACCC. As the team moved closer to the ACCC, they heard an individual (later identified as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)) yelling from the bathroom. As the individual came out of the bathroom (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) fired one shot at (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was not hit and was escorted out of Bldg 101 and released. (Agent Note: The interview was cut short due to mission essential personnel arriving at KAIA).

2-38 Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Intelligence Division, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 3 May 11/HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//~~FOUO~~) With the assistance of Cultural Advisor (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) JCIU-A, Kabul, AFG, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided the following information: On 27 April 11, he was in the conference room adjacent to the room where the incident occurred. As soon as the shooting began, he and approximately 14 other individuals in the conference room exited the room. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran out of the conference room and out Bldg 101's main door. The group then crossed the driveway and gathered behind a Bldg away from Bldg 101. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could see Bldg 101 and watched an ANA QRF vehicle fire into the front of Bldg 101. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he knew that SUBJECT used hashish and drank alcohol heavily. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went on to state that SUBJECT was a "fanatical Muslim". When asked how he knew this information, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided he heard it in the news.

2-39 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), ACCC, HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG, AFG
Date/Place: 4 May 11/Bldg 200, Rm 2, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 26

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a linguist, provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) detailing the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived to work at 0850 hours to accomplish ACCC manning documentation. DECEASED BRODEUR was in the office with his linguist, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ACCC, HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sat next to DECEASED BRODEUR on the inside desk of the first row of seating against the wall opposite the main room entrance.

(U//~~FOUO~~) At approximately 1000 hours, the scheduling meeting was presumably about to begin when (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard gunshots. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated there were multiple shots being rapidly discharged from SUBJECT's weapon. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) immediately looked to his right and witnessed SUBJECT standing in the middle section of the first tier of the three tiered floor. SUBJECT held a handgun in his right hand and shot toward the back of the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related he did not see any of the Americans who were shot due to the severity of the situation. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated he was fearful of losing his life and did not even think about what anyone else was doing. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) just wanted to get out of the Bldg and run for safety. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) darted through the door that was adjoined with the conference room. From there, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran out of Bldg 101 to a nearby Bldg for safety.

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted seeing DECEASED NYLANDER when DECEASED NYLANDER went into the ACCC before the MOD meeting was scheduled to begin. A "skinny faced lady" (later identified as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)) (refer to para 2-49) accompanied DECEASED NYLANDER. DECEASED NYLANDER just went to engage in small talk and departed prior to the shootings. Additionally,

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN, who was working on a computer issue in the back of the ACCC.

2-40 MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 439 AEAS, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 4 May 11/Bldg 200 Rm 4, KAIA, AFG
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 27

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) which related the following information. On the morning of 27 Apr 11 at approximately 0730 hours, DECEASED AMBARD and DECEASED RANSOM had conversation in the communication advisor's office. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) exchanged greeting after he met DECEASED ESTELLE and DECEASED RANSOM, who were visiting Kabul for a local site visit to get better situational awareness on the ANAF's communication advising program. At approximately 0750 hours, DECEASED BROWN entered the office after her normal morning workout. DECEASED BROWN wore ABSG's as well as her 9 mm pistol, secured by a rust colored leather shoulder holster, with an additional two magazines. DECEASED BROWN also met DECEASED ESTELLE and DECEASED RANSOM. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated shortly after the introductions and small chatting DECEASED BROWN left; that was the last time she saw DECEASED BROWN. DECEASED AMBARD instructed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to meet him at the Afghan Communications Squadron at 0845 hours to brief DECEASED RANSOM and DECEASED ESTELLE on his respective areas of responsibility. DECEASED AMBARD relayed to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) he was taking DECEASED ESTELLE and DECEASED RANSOM to meet the leadership, followed by a briefing, in various areas and he would see him at 0845 hours. The meeting took place and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relayed he took DECEASED RANSOM and DECEASED ESTELLE to the radio, phone, and crypto shop and briefed those areas. They spent approximately 15 to 20 minutes in each shop discussing strengths and weaknesses of those areas. Once (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was done, DECEASED AMBARD invited him to join them but (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) declined due to his workload. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then returned to his office located in KSPAN1. At approximately 1020 hours and within moments of sitting down at his desk, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) came down the office hallway telling everyone that shots were fired on OQAB (Note: It is unclear what (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) meant by the term "OQAB." It is possible this term was used in reference to Operation Oqab, an operation (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) immediately tried to call DECEASED AMBARD and DECEASED BROWN but did not get an answer. Since (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not get an answer, he then texted them stating "Shots fired on OQAB, take cover".

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had never been to Bldg 101 and DECEASED AMBARD never mentioned (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that they were going over to Bldg 101. DECEASED BROWN informed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that after shortly after arriving to Kabul, the Afghans on the ANA compound had hollered and stared at her many times. DECEASED BROWN normally went to the gym located at the KSPAN 1 in the morning approximately 0600 hours. DECEASED BROWN walked by herself and stated to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that she did not feel safe at times. Approximately on 19 or 20 April 2011, DECEASED BROWN told (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that she was physically harassed by some Afghan soldiers on her walk into the gym and to work. DECEASED BROWN related she felt threatened enough to put a magazine into her 9 mm pistol and show it to the Afghan soldiers. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know what she meant by that, he did not know if DECEASED BROWN drew her weapon or simply showed it while it was holstered. DECEASED BROWN related to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that Afghan soldiers had also recently harassed MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI).

2-41 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ACCC, HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 4 May 11/HQ ANSF, Bldg 101, ACCC, KAIA, AFG

Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibits: 28 and 29

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a linguist, provided two diagrams (attached) and a signed, sworn statement (attached) detailing the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was at the ACCC on 27 Apr 11 to translate for DECEASED AMBARD, DECEASED BROWN, DECEASED ESTELLE, and DECEASED RANSOM. Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG, deployed from Det. 10 Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), Rome NY, had invited them to Kabul to share communication ideas and learn the GPG System (a new communications encryption system). DECEASED RANSOM was TDY from Kandahar Air Field (KAF), AFG and DECEASED AMBARD was TDY en route from Shindand Air Base (SAB), AFG.

(U//FOUO) At approximately 1000 hours, SUBJECT entered the ACCC with a pistol in his right hand. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted the weapon did not look like the weapons Americans typically carry. SUBJECT's weapon was "light colored", unlike the Beretta 9 mm handgun. SUBJECT had a very angry look on his face. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated it was the first time he had seen SUBJECT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted SUBJECT wore his military uniform as he methodically entered the room, walked to the center of the first tier toward the front of the room and fired.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) looked for immediate cover and went beneath one of the work desks on the second row, right hand side of the room. To provide more concealment, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) pulled the chair up against and halfway underneath the desk where he hid. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he did not hear SUBJECT speak. Additionally, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted the room was very quiet with the exception of the gunfire. No one screamed or yelled. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not understand why the Americans did not shoot at SUBJECT since they were all armed with weapons. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) knew two individuals who were in the adjoined "Radio Operations Room" located in the right rear of the ACCC. Further, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI), and an ANA member were in the room when SUBJECT attempted to enter but (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) held the door handle so he could not enter.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard the gun shots moving toward the back of the room. Furthermore, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated he hid so well he could not see SUBJECT at any time after SUBJECT's initial entry into the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) thought SUBJECT was near the rear of the ACCC so (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) darted for the main entrance and into the hallway. In the hallway, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw several people running toward the exits so he followed them. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) proceeded to the JF-2 Building where he called (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI), and explained to him what happened in the ACCC, AFG.

2-42 Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF Aerial Intelligence and Reconnaissance Department, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 4 May 11/KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with the assistance of Cultural Advisor (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) JCIU-A Kabul Team, KAIA, AFG, provided the following information: On 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived to work at 0730 hours. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went to Bldg 101 to drop off a monthly expense report. At approximately 0930-1000 hours (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard one gun shot fired in the building and shortly thereafter an individual shouted, "The suicide bomber is coming up!" (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and another individual, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI) got into an office with a steal door and locked it from the inside. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) hid behind steal safes inside the office expecting an explosion to follow. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he heard three gunshots in the common area outside the office he was in, one gunshot a pause and then two more shots. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that after the last shot he heard someone say, "Allah, Allah," and moaning in pain followed by silence. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he heard many individuals enter the room and ask people to come out of the

adjacent offices but he and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stayed in the office until they heard Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI) ask them to exit the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that when he exited SUBJECT's body was already gone. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then exited the building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he never saw SUBJECT before and did not know of him at all.

2-43 Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF Personnel, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 4 May 11/KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) the Deputy of Personnel, with the assistance of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in his office on the first floor in Bldg 101 on 27 Apr 2011. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard gunfire at an unknown time. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and the individuals with him in his office barricaded the door with a couch and then proceed to exit the building through the window. Once outside the building the group ran away, heading toward the flight line where they waited until they were signaled all clear. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided he did not know SUBJECT.

2-44 Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF Deputy Base Command Section, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 4 May 11/KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Chief of Staff to Deputy Base Commander, was in his office on the second floor of Bldg 101 on 27 April 2011. Sometime prior to lunch he heard gunfire start in the building. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then ran to all the upstairs offices shouting, "Somebody is shooting!" Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then ran back to the Deputy Base Commander's office and jumped from the window. After reaching the ground Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran to the Afghan Victory Day celebration in the ANAF parking lot. Once he arrived at the event Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reported to his boss what had occurred. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided he did not know SUBJECT.

2-45 Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 5 May 11/KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) During an interview, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated on 27 Apr 11 he was supposed to meet with his ANAF counterpart, Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF Public Affairs Offices, KAIA, AFG at 0900 hours in Bldg 101. Prior to their scheduled meeting, sometime between 0745 hours and 0830 hours, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) called (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to inform him he would be at the MOD and therefore unable to meet at the scheduled time. Shortly thereafter, also sometime between 0745 hours and 0830 hours, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF, KAIA, AFG, came to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) office to discuss some paperwork and the required signatures. At approximately 0900 hours the group, accompanied by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) linguist (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF, KAIA, AFG, went to Bldg 101 and met with Gen (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF, KAIA, AFG to discuss the same paperwork. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) left Bldg 101 between 1000 hours and 1005 hours and proceeded to the Thunder Lab. While at the Thunder Lab, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard one gunshot.

(U//FOUO) At approximately 1251 hours on the same day (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw an article on Cable News Network (CNN) reporting on the incident that had just occurred. The article had a quote from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated everything (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said has to be cleared through MOD, a process which generally takes approximately one day or more. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opined there was some degree of foul play involved; stating these statements made by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could have been preplanned statements. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went onto opine that (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) behavior prior to the incident was odd as he called to reschedule a meeting that he was able to attend. Note: The article (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) referred was

general in nature, anyone on the ANAF side of the base could have made the comment (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did. AFOSI was unable to corroborate any facts supporting (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opinion.

2-46 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 2nd Street, Kabul, AFG

Date/Place: 5 May 11/Kabul, AFG

Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 30

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) detailing the following information: At approximately 0945 hours on 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DECEASED BROWN, DECEASED AMBARD, DECEASED RANSOM, DECEASED ESTELLE, and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) walked from Building 105 (NFI), to Bldg 101 to prepare for the 1000 hours meeting held in the ACCC room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted two Americans (DECEASED BRYANT and DECEASED BRODEUR) with flight suits, or Air Force uniforms, were in the center of the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and his group exchanged pleasantries and had a short conversation with them. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stood behind DECEASED BROWN, DECEASED AMBARD, DECEASED RANSOM, and DECEASED ESTELLE as they talked at approximately 0955 hours. After about two minutes, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) he needed to check the computer in but would talk to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) later. DECEASED BROWN subsequently asked about the email problem ACCC had with receiving messages on the MOD server. DECEASED BROWN informed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) she would mention it to the two advisors, DECEASED BRYANT and DECEASED BRODEUR, who stood close to each other engaged in a discussion in the middle of the room. The next thing (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) remembered was the loud sound of a long burst of gunshots. After SUBJECT fired the first shot (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANA, KAIA, AFG, and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANA, KAIA, AFG ran for cover in the radio room, which was connected to the rear of the main ACCC room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) locked the door immediately behind him. The shots were continuous, at least 10 to 12 shots total. Through the walls, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard the people shot making grunting noises from the radio room; (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard everything very well because of the thin wooden walls. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard SUBJECT leave the room because the room was relatively quiet except for SUBJECT's footsteps, which were normally paced steps that proceeded into the hallway. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related SUBJECT walked into the hallway where (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard at least two or three shots followed by the sound of breaking glass. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated SUBJECT was in the hall for maybe one to two minutes. After the first round, many mobile phones began to ring on the bodies of the American advisors. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) remarked it was strange how quickly people started to call to check on the advisors when only minutes had passed since the shooting began. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT went back to ensure the advisors were dead; SUBJECT shot approximately 6 to 8 shots when he re-entered the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated he noticed SUBJECT's footsteps. When SUBJECT approached the right rear corner of the room, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then heard a lady's voice (later identified as DECEASED BROWN) pleading, "No, No, No, Please." This was repeated 3 to 4 times by DECEASED BROWN until (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) again heard SUBJECT shoot off four more shots. SUBJECT subsequently reloaded the gun after shooting DECEASED BROWN. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related he thought SUBJECT reloaded the gun one time during the shooting, but was not sure. Next, SUBJECT checked the door to the radio room, but he could not get in because (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) locked the door. SUBJECT also checked the duty officer, or computer room, to the left of the radio operations room, but could not gain entry. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT left the room for what (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed to be the final time when he heard one or two gun shots from the second floor, which started about two minutes after SUBJECT last left ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opined this was more than enough time to slowly walk upstairs.

2-47 Lt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 538 AEAS, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center (ECRC) Norfolk, Little Creek, VA
Date/Place: 5 May 11/Bldg 200, KAIA, Kabul, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD)

Exhibit: 31

(U//FOUO) On 29 Apr 11, provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) detailing the following: On 27 April 2011, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) an ANA Col Select (NFI), and DECEASED AUSBORN walked into Building 101 a few minutes before 1000 hours. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated DECEASED AUSBORN wanted to speak with DECEASED BRODEUR about future flight schedules. Once they arrived at the ACCC conference room, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) escorted DECEASED AUSBORN to the ACCC and introduced him to DECEASED BRODEUR. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated DECEASED BRODEUR was having a conversation with one individual (NFI) but it seemed like they had just finished talking. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) left the room to attend the scheduling meeting in the conference room. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated approximately two minutes after he returned to the conference room he heard gunshots. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) advised the first few gunshots confused him because he was not sure what was happening and then once it registered that it was gunfire he got up to exit the room. The ANA soldiers and the other U.S. members in the conference room rushed to the door leading to the hallway. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) remembered seeing (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) in the group of people rushing to leave the conference room.

2-48 Maj (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from Det. 10 Air Force Research Laboratory, Rome NY
Date/Place: 6 May 11/Bldg 200 Rm 2, KAIA, AFG
Agent: SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 32

(U//FOUO) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) completed a signed sworn statement (attached) that related the following information: On 26 Apr 11, both DECEASED RANSOM and DECEASED ESTELLE arrived to Kabul for a three to five day TDY. DECEASED RANSOM was from Kandahar AB, AFG and DECEASED ESTELLE was en-route to Shindand AB, AFG. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) wanted to provide some training on how he advised the Afghan Wing G6 and Afghan Communications Squadron.

(U//FOUO) On 27 Apr 11, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) requested DECEASED AMBARD give a tour to DECEASED RANSOM and DECEASED ESTELLE of the Communications Squadron areas and the communications shop. The communication systems area in Bldg 101 was in the ACCC room. The specific communication system they went to look at was the GPG system. The Afghans used this system to send secure message traffic. On the evening of 26 April 2011, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) met with DECEASED ESTELLE and DECEASED RANSOM to layout some of the things that they needed to have implemented at each of their bases and (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) told them that the GPG System should be one of their first priorities. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) believed that was the reason DECEASED BROWN, DECEASED ESTELLE, DECEASED AMBARD, and DECEASED RANSOM were in the ACCC at the time of the shooting. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also believed DECEASED BROWN was with them to take the opportunity to learn the GPG system since DECEASED BROWN always wanted to learn more and she wanted to help troubleshoot some of the MOD network PCs that were in the ACCC room.

(U//FOUO) On 26 Apr 11, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) noticed DECEASED RANSOM arrived without a 9 mm and asked him where it was. DECEASED RANSOM replied all he needed was his long gun and he had left it back in Kandahar, AFG. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated DECEASED ESTELLE was en-route to his TDY location and had yet to be issued ammunition for his weapons. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) had no further information to add for this investigation.

2-49 POI (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from NALF, San Clements Island, Naval Base Coronado, CA
Date/Place: 6 May 11/Bldg 200, Rm 2, KAIA, AFG

Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 33

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) detailing the following information: DECEASED NYLANDER and linguist (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) left at approximately 0945-0950 hours to walk to the ACCC for the meeting in the conference room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DECEASED NYLANDER, and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived at the conference room but it was locked. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DECEASED NYLANDER, and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) walked into ACCC in order to enter the conference room through the door that adjoined with the ACCC Operations room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) greeted DECEASED BRODEUR and then proceeded to the conference room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) unlocked the conference room door to the hallway and sat down next to the immediate left of DECEASED NYLANDER. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sat down next to DECEASED NYLANDER, on his right. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related the meeting attendees began to arrive to the scheduling meeting and take their seats at approximately 1000 hours. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) remembered some of the individuals present at the meeting were Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and MAJOR (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI); two fixed winged ANA maintenance members (NFI), (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) an Afghan C-27 pilot, DECEASED AUSBORN, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) walked into the conference room from ACCC and informed DECEASED AUSBORN that DECEASED BRYANT was ready to talk to him about a scheduling matter. DECEASED AUSBORN exited the conference room en route to the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) rejoined everyone at the conference room table upon directing DECEASED AUSBORN to report to the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated about two minutes passed after (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sat down when she heard three to four gun shots fired in rapid succession from the next door ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related everybody in the conference room surged to the hallway entrance, while DECEASED NYLANDER immediately chambered a round in his Beretta pistol and maneuvered toward the ACCC door that joins with the conference room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) chambered a round in her handgun and sprinted toward the door and observed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) lying on the floor reaching for his gun. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated she jumped over (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) whose chair flipped over backwards, and continued toward the exit. When she exited the main entrance of Bldg 101, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard three more shots fired from inside the building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated there was a pause between gunfire from the time (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and her linguist, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) continued running over the berm and behind the buildings across the street. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) yelled for (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to seek cover with him in the bunker. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related she glanced in and decided to continue running back to her office building, (NFI). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated her leadership had her unit providing security and being observant until leadership determined there was no further immediate threat.

(U//FOUO) In addition to her signed, sworn statement, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) verbally related the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) described SUBJECT as a personable man who always greeted everyone at each meeting. Furthermore, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was unaware SUBJECT ever carried a gun, primarily since SUBJECT was so overweight and wore a tightly fitted flight suit. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated it would have been easy to identify a weapon beneath SUBJECT's tight clothing. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) shared information regarding the ANA member she advised, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) apparently had "some history" with SUBJECT (NFI). Moreover, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in the process of giving ACCC the power to take control of the wing flight scheduling process." (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) further stated the desire to change wing scheduling procedures would ultimately give ACCC the ability to be independent of the direction usually provided via the daily Conference Room wing scheduling meetings. (Note: The scheduling meeting ultimately drove the number of sorties the ACCC Operations team would attempt to complete.) The MOD had the optimum authority to override any sortie, depending on the level of importance (i.e. Upper level Afghani leaders requesting a last minute impromptu flight). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated this change could affect SUBJECT and "Innerkalat", also known as cargo movement procedures.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opined certain personnel, to include SUBJECT, may have not favored the idea of dealing with change in the scheduling after being accustomed to a certain way of doing business. Furthermore, SUBJECT was a cargo movement officer whom could be significantly impacted if the change in scheduling occurred.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) identified three ANA members who assumed responsibility for Cargo Movement when SUBJECT was unavailable for work. The individuals were: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted SUBJECT was gone for approximately one month, from 21 Mar 11 until mid Apr 11 (Agent Note: The ACCC monthly attendance roster illustrated perfect attendance for SUBJECT for the entire month of April). Moreover, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know where SUBJECT was during this time, but she recalled hearing this in a discussion with someone (NFI). During the time SUBJECT was gone, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) handled the briefing portion of the conference room meeting as well as other cargo movement issues. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was unaware of the location of the Cargo Movement office, or if SUBJECT had office space at KAIA.

2-50 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) CJ2X ISAF Command, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 6 May 11/Bldg 200, Rm 2, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 34

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided the following information in a signed, sworn statement (attached): On 27 April 2011, the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) Afghan National Director Security (NDS) liaison office requested (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) support their office by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) responding to Bldg 101. Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) liaison officer IJC Afghan NDS, KAIA, AFG related Coalition Forces would not let him leave the Coalition side of the KAIA. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) confirmed with Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) US Army CJ2 Operations Officer, IJC, KAIA, AFG, he wanted (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to assist in gaining access to the ANA side of the installation for the Afghan NDS. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) coordinated the passage through the perimeter. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) gathered and exploited SUBJECT's computer and cell phone.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) USAF exploitation representative, Defense Intelligence Agency, (DIA), JDEC-A, KAIA, AFG, SSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAS, KAIA, AFG, SSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DIA, JDEC-A, KAIA, AFG (NFI) (Note: Agents did not obtain any further identifying information) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) proceeded to the main entrance of Bldg 101. At the entrance ANA soldiers stopped them, told them the building was not clear and they would have to wait until it was before entering. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Afghan NDS investigators were also waiting to enter the building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related he could see blood drips in the hallway and a bloody handprint near the stairwell. There was broken glass in the lobby and a bullet hole in the glass panel near the entrance. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not see any casings on the floor of the lobby. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and the others asked the ANA soldiers why they could not enter Bldg 101. The ANA soldiers said Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told them not to let anyone into the building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) called (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who assisted them in gaining access to the building after approximately 30-45 minutes.

(U//FOUO) In the lobby on the first floor (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed something written in blood. A linguist (NFI) told (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) it said "God is one" (Note: Agents did not obtain any further identifying information). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered the ACCC, and observed the French Exploitation Armament Technologies (ARTEC) team and JDEC taking photos of the writing. He was only in the ACCC approximately 15 minutes before he went to the second floor of the building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) looked for cell phones or the SUBJECT's weapons, but did not find any. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked the location of SUBJECT, SUBJECT's weapon, his cell phone and his work computer. The ANA representative stated SUBJECT was at the Afghan clinic and his personal affects were in the G-2 office locked up. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went to the Afghan clinic. The SUBJECT was in his underwear and on a litter. SUBJECT's uniform was in a black trash bag so (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) instructed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to go through it and look for any personal affects; however, he did not find anything so the group returned to the G-2 office in Bldg 101. A G-2 (Intelligence Officer) (NFI) unlocked a grey file cabinet and took out a bag of SUBJECT's personal affects (papers and Afghan money) (Note: Agents did not obtain any further identifying information). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed three cell phones (an iPhone and two standard cell phones) inside the file cabinet. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) requested the phones but the G-2 officer said they were ANA phones; however, he gave the phones to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for exploitation. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) exploited the three phones and placed them on a table. Shortly after, the ANA received a call to bring all the evidence to Maj Gen (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Legal Advisor to the Afghan MOD, KAIA, AFG in a neighboring building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) followed the ANA to the neighboring building because they were concerned Coalition Forces would lose the chance to seize the evidence. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained that Coalition Forces would require access to the evidence and asked if he could contact Lt Gen (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Chief of ANA Staff, ANA, AFG. Lt Gen (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) agreed so (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) called Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) at the Joint Operations Center (JOC) for him to make the call. Lt Gen (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then called Lt Gen (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who told him to turn the evidence over to the Afghan NDS.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Afghan NDS investigators allowed Coalition Forces one hour with the evidence before they had to transfer it to Afghan NDS headquarters.

2-51 Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) French Hospital, KAIA, Kabul, AFG
Date/Place: 7 May 11/French Hospital, Kabul, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA HUTCHINS

Exhibit: 35

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) that stated, under the direction of Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG, (NFI) hospital personnel put the uniforms of the deceased Americans into bins. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not identify the names of the American officers. The Ecology Company then picked up and incinerated the clothing. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not provide further information on the Ecology Company.

2-52 Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) AAF, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 7 May 11/Bldg 101 Conf Rm, Kabul, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 36

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) that related the following information through linguist (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). On 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) worked on schedule plans at the computer terminal on the first set of desks. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) instructed Captain (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANA, KAIA, AFG on the scheduling procedures. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed SUBJECT enter the main door to the ACCC. SUBJECT walked past his work space but (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not observe anything further since he was working on his schedule. After approximately one to two minutes, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard shooting from his left and to his rear. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard approximately three shots before he exited the room and ran toward the main entrance of the building. When he ran down the hall he entered the main foyer of the building where (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he slipped and fell on his right side injuring his shoulder. He immediately rose to his feet and proceeded up the stairs and into the Radar Air Defense Room on the second floor. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he left so quickly because he assumed SUBJECT was a suicide bomber.

2-53 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANA, KAIA, AFG

Date/Place: 7 May 11/ACCC, KAIA, AFG
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) verbally related the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived at the ACCC to assist DECEASED BROWN and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) in fixing an internet problem (Outlook Express was not receiving messages, only sending out emails). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) overheard (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) make a joke while introducing (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to DECEASED BROWN, who also worked on the internet issues, when he heard shots from the front of the room near the entrance. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) fled with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to the closest area for cover in the radio communications room at the northeast of the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was the last to flee to the room for cover. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) immediately locked the dead bolt and turned off his phone so he would not be detected if his phone rang. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed SUBJECT would have killed him if SUBJECT found him in the radio communications room.

(U//FOUO) After (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard the initial 4 to 5 shots, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated he could not hear very well from the radio communications room. From what (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could hear, SUBJECT left the ACCC for a few minutes. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opined SUBJECT continued to fire shots in the hallway and it sounded like someone fired back at him. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opined SUBJECT came back into the room after firing shots in the hallway and fired more shots in the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated he did not know the number of shots fired in the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT did not say one word during the shooting, nor did any of the advisors. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was able to hear painful breathing from an unknown part of the room in addition to the advisors' phones ringing. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT kept to himself and chose to not associate with other ANA members.

2-54 MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANA, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 7 May 11/Bldg 101, ACCC, KAIA, AFG
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) verbally provided the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in the ACCC when SUBJECT opened fire and killed eight US Forces's advisors in the ANAF HQ. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) worked in the radio communications room located in a separate adjacent room in the rear of the ACCC room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he worked in the radio communications room once a week and that day was the day of the shooting.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) learned against the wall next to the doorway leading into the radio room, which was next to the right rear corner of the room where the chai tea brewed. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) subsequently heard SUBJECT fire off three to four shots with a pause between the first and second shot followed by three rapid bursts. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated SUBJECT may have expended an entire magazine in the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not see any of SUBJECT's actions due to having his back to the entrance when SUBJECT fired the first shots.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sought cover and moved into the small communications office along with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) locked the door behind them as they sat motionless for the duration of the shooting.

2-55 Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANA, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 7 May 11/ANAF HQ Building 101, Conf Rm, KAIA, AFG
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 37

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a scheduler, provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) that related the following information; (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sat to the left of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) at the first set of desks located at the entrance to the ACCC room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) instructed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on the scheduling plans. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) looked at the computer screen when he heard a burst of gunshots from behind him. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) immediately stood up and ran for the main entry door that was open in the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran into the main hallway and out of the main entrance because he was afraid SUBJECT would shoot him in the back. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not see SUBJECT enter the room.

2-56 Re-Interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Date/Place: 11 May 11/US Embassy, 24-36 Grosvenor Square, London, W1A 1AE, UK
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DET 541, London, UK

(U//FOUO) SUBJECT had (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed that SUBJECT may have visited Russia during the time of Communist rule in AFG. The visit might have been for flight training. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was not aware of any other travel outside of AFG or PK by SUBJECT.

(U//FOUO) Before SUBJECT moved to PK, the ANA gave SUBJECT an apartment near the airport as part of his association with the military. The section of housing that he lived in was a block of apartments known as the Air Section. SUBJECT either needed money or wanted to move to PK so he did not sign a lease for the apartment. Instead, a family sublet the apartment from SUBJECT; however, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not believe SUBJECT ever collected the rent from the family. In approximately Jan 10, SUBJECT sold the apartment he sublet. Subject paid off his debts and purchased a vehicle.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was aware of one of SUBJECT's friends, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) the CEO or a Director of Ariana Afghan Airlines. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know any other identifying information for (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had no other information on any other friends or associates of SUBJECT.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) estimated SUBJECT was in PK for approximately one to one and a half years. SUBJECT and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) lived in Hayatabad, PK and did not believe SUBJECT worked while in PK.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had no knowledge of the Imam at the mosque frequented by SUBJECT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed SUBJECT attended a mosque in AFG before he moved to PK but (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know which one. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know what mosque SUBJECT attended after he moved back to AFG; however, he assumed it was the one near where SUBJECT lived in the Taimani Quarter Kabul, AFG. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was not aware if SUBJECT ever had any association with the Taliban while in Hayatabad. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled SUBJECT was in the AFG military when the Taliban were in AFG. When SUBJECT moved to PK, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was not aware of SUBJECT's military status. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had no knowledge of any disciplinary actions or incidents while SUBJECT was in the military.

2-57 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 4th Street, Kabul AFG
Date/Place: 9 May 11/Bldg 200, Rm 2, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibits: 38 and 39

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a linguist, provided a signed, sworn statement (attached) and a sketch of the ACCC (attached) detailing the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived to work (NFI) at 0830 hours on the morning of 27 Apr 11 and walked over to the ACCC with DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN arrived and helped the ACCC personnel with their office equipment (ex: tracker, printer, excel, etc). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated that between 1015 hours and 1030 hours he took his seat for the meeting after grabbing a cup of tea. He talked with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) faced away from

the main door of the ACCC and looked directly at (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) when SUBJECT fired his first shot. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ducked his head and looked over his left shoulder to see what happened. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opined there was at least a three second pause until SUBJECT fired more shots. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw SUBJECT shooting toward the right side of the room, holding the gun in his right hand, and fired four more shots in rapid succession where the advisors stood and conversed next to Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relayed SUBJECT calmly walked and fired his black pistol toward the side of the room where the advisors stood prior to SUBJECT's first shot. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) jumped up and over his desk in an effort to escape through the open Conference room door when SUBJECT went toward the rear of the room.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) turned his face toward the direction of SUBJECT and saw him shoot a US Air Force Officer (later identified as DECEASED BRODEUR) in a tan flight suit; however he could not see their face. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated he feared for his life so he started running toward the main door of the ACCC to exit the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related he saw SUBJECT still shooting as he glanced back into the ACCC room before running towards the main entrance of the ANAF HQ Building 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he heard what he believed to be a rifle shooting or automatic weapon shooting as he neared the building exit.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled the following ANAF personnel in the ACCC on 27 Apr 11: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Najibullah Province, AFG (NFI), an old Afghani man who makes tea. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated the linguists were (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). Additionally, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) listed three key ANA members who were not present for the ACCC meeting: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI), (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI), was the only linguist not present on 27 Apr 11.

(U//FOUO) In addition to the signed, sworn statement (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) verbally provided the following: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed all of the advisors in the ACCC had weapons except his advisor, DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) described SUBJECT as mild mannered other than the one time SUBJECT had problems printing a document in ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relayed SUBJECT became angry that he could not fix the printer and print his document. Furthermore, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated it was merely the power cord that was not plugged into a power supply. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opined it was unnecessary for SUBJECT to become so irritated over such a minor situation. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not have much social contact with SUBJECT as was the case with most people associated with SUBJECT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) occasionally saw SUBJECT driving his silver Toyota Corolla on base. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know why SUBJECT killed the Americans.

2-58 Re-Interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Date/Place: 16 May 11/KAIA, AFG
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) verbally provided the following information concerning the shooting on 27 Apr 11: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was unaware which ANA members were armed in the ACCC during the shooting but relayed information regarding (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) attended a briefing in mid-Mar 11 between (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) attended the meeting because he served as the linguist for DECEASED BRODEUR, who was also in attendance. The meeting was set up to arrange issue of weapons to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) requested handguns because they lived

in an area of Kabul, AFG, which had a strong Taliban presence. Furthermore, the weapon acquisition process is fairly simple for Afghani pilots.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) showed SUBJECT's walking path around the ACCC as he shot the DECEASEDs. In addition to what (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided during his initial interview, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) pinpointed the location of SUBJECT when he shot (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). Additionally, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not think SUBJECT left the room momentarily and returned after firing shots in the hallway. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) maintained SUBJECT continuously, killed the mentors, and left the ACCC not to return.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) mentioned one ACCC member who SUBJECT may not have liked was Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANA, KAIA, AFG. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) would often view pornographic images on the internet provided by ACCC. One occasion, SUBJECT appeared disgusted when he logged onto a computer and accidentally viewed a pornographic image that (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) left. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT said nothing about the images, but just appeared unnerved. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) further identified SUBJECT as one who strived to be a good Muslim, one who would frown upon negative actions such as looking at porn.

2-59 UNK (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), Najibullah Province, AFG
Date/Place: 18 May 11/Main Conference Rm, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) verbally relayed the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was the office helper for the ACCC who was usually present for the meetings in ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) main responsibility was to have tea, (chai), readily available for the US mentors and the ANAF members who worked in the ACCC.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was not in ACCC when SUBJECT opened fire on the DECEASEDs. He was out of the office running an errand. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated he made tea at approximately 0900 hours on 27 Apr 11 and departed Bldg 101 at approximately 0945 hours because (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) instructed him to immediately hand carry a very important message to the Gen (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was not allowed to enter the building upon his return due to the severity of the incident and commotion surrounding the crime scene.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said Afghani officers did not respect him and he did not have any information concerning SUBJECT, his associates, or (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opined in Afghanistan a man remains concerned about his tribe or village, not those he works with. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated he was from the Tajik border area, Najibullah Province. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) appeared surprised to be a witness in SUBJECT's investigation. Moreover, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) considered himself as "garbage" and no one to include SUBJECT ever paid attention to him other than when they needed tea or paperwork taken to another office.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related all of the officers had plenty of money in comparison to the rest of the oppressed population. Most of the officers had vehicles, or at least that was (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) assumption. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know if SUBJECT had a vehicle.

2-60 Re-Interview of Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Date/Place: 18 May 11/ANAF HQ Building 101, ACCC Conf Rm, Kabul, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided the following information regarding the arming status the day of the shooting and background information on SUBJECT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) still recovered from a shoulder injury he

received while running away from the ACCC room the morning of 27 April 11. (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) stated he did have his pistol in his hip holster and a magazine inside the weapon but nothing in the chamber. He further stated he did not take it out because all he thought about was getting out of the room. He thought SUBJECT would blow himself up. (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) said he received his pistol but never received any formal training on it. He estimated the last time he fired his pistol was five months earlier but never received training on close quarters firing techniques.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) did not know if anybody else armed the day of the shooting since they carried their weapons concealed. He was unable to say who was issued a pistol or authorized to carry one. (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) was not able to provide any background information on SUBJECT because he did not know him. SUBJECT was quiet and (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) stated they never had a one-on-one conversation. They came into work and left when they completed their work. (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) stated he had no idea why SUBJECT performed the attack on 27 Apr 11.

2-61 (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)
Date/Place: 19 May 11/ANSF HQ Bldg 101, Kabul, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) SA (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) provided the following information concerning SUBJECT's responsibilities: SUBJECT was a passenger and cargo coordinator for the ANAF. (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) was unaware of SUBJECT's hours or personal background. (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) did not know where SUBJECT took leave to in Mar 11; he was usually not aware of anybody's leave location. In order for the ANAF soldiers to take leave, they only need to get permission for the dates requested; their leave form does not require the soldier to divulge the location.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) was not aware of SUBJECT's work hours but did state that some of the ANAF soldiers were lazy or irresponsible. He expected them to be at work from 0730 hours to 1530 hours. If the behavior continued, the soldiers were counseled and, at times, not permitted to return to their families for their day off. (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) counseled SUBJECT in the past with some other ANA soldiers present but never a one-on-one session. (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) stated SUBJECT did not show emotion or come up with excuses or justifications; he only stated he would correct the behavior. (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) could not remember when this counseling took place. (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) did not know about SUBJECT's past he only knew SUBJECT was a pilot and an AAF officer.

2-62 Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) ANAF, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 30 May 11/Bldg 101, Afghan CID office, KAIA, AFG
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) provided the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) was an ANAF Helicopter Pilot stationed at KAIA, AFG. (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) was SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) served the Afghanistan President HAMID KARZAI in support of the Afghan Presidential Airlift Squadron. (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) indicated his primary duty is flying KARZAI to meetings and events throughout the country.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) had limited contact with SUBJECT over his lifetime and stated he was not very close to him. (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) occasionally saw SUBJECT during the holidays such as Eid, but only for short periods of time. Their conversation and interaction was usually limited at (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) events. (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) noted he rarely saw SUBJECT during work due to conflicting schedules and different job responsibilities. SUBJECT was in a helicopter crash approximately fifteen years prior. The crash, in conjunction with an injury sustained from a land mine,

forced SUBJECT to undergo eighteen surgeries over the prior fifteen years; primarily on his legs. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opined the crash was possibly the reason SUBJECT became separated from the military. During SUBJECT's period of non-military time, he was a driver for the World Food Bank. SUBJECT owed different people money and had to find a way to support himself. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT only made trips within Kabul and did not leave the country as a result of job duties. SUBJECT left the country in approximately 2007 or 2008 for his pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) paid for this trip. The only other time (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) knew SUBJECT left the country was when he flew to Pakistan in the mid 1990's to assist earthquake victims. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know for sure whether SUBJECT ever lived in Pakistan for a period of time, especially in the prior 10 years because he was not very close to SUBJECT.

(U//FOUO) SUBJECT had (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recommended investigators talk to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) because he was intelligent and open-minded. Additionally, SUBJECT had (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and two other brothers who died. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also mentioned SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) starting with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SUBJECT had (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SUBJECT had a (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who was in (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know any further information regarding SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was the only (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) he knew who lived outside of AFG.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relayed SUBJECT lived in the Taimini District, North Kabul; and he lived toward the southwest side of Kabul. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) never shared a residence with SUBJECT at any time but indicated SUBJECT lived with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) along with SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for the last three to four years. SUBJECT sold his home to help with finances during his period of being off active duty service from the ANAF. Furthermore, SUBJECT sold the house he obtained as a result of his military service as a pilot. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated all pilots received homes and they could sell them if they chose, as was the case for SUBJECT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated that SUBJECT had very bad mood swings which were linked to the surgeries. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opined SUBJECT would actually have "rages" if things were not going well. SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) informed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) the surgeries could have played a large part in causing some strange thought processes. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated it could have been a cause for SUBJECT being introverted and anti-social.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was unaware of SUBJECT's radical views or ties to extremist groups. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know about the validity of the claim certain Taliban members were present at SUBJECT's funeral. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) confirmed there was a large crowd of about 1500 people present for SUBJECT's burial. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) estimated that number was approximately half of the entire Tarakhil District where SUBJECT had lived. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) knew of the heroic posters and rumors of SUBJECT now being a martyr and related the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not share those feelings.

2-63 Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF Security Forces Commander, KAIA, AFG
Date/Place: 30 May 11/ Security Forces Office, KAIA
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) verbally provided the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in charge of the ANA QRF, which was tasked with providing security forces as required to address security gaps, to react to identified threats, and to eliminate identified threats (24-hours a day) at the ANAF compound at KAIA. Numerous ANA QRF and security personnel responded to Bldg 101 within minutes of the initial reports of gunfire at that location. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the ANA QRF personnel who responded included himself, 1Lt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BRIDMAL Sergeant (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BRIDMAL Sergeant (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Soldier (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Soldier (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Soldier (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) AAF QRF, KAIA, AFG.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ordered QRF members to enter the building to clear it but not to systematically search for victims or wounded personnel. ANA QRF personnel discovered SUBJECT's remains inside the G-2 office on the second floor of Bldg 101 and transported them to the ANAF clinic. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained he thought SUBJECT proceeded to the G-2 Intelligence office after killing the Americans because SUBJECT applied many times, via the G-2 Intelligence office, in an effort to obtain a base parking pass but they rejected each of SUBJECT's applications. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opined SUBJECT, after his numerous application rejections; may have become frustrated enough to be compelled to harm someone in the G-2 office. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related his office received threat information on 25 Apr 11 concerning an ANAF Col imposter who reportedly planned on conducting a suicide bomber attack on an Afghan Air Corps facility (Note: The threat information was a possible ANA Lt Col would blow himself up with a IED vest. This would occur at a headquarters building but the threat did not specify the building or location. The ANSF did not pass this information onto the correct Coalition Offices to disseminate throughout). Furthermore, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted the imposter was allegedly tall and had a shaved head according to the Be on the Lookout (BOLO) notification (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) security guards received from the G-2, Intelligence Office. Due to the BOLO, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed his guards looked for an individual who fit the BOLO description and not all Lt Col ANA members that entered the main gate. There were a number of ANA officers that arrived to the gates and SUBJECT did not bring any attention to himself as he entered the gate. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related ANAF gate guards could not pinpoint when SUBJECT arrived to the base, SUBJECT's mode of transportation, or if someone accompanied SUBJECT to work that morning. ANAF guards also checked the main parking lot adjacent to the main gate but did not find SUBJECT's car.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed SUBJECT planned the attack on the Americans, in part; since SUBJECT requested to practice firing his pistol at the ANAF Kabul Training Center (KMTC) firing range on 25 Apr 11; two days prior to the 27 Apr 11 attack. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated it was uncommon for ANAF members to utilize the KMTC shooting range for practice, especially considering its long distance away in the mountains. Additionally, pre-coordination with the Block Commander was necessary to facilitate range time. ANAF Lt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI) who worked the range on this day; informed SUBJECT he did not have the required documentation needed to be on the shooting range. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) offered to call his Commander (NFI) to request proper approval but SUBJECT told him not to bother and subsequently left the range.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relayed there was no record of SUBJECT receiving specialized weapons training during his AAF career. Further, ANAF members receive initial training upon entry into the military and on as needed thereafter. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted SUBJECT only received basic training on proper handling and the kneeling, standing, and prone positions. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided documentation that revealed the initial issue of the weapon SUBJECT use in the shooting. Additionally, each ANAF member received two magazines with 15 rounds in each magazine.

2-64 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF, KAIA, AFG

Date/Place: 3 Jun 11/Bldg 101, G2 Office AAF, KAIA, Kabul, AFG

Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a verbal statement with the assistance of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) which related the following: On approximately 25 Apr 11, a message to soldiers came out from the Commander and Director (NFI) to tell them to be alert. On 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) learned of a suicide bomber in Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Humvee was on the road to the northwest side of the building with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) manning the M16 on top of the vehicle. Moments later, SUBJECT opened the first window to the north of the main entrance and stuck one hand out the window and fired one round from a handgun towards (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). The round struck (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) antenna on the Humvee approximately three feet from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) position. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) yelled at SUBJECT to stop shooting and to come out. When SUBJECT refused, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) fired four rounds in SUBJECT's direction, one went through the window where SUBJECT was and the other three went through the glass on the main entrance. SUBJECT stepped away from the window and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not see SUBJECT again. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not hear SUBJECT say anything out the window nor was he able to see any wounds on SUBJECT's body. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) only saw the side of SUBJECT's face and part of his ANA uniform.

2-65 Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 51st Fighter Wing, Osan AB (OAB), Republic of Korea (ROK)
Date/Place: 10 Jun 11/AFOSI 5 FIS, Bldg 1359, OAB, ROK
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD), FIS 5, OAB, ROK; SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) FIS 5, OAB, ROK

Exhibit: 40

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided a written statement (attached). In addition to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) written statement, he verbally related the following information: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) deployed to Kabul Afghanistan from Jan 09 to Dec 09, where he served as an embedded advisor to an ANA Infantry Battalion Commander (NFI). In that capacity, he was responsible for Kabul, Kandahar, Mazari Sharif, and numerous contingency operating bases throughout AFG. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) worked for an USAF group commander, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI), a USA colonel (NFI) and a USA lieutenant colonel (NFI). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was responsible for training the ANA in base defense, main supply route and convoy defense, QRF activities, check point operations, flight line security, and miscellaneous other elements of ground base defense. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also trained the ANA in combat arms (CATM) procedures, to include arms operation and maintenance, ammunition handling and storage, and other armory operations. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) specifically coordinated the above-listed training. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled working with or supervising the following individuals: MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI), Capt or Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI), and TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI).

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) first met SUBJECT in Feb or Mar 09. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) mentally grouped SUBJECT in with eight or nine Afghan officers "just like him," referring to a perceived unstable mental state and anti-social demeanor. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled SUBJECT frequently wore different uniform combinations, to include flight suits with sandals and Afghan National Police uniforms with Afghan military patches. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not recall SUBJECT ever flew, despite the fact he wore a flight suit. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed SUBJECT to be of Pashto lineage, although (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not recall specific or additional pedigree information. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled seeing SUBJECT once weekly while SUBJECT was in Afghanistan. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled SUBJECT walked around with one other male; however, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not recall details of the other male.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) felt there were two different types of Afghan Army members with whom (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interacted: those who liked, or at least tolerated the US presence, and those who did not. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) categorized SUBJECT as one who clearly did not like the US presence, due to his mannerisms, anti-social behavior, and lack of dialogue or discussion with US military members.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided an example of SUBJECT's behavior in the following recollections. During a QRF exercise in which a QRF force responded to a downed helicopter, SUBJECT encroached on an established cordon. SUBJECT was not a player in the exercise, but rather walking in the vicinity of the exercise location. When instructed to leave the cordon, SUBJECT became verbally abusive and ultimately threw rocks at the Afghan soldier enforcing the cordon. On another occasion, in June or July 09 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interpreter, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANA, KAIA, AFG, told (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that SUBJECT was "crazy." (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related that his element received rifles and pistols for the purpose of training and arming the ANA infantry units; however, when the ANA pilots discovered that there were pistols in the armory, they attempted to obtain them by coercion and threats of violence. Eventually, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received a direct order from Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI) to provide a limited number of pistols and rifles to the ANA pilots on the condition that the pilots receive training on the firearms. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled he trained SUBJECT on the pistol for one day and the rifle for one day. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) described the training and course of fire as similar to an advanced weapons course taught by USAF CATM. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled the standard load for the pistols was two 10-round magazines. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) felt SUBJECT was competent in pistol operations after completing the prescribed course of fire.

2-66 Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF, KAIA, AFG
 Date/Place: 27 Jun 11/KAIA, Kabul, AFG
 Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DET 320 OL-A, Minneapolis
 ARS, MN

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) described SUBJECT as a very quiet person and lived a normal life. It had been approximately 1 ½ years since (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had spoken to SUBJECT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated over the past one to two years SUBJECT became less motivated and nervous, but (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know why. SUBJECT became less involved with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and would become emotional over simple things. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated it seemed like SUBJECT lost his love of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he purchased a new home in Kabul but SUBJECT never came by to visit or see the new home which (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated was not a normal Afghan (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) tradition. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) further added SUBJECT would not attend (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) gatherings over the prior one to two years. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) being a (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) offered to help SUBJECT by providing medication or hospitalization to which SUBJECT responded he was the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and he could take care of himself.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT was not connected to insurgent groups or anti-coalition organizations. While SUBJECT was in the military under the Taliban regime, they released him from duty because of arguments with the Taliban commanders. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know the content or extent of the arguments and provided no further information. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) commented on SUBJECT's financial status after SUBJECT's release from the Taliban regime military. SUBJECT was unemployed and built up some debt but (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know how much. SUBJECT purchased a house which was his pride and joy and main source of happiness. When he could no longer pay the bills he had to sell the house and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) felt when this happened SUBJECT lost a piece of his heart. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) knew SUBJECT was in some debt in the days leading up to his death and he was paying it back whenever he had extra money.

Searches

2-67 Crime Scene Search
 Date/Place: 1 May 11/ANAF HQ Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
 Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The HQ ANAF, Bldg 101 was a two story, tan stucco building. Windows covered the length of the approximately 100 yard building. The only identifiers on the building were the number of the building. In front of the main entrance to the building was a circle drive and in front of that, a grassy area with flag poles. There was a road, a berm and then fence on the north end of the building. A temporary fence covered with a green concealment-type material (commonly used at construction sites) was approximately 100 feet out from the building and covered approximately two-thirds of the building on the east side (or back side). There were two bunkers on the east side of the building. One was halfway between the mid-point of the building and the north end of the building. The other was halfway between the mid-point of the building and the south end of the building. One covered, external stairwell was on each of the two ends of the building (one on the north and one on the south). Each stairwell was approximately 6 to 8 feet wide and led from the ground floor to the second floor, changing the direction at the floor.

(U//~~FOUO~~) During this search ANA soldiers escorted agents through Bldg 101. Agents were not able to fully conduct a crime scene search because they had to wait for Afghan officials to grant them full access (ref para 2-68). However, they were able to seize one projectile from under a bookshelf in the ACCC, Bldg 101

2-68 Crime Scene Search

Date/Place: 2 May 11/ HQ ANAF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG

Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//~~FOUO~~) ANA soldiers escorted agents through Bldg 101 during this search as well. Agents were not able to conduct a full crime scene search and evidence seizure because they did not have permission from Afghan officials to do so. However, agents were able to seize one metal jacket, part of a projectile, from the 1st floor's North hallway between the ACCC entrance and the North exit and one metal jacket, part of a projectile, from the floor of the ACCC's East wall baseboard between the conference room door and the first row of desks.

2-69 Crime Scene Search

Date/Place: 3 May 11/ HQ ANAF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG

Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibits: 41

(U//~~FOUO~~) Under the authority of the Gen (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) AFG, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) FSC, lead a search of the crime scene assisted by SAs (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived at the crime scene (Bldg 101, Afghan Compound, KAIA, AF) at approximately 1300 hours, assessed and processed the scene until approximately 1545 hours. Bldg 101 has two stories with a long hallway running North and South the length of the building. Two very short hallways run East and West at the center of the building. The 'crossroads' was where the North, South, East and West hallways met. The main entrance was in the middle of the West side of the building. Other exits consisted of an East door across from the main entrance, North doors on both the 1st and 2nd floors and South doors on both the 1st and 2nd floors. External stairs were on both the North and South ends of the building leading from the 2nd floor to the ground. At the time of the shootings, all exits were locked except for the main entrance as standard protocol by the controlling ANA. Stairs, leading to the first floor, were at the main entrance. The main entrance was primarily glass and contained multiple holes reported to have been from gunfire. Maintenance personnel were present and in the process of replacing the glass. Directly North of the main entrance was a window to an office which contained one reported gunshot hole as well as a defect in the outside wall of the building next to the building.

(U//~~FOUO~~) An escort (who changed many times) accompanied SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) during his walkthrough the building so he could assess the condition of the crime scene. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was not provided with the names of the escorts. The Afghans cleaned up the crime scene, so SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) used first responder pictures to visualize where he could possibly still recover evidence. The escort first took SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) down the North hallway to the ACCC where seven of the nine US members died. The room had high ceilings, a three tiered floor, cubical-style desks and a conference table in the back. The room had a door in the Southeast corner that lead to the adjoining conference room. The North end of the room had two doors which lead to a small radio room and a cipher room. Each of these small rooms had another door to another small room used for storage (off of the radio room) and for classified material (off of the cipher room). The Northeast corner of the room was squared off with filing cabinets and a large sheet printer. A large framed map (approximately 7'X12') was against the Northwest wall. The Afghans moved the filing cabinets from their position during the shooting. There was no blood present except for staining on the floor in the Northeast corner and smears on the filing cabinets. The Afghans removed all visible evidence; they also painted the North wall where, according to the first responder photographs, blood spatter was present. None of the ANA personnel could confirm the position of the chairs or equipment. A broken table, originally in the middle of the room according to the photographs, was behind the framed map against the North wall.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The escort then took SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) into the adjoining carpeted conference room which also had a door leading out to the North hallway. The room had a large conference table with chairs and flags at the front. Chairs also lined the length of one wall. All the chairs were at the table or lined against the wall, however, first responder photographs showed this room with chairs tipped over and scattered around. Photographs of the conference room also showed a suspected blood stain on the floor behind the door leading to the North hallway. The Afghans cleaned the stain up and it was no longer visible.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The escort then took SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) back out to the North hallway exit where there were multiple holes in the door, door frame and concrete above the door. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted multiple suspected graze marks from projectiles down the hallway and in the ceiling tiles.

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) returned to the crossroads where the photographs showed writing on the wall in suspected blood immediately where the North hallway began. The Afghans cleaned the walls and painted them with a thick paint. A light switch near the writing on the wall contained suspected smeared blood in photographs, but no blood was visible. The Afghan filled in two bullet holes with concrete patches at the crossroads. They also cleaned and painted over a suspected hand print on the wall leading to the North hallway. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted blood on the floor at the crossroads just inside the East hallway on the North side. A full sheet of plywood and a table blocked the way of one of the two glass doors to the East exit. A small window next to the door contained a suspected bullet hole. Photographs of this location showed shattered glass and a large amount of blood directly outside of the East exit; however the Afghans washed and cleaned it up.

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then walked up the stairs at the main entrance to the 2nd floor. First responder photographs showed a blood trail up the stairs, but it no longer contained the blood. A defect, suspected to be caused by a projectile, was in the wall of the 2nd floor just above the open stairs. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went down the 2nd floor South hallway to the last door on the left known as the G-2 office. Several graze marks were on the walls and in the ceiling tiles as well as in a door frame. The location of the two blood pools on the floor in photographs were no longer visible. A couch was directly to the left of the entrance to the G-2 office where SUBJECT died. The G-2 office contained several smaller offices with wooden doors, one of which contained a bullet hole. Inside the office, the bullet grazed a chair and created a defect in the opposite wall. The projectile was reported to have been collected directly after the shooting. The couch appeared to be brown leather-like material. Photographs showed the couch soiled

with blood and contained two holes in the back rest portion from where SUBJECT allegedly sat and shot himself twice. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) cut the portion of the couch which contained the two holes and placed it on the seat of the couch. The Afghans cleaned the couch and several ANA personnel were currently on the couch.

(U//FOUO) The escort notified SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) he only had a short period of time to remain in the scene before he had to leave because it was the end of the Afghan working day. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) returned to the ACCC and adjoining conference room and processed the area for a short time.

(U//FOUO) Agents specifically seized from the scene one swab of suspected blood from around the ACCC entrance doorframe, one swab of suspected blood from the baseboard next the ACCC entrance, two swabs of suspected blood from the carpet behind the conference room main entrance, one swab of suspected blood from the wall directly outside the East exit, one swab of suspected blood from the ACCC door, one swab of suspected blood from a chair in the conference room, one lead portion of a projectile from Northeast wall of ACCC, one projectile jacket fragment from North wall of ACCC next to the cipher room and one lead portion of a projectile from behind the main entrance of the ACCC.

(U//FOUO) During the search agents took photographs (attached) to document the scene.

2-70 Crime Scene Search

Date/Place: 4 May 11/ HQ ANAF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG

Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) continued the search of the crime scene. Due to a bomb threat at the gate connecting the ISAF and KAIA compounds, AFOSI was not able to arrive to the scene until approximately 1130 hours. The Afghans allowed SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to process the scene until approximately 1620 hours. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know if the Afghans would grant further access AFOSI to continue processing the scene beyond 4 May 11. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know if further cleanup would take place, so he made efforts to process as much as possible across the entire building. Agents took swabs of suspected blood from the ACCC. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sprayed Blue Star, a solution to detect trace amounts of blood by means of chemoluminescence, in the North hallway. Agents also removed and swabbed the light switch cover in the North hallway and took paint scrapings of the North hallway wall at the approximate locations where the first responder photographs showed a suspected bloody handprint and writing in suspected blood. Agents searched the East exit for projectiles and other physical evidence, as well as, searched holes in the walls and ceilings of the North hallway of the first floor and South hallway of the 2nd floor for projectiles and the couch in the G-2 office where SUBJECT died.

(U//FOUO) Agents specifically seized from the scene one swab of suspected blood from the floor in the 1st floor North hallway just north of the Public Affairs office, one swab of suspected blood from the floor in the 1st floor North hallway between the PA office and conference room, two swabs of suspected blood from the northeast corner of the 1st floor hallway crossroads, one swab of suspected blood from the light switch cover on the south end of the 1st floor North hallway, one swab of suspected blood from a portion of the couch where ANA QRF found SUBJECT dead (the couch portion contained two suspected bullet holes), one swab of suspected blood from the top of a broken table in the ACCC, one swab of suspected blood from the North wall below the fire alarm in the ACCC, one swab of suspected blood from a filing cabinet in the northeast corner of the ACCC, one swab of suspected blood from the North wall next to the fire alarm in the ACCC, one swab of suspected blood from under the light switch cover on the south end of the 1st floor North hallway, one swab of suspected blood from the seat portion of the couch where ANA QRF found SUBJECT dead, one projectile from the ceiling outside of the PA office in

the 1st floor hallway, one jacket fragment from the floor outside the cipher room in the ACCC, one projectile from the door frame of the Operations Office in the South hallway of the 2nd floor, one jacket fragment from a crack in the concrete outside the East exit, one projectile from the wall above the North hallway exit, paint scrapings from the interior west side of the North hallway at the location of writing on the wall in suspected blood, paint scrapings from the exterior side of North hallway under the stairs at the location of a suspected bloody handprint, one portion of the couch where ANA QRF found SUBJECT dead (the portion contained two suspected bullet holes) and one piece of carpet from the floor directly outside the conference room entrance in the North hallway.

2-71 Crime Scene Search

Date/Place: 7 May 11/ HQ ANAF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG

Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) continued the search of the crime scene. The search of the crime scene was limited (1.5 to 2 hours) due to focus on the main mission of accomplishing follow-up and final interviews of key witnesses. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was able to search the ACCC for suspected blood overlooked in previous searches. The Afghans granted access to agents to the cipher and radio rooms as well as the small rooms adjoining them. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also retrieved stuffing from the couch in the G-2 office for comparison to trace evidence possibly present on projectiles recovered from the couch.

(U//FOUO) Agents specifically seized from the scene one swab of suspected blood from the back side of the cipher room door in the ACCC, one swab of suspected blood from the front side of the door located inside the cipher room in the ACCC, one swab of suspected blood from the backside of a large framed map in the ACCC and stuffing from inside the couch where ANA QRF found SUBJECT dead.2-55

2-72 Crime Scene Search

Date/Place: 8 May 11/ HQ ANAF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG

Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 42

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) continued the search of the crime scene. The agents searched the stairwell outside the South exit of the 1st and 2nd floor for evidence of the ANA QRF's transportation of SUBJECT out of the exit to the medical facility.

(U//FOUO) Agents specifically seized from the scene one unknown substance soaked in suspected blood from the stairway platform between the 1st and 2nd floor outside the South exit and one swab of suspected blood from the stairway between the 1st and 2nd floor outside the South exit.

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) created a sketch (attached) to document the crime scene and its evidence.

2-73 Crime Scene Search

Date/Place: 9 May 11/ HQ ANAF, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG

Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) AFOSI 24 EFIS, AUAB, QT

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) escorted SA (Col) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) AFOSI 24 EFIS/CC through the crime scene. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) met with Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to determine the location of key pieces of evidence Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) men recovered directly after the shootings occurred. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relayed his men recovered pieces of a suspected watch band from just inside an open bathroom

door across the North hallway from the entrance to the ACCC. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) showed SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) general locations (i.e. North hallway, ACCC etc.) where his men recovered projectiles, cartridges and cartridge casings in the ACCC, 1st floor North hallway, East hallway and 2nd floor South hallway. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) men did not document the evidence specifically and all it all in a couple paper envelopes. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also pointed out the location where his men recovered a US radio and a locking mechanism for a door that was broke and left in the North hallway.

(U//~~FOUO~~) During the walkthrough, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed suspected blood on the door frame between the ACCC and the adjoining conference room. Agents took two swabs of the suspected blood for evidence.

Document Reviews

2-74 Passport of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Date: 2 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//~~FOUO~~) A review of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) passport revealed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was a British National born in Kabul, AFG. The UK Passport Agency issued the passport on 3 May 2007, it expires on 3 May 17.

2-75 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement to US Army CID
Date/Place: 4 May 11/Camp Phoenix, AFG
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 43

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) conducted a document review of the signed sworn statement (attached) of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) which related the following: At approximately 1000 hours the Kabul City Police Command Criminal Investigation office requested to dispatch a team of investigators to a reported suicide bomber/vehicle borne IED attack on the Afghan National Air Force compound. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 134th Calvary Regiment, Camp Phoenix, AFG contacted the ARTEC team and proceeded to the Afghan compound. Upon arrival to the Afghan Headquarters building Afghan soldiers approached (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and related they were in danger due to a possible suicide bomber loose on the compound and recommend they leave. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed a number of Afghan security elements conducting sweeps inside of the building. Another Afghan soldier approached (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and related there were dead Americans inside the building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) notified the National Police Coordination Center desk officer and informed them of the possibility of a number of American advisors that were inside the building. At approximately 1230 hours a high ranking Afghan Air Force officer (NFI) informed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that his (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) team was not going to gain access into the location of the Americans in the building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) informed the unidentified Afghan officer as a NATO team they had the clearance and would assume control of the bodies of the advisors by any means necessary. He further explained that his team would process the room where the incident took place. The same unidentified Afghan officer reluctantly agreed however, escorted (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and his team. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed writing on the wall that was translated as "God is only one" in blood (Note: This information was provided on the US Army CID statement and it is unknown who translated this to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) or if he knew Dari and translated it himself). When (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered the room he observed two of the DECEASED AUSBORN and DECEASED BRYANT in the middle of the room. One man appeared to have a gunshot wound in the head and both of them in the chest and upper torso. They walked into the room and located DECEASED BRODEUR on the left, a major who had a gunshot wound in the neck. They also located DECEASED RANSOM and DECEASED AMBARD to the rear of the room on the right hand side. DECEASED ESTELLE and DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN were on the right side of the

room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) counted six American Airmen all officers and one civilian contractor deceased. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) continued to process the scene with the help of the French taking photos including SUBJECT's upstairs location.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) informed Col ANDERSEN that the bodies could go to the KAIA. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided the Command and Control (C2) element two 9 mm Berretta pistols his team recovered. The team left the area at approximately 1600 hours.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and his team turned over the following evidence that they recovered: Five projectile fragments from the ACCC and 1st floor North hallway, 19 cartridge casings from the ACCC, one cartridge case recovered from the 2nd floor, one small piece of suspected drywall containing suspected projectile fragments (recovered from an unknown location), three projectile fragments reportedly removed from DECEASED BRYANT's body at the French Medical Facility, KAIA, AFG, one expanded projectile reportedly removed from DECEASED ESTELLE's body at the French Medical Facility, KAIA, AFG, three projectile fragments reportedly removed from DECEASED AUSBORN's body at the French Medical Facility, KAIA, AFG, one white rubber glove recovered at the French Medical Facility, KAIA, AFG and one projectile recovered at the French Medical Facility, KAIA, AFG

2-76 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MPRI, KAIA, AFG Statement to US Army CID

Date: 15 May 11

Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibits: 44 and 45

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) review of the statement (attached) revealed the following information: On 27 Apr 11, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) USAREUR G-2, Heidelberg, GE conducted an interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a Mentor ANAF Directory of Safety, related the events that took place between 1000 and 1300 hours, at Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 538 AEW, MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, Safety Office, and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) linguist, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MPRI, KAIA, AFG, went to the Afghan Director Safety Office located in Bldg 101 on the first floor. At approximately 1005 hours (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard a bang and then obvious gunfire. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) immediately barricaded the office door and took cover. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard gunfire from down the hall and glass breaking. At approximately 1025 hours (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) watched an ANAF soldier holding a pistol to the back of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) from the ACCC office. They were outside and walked south toward a bunker when (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI). The soldier told (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to get down on the ground. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told the soldier (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was a good guy. The soldier let (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) leave and returned to the northeast side of the bunker. At approximately 1040 hours (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) group exited the office through a window and into the Afghan medical clinic. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was not armed so he took watch while (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) guarded the entry points to the clinic. At approximately 1055 hours (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived with DECEASED NYLANDER and an ANAF soldier (SUBJECT). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was now at the clinic along with an additional six injured Afghans. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took DECEASED NYLANDER to the hospital. A few minutes later ANAF members from the G-2 arrived and a few minutes later three more ANAF personnel arrived. Those ANAF members were with SUBJECT's body about five minutes and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw the ANAF members had with a bag containing patches and personnel affects. At approximately 1300 hours US Escorts took (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to the Thunder Lab.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also provided an MRF (attached) detailing the events of 27 Apr 11.

2-77 Memorandum for Record (MFR) for the Interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Finance Office, KAIA, AFG
Date: 15 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 46

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) review of the MFR (attached) revealed the following information: On 27 Apr 11, CW4 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) IJC-CJ2X, HQ ISAF, Joint Command, KAIA, AFG conducted an interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was at work in his office at Bldg 101 in the Finance Office. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard automatic gunfire coming from a 9 mm pistol. However, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related it "sounded like AK fire" (meaning AK-47). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) subsequently shut his office door and exited the building through the window. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) proceeded to the east side of the flight line and had no further details concerning the incident.

2-78 MFR for the Interview of MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Date/Place: 15 Apr 11/Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG
Agent(s): SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 47

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) review of the MFR (attached) revealed the following information: On 27 Apr 11, CI Support Contractor (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) IJC-CJ2X, HQ ISAF, Joint Command, KAIA, AFG conducted an interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard gunfire from his work location, JAF Hangar One, Bldg 101, at approximately 1020 hours. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recognized the sound as handgun fire and entered the room after all shooting ceased. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed three of the US victims were shot in the back of the head. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed there was more than one shooter involved but could not provide any further information.

2-79 Translation of a JDEC-A- Kabul Document
Date: 20 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 48

(U//~~FOUO~~) A review of a JDEC-A- Kabul Document Translation of various pictures to include two written items in blood on the left and right side of the hallway located in Afghan Headquarters Building on 27 Apr 11 depicted two color pictures of the writings on the wall in Dari. After translation it read "Allah is one" and "Allah in your name". The other photos are of SUBJECT's Allied entry card, pocket litter and uniform patches.

2-80 MFR for the Interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF, KAIA, AFG
Date: 21 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 49

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) review of the MFR (attached) revealed the following information: On 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) IJC-CJ2X, HQ ISAF, Joint Command, KAIA, AFG conducted an interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) the linguist for (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated "I know nothing, I was not there." (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were inside the G-8 office when (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard gunshots and jumped

out the window after gunfire ceased. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) described the sound of the shots as those fired from a pistol; not an AK-47.

2-81 MFR for the Interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF, KAIA, AFG
Date: 21 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 50

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) review of the MFR (attached) revealed the following information: On 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) conducted an interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a linguist. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in the first floor Afghan Safety Directorate Office during the shooting. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted the time as being 1015 hours. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related three unidentified US service members (NFI) were with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) throughout the duration of the incident.

2-82 MFR for the Interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Date: 21 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 51

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) review of the MFR (attached) revealed the following information: On 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) conducted an interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed the weapons fired were handguns, according to the sound. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) cleared the ACCC room and noted SUBJECT shot in the back of the head and killed "several" US mentors. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed there was more than one gunman involved in the shootings. Furthermore, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard an explosive device was possibly present in Bldg 101 via the Force Protection channel. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had no information concerning the Afghani members present in the ACCC room where the shooting occurred.

2-83 MFR for the Interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Date: 22 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 52

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) review of the MFR (attached) revealed the following information: On 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) IJC-CJ2X, HQ ISAF, Joint Command, KAIA, AFG conducted an interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he exited the building as quickly as he could after hearing approximately fifteen gun shots. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in the conference room next to the ACCC when he heard the shots.

2-84 MFR for the Interview of Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from 315th Training Squadron, Goodfellow AFB, TX
Date: 22 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibits: 53

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) review of the MFR (attached) revealed the following information: On 28 Apr 11, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) IJC-CJ2X, HQ ISAF, Joint Command, KAIA, AFG conducted an interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) assisted in gathering statements from personnel present at Bldg 101 on 27 April 2011. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) disclosed a list of persons knowledgeable regarding the attack including the

personnel who took part in extracting the bodies of the US service members killed in the attack. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted that his linguist, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG called in sick the day of the shooting, however (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) called in sick in the past. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) further stated that (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) feared for his life because he believed Brig Gen (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was corrupt and under the influence of an unnamed criminal organization. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed if he cooperated with the investigation in any manner they (NFI) would kill him.

2-85 MFR for the Interview of TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG, KAIA, AFG
Date: 22 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 54

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) review of the MFR (attached) revealed the following information: On 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) conducted an interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) only heard one shot from his vantage point, which was directly outside his building.

2-86 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement to US Army CID
Date: 22 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 55

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) conducted a document review of the signed sworn statement (attached) of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) which related the following: On 27 Apr 11, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard shots fired from ANAF HQ Building 101 and subsequently joined a Fire Team that entered the building for the purpose of casualty removal. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted SUBJECT, was dead upon arrival at the Afghan Medical Clinic, Building 303. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) assisted (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with chest compressions and rescue breaths during the effort to revive SUBJECT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) assembled the Fire Team and left for Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) accompanied the Fire Team for medical support and extra manpower. The Fire Team secured all the rooms until they arrived at the ACCC where they observed six deceased US personnel in addition to DECEASED BROWN, who still had a pulse. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reacted and utilized the "fireman's carry" to retrieve DECEASED BROWN from the ACCC to receive medical treatment. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) carried DECEASED BROWN out the south entrance of the building where a gurney awaited to take her to the Afghan clinic.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not get the French personnel to take DECEASED BROWN to the French Hospital. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) acquired a Prada SUV that enabled the transport of DECEASED BROWN to the hospital. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related he and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reported to the ISAF Joint Command for mission information after leaving the hospital.

2-87 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement to US Army CID
Date: 22 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 56

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) conducted a document review of a signed, sworn statement (attached) from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) dated 29 Apr 11. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was behind his office building when the call came over the radio stating shots fired at Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) put on his gear and posted security outside of KSPANI (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) joined (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) made a decision to get closer to Bldg 101 so he could have a better view.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) called (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who related US personnel were still in the building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) made it to the Afghan clinic and shortly after arriving, SUBJECT arrived on a stretcher. SUBJECT had a faint pulse and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed three penetrating gunshot wounds to his chest and one to his wrist. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) began CPR but an unknown medical official pronounced SUBJECT dead.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) assembled a Fire Team to enter the Afghan Headquarters to secure the US personnel. The Fire Team consisted of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). The team tried to enter on the first floor but was unsuccessful due to locked doors so they proceeded to the second floor. As they entered the second floor and headed down stairs to the first floor of the hallway they observed a blood trail leading into the ACCC room at the very north end of the building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided security as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) looked for wounded. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he came upon two deceased people (DECEASED BRYANT and DECEASED AUSBORN) in the middle of the room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) checked another victim (DECEASED BRODEUR) to the left against the wall without a pulse. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) proceeded to the rear of the room and located three more service members (DECEASED BROWN, DECEASED AMBARD and DECEASED RANSOM). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) located DECEASED BROWN who had a pulse. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) rolled her over and found her breathing and slightly responsive. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) decided to rapid transport her to the clinic for treatment. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with the help of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) lifted DECEASED BROWN into a fireman's carry and exited the ACCC room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he did not notice any M9 pistols on any of the victims only an M4 in the corner near DECEASED BROWN. Once outside the building, they put DECEASED BROWN onto a stretcher and took her to the clinic. DECEASED BROWN, at approximately 1005 hours, called (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and told (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that she was in the ACCC and to come get her. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know if SUBJECT had shot DECEASED BROWN at that point.

2-88 MFR from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAW, KAIA, AFG
Date: 22 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 57

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) highlighted the following information from the memo (attached). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a civilian contractor, related he was in Bldg 101 at approximately 0930 hours in the G-3 Operations office discussing Victory Day (celebration when Afghans challenged and fought back against Russia) operations. There was some confusion on the scheduling and coordination of the directed operations, so (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) left the G3's office and went into the ACCC.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) spoke to DECEASED BRODEUR and DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN to alert them of the impending change in flight schedule and to get a phone number for (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated DECEASED BRODEUR was sitting on the left of the third tier and DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN was sitting on the left in the ACCC room. There were also two linguists in the front of the room (Note: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not identify the two linguists). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) exited the ACCC and proceeded to the main lobby to call (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to discuss the situation further. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he called (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) at approximately 0946 hours and 0947 hours but (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not answer. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) returned upstairs and went back into the G3's office area where he succeeded in reaching (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) via telephone. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ended the phone call and proceeded to Brig Gen (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) office. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard what sounded like four or five shots fired from a small caliber weapon when he and sat down on the couch in Brig Gen (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) office.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) further explained the shots sounded almost like a short string of firecrackers and the interval between shots was about that speed. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated to Brig Gen (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) "that was gunfire". (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related Brig Gen (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) denied that it was gunfire. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed

people running from the front doors in all directions some with weapons drawn. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and his two officers (NFI) were armed and started to guard the office door (Note: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not provide the names of the two officers). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received a phone call and received information that the shooting had started in the ACCC room.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated it appeared the gunfire was getting closer and moving upstairs. An Afghan officer (NFI) kicked down a boarded door located at the west end of the hallway and motioned for (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to go down and get out (Note: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not provide the name of the officer).

2-89 MFR from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Date/Place: 22 May 11/Block 10 Ward 3, KAIA, Kabul, AFG
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 58

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) conducted a document review of an MFR (attached) from an interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) regarding the shooting. The interview was in four separate interviews due to time constraints and accessibility to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). The first interview began when (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) informed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with information and opinions of SUBJECT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had an outline of how he believed SUBJECT progressed to the second floor as he recited verses from the Quran before he took his own life. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided the serial number of the gun he thought was involved in the shooting. He insisted, SUBJECT "was a lone gunman who may have been influenced by his hashish problem and some extreme religious views."

(U//FOUO) The second interview was on 2 May 11 and provided the following details: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he met SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on 30 Apr 11, in Kabul. He spoke to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI). The three individuals informed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that SUBJECT had been estranged from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for the last three years. SUBJECT had left (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and spent most of his time at religious centers in Kabul, the city of Shohado in particular; which was near the city Bala Hassar (NFI).

(U//FOUO) SUBJECT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed he had mental problems and denied he had any ties to the Taliban. Additionally, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related SUBJECT had limited computer skills. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT possibly worked at local hotels and worked as a driver for the United Nations Development Program. Furthermore, he provided a Forensic and Toxicology report (ref para 2-89) that had details of SUBJECT's death.

(U//FOUO) On 3 May 11, the third interview discussed the following details: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) mentioned escorting (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) down the stairwell to North after he heard shots fired. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) offered a very simplistic explanation as to why SUBJECT proceeded to the G-2 office after shooting everyone in the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) thought SUBJECT may have been angry about harassment he received at the main gate because of enforcement of the uniform policy. Furthermore, the preceding attack at the MOD a week earlier prompted (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI) to implement more stringent policies and standards for uniforms due to Taliban using imposters to infiltrate via actual ANAF uniforms.

(U//FOUO) The fourth interview in this document review detailed the following information focused on SUBJECT's return to active duty and weapons accountability for the ANAF: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opined the ANAF reinstated SUBJECT due to being a former pilot. The ANAF often used former pilots were

often utilized to fill the Tashkil or manning requirement for ANAF. After an MOD background check, competency exam, and complete board process, an applicant would be back on active duty. The ANAF considered SUBJECT "reformed" from the Taliban and returned him to active duty nine months and five days prior to the shooting.

2-90 SUBJECT's Autopsy Report by the Ministry of Public Health

Date: 22 May 2011

Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 59

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) conducted a document review of SUBJECT's autopsy report (attached); provided by the Ministry of Public Health, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Presidency of Forensic Services. The issue number was 6773 and the record number was 57. The report described SUBJECT as tall and approximately 45 years old. The document listed SUBJECT's uniform items worn during the shooting. The items were as follows: bloody t-shirt, black and blue underwear, gray socks, military uniform, camouflage scattered bloody, flowery scarf (handkerchief), a hat with governmental emblem, and a brown leather belt wrapped in a plastic bag. It described the bullet wounds as: on the right side of the chest over clavicle bone there was an entrance bullet hole with contaminated and scratched circles including gunpowder smoke around it, which has caused the fracture of the clavicle, measuring approximately 1 x 1 centimeters in oval shape. On the left side of the chest, closer to midsection, approximately six centimeters lower than clavicle bone there is an entrance bullet hole that has been contaminated with scratched circles including gunpowder smoke around it. On the back toward the left side and two centimeters from the midsection was an external hole wound approximately 1 x 1 centimeter oval shape visible, which seems to be a passing bullet canal which caused tearing of the skin toward the outside and is visible. On the lateral side of the left hand, in the region of the forearm joint, on the posterior side; was a circular shaped bullet entrance hole measuring 2 x 2 centimeters, visible, where the skin was ruptured from the inside toward the outside. 8 centimeters left of the previous bullet hole was a bullet entry hole measuring 0.8 x 0.8 centimeters, with contaminated, scratched circles and gunpowder gas visible.

On SUBJECT's back, approximately 10 centimeters lower than armpit was an external bullet hole that measured 0.8 x 0.8 centimeters, circular shape, having contaminated and scratched circles and gunpowder gas visible.

(U//~~FOUO~~) A blood sample was obtained and sent to Toxicology (Reference Number 1390/2/10 {6762}). Blood test results subsequently indicated no Methyl Alcohol or Ethyl Alcohol was present in SUBJECT's system. The report concluded with the following summary: SUBJECT died from gunshot wounds by means of a "forced nature". Furthermore, the wounds are consistent of entrance and exit wounds which, in the process of being wounded, caused intense blood loss and damage to internal viscera, constituting death.

2-91 Bldg 101 Floor Plan Provided by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Date: 23 May 11

Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 60

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) conducted a document review of a two page floor plan (attached) of Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided the floor plan in Pashto and English. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) highlighted the following information included in the document: The floor plan provided a schematic view of the first and second floors of Bldg 101, which was computer generated and made to scale. The view of the sketch had the top

listed as the true Easterly direction, with North to the left. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) circled the front entrance where he assumed SUBJECT entered the building. Additionally, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) drew a rectangle to annotate the position of the ANSF's home position as he visualized it from his vantage point, which was directly outside the office window of the G-1, Personnel Office.

(U//FOUO) The view of the second floor illustrated SUBJECT's path en route to the G-2 office, as depicted with an arrow. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) drew in an oval to show the location the ANA QRF found SUBJECT. On the Pashto version of the second floor plan, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) marked three positions in the G-2 office, they were as follows: a local national linguist's position in the northeast corner of the office, while an ANSF member was off to the right of the entrance, and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) depicted SUBJECT as a stick figure lying on the ground with two small handguns to his left.

2-92 MFR from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), KAIA, AFG
Date: 23 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 61

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) conducted a document review of the MFR (attached) provided by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) MPRI Program Manager, NATO Training Command, Kabul, AFG. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) drafted the MFR on 1 May 11 and titled it "Attack on Afghan Air Force Base, Kabul, 27 Apr 11." (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) served as the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and worked directly with the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also related he unofficially worked for (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) witnessed the following due to his location in Bldg 101: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) noted there was an unordinary presence of Ministry of Interior (MOI) Ford Ranger pickup trucks waiting at Bldg 101 entrance on the west side of the building. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) opined the trucks were present due to additional MOI visitors in the building on 27 Apr 11. Other than that, everything was normal. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) discussed normal topics with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) when (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) entered the room with a group of senior MOI officers. After the group exchanged pleasantries with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) he heard the first shots. Initially (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) thought the MOI members were under attack and he was concerned for their safety. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) looked out the window and realized they had already departed the Bldg 101. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also noticed several people running from the building so he barricaded the door due to being unarmed and unsure of a volatile situation.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) described the gunfire as a series of shots fired in rapid succession. The rounds sounded like small caliber handgun rounds fired from inside of the building. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) noted larger caliber automatic rifle fire followed the small caliber rounds. The shots, at this time, appeared to be coming from inside and outside of the building. After a few minutes, the firing appeared to move up to the second floor into the hallway near (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) position in (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) office. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) thought the gunfight continued for approximately 45 minutes, yielding possibly hundreds of shots.

(U//FOUO) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN's boss and immediately became concerned with his safety since he worked in the ACCC on that day. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) attempted to call DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN, but to no avail. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was subsequently escorted out the south exit of the building to the Presidential Unit Building. Additionally, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) noticed the blood on the walls as he rapidly exited the building.

2-93 Questionnaire Answered by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Date: 24 May 11

Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 62

(U//FOUO) A review of a questionnaire (attached) produced by the Ministry of Defense, Legal Directorate for (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) revealed the following information: The (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ordered (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) cease meetings and information collection on 27 and 28 Apr 11 because the enemy (NFI) had a plan to perform terrorist activities (Note: the document did not disclose the name of the deputy or who the enemy was). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SUBJECT worked in the ANAF Command and Control, Operations Chief Office, and specifically with the management of cargo and people. He said SUBJECT used two pistols to kill nine ISAF and wound nine ANA. One of the pistols belonged to the ANAF but the other was not. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) has not found any connection between SUBJECT and any anti-government entities. He also added SUBJECT was addicted to marijuana.

2-94 3-D Diagram of the ACCC

Date: 24 May 11

Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 63

(U//FOUO) A review of the diagram revealed the (attached) ACCC map and location of people inside the ACCC based on (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) perspective.

2-95 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement to Afghan CID

Date: 26 May 11

Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 64

(U//FOUO) A review of the statement (attached) revealed the Afghan CID office conducted an interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). The Afghan CID office asked (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) eleven questions regarding the shooting on 27 Apr 11. After SUBJECT passed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) at his desk which was the first cubicle next to the main entrance of the ACCC but did not say "Salam" (a common greeting). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then heard shots. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had his Walter Germany Pistol # 451158 throughout the incident, but did not have the courage to take the weapon out of his holster. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) immediately ran out of the room and stated he was "completely shocked." (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran up to the Air Defense Commander's Office, where he located Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and a civilian office cleaner (NFI). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was not able to identify the office cleaner. ANSF personnel found (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) when the shooting was over.

2-96 Timeline of Events from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Date: 26 May 11

Agent(s): SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 65

(U//FOUO) A review of a timeline (attached), as perceived by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) started with a phone call she received from DECEASED BROWN at 1000 hours on 27 Apr 11. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not include any other times but provided a synopsis of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) involvement in casualty retrieval/removal from Bldg 101 subsequent to the shooting.

(U//FOUO) The following are highlights of [REDACTED] timeline: [REDACTED] was initially part of a make-shift security team for the Afghan Medical Clinic subsequent to the shootings. [REDACTED] witnessed the ANAF soldier bring SUBJECT into the clinic; they proclaimed SUBJECT was the "shooter." [REDACTED] noted ANAF personnel aimlessly stood in the hallways of Bldg 101as if nothing was wrong; laughing and joking. [REDACTED] entered the conference room first and noticed a bloody ABU cap on the floor next to what appeared to be a blood spot on the carpeted floor.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] indicated one of the DECEASEDs did not have his weapon due to the empty holster. [REDACTED] then heard the ANAF soldiers were stealing items from the DECEASEDs; this prompted [REDACTED] to begin removing name patches, with the help of [REDACTED] from the uniforms of the DECEASEDs. [REDACTED] stated DECEASED BROWN was still alive and [REDACTED] carried her from the room. [REDACTED] said DECEASED AMBARD was face down in a pool of blood and she thought he was lying on his weapon but was unsure because she did not roll him over.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] left to check on DECEASED BROWN's status shortly after [REDACTED] took her to the Afghan Clinic. [REDACTED] noted the ANAF security guards were still laughing and "milling around" in the hallway as she departed the Bldg. [REDACTED] entered the emergency room and talked to DECEASED BROWN. [REDACTED] noticed she had no weapon as medics attempted to stabilize her. Medics screamed for an ambulance to transport DECEASED BROWN to the NATO hospital. [REDACTED] related the French initially responded but then turned around and left, walking toward Bldg 101. As a result of the miscommunication, [REDACTED] retrieved a Prada SUV and ultimately loaded DECEASED BROWN, who survived until they handed her off to the NATO Hospital.

2-97 MFR from [REDACTED]
Date: 27 May 11/Bldg 200, Rm 02
Agent: SA [REDACTED]

Exhibit: 66

(U//FOUO) A review of a memo (attached) [REDACTED] drafted concerning the workings of the ANAF ACCC & other Command & Control (C2) Initiatives revealed the following information: [REDACTED] stated there was a distinct lack of transparency in the way the Afghan MOD and ANAF like to schedule and fly their missions. The ANAF do not like to plan ahead, use a printed schedule, or use a commonly agreed upon priority matrix for mission tasking. They prefer to use the cell phone to task aircraft for short notice "emergency" missions. [REDACTED] related it was difficult to determine the details of these mission most of the time because the Afghan's either do not know or do not want to tell the Americans who or what they fly around the country.

(U//FOUO) The Afghan's do not like to screen passengers or their bags for weapons, drugs, explosives or anything else especially if the passengers are senior officers or "VIPs." This process is the responsibility of an organization called "Interclot". [REDACTED] further related he had heard Interclot had some private investors who were also senior officers and officials within the ANAF, MOD, and the Government Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). The rumor was the key players include [REDACTED] and the First Vice President FAHIM. DECEASED BRYANT and DECEASED BRODEUR worked hard to turn the ACCC to a functional command center that could and would enforce disciplined policies and procedures while being able to track the movements of every ANAF aircraft throughout AFG. [REDACTED] felt it was clear that the Afghan leadership at all levels did not want "transparency" in the way they scheduled and executed the mission.

2-98 [REDACTED] Statement to US Army CID
Date/Place: 29 May 11/Bldg 200 Rm 13, Kabul, Afghanistan

Agent(s): SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD)

Exhibit: 67

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) conducted a document review of a 6 May 11 interview (attached) of Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Operational Team, 438 AEG, KAIA, AFG. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was present in the 438th AEAS briefing room on the east side of the second floor during the shootings. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was able to confirm that DECEASED NYLANDER was dead after taking him to the hospital from the Afghan Medical Clinic. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) checked for a pulse, but was unsuccessful. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were also present with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) in the van used to transport DECEASED NYLANDER.

2-99 Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement to US Army CID
Date/Place: 29 May 11/KAIA, AFG
Agent(s): SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 68

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) conducted a document review of a 10 May 11 interview (attached) of Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was inside the medical clinic in the OQAB with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) when they learned an unknown was shot. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted two of his medics left for Kandahar, AFG and the only two medics were (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) maintained updates and casualty counts throughout with a DSN phone and "brick" (hand held radio). Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered the ACCC after the shooting ended. He noted someone used blood to write in Arabic on two different wall areas in the first floor hallway leading to the ACCC. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) pronounced seven dead in the room after examination of the casualties. Most were already stiff from the prolonged downtime. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) related, of the weapons still present on the DECEASEDs, some of the magazines were not present. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted 9 mm shell casings on the floor and some desk tops. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) facilitated transfer of the bodies, but had to move chairs, desks, and file cabinets in the process. Furthermore, the bodies went to the French Role III Hospital. After Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived at the hospital, he noticed DECEASED NYLANDER and DECEASED BROWN were already in the morgue. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sorted through ID cards and personal effects of the dead with the help of Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C).

2-100 Report of the Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation at KAIA
Date: 7 Jun 11
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) completed a review of the report dated 26 May 11. The report revealed the following information; On 28 April 2011, the Chief of Staff of the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), acting on behalf of the Commander of CSTC-A, appointed Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) U.S. Army, as the Investigating Officer, and Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) U.S. Army, as the deputy Investigating Officer. The purpose of the investigation, pursuant to AR 15-6, was to find the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the incident that took place on KAIA on 27 April 2011, which resulted in the deaths of eight Air Force service members of the and one contractor, and injuries to other persons. This report contains information essentially identical to that provided to AFOSI during the course of its investigation.

2-101 Firearms Lab Analysis Report
Date: 15 Jun 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 69

(U//~~FOUO~~) A review of the report (attached) from the Joint Expeditionary Forensics Facility (JEFF)5 (05-11-0465 A, B, C) revealed SUBJECT's Smith and Wesson 9mm pistol fired one of five projectiles recovered from inside the ACCC and the North hallway of Bldg 101, one jacket fragment reported to have been removed from DECEASED ESTELLE's body at the French Medical Facility on KAIA, one projectile reported to have been removed from DECEASED AUSBORN's body at the French Medical Facility on KAIA, one projectile recovered at the French Medical Facility on KAIA (it is unknown which body it came from), one jacket fragment recovered from a crack in the concrete directly outside the East exit where first responders found DECEASED NYLANDER in Bldg 101, one projectile recovered from the ceiling outside the Public Affairs office on the 1st floor North hallway in Bldg 101, one projectile recovered from DECEASED BRODUER's body during autopsy, one projectile recovered from DECEASED RANSOM's body during autopsy, one projectile recovered from DECEASED AMBARD's body during autopsy, and one projectile recovered from DECEASED ESTELLE's body during autopsy

(U//~~FOUO~~) It also revealed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) M-9 pistol fired one of five projectiles recovered from inside the ACCC and the North hallway in Bldg 101 and one projectile recovered from the concrete wall above the 1st floor's North exit in Bldg 101 DECEASED NYLANDER's M-9 pistol fired one jacket fragment recovered from the 1st floor North hallway's East baseboard between the entrance to the ACCC and the North exit in Bldg 101. The JEFF5 determined the following projectiles or jacket fragments had class characteristics similar to the test fired projectiles from Smith and Wesson 9 mm pistol: the jacket fragments recovered from DECEASED BROWN's body during autopsy, the jacket fragments recovered from DECEASED NYLANDER's body during autopsy, one projectile recovered from DECEASED RANSOM's body during autopsy, the jacket fragments recovered from DECEASED AUSBORN's body during autopsy, one projectile recovered from underneath a bookshelf in the ACCC in Bldg 101, one jacket fragment recovered from the East baseboard of the ACCC between the conference room door and the 1st row of desks in Bldg 101, one projectile recovered from the wall next to the cipher room in the ACCC in Bldg 101 and one projectile recovered from the door frame of the Operations Room on the 2nd floor's South hallway in Bldg 101. The report also revealed JEFF5 identified SUBJECT's Smith and Wesson 9 mm pistol fired the following cartridge casings: 20 cartridge casings recovered from in the ACCC in Bldg 101, one cartridge case recovered from the 2nd floor of Bldg 101, 13 cartridge casings recovered from the ACCC, North hallway and 2nd floor in Bldg 101 and placed in the same bag by Afghan CID and three cartridge casings recovered from the East hallway in Bldg 101. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) M-9 pistol fired six cartridge casings recovered from the ACCC, North hallway and 2nd floor in Bldg 101 and placed in the same bag by Afghan CID. Finally, SUBJECT's camouflage uniform shirt showed numerous particles consistent in physical appearance with gunpowder particles primarily concentrated in the upper left chest area near suspected bullet holes. The concentration of gunpowder particles and lack of fabric tearing suggest a muzzle distance within 3 feet but not direct contact.

2-102 Autopsy Reports, Toxicology Reports and Death Certificates of the Active Duty DECEASEDs:

Date: 24 Jun 11

Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibits: 70 and 71

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reviewed the Armed Forces Medical Examiner's autopsy and toxicology reports (attached) and death certificates (attached) of the active duty DECEASEDs, they revealed the following:

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED BRYANT sustained 5 gunshot wounds:

1. Entrance: Left side of the head
Exit: Right side of the head

Direction: Slightly front to back, left to right and downward

2. Entrance: Left side of the upper back (higher than #3)
Exit: Front of left shoulder
Direction: Back to front, left to right, upward
3. Entrance: Left side of the upper back (lower than #2)
Exit: Left side of the chest
Direction: Back to front, left to right and upward
4. Entrance: Left side of mid back
Exit: Left side of chest
Direction: Back to front, left to right and upward
5. Entrance: Left side of lower back
Exit: Left side of chest
Direction: Back to front, left to right and upward

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED BRYANT sustained severe injuries to the skull, brain, heart and left lung with internal bleeding into the chest cavity. One irregular grey metal fragment was recovered from the scalp on the right side of the head. There was no evidence of close range discharge of a firearm on the skin surrounding any of the entrance gunshot wounds.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Cause of Death: Multiple gunshot wounds

(U//~~FOUO~~) Manner of Death: Homicide

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED BRYANT's toxicology results were negative for ethanol, screened drugs of abuse/medications.

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED ESTELLE sustained 3 gunshot wounds:

1. Entrance: Right temple
Exit: Left side of the face/left eye socket
Direction: Back to front, left to right and slightly upward
2. Entrance: Back right side of the head
Exit: None
Direction: Back to front, right to left and downward
3. Entrance: Right buttock
Exit: None
Direction: Back to front, right to left and upward

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED ESTELLE sustained serious injuries to the skull, brain, and left eye. One grey metal fragment was recovered from the left side of the face; one grey metal fragment and one yellow metal fragment were recovered from underneath the scalp behind the right ear; and one projectile was recovered from the pelvic region. Gunpowder stippling was observed on the skin surrounding gunshot #2 suggesting an intermediate range discharge of a firearm.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Cause of Death: Multiple gunshot wounds

(U//~~FOUO~~) Manner of Death: Homicide

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED ESTELLE's toxicology results were negative for ethanol, screened drugs of abuse/medications.

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED BRODEUR sustained 3 gunshot wounds:

1. Entrance: Right side of neck
Exit: Left side of the face/jaw
Direction: Front to back, right to left and upward
2. Entrance: Right side of abdomen
Exit: None
Direction: Front to back, right to left and upward
3. Entrance: Left lower back
Exit: Right lower back
Direction: Slightly back to front, left to right and downward

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED BRODEUR sustained severe internal injuries to the head, neck and torso. One projectile was recovered from the soft tissue of the left upper back. Possible gunpowder stippling was observed above gunshot #1 consistent with an intermediate range discharge of a firearm. Dark pigmentation and a pink-colored skin surround gunshot #2, suggestive of a close range discharge of a firearm.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Cause of Death: Multiple gunshot wounds

(U//~~FOUO~~) Manner of Death: Homicide

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED BRODEUR's toxicology results were negative for ethanol, screened drugs of abuse/medications.

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED AUSBORN sustained 4 gunshot wounds:

1. Entrance: Left side of the back of the head
Exit: Right top portion of the head
Direction: Back to front, left to right and upward
2. Entrance: Right side of the back of the head
Exit: Top of the head
Direction: Back to front and upward
3. Entrance: Left side of the abdomen
Exit: Right side of the back
Direction: Front to back, left to right and upward
4. Entrance: Middle of the right forearm
Exit: Rear of the right forearm
Direction: Left to right with no front to back or upward/downward deviation

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED AUSBORN sustained severe injuries to the skull, brain, small bowel, aorta, right renal (kidney) artery and vein, liver, right portion of the diaphragm and 9th right rib causing

bleeding into the right chest and abdominal cavities. The gunshot wound to the right forearm injured skin and soft tissue only, contributing to overall blood loss. Two yellow metal jacket fragments were recovered from the brain and five irregular grey metal fragments were recovered from the scalp on the right side of the head. There was no evidence of close range discharge of a firearm on the skin surrounding any of the entrance gunshot wounds.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Cause of Death: Multiple gunshot wounds

(U//~~FOUO~~) Manner of Death: Homicide

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED AUSBORN's toxicology results were negative for ethanol and screened drugs of abuse. Screening tested positive for diphenhydramine (an antihistamine medication), but was deemed unrelated to cause and/or manner of death.

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED AMBARD sustained 6 gunshot wounds:

1. Entrance: Back of the head
Exit: Left side of the face
Direction: Back to front, slightly right to left and downward
2. Entrance: Left upper back
Exit: Left chest
Direction: Back to front, slightly left to right and downward
3. Entrance: Right forearm
Exit: Right upper arm/right armpit
Direction: Back to front, right to left and upward
4. Entrance: Left side of left thigh
Exit: Front of left thigh
Direction: Back to front, left to right and upward
5. Entrance: Side of right lower leg more toward the rear
Exit: Front of right lower leg
Direction: Back to front, right to left and downward
6. Entrance/Exit: Grazing wound to the outside of the right upper arm
Direction: Undetermined

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED AMBARD sustained severe internal injuries to the head, brain, left lung and ribs; along with other soft tissue and skeletal damage. One projectile was recovered from the muscles of the right armpit related to gunshot #3. There was no evidence of close range firing on the skin surrounding any of the entrance wounds.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Cause of Death: Multiple gunshot wounds

(U//~~FOUO~~) Manner of Death: Homicide

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED AMBARD's toxicology results were negative for ethanol, screened drugs of abuse/medications.

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED RANSOM sustained 4 gunshot wounds:

1. Entrance: Back of the neck
Exit: None
Direction: Back to front, left to right and upward
2. Entrance: Left side of the neck
Exit: None
Direction: Front to back, left to right and downward
3. Entrance/Exit: Grazing wound to the back of the left hand (opposite the palm)
Direction: Undetermined
4. Entrance: Back of the calf
Exit: Back left of the calf
Direction: Back to front, right to left and upward

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED RANSOM sustained severe injuries to the 1st cervical vertebra, spinal cord, brain, skull and right lung causing significant bleeding into the chest cavity. The gunshot wounds to the left hand and right leg contributed to the total blood loss, but did not injure any vital organs. One deformed jacket fragment was recovered from the maxillary sinus of the skull; two jacket fragments were recovered from the right collar bone area and one grey projectile core was recovered from the right chest cavity. There was no evidence of close range firing on the skin surrounding any of the entrance wounds.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Cause of Death: Multiple gunshot wounds

(U//~~FOUO~~) Manner of Death: Homicide

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED RANSOM's toxicology results were negative for ethanol, screened drugs of abuse/medications.

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED NYLANDER sustained 3 gunshot wounds:

1. Entrance: Back of the right side of the head
Exit: None
Direction: Back to front, left to right and downward
2. Entrance: Front of the right thigh
Exit: None
Direction: Front to back, left to right and downward
3. Entrance: Inside of left thigh
Exit: None
Direction: Front to back, right to left and upward

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED NYLANDER sustained severe injuries to the brain and skull as well as to the long bones of the legs. Two jacket fragments and one grey metal fragment were recovered from the base of the skull where it joins the vertebra; two grey metal fragments were recovered from left side of the brain stem; six grey metal fragments and three jacket fragments were recovered from the soft tissue behind the right ear; two grey metal fragments and one jacket fragment were recovered from the right thigh; eight bullet fragments were recovered from the back of the left thigh. Gunpowder stippling was present on the skin surrounding the gunshot wound to the head which is consistent with an intermediate range discharge of a firearm. There was no evidence of GSR on the skin surrounding any of the other entrance wounds.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Cause of Death: Multiple gunshot wounds

(U//~~FOUO~~) Manner of Death: Homicide

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED NYLANDER's toxicology results were negative for ethanol, screened drugs of abuse/medications.

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED BROWN sustained 3 gunshot wounds:

1. Entrance: Left side of the back of the head
Exit: Left side of the upper face - possible secondary projectile/bone fragmentation causing an exit out of the back of the head
Direction: Back to front, right to left and downward
2. Entrance: Right shoulder
Exit: Right upper back
Direction: Slightly front to back, right to left and downward
3. Entrance: Left side of the left buttock
Exit: Front left side of the left thigh
Direction: Back to front, left to right and downward

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED BROWN sustained severe injuries to the brain. Projectile fragments were recovered from the exit wound of gunshot #1 in proximity of the left eye. There was no evidence of close range discharge of a firearm on the skin surrounding any of the entrance gunshot wounds.

Cause of Death: Multiple gunshot wounds

Manner of Death: Homicide

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED BROWN's toxicology results were negative for ethanol and screened drugs of abuse. The screening tested positive for Pentobarbital and Lidocaine; both consistent with medical intervention.

(U//~~FOUO~~) NOTE: Consideration must be given to the fact that all DECEASEDs wore clothing at the time of the shooting which could have acted as a barrier to GSR reaching the skin. The clothing was unavailable for analysis due to being removed and incinerated at the French Medical Facility in Kabul, AFG.

2-103 Financial Records, SUBJECT

Date: 11 Jul 11

Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 72

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 11 Jul 11, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reviewed the translated bank statement (attached) of SUBJECT. SUBJECT's bank account (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was opened on 17 Aug 10. It was active and reflected no large amounts deposited before or after the 27 Apr 11 incident. SUBJECT was paid normal deposits from the ANA with the last deposit in Apr 11. There was no significant information provided in the bank statements.

2-104 DNA Lab Analysis Report

Date: 17 Jul 11

Agents: SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (LEAD)

Exhibit: 73

(U//~~FOUO~~) The USACIL DNA report (CILA-RBOC-DNA 11 JUL 11) (attached) revealed the laboratory compared the known DNA profiles from DECEASEDs to the DNA profiles recovered from previously analyzed evidence from the scene. The DNA profiles obtained from a carpet mat from in front of the conference room door in the North hallway of Bldg 101, the seat portion of the couch where the QRF found, a swab of suspected blood from the carpet behind the conference room's door to the hallway of Bldg 101, a swab of suspected blood from the light switch cover in the 1st floor North hallway of Bldg 101, a swab of suspected blood from the floor where hallways cross on the 1st floor of Bldg 101, a swab of suspected blood from the floor between the conference room and Public Affairs Office in the 1st floor North hallway of Bldg 101, a swab of suspected blood next to the fire alarm on the North wall of the ACCC; Bldg 101, a swab of suspected blood from the front side of the door inside the cipher room; ACCC in Bldg 101, two Nokia cell phone and an Apple iPhone were mixtures that did not qualify for comparison. The DNA profiles from DECEASED BRYANT's M-9 pistol (SN-1204650), a magazine from SUBJECT's pistol and SUBJECT's ID card all contained SUBJECT's DNA.

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED ESTELLE's DNA profile was on his M-9 pistol (SN -1289190) and a projectile jacket fragment (received from the French Medical Facility, KAIA, in a bag marked "ESTELLE").

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN's DNA profile was on five projectile fragments (collected from the ACCC and North hallway of Bldg 101). Note: Not all fragments were able to produce a usable profile.

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED BRYANT's DNA profile was on projectile jacket fragments (received from the French Medical Facility, KAIA, in a bag marked "BRYANT").

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED AUSBORN's DNA profile was on projectile jacket fragment (received from the French Medical Facility, KAIA, in a bag marked "AUSBORN"). Note: DECEASED AUSBORN's DNA matched the DNA profile collected from the carpet behind the door of the conference room in Bldg 101.

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED AMBARD's DNA profile was on the projectile of unknown origin (received from the French Medical Facility, KAIA), a Nokia cell phone (Model 1202-2), a Sony Cyber Shot camera and a lead projectile without a jacket (recovered from the northeast wall of the ACCC in Bldg 101). Note: DECEASED AMBARD's DNA matched the DNA profile collected from the top of a broken table in the ACCC in Bldg 101).

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED RANSOM's DNA profile was on a Kodak Play Sport camera. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
DNA profile was on a projectile jacket fragment (recovered from the southeast baseboard of the ACCC in Bldg 10).

(U//~~FOUO~~) SUBJECT's DNA profile was on a 9 mm cartridge casing (recovered in the ACCC in Bldg 101). A silver 9mm magazine (recovered by Afghan CID somewhere on the 1st floor of Bldg 101) contained a mixture of DECEASED RANSOM and SUBJECT's DNA. A projectile jacket fragment (recovered from a crack in the concrete directly outside the East exit of Bldg 101) also contained a mixture of DNA but it did not qualify for comparison. Three 9 mm magazines containing 15 cartridges each, one empty 9 mm magazine, one projectile (recovered from the wall above the North exit on the 1st floor in Bldg 101) and one projectile (recovered from the wall directly West of the cipher room door in the ACCC in Bldg 101) all contained DNA profiles but the profiles were no sufficient for comparison. The lab was unable to obtain DNA profiles from a Nokia cell phone (Model 1202), a projectile jacket

fragment (recovered along the East baseboard of the North hallway on the 1st floor of Bldg 101) and a projectile (recovered from the South door entrance to the Operations Office on the 2nd floor of Bldg 101). SUBJECT's DNA profile was the major contributor of a swab of suspected blood from the conference room/ACCC door frame in Bldg 101, a swab of suspected blood from the stairs outside the South exit of Bldg 101, a swab of suspected blood from the leg of a chair in the conference room of Bldg 101, a swab of suspected blood from the exterior wall directly outside the East exit of Bldg 101, a swab of suspected blood collected from the northern baseboard directly outside the ACCC; Bldg 101, a swab of suspected blood from below the fire alarm on the North wall of the ACCC; Bldg 101, a swab of suspected blood from the floor where the hallways cross on the 1st floor of Bldg 101, a swab of suspected blood from a filing cabinet in the Northeast corner of the ACCC; Bldg 101, a swab of suspected blood from a cut out portion of the couch where the QRF found SUBJECT, a swab of suspected blood from under the light switch cover in the 1st floor North hallway of Bldg 101, the cutout portion of the couch, an Afghan military blouse reportedly taken off of SUBJECT and a torn t-shirt reportedly taken off of SUBJECT.

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED ESTELLE's DNA profile attributed to an unknown substance soaked in suspected blood from the stairwell outside the South exit of Bldg 101.

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DNA profile was on a swab of suspected blood from the conference room/ACCC door frame in Bldg 101 and a swab of suspected blood from the backside of a large framed map in the ACCC of Bldg 101. DNA found on a thigh rig with detachable holster mostly attributed to DECEASED NYLANDER.

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED AMBARD's DNA profile attributed to a swab of suspected blood from the North side of the ACCC's door frame in the North hallway of Bldg 101 and a swab of suspected blood from the ACCC's main door in the North hallway of Bldg 101.

(U//~~FOUO~~) An unknown individual's DNA profile mostly attributed to a swab of suspected blood collected just North of the Public Affairs Office from the floor of the 1st floor North hallway of Bldg 101.

(U//~~FOUO~~) DNA found on a swab of suspected blood collected from the top of a broken table located in the ACCC in Bldg 101 mostly attributed to DECEASED AMBARD. A swab of suspected blood collected from the backside of the cipher room door in the ACCC in Bldg 101 contained DECEASED RANSOM's DNA. DECEASED BROWN's DNA was on a leather shoulder rig. DNA found on a swab of suspected blood collected from the carpet behind the conference room's door to the hallway of Bldg 101 mostly attributed to DECEASED AUSBORN. The DNA profile obtained from the paint scrapings from location of suspected bloody handprint was insufficient for comparison. Finally, there were no DNA profiles obtainable on paint scrapings from the location of suspected bloody words written on the wall.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The DNA profile from the back side of the cipher room door and the profile from the Kodak camera were from the same contributor.

2-105 Cellex Data Reports

Date: 28 Jul 11

Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibits: 74, 75 and 76

(U//~~FOUO~~) A review of the data received from three media exploitation Cellex reports (attached) from cell phones recovered from the crime scene revealed the following information was taken from DECEASED BROWN, DECEASED BRODEUR, and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) cell phone. The information reflects the

earliest activity on the phones related to the case was at 1009 hours, the 30 second call from DECEASED BROWN to [REDACTED]. The report also reflects [REDACTED] texted DECEASED BROWN back at 1012 hours. These times are only as good as the times on the phone or the network. No further information was pertinent to the investigation.

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED BROWN made a phone call to [REDACTED] at 1009 hours for 30 seconds. [REDACTED] phone related a text message sent at 1011 hours that stated, "Keep head down lock and load, QRF coming". DECEASED BROWN received a text message at 1012 hours that stated, "Keep head down lock and load TAKE COVER" from [REDACTED] cell phone. DECEASED BROWN and DECEASED BRODEUR received a text message at 1013 that stated, "Shots fired at OQAB TAKE COVER".

2-106 Autopsy Report, Toxicology Report and Death Certificate of DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN

Date: 1 Aug 11

Agent: SA [REDACTED]

Exhibits: 77 and 78

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA [REDACTED] reviewed the Armed Forces Medical Examiner's autopsy and toxicology reports (attached) and death certificates (attached) of DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN, they revealed the following:

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN sustained 4 gunshot wounds:

1. Entrance: Right side of the chest
Exit: Left side of the chest
Direction: Front to back, right to left and upward
2. Entrance: Right side of the chest
Exit: Left side of the chest
Direction: Front to back, right to left and upward
3. Entrance: Outside back of the right arm
Exit: Front inside of the right arm
Direction: Back to front, right to left and upward
4. Entrance: Front inside of the left arm
Exit: Outside back of the left arm
Direction: Front to back, right to left and upward

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN sustained severe injury to the heart and lungs from four gunshot wounds suspected to be from only two shots fired from a gun. It appears the entrance gunshot wound to the right side of the chest is secondary to a projectile passing through the right arm. Additionally, it appears the entrance gunshot wound to the left arm is secondary to the projectile passing through the left side of the chest. There was no evidence of close range discharge of a firearm on the skin surrounding any of the entrance gunshot wounds.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Cause of Death: Multiple gunshot wounds

(U//~~FOUO~~) Manner of Death: Homicide

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECEASED NYLANDER's toxicology results were negative for ethanol, screened drugs of abuse/medications.

(U//~~FOUO~~) NOTE: Consideration must be given to the fact that all DECEASEDs wore clothing at the time of the shooting which could have acted as a barrier to GSR reaching the skin. The clothing was unavailable for analysis due to being removed and incinerated at the French Medical Facility in Kabul, AFG.

2-107 MFR from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Date: 23 Aug 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 79

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided an MFR (attached) which stated he was at his office located in KSPAN1 when the shooting occurred. Once Bldg 101 had been secured (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided assistance with placing the DECEASEDs into body bags and escorting the DECEASEDs out of BLDG 101. When (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered Bldg 101 he witnessed a bloody handprint on a wall to the left and as he started to climb the stairs to the second floor (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed a small trail of blood leading up the stairs and more blood located on the second tier of stairs. Before (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went further, and unknown individual directed him to go back because the DECEASEDs were on the first floor.

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) proceeded down the stairs and while waiting observed a bullet hole opposite of the one bloody handprint. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated it appeared to be coming from the left side of the entrance outside of the building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) turned down the hallway and noticed on the right side of the wall what appeared to be words written in blood in dari. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered the ACCC and noticed the first tier looked undisturbed. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) walked further into the ACCC room and observed two bodies in the middle of the floor (DECEASED BRYANT and DECEASED AUSBORN). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) assisted in carrying DECEASED BRYANT and DECEASED AUSBORN out of the building and returned to the ACCC. The next body (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) removed was in a cubicle face down (DECEASED AMBARD). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stood in the rear of the ACCC, looked around and noticed a small room to the right with a brown wooden door. The door appeared to have been kicked in from the outside. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not see past the door to see what was inside the room because the room was dark (Note: AFOSI agents later identified this room as a storage room. The QRF kicked in the locked door when they cleared all the rooms).

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) carried out DECEASED AMBARD and when he returned to the ACCC, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) pulled a body out from in between the cubicle and the wall (DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) assisted with bagging DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN and removing him from the ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not observe any entry or exit wounds on any of the DECEASEDs when he bagged and removed the DECEASEDs.

2-108 Firearms Lab Analysis Report
Date: 30 Aug 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 80

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reviewed the JEFF5 firearms report 05-11-0465 A, dated 25 Aug 11, it contained the following confirmed information:

JEFF5 compared the mis-fed (stove piped or jammed) cartridge, reported to be in DECEASED NYLANDER's M9 pistol, to test cartridges deliberately mis-fed to the gun. The examination revealed

significant similarities between the questioned mis-fed cartridge and those recreated, however a JEFF5 could not determine a positive match.

FSC Note: Without photographs of the exact original position of the questioned mis-fed cartridge, it is very difficult to recreate the same "jam" scenario. Simply achieving "significant similarities" increases probative value of the laboratory findings. These findings lend credibility to statements placing the questioned cartridge in DECEASED NYLANDER's M9 pistol.

2-109 Gunshot Residue Lab Analysis Report
Date: 1 Sep 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 81

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reviewed the JEFF5 firearms report 05-11-0465C, dated 25 Aug 11, it contained the following confirmed information:

JEFF5 observed numerous particles of apparent unburned gunpowder in the upper left chest area of SUBJECT's camouflage uniform blouse, however, the Griess (test for burned gunpowder) and Sodium Rhodizonate (test for lead) tests did not produce positive reactions.

FSC Note: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Firearms Examiner, JEFF5, Bagram, AF relayed to SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) he tested the upper right chest portion of the blouse containing a bullet hole as well; he did not detect any burned gunpowder, unburned gunpowder, or lead. These results are consistent with the upper left chest shot being at close/intermediate range.

Law Enforcement Records Checks

2-110 Intelligence Information Systems, SUBJECT
Date: 28 Apr 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) EDET 2405, BAF, AFG

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Analyst, AFOSI EDET 2405, BAF, AFG, conducted an intelligence records check on SUBJECT. No information was found relevant to this investigation.

Consultations

2-111 Forensic Science Consultation
Date/Method: 28 Apr 11/Telephonic
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) AFOSI 4 FIS, Vogelweh, GE

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) briefed SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on the facts and circumstances of this investigation. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) consulted on the investigative strategy based on the information known at the time.

2-112 Forensic Science Consultation
Date/Method: 29 Apr 11/Telephonic
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 29 Apr 11, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) spoke to SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to discuss various items of evidence and personnel property that AFOSI received. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided guidance.

2-113 Forensic Science Consultation
Date/Method: 2 May 11/Telephonic
Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) called to discuss the number of weapons involved and, in particular, which she needed to seize as evidence.. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided guidance.

2-114 Polygraph
Date/Method: 2 Jun 11/Telephonic
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) AFOSI 4 FIS, Sembach ABS, GE

(U//~~FOUO~~) Det 541 and the ICON requested polygraph support to verify information from an individual and to ensure the individual was not targeting US law enforcement and providing misleading information.

2-115 Analytical Consultation
Date: 3 Jun 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The information collected regarding SUBJECT and his background does not support his involvement in insurgent activity. AFOSI analysts, in concert with other analysts and agencies, have reviewed multiple intelligence documents, investigative reports, and Open Source reporting to determine SUBJECT's motives for the attacks. This analysis is not stating that there are no insurgent connections to SUBJECT, but that none have been established thus far during this investigation. Additionally, there are multiple reports, that indicated SUBJECT may have had mental issues that were possibly compounded by alleged financial problems.

Other Investigative Aspects

2-116 Initial Notification
Date: 27 Apr 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) notified SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on a shooting that occurred at KAIA, Kabul, AFG.

2-117 Retrieval of Initial Crime Scene Photos
Date: 28 Apr 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Exhibit: 82

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received photos (attached) of the crime scene from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). The photographs contain images of the exterior of the building, an initial walkthrough of the scene with the DECEASEDs present and SUBJECT.

2-118 Evidence Retrieval from the French Medical Center
Date: 2 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went to the KAIA ISAF French Hospital to retrieve evidence. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received the one tan t-shirt, one Black Hawk thigh rig with detachable holster, two pairs of combat boots and a set of dog tags, belonging to DECEASED BROWN.

2-119 Evidence Retrieval from Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANAF, KAIA, AFG
Date: 3 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received a vile of blood, reported to be from SUBJECT, from Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2-120 Evidence Retrieval from Lt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG; Deployed from Naval Strike and Warfare Center, Naval Air Station (NAS), Fallon, NV
Date/Place: 3 May 11/KAIA, ISAF Compound, Bldg 200 Rm 3, AFG
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) contacted AFOSI and turned over evidence he received from the KAIA ISAF Medical Facility on 27 Apr 11. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated medical responders partially handled the evidence with ungloved hands for inventory purposes and all evidence was in plastic bags when he received it. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) turned over seven Nokia cell phones, one leather shoulder rig with an ammo pouch containing one 9 mm magazine and 15 cartridges, one Olympus camera, one Kodak camera and one Sony camera.

2-121 Evidence Retrieval from SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) US Army CID, KAIA, AFG
Date: 3 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with two swabs taken from the open wounds of SUBJECT's wrist, two swabs of SUBJECT's left hand for GSR analysis, two buccal swabs from SUBJECT, two swabs from blood around SUBJECT's neck, two socks removed from SUBJECT's feet and one syringe containing a small amount of SUBJECT's vitreous fluid.

2-122 Evidence Retrieval from Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ISAF/CJ2X, KAIA, AFG
Date: 4 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received, one M-9 pistol with one empty 9 mm magazine (already analyzed by JEFF5 Lab), one silver 9 mm magazine, eight cartridge casings (used for comparison analysis), two projectiles (used for comparison analysis), five patches from an Afghan military uniform, one identification card belonging to SUBJECT, one Afghan National Army ID card belonging to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (NFI), one Kabul bank card also belonging to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 190 Afghani (the Afghan currency), one unidentified informal receipt on a piece of paper, three pictures of unidentified males, one 9 mm magazine with 12 loose 9 mm cartridges, two projectiles recovered from the couch, two Nokia cell phones, one Apple iPhone and one Smith & Wesson 9 mm pistol with 1 silver 9 mm magazine (already analyzed by JEFF5 Lab) from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C).

2-123 Evidence Retrieval from Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Date: 4 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided agents with 22 cartridge casings from the 1st floor East hallway, 1st floor North hallway, ACCC and 2nd floor South hallway, Bldg 101 (they were unlabeled and all in the same bag), two 9 mm cartridges, one silver 9 mm magazine, one rifle sling, one cartridge casing from the ACCC, Bldg 101, one CAC reader, one US military ID card belonging to DECEASED BRODEUR, one notebook, five pieces of a silver linked watch band, one door locking mechanism with a screw and five cartridge casings from the 1st floor North hallway, Bldg 101.

2-124 Briefings to Senior Leaders

Date: 4 May 11

Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD); SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) On 4 May 2011, at Bldg 200, KAIA, AFG, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) briefed the AFCENT Commander, Brig Gen DAVID W. ALLVIN, 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG, and Deputy Commander, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW, KAIA, AFG.

(U//FOUO) On 5 May 2011, at Bldg 200, KAIA, AFG, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) telephonically briefed Brig Gen ALLVIN on the status of the investigation, at his request. Brig Gen ALLVIN expressed his concern related to SUBJECT's motivation behind the incident and wanted to know when he would learn the motive.

(U//FOUO) On 6 May 2011, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) briefed the AFCENT Commander, Lt Gen MIKE HOSTAGE III, USAFCENT, AUAB, QT, on the status of the investigation. A Force Protection representative, Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) USAF AFCENT, AUAB, QT, also provided a briefing to the group. Following the briefings, the group discussed Force Protection deficiencies and recommendations and noted the lack of a dedicated inside the wire counter-threat team.

2-125 Evidence Retrieval from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Date/Place: 5 May 11/Bldg 200 Rm 2, KAIA, AFG

Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) turned over items of evidence that he inadvertently became in charge of immediately following the shooting. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received eight M9 pistols, four 9 mm Lugar pistols, 14 9 mm Smith and Wesson pistols, one GUU-5P rifle, six 9 mm magazines containing 15 cartridges each, one 9 mm magazine containing eight cartridges, one empty 9 mm magazine and one .223 magazine containing 30 cartridges.

2-126 Buccal Swab from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Date: 7 May 11

Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recovered a buccal swab from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for DNA analysis and comparison. He obtained it while (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was at the French Medical Facility on the ISAF side of Kabul for a checkup.

2-127 Buccal Swab from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ANA, KAIA, AFG

Date: 8 May 11

Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//FOUO) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recovered a buccal swab from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a linguist, for DNA analysis and comparison.

2-128 Buccal Swab from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Date: 8 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recovered a buccal swab from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for DNA analysis and comparison.

2-129 CJ2 Exploitation Reports
Date: 17 May 11
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reviewed the ten reports from the CJ2 Exploitation of Cell phones in regard to the incident on 27 Apr 2011 and determined they contained nothing pertinent to the investigation. There were no phone calls to indicate any wrong doing prior or after the incident.

Coordinations

2-130 Investigations and Operations
Date/Method: 27 Apr 11/Telephonic
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Assistant Attaché, Regional Security Office (RSO), USEMB, London, UK, advised that on 27 April 2011, the USEMB switchboard received a telephone call that was transferred to a Foreign Service National Investigative (FSNI) RSO staff member. The FSNI spoke to the individual and reported the following:

(U//~~FOUO~~) Telephone call received today at 1131 hours from an individual identifying himself as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on UK mobile phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), stated that he was an Afghan, born in Kabul, currently living in London, UK. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that he wanted to pass on information about the individual who carried out the gun attack at the Kabul Airport earlier this morning. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the individual (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked if someone could contact him regarding the information he wanted to pass.

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sounded very articulate, educated, and spoke in excellent English with a slight foreign accent. There was a considerable level of traffic noise in the background. This call lasted about four minutes.

2-131 Investigations and Operations
Date/Method: 28 Apr 11/In Person
Agent: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) participated in a meeting hosted by SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) the Second Secretary, USEMB, London, UK and an Assistant Legal Attaché, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Legal Attaché Office (LEGATT), USEMB, London, UK. During the meeting, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) briefed all parties on his telephone conversations with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) advised that he made an appointment for (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to come to the USEMB at 1500 hours, 28 April 2011, and that he would facilitate (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entry to the USEMB. Further discussions resulted in the agreement that SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) would conduct a joint interview of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C).

2-132 Autopsy

Date/Method: 30 Apr 11/In Person

Agents: SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) AFOSI ICON, Andrews AFB, MD; SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) AFOSI ICON, Andrews AFB, MD

Exhibit: 83

(U//~~FOUO~~) SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) AFOSI ICON, Andrews AFB, MD and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) AFOSI ICON, Andrews AFB, MD attended the autopsies of the DECEASEDs at Dover AFB, DE. All DECEASEDs arrived to Dover AFB, DE without clothing and their injuries dressed. Also in attendance were photographers (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) AFME, Rockville, MD and SSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) AFME, Rockville, MD and assistants SSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) AFME, Rockville, MD and AIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP), Rockville, MD. At approximately 0900 hours, Dr (Col) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Deputy Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME), Rockville, MD conducted the autopsy of DECEASED BROWN. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) discovered multiple gunshot wounds to DECEASED BROWN. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) seized metal fragments as evidence.

(U//~~FOUO~~) At approximately 0900 hours, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Associate Medical Examiner, AFME, Rockville, MD conducted the autopsy of DECEASED ESTELLE. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) discovered multiple gunshot wounds to DECEASED ESTELLE. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) seized metal fragments as evidence.

(U//~~FOUO~~) At approximately 0900 hours, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Associate Medical Examiner, AFME, Rockville, MD conducted the autopsy of DECEASED ESTELLE. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) discovered multiple gunshot wounds to DECEASED ESTELLE. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) seized metal fragments as evidence.

(U//~~FOUO~~) At approximately 0900 hours, Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Associate Medical Examiner, AFME, Rockville, MD and Dr (CDR) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), Deputy Medical Examiner, AFME, Rockville, MD conducted the autopsy of DECEASED (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). They discovered multiple gunshot wounds to DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN.

(U//~~FOUO~~) At approximately 1030 hours, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) conducted the autopsy of DECEASED NYLANDER. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) discovered multiple gunshot wounds to DECEASED NYLANDER. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) seized metal fragments as evidence.

(U//~~FOUO~~) At approximately 1100 hours, Dr (Maj) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Deputy Medical Examiner, AFME, Rockville, MD conducted the autopsy of DECEASED RANSOM. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) discovered multiple gunshot wounds to DECEASED RANSOM. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) seized metal fragments as evidence.

(U//~~FOUO~~) At approximately 1130 hours, Dr (Capt) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Deputy Medical Examiner, AFME, Rockville, MD conducted the autopsy of DECEASED AMBARD. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) discovered multiple gunshot wounds to DECEASED AMBARD. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) seized a metal fragment as evidence.

(U//~~FOUO~~) At approximately 1200 hours, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) conducted the autopsy of DECEASED BRODEUR. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) discovered multiple gunshot wounds to DECEASED BRODEUR. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) seized a metal fragment as evidence.

EVIDENCE

3-1 The following is a list of evidence associated with this investigation (cross-referenced):

Obtained at: KAIA ISAF Compound, Bldg 200 Rm 2, Kabul, AFG (para. 2-74)
Obtained on: 30 Apr 11
Obtained by: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD)
Agent(s): (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD)

04918111301210-1: (1) Clear plastic ziplock bag with three white stripes on one side. The bag is sealed with tape with foreign language "JANDARM" on the tape. Tape appears to be initialed on both sides with unknown initials. The bag contains (5) projectile fragments.

Marked: "30 Apr 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)" for identification

Condition: Used

04918111301210-2: (1) Clear plastic zip lock bag sealed with tape with a foreign language "ARMA KRIMINAL" on the tape. Tape appears to be initialed on both sides with unknown initials. There is also what appears to be Farsi writing in black on one side of the bag; some of which is rubbed off. Bag contains (19) cartridge casings wrapped in white paper with what appears to be Farsi writing on some of the white papers. The papers have been twisted at each end.

Marked: "30 Apr 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)" on bag for identification

Condition: Used

Value: Unknown

04918111301210-3: (1) Clear plastic bag containing (1) white rubber glove and (1) projectile

Marked: "30 Apr 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)" on bag for identification

Condition: Glove is used and projectile is deformed

04918111301210-4: (1) Clear plastic zip lock bag sealed with tape with a foreign language (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on the tape. Tape appears to be initialed on both sides with unknown initials. There is also what appears to be Farsi writing in black on one side of the bag; some of which is rubbed off. Bag contains (1) cartridge casing wrapped in white paper. The paper has been twisted at each end.

Marked: "30 Apr 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)" on bag for identification

Condition: Used

Value: Unknown

04918111301210-5: (1) Clear plastic bag labeled "BRODEUR" containing a small piece of dry wall containing brass fragments

Marked: "30 Apr 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)" on bag for identification

04918111301210-6: (1) Clear plastic bag labeled "BRYANT" containing (3) pieces of brass fragments

Marked: "30 Apr 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)" on bag for identification

04918111301210-7: (1) Clear plastic bag labeled "ESTELLE" containing (1) piece of expanded projectile fragment, copper in color
Marked: "30 Apr 11 [REDACTED] on bag for identification

04918111301210-8: (1) Clear plastic biohazard bag labeled "AUSBORN" containing (3) projectile fragments
Marked: "30 Apr 11 [REDACTED] on bag for identification

Obtained at: KAIA ISAF Compound, Bldg 200 Rm 2, AFG (para. 2-28)
Obtained on: 2 May 11
RCVD From: [REDACTED]

04918111301357-1: (1) 9mm cartridge, ball ammo, serial # WCC04
Marked: "2 May 11 [REDACTED] for identification
Condition: Defect at ejection groove

Obtained at: KAIA ISAF Compound, Bldg 200 Rm 2, AFG (para. 2-48)
RCVD From: [REDACTED]

04918111301402-1: (1) Nokia cell phone, black in color. Model 1202-2, type RH-112.
Code: 0562273, CE0434
(1) Nokia cell phone battery, grey in color. 3.7 volt, BL-4C
(1) Cell phone memory chip. White and blue in color. Numbers on back of chip: 89930, 17100, 04077, 3795
Marked: "2 May 11 [REDACTED] for identification
Condition: Used
Value: Unknown

Obtained at: KAIA ISAF Compound, Bldg 200 Rm 2, AFG (para. 2-29)
Agent(s): SA [REDACTED] (LEAD), [REDACTED]
RCVD From: [REDACTED]

04918111301410-1: (1) Nokia cell phone, black in color with a slide out keyboard. Model # 6760s-1, type RM-573, code 0522838, CE0434
(1) cell phone memory chip, red and white in color. Numbers on chip: 8993, 2002, 0001, 1714, 781
(1) Nokia cell phone battery, white and grey in color. 3.7 volt, BP-4L
Marked: "2 May 11 [REDACTED] for identification
Condition: Used
Value: Unknown

Obtained at: KAIA ISAF Compound, Bldg 200 Rm 3, AFG (para. 2-118)
Obtained on: 3 May 11
Agent: [REDACTED]

04918111301501-1: (1) Black Nokia Model 1280 cell phone. IMEI # 355929/04/624997/6

Marked: "3 May 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for identification
Condition: Used
Value: Govt equipment

04918111301501-10: (1) Black Nokia Model 1202-2 cell phone. IMEI # 353386/04/052221/7

Marked: "3 May 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for identification
(1) Black Nokia Model 1202 cell phone. IMEI 358833008538730
Marked: "3 May 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for identification
Condition: Both covered in suspected blood
Value: Govt equipment

04918111301501-2: (1) Brown leather Galco shoulder rig with holster and double magazine pouch. D109T and V202 stamped on the holster. Pouch contained (1) magazine containing (15) cartridges

Marked: "3 May 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for identification
Condition: One strap cut and soiled with suspected blood
Value: \$150.00 estimated by SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

04918111301501-3: (1) Black Nokia Model 1280 cell phone. IMEI # 353778/04/743095/8

Marked: "3 May 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for identification
Condition: Used
Value: Govt equipment

04918111301501-4: (1) Blue and silver Olympus Stylus Tough camera with black wrist strap connected. SN B1J516551

Marked: "3 May 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for identification
Condition: Used
Value: \$150.00 estimated by SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

04918111301501-5: (1) Black and silver Nokia Model 1110 cell phone. IMEI # 359768/00/880531/8

Marked: "3 May 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for identification
Condition: Used
Value: Govt equipment

04918111301501-6: (1) Black Nokia Model 1202-2 cell phone. IMEI # 353386/04/051783/7

Marked: "3 May 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for identification
Condition: Used
Value: Govt equipment

04918111301501-7: (1) Black Nokia Model 1202 cell phone. IMEI # 359745008880608

Marked: "3 May 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for identification
Condition: Used/back will not stay on
Value: Govt equipment

04918111301501-8: (1) Cream and black Kodak Play Sport camera with black wrist strap connected. SN KCTMK01114203

Marked: "3 May 11 [REDACTED] for identification
Condition: Suspected blood on face
Value: \$150.00 estimated by SA [REDACTED]

04918111301501-9: (1) Black Sony Cybershot digital camera with wrist strap. SN 409164. Does not contain memory card
Marked: "3 May 11 [REDACTED] for identification
Condition: Covered in suspected blood
Value: \$150.00 estimated by SA [REDACTED]

Obtained at: ACCC, Bldg 101, Afghan CID Office, AFG (para. 2-33)
Obtained on: 4 May 11

04918111310843-1: Clear plastic bag containing:
(1) Silver 9mm magazine containing (0) cartridges
(2) Unfired 9mm cartridges
(22) Cartridge casings
Marked: "7 May 11 [REDACTED] on magazine and plastic bag for identification
Condition: Appears intact

04918111310843-2: Clear plastic bag containing:
(1) Nylon-type rifle sling with one side of a plastic latch
Marked: "4 May 11 [REDACTED] for identification
Condition: Sling is cut

04918111310843-3: Clear plastic bag containing:
(1) Common Access Card (CAC) reader with USB cable
(1) US military ID card belonging to David L Brodeur
(1) 9mm cartridge casing
Marked: n/a
Condition: Used

04918111310843-4: Clear plastic bag containing:
(1) Skilcraft Executive Steno notebook, bar code 7530002237939
Marked: "4 May 11 [REDACTED] for identification
Condition: Used/notes on several pages and portions soaked with suspected blood

04918111310843-5: Clear plastic bag containing:
(5) Pieces of a silver linked watch band
(1) Door/window locking mechanism
(1) Flat head screw
(5) Cartridge casings
Marked: "4 May 11 [REDACTED] on bag for identification
Condition: Watch band is broken; Locking mechanism worn; Primers on all casings dimpled

Obtained at: ACCC, Bldg 101, Air Corps Command Center, AFG (para. 2-66)
Obtained on: 1 May 11

04918111301322-1: (1) Metal jacketed projectile recovered from under a bookshelf in the Northeast corner
Marked: n/a
Condition: Deformed

Obtained at: ACCC, Bldg 101, 1st floor, North hallway, AFG (para. 2-67)
Obtained on: 2 May 11

04918111301344-1: (1) Copper colored projectile metal jacket found on the floor along the East baseboard halfway between the Air Corps Command Center's entrance and the North exit
Marked: n/a
Condition: Deformed

04918111301344-2: (1) Copper colored projectile metal jacket found on the floor along the East baseboard halfway between the conference room door and the first row of desks
Marked: n/a
Condition: Deformed

Obtained at: Bldg 101, 1st floor, North hallway, AFG (para. 2-68)
Obtained on: 3 May 11

04918111301433-1: (1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on the hall baseboard just north of the Air Corps Command Center's main entrance door frame
Marked: "4" for identification

Obtained at: Bldg 101, Air Corps Command Center, AFG (para. 2-72)

04918111301433-10: (1) Grey projectile thought to be lead found behind the main entrance door along the baseboard
Marked: n/a
Condition: Deformed

Obtained at: Bldg 101, 1st floor, North hallway, AFG (para. 2-72)

04918111301433-2: (1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on the North side of the Air Corps Command Center's main door frame
Marked: "6" for identification

Obtained at: Bldg 101, Conference room, AFG (para. 2-68)

04918111301433-3: (1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on the carpet behind the main door

Marked: "3" for identification

04918111301433-4: (1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on the carpet behind the main door

Marked: "2" for identification

Obtained at: Bldg 101, Outside of East exit, AFG (para. 2-68)

04918111301433-5: (1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on the exterior wall directly north of the East exit door

Marked: "7" for identification

Obtained at: Bldg 101, 1st floor, North hallway, AFG (para. 2-69)

04918111301433-6: (1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on the Air Corps Command Center's main door

Marked: "5" for identification

Obtained at: Bldg 101, 1st floor, Conference room, AFG (para. 2-68)

04918111301433-7: (1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on the bottom chair leg of the chair located at the head of the conference table

Marked: "1" for identification

Obtained at: Bldg 101, Air Corps Command Center, Northeast wall, AFG (para. 2-68)

04918111301433-8: (1) Lead projectile without metal jacket removed from the wall

Marked: n/a

Condition: Deformed

Obtained at: Bldg 101, Air Corps Command Center North wall, AFG (para. 2-68)

04918111301433-9: (1) Metal jacketed projectile removed from inside the wall directly West of the cipher room

Marked: n/a

Condition: Deformed

Obtained at: ACCC, Bldg 101, 1st floor, AFG (para. 2-69)

Obtained on: 4 May 11

04918111310855-1: (1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on the floor of the North hallway between the Conference room and Public Affairs Office

Marked: "19" for identification

Obtained at: Bldg 101, 1st floor, North hallway, AFG (para. 2-69)

04918111310855-10: (1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located under the cover of the light switch on the South end of the North hallway

Marked: "9" for identification

Obtained at: Bldg 101, 2nd floor, Intel Office, AFACCC, AFG (para. 2-69)

04918111310855-11: (1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on the seat portion of a couch

Marked: "17" for identification

Obtained at: Bldg 101, 1st floor, ACCC, AFG (para. 2-69)

04918111310855-12: (1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on the floor of the Northeast corner at the hallway crossroads

Marked: "15" for identification

Obtained at: Bldg 101, North hallway ceiling, ACCC, AFG (para. 2-69)

04918111310855-13: (1) Metal jacketed projectile removed from the ceiling tile in front of the Public Affairs Office

Marked: n/a

Condition: Deformed

Obtained at: ACCC, Bldg 101, Air Corps Command Center, AFG (para. 2-69)

04918111310855-14: (1) Small piece of a metal jacketed projectile located on the floor in front of the cipher room door

Marked: n/a

Condition: Deformed

Obtained at: ACCC, Bldg 101, 2nd floor, Operations Center door frame, AFG (para. 2-69)

04918111310855-15: (1) Metal jacketed projectile removed from the South door frame

Marked: n/a

Condition: Deformed

Obtained at: ACCC, Bldg 101, outside East exit, AFG (para. 2-69)

04918111310855-16: (1) Metal jacket to a projectile removed from a crack in the concrete directly outside the East exit

Marked: n/a

Condition: Deformed

Obtained at: ACCC, Bldg 101, North hallway above exit door, AFG (para. 2-69)

04918111310855-17: (1) Metal jacketed projectile removed from the wall

Marked: N/A

Condition: Deformed

Obtained at: ACCC, Bldg 101, North hallway, AFG (para. 2-69)

04918111310855-18: Paint scrapings from interior West side of North hallway where writing in suspected blood had been painted over

Obtained at: Bldg 101, 1st floor, West side of North hallway, AFG (para. 2-69)

04918111310855-19: Paint scrapings from location of suspected bloody handprint that had been painted over

Obtained at: ACCC, Bldg 101, 1st floor, AFG (para. 2-68)

04918111310855-2: (1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on the floor of the North hallway just north of the Public Affairs Office

Marked: "20" for identification

Obtained at: Bldg 101, 2nd floor, Intel Office, AFG (para. 2-68)

04918111310855-20: (1) Piece of dark brown leather-like material previously cut out of a couch. Material contains (2) suspected bullet holes with in incision joining the two holes

Marked: "4 May 11 [REDACTED] for identification

Condition: Contains suspected blood

Obtained at: Bldg 101, North hallway, in front of conference room entrance , AFG (para. 2-69)

04918111310855-21: (1) 58"X18" tan piece of carpet frayed on all sides. Presumptive positive for blood using Blue Star

Marked: "3 May 11 [REDACTED] for identification

Condition: Worn

Value: \$1.00 estimated by SA [REDACTED]

Obtained at: ACCC, Bldg 101, 1st floor, AFG (para. 2-69)

04918111310855-3: (1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located as a single drop on the floor of the Northeast corner at the hallway crossroads
Marked: "16" for identification

04918111310855-4: (1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on the light switch on the South end of the North hallway
Marked: "8" for identification

Obtained at: ACCC, Bldg 101, 2nd floor, Intel Office, AFG (para. 2-69)

04918111310855-5: (1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on a portion of a couch that had been previously cut from the couch and contains two suspected bullet holes
Marked: "18" for identification

Obtained at: Bldg 101, Air Corps Command Center, AFG (para. 2-69)

04918111310855-6: (1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on the top of a broken table
Marked: "11" for identification

04918111310855-7: (1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on the North wall below the fire alarm
Marked: "14" for identification

04918111310855-8: (1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on filing cabinet drawers in the Northeast corner of the room
Marked: "13" for identification

04918111310855-9: (1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on the North wall near the fire alarm
Marked: "10" for identification

Obtained at: French Medical Facility, AFG (para. 2-116)

Obtained on: 2 May 11

04918111301426-1: (1) Tan t-shirt, Skilcraft brand, size large. Brownish-red stains on the front and sleeves suspected to be blood.
Marked: "3 May 11 [REDACTED] for identification
Condition: Used/stained
Value: \$5.00 estimated by SA [REDACTED] (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

04918111301426-2: (1) Grey plastic BlackHawk thigh rig with detachable holster
Marked: "3 May 11 [REDACTED] for identification

Condition: Suspected blood on straps and plastic
Value: \$70.00 estimated by SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

04918111301426-3: Received from: French Medical Facility
(2) Pair of combat boots containing spot of suspected blood. One pair have dog tags attached belonging to TARA BROWN.
Marked: N/A
Condition: Used/stained
Value: \$65.00 estimated by SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Obtained at: ACCC, Bldg 303, Afghan Medical Facility, AFG (para. 2-117)
Obtained on: 3 May 11

04918111310808-1: (1) Brown paper bag containing a standard white envelope which contains a vile of blood reported to be Col Ahmed Gul's. Envelope is sealed with clear tape with unknown initials and has a circular purple stamp many times along the adhesive seam.
Marked: "3 May 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)" on outer brown paper bag for identification
Condition: Unknown

Obtained at: KAIA ISAF Compound, Bldg 100, CJ2X Office, AFG (para. 2-120)
Obtained on: 4 May 11

04918111310812-1: (1) Plastic bag containing a Beretta 9mm handgun. Serial # 1204650 and (1) 9mm magazine containing (0) cartridges.
(1) Clear plastic bag taped to the outside of the other bag containing (4) cotton tipped applicators used by JEFF 5 lab for analysis
Marked: "05-11-0465" on outside of both bags
Condition: Handgun and magazine appear intact and soiled with suspected blood

04918111310812-2: (1) Silver 9mm magazine containing (0) cartridges
Marked: "Item 12, 05-11-0465, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)" for identification
Condition: Appears intact

04918111310812-3: (1) Clear plastic bag containing (5) cartridge casings and (2) projectiles
Marked: "JEFF 5 05-11-0465; Item 9, 10" on outside of bag
Condition: Casing primers are dimpled and projectiles have been fired

04918111310812-4: (1) Clear plastic bag containing (3) cartridge casings and (2) projectiles
Marked: "JEFF 5 05-11-0465; Item 13, 14" on outside of bag
Condition: Casing primers are dimpled and projectiles have been fired

04918111310812-5: (1) Clear plastic bag containing (5) patches from an Afghan military uniform
(1) Identification card for Col Ahmed Gul
Marked: "JEFF 5 05-11-0465; Item 15, 16" on outside of bag
Condition: Worn and contain suspected blood

04918111310812-6: (1) Afghan National Army ID card for (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
(1) Kabul bank card for person (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
190 in Afghani currency
(1) Unidentified paper chit
(3) Pictures of unidentified males
All items removed from a locked filing cabinet at the ACCC, Bldg 101, Intel Office
Marked: "JEFF 5 05-11-0465" on outside of bag
Condition: Dirty, possibly soiled with blood

04918111310812-7: (1) 9mm magazine containing (0) cartridges
(12) 9mm cartridges within an interior clear plastic bag
Marked: Both bags marked "JEFF 5 05-11-0465"

04918111310812-8: (2) Metal jacketed projectiles recovered from the couch in the
AFACCC, Bldg 101, Intel Office
Marked: One projectile marked with a 6 and the other with a 5 and 05-11-0465
Condition: good/rifling characteristics

04918111310812-9: Clear plastic bag containing:
(1) Black Apple Iphone with rubber OtterBox
(1) Black and grey Nokia Model 1208 cell phone. IMEI # 357689/01/531443/7
(1) Black Nokia Model 5030c-2 cell phone. IMEI # 352708/04/133934/4
Marked: "6 May 11" on all
Condition: Used

04918111310812-10: (1) Clear plastic bag containing a Smith and Wesson Model
SW9VE handgun. Serial # PDH1324
(1) Silver 9mm magazine containing (0) cartridges
(1) Clear plastic bag taped to the outside of the other bag containing (4) cotton tipped
applicators used by JEFF 5 lab for analysis
Marked: "05-11-0465" on outside of both bags
Condition: Handgun and magazine appear intact and soiled with suspected blood

Obtained at: Bldg 200 Rm 2, KAIA ISAF Compound, AFG (para. 2-123)
Obtained on: 5 May 11
RCVD From: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

04918111320907-1: Received from: Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438th AEAS/DO
(3) 9mm magazines containing (15) cartridges each
(1) 9mm magazine in clear plastic bag marked "meal card 25960"
(1) .223 magazine containing (30) cartridges
Marked: n/a
Condition: All appear intact - magazine covered in suspected blood
Value: Govt equipment

04918111320907-10: Received from: Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438th AEAS/DO
(4) Black 9mm Lugar handguns. Serial #'s - 450227, 450226, 450481, 454967
Marked: n/a
Condition: All appear intact

Value: Unknown

04918111320907-11: Received from: Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438th AEAS/DO
(14)Black with silver slides Smith and Wesson 9mm handguns. Serial #'s - PBY3546,
PDF9217, PDF7807, PDF9201, PDH0462, PDF8364, PDH0651, PDF9034, PDF9314,
PDF7757, PDH0731, PDF9967, PDF9305, PBY7516
Marked: n/a
Condition: All appear intact
Value: \$500 estimated by SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

04918111320907-12: Received from: Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438th AEAS/DO
(1)Black US military issue GUU-5P rifle. SN - 302811
Marked: n/a
Condition: Appears intact
Value: Govt equipment

04918111320907-2: Received from: Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438th AEAS/DO
(1)Black US military issue M-9 Beretta handgun. SN - 1503908
Marked: n/a
Condition: Appears intact
Value: Govt equipment

04918111320907-3: Received from: Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438th AEAS/DO
(1)Black US military issue M-9 Beretta handgun. SN - 1490088
Marked: n/a
Condition: Appears intact
Value: Govt equipment

04918111320907-4: Received from: Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438th AEAS/DO
(1)Black US military issue M-9 Beretta handgun. SN - 1076514
Marked: n/a
Condition: Appears intact
Value: Govt equipment

04918111320907-5: (1) Black US military issue M-9 Beretta handgun. SN - 1436491
(1) 9mm magazine containing (8) cartridges
Marked: n/a
Condition: Both appear intact
Value: Govt equipment

04918111320907-6: Received from: Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438th AEAS/DO
(1)Black US military issue M-9 Beretta handgun. SN - 1289190
Marked: n/a
Condition: Appears intact - suspected blood on surface
Value: Govt equipment

04918111320907-7: Received from: Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438th AEAS/DO
(1) Black US military issue M-9 Beretta handgun. SN - 1115915
(1) 9mm magazine containing (15) cartridges
Marked: n/a
Condition: Both appear intact

Value: Govt equipment

04918111320907-8: Received from: Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), 438th AEAS/DO
(1) Black US military issue M-9 Beretta handgun. SN - 1465524
(1) 9mm magazine containing (15) cartridges
Marked: n/a
Condition: All appear intact
Value: Govt equipment

04918111320907-9: Received from: Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), 438th AEAS/DO
(1) Black US military issue M-9 Beretta handgun. SN - 1311367
(1) 9mm magazine containing (15) cartridges
Marked: n/a
Condition: Both appear intact
Value: Govt equipment

Obtained at: KAIA ISAF Compound, Bldg 200 Rm 3, AFG (para. 2-48)
Obtained on: 9 May 11
Agent(s): (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD), SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
RCVD From: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

04918111321012-1: Received from: Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), 438th AEW
(1) PNY Optima 4 GB SD memory card
Serial # 1028 WG2982G
Marked: "9 May 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for identification
Condition: Appears intact
Value: \$20.00 estimated by SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Obtained at: Bldg 101, Air Corps Command Center, AFG (para. 2-70)
Obtained on: 7 May 11
Agent(s): (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (LEAD)

04918111320935-1: During search of: Bldg 101, Air Corps Command Center
(1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on the backside of the door to the cipher room
Marked: "21" for identification

Obtained at: Bldg 101, 2nd floor, couch in Intel Office, AFG (para. 2-70)

04918111320935-2: Search of: Bldg 101, 2nd floor, couch in Intel Office
Stuffing from inside the couch at the location where two projectiles were removed.
Stuffing is wrapped in white notebook paper.
Marked: "7 May 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on notebook paper for identification

Obtained at: Bldg 101, Air Corps Command Center, AFG (para. 2-70)

04918111320935-3: During search of: Bldg 101, Air Corps Command Center

(1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on the front side of the door inside the cipher room
Marked: "22" for identification

04918111320935-4: During search of: Bldg 101, Air Corps Command Center
(1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood located on the backside of a framed map against the North wall
Marked: "12" for identification

Obtained at: Bldg 101, stairway platform between 1st and 2nd floor outside South exit, AFG (para. 2-71)

Obtained on: 8 May 11

04918111320952-1: Search of: Bldg 101, stairway platform between 1st and 2nd floor outside South exit
Clear plastic Biohazard bag containing:
(1) Unknown substance soaked in suspected blood. Brownish-red in color. Wrapped in tan notebook paper
Marked: "8 May 11" for identification
Condition: Completely dry when collected

Obtained at: Bldg 101, stairs outside South exit, AFG (para. 2-71)

04918111320952-2: Search of: Bldg 101, stairs outside South exit
(1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood
Marked: "26" for identification

Obtained at: Bldg 101, Air Corps Command Center, door to conference room, AFG (para. 2-72)

Obtained on: 9 May 11

04918111321017-1: Search of: Bldg 101, Air Corps Command Center, door to conference room
(1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood. Stain was on Northeast side of frame as a smear.
Marked: "28" for identification

04918111321017-2: Search of: Bldg 101, Air Corps Command Center, door to conference room
(1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a dried brownish-red substance suspected to be blood. Stain was on inside of door frame as an elongated droplet.
Marked: "27" for identification

Obtained at: AFOSI EDET 2405, Bagram, AFG, AFG (para. 2-119)

Obtained on: 3 May 11

RCVD From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

04918111321038-1: Received from: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) USA CID
(2) Swabs, cotton tip, 6", from the open injury to the left wrist of SUBJECT. Placed in a swab carton.
Marked: "1 May 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 1730" for identification

04918111321038-2: Received from: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) USA CID
(2) Swabs, cotton tip, 6", from the left hand of SUBJECT for GSR analysis. Placed in a swab carton.
Marked: "1 May 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 1730" for identification

04918111321038-3: Received from: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) USA CID
(2) Swabs, cotton tip, 6", intraoral attempt of buccal swab from SUBJECT. Placed in a swab carton.
Marked: "1 May 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 1730" for identification

04918111321038-4: Received from: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) USA CID
(2) Swabs, cotton tip, 6", from blood around SUBJECT's neck. Placed in a swab carton.
Marked: "1 May 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 1730" for identification

04918111321038-5: Received from: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) USA CID
(2) Grey / tan socks, containing blood, removed from SUBJECT's feet. Placed in a paper bag
Marked: "1 May 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 1730" for identification

04918111321038-6: Received from: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) USA CID
(1) Syringe with capped needle containing minuet amount of vitreous fluids from SUBJECT. The syringe was placed in a swab carton.
Marked: "1 May 11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 1730" for identification

Obtained at: KAIA ISAP Compound, French Medical Facility, AFG (para. 2-123)
Obtained on: 7 May 11

04918111320945-1: Received from: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
(1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a buccal sample for DNA analysis
Marked: "23" for identification

Obtained at: ACCC, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG (para. 2-124)
Obtained on: 8 May 11

04918111321001-1: Received from: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
(1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a buccal sample for DNA analysis
Marked: "25" for identification

Obtained at: ACCC, Bldg 101, KAIA, AFG (para. 2-125)

04918111321006-1: Received from: Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (ANA)
(1) Cotton tipped applicator used to collect a buccal sample for DNA analysis
Marked: "24" for identification

EXHIBITS

4.1 The following items are appended to this report (cross-referenced):

- 1 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-3)
- 2 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-4)
- 3 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-6)
- 4 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-9)
- 5 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-10)
- 6 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-11)
- 7 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-12)
- 8 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-13)
- 9 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-14)
- 10 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-15)
- 11 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-16)
- 12 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Statement (para. 2-17)
- 13 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Statement (para. 2-18)
- 14 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-19)
- 15 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-22)
- 16 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Statement (para. 2-24)
- 17 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-26)
- 18 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-27)
- 19 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-28)
- 20 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-29)
- 21 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-32)
- 22 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-34)
- 23 AF Form 1168 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-35)
- 24 Sketch from (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-35)

- 25 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement (para. 2-36)
- 26 AF Form 1168 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-39)
- 27 AF Form 1168 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-40)
- 28 Sketches from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-41)
- 29 AF Form 1168 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-41)
- 30 AF Form 1168 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-46)
- 31 AF Form 1168 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-47)
- 32 AF Form 1168 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-48)
- 33 AF Form 1168 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-49)
- 34 AF Form 1168 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-50)
- 35 AF Form 1168 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-51)
- 36 AF Form 1168 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-52)
- 37 AF Form 1168 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-55)
- 38 AF Form 1168 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-57)
- 39 Drawing of ACCC Room by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-57)
- 40 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement (para. 2-65)
- 41 Crime Scene Photos (para. 2-69)
- 42 Crime Scene Sketch (para. 2-72)
- 43 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement (para. 2-75)
- 44 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement (para. 2-76)
- 45 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MFR (para. 2-76)
- 46 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MFR (para. 2-77)
- 47 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MFR (para. 2-78)
- 48 JDEC-A-Kabul Document (para. 2-79)
- 49 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MFR (para. 2-80)

- 50 [REDACTED] MFR (para. 2-81)
- 51 [REDACTED] MFR (para. 2-82)
- 52 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MFR (para. 2-83)
- 53 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MFR (para. 2-84)
- 54 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MFR (para. 2-85)
- 55 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement (para. 2-86)
- 56 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement 2 (para. 2-87)
- 57 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MFR (para. 2-88)
- 58 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MFR (para 2-89)
- 59 SUBJECT's Autopsy Report by Ministry of Public Health (para. 2-90)
- 60 Floor Plan from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-91)
- 61 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MFR (para. 2-92)
- 62 Questionnaire Answered by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (para. 2-93)
- 63 3-D Diagram of the ACCC (para. 2-94)
- 64 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement (para. 2-95)
- 65 Timeline of Events from [REDACTED] (para. 2-96)
- 66 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MFR (para. 2-97)
- 67 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Statement (para. 2-98)
- 68 Col [REDACTED] Statement (para. 2-99)
- 69 Firearms Lab Report (para. 2-101)
- 70 Autopsy and Tox Reports for Military DECEASEDs (para. 2-102)
- 71 Death Certificates for Military DECEASEDs (para. 2-102)
- 72 Financial Bank Records (para. 2-103)
- 73 DNA Lab Analysis Report (2-104)
- 74 Cellex Report [REDACTED] (para. 2-105)
- 75 Cellex Report DECEASED BROWN (para. 2-105)

- 76 Cellex Report DECEASED BRODEUR (para. 2-105)
- 77 Autopsy and Tox Reports for DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN (para. 2-106)
- 78 Death Certificate for DECEASED MCLAUGHLIN (para. 2-106)
- 79 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MFR (para. 2-107)
- 80 Firearms Lab Report (para. 2-108)
- 81 GSR Lab Report (para. 2-109)
- 82 Initial Crime Scene Photos (para. 2-117)
- 83 Autopsy Photos (para. 2-132)

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT
 WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013 44 U.S.C. 3101, and EO 9397
PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc. and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.
ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.
DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY. SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20110929	TIME 0930	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No) C10, Word 3 Kebul Interadent AFB/A	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT ACOSI Det 2405	REPEAT (If known) OFFENSE COMPLAINT
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II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	SSN N/A	STATUS/GRADE ANA / 101.
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (if required) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	TELEPHONE HOME (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DUTY
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DEROS N/A

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) S	GRADE E	SSN L	ORGANIZATION F	DUTY PHONE
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III. ADMISSION OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank) _____ INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF special agent, etc.)
Special Agent

SUSPECT INITIALS _____ and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.

Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.

I have the right to consult with a lawyer. N/A X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.

I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.

I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.

If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.

MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.

CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS _____ I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice: (Initial One)

I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.

I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.

I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.

I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
----------------------	----------------------------------

IV. STATEMENT

See Attached // X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SIGNATURE

hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I know (or believe) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

X

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 29 day
of April, 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGES

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)." At the bottom of each page, print or type: "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

Report of

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

" "

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Air Force, National Army. I want to present the incident of my leg's fracture, meaning, getting injured, on 17-2-1390.

I was present at 7 o'clock on mentioned date, for my duty and after signing attendance I proceeded toward my department (My office) on second floor toward south direction of (main) office, last on left side. In

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

commandment Headquarters, I went to my office and got busy with execution of daily official tasks, and later I progressed toward office, who is

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

after a few minutes we heard sound of bullet shootings (shots) and at the same

time

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

our ^{hastily} with 3 linguists
Entered into

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

and said that suicide bombers and terrorists have entered ^{into} Commandment Headquarters and are getting close (coming) toward us. We should open the windows and drop our selves (Jump) from second floor. At this time

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

⁰
Broke
the glass of window and dropped him self from second floor. From outside officers shouted and told me to do the same

(Jump out of window), so I also
jumped out of window. when I fell
I noticed that I have broken my leg.
by holding to one of walls I walked
ten steps, Afterward I saw captain
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) of company, I

asked him to take me to hospital.

Captain (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took me to
(Air) force hospital. After entering
into the hospital they put me on
bed and hospital's doctors, who were
on duty gave me first aid treatments
and dressed my (wound) leg with
bandage. A few minutes later (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

with a few of ground forces

and [REDACTED] of Air forces entered into the room, where we injured personnel were present. (they) gave us ~~there~~ their condolences. Later we were transported to ISAF Hospital by ISAF vehicle. Doctors who ~~are~~ ^{were} on duty started our treatment, with a very good behavior, and even till this moment we are under treatment.

I want to say thanks (appreciate) human-loving and sympathetic doctors and workers of ISAF hospital (ASAT) (I think subject means ISAF) (Tanky) (I think subject means Thank you).

[REDACTED] (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
"Signature".

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT
 WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY 10 U.S.C. 8013, 44 U.S.C. 3101, and EO 9397
PRINCIPAL PURPOSES Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc., and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken
ROUTINE USES Information may be disclosed to local, county, state and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings
DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (If known)
2011 04 29	0934	Kab-1 AS, French Hospital, W223	AFOSI SDET 2425	OFFENSE COMPLAINT

II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	SSN	STATUS/GRADE
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	N/A	Capt - ANA
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (If required)	TELEPHONE
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	HOME (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DUTY N/A
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER	DEROS
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	N/A

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE

III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank): _____ INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.):
 Special Agent

SUSPECT INITIALS: _____ and advised me that I have the following rights: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

- I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
- Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
- I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
- I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
- I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
- I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
- If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
- MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
- CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS: _____ I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)

- I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.
- I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
- I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.

I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT: _____ SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER: _____

IV. STATEMENT

/// See Attached /// x

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

"I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge."

SIGNATURE OF

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24 day of April, 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)". At the bottom of each page print or type "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Son of

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(AAF).

Respectable!

Heartscratching

on (date) 1390/2/7 that incident that occurred

We came to work at 7 o'clock in the morning of that day. After execution of official tasks, which lasted till 9 o'clock, At the same time

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

td (instructed) me to send this

code to Air force. I executed the task. At this moment Entrance door opened with speed.

(they) said that suicider has entered. At this moment we were 3 members (of staff) in office, the rest were (the "customers", or I should say non-staff individuals who were there to renew their cards/badges or "others,") Entered

(in the office). They started to (jump) off the window of office. At this moment in office were present, [REDACTED] (A staff member who is female), one other individual and I myself. We closed the door and put the table/desk behind that door.

At this moment we hear a voice, saying who is Intelligence and co-incident was a sound of shooting of one bullet, I dropped (Jumped) myself out of the window, and walked toward hospital. Behind hospital, present were, authorities, when they saw me, they immediately opened the doors of hospital and I got on bed inside of hospital.

They administered an IV (Intravenous saline) and a syringe and half an hour later doctors came from ISAF. They brought us to ISAF hospital with respect.

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT	<input type="checkbox"/> SUSPECT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WITNESS/COMPLAINANT
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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013; 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397
PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc.; and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.
ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.
DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (if known)
2010428	1700	Kabul Medical Center Kabul International Airport	ACUSE Det 2405	OFFENSE COMPLAINT

II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) <small>(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)</small>	SSN N/A	STATUS/GRADE Civ.
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (if required) <small>(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)</small>	TELEPHONE HOME <small>(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)</small> DUTY
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code) <small>(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)</small>	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER KOR / Titan 2-3	DEROS N/A
SPONSOR INFORMATION		
NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) <small>(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)</small>	GRADE	SSN ORGANIZATION DUTY PHONE

III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank) _____ INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.)
Special Agent

SUSPECT INITIALS	<i>and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.</i>
	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview. <small>(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)</small>
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS	<i>I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)</i>
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.

I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
----------------------	----------------------------------

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

MEP - (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

My name is (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) current resident of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) of Kabul city.

I have worked with foreign forces since 2003. I usually come to work at 8:10 and as usual, this day (The day of incident)

I came to work at 8:15 or 8:20 and everything seemed ordinary and normal. Other

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with names of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also were there and I did not notice anything new. I asked all's condition (saying Hello/Salam; Afghans ask about health and sometime about family members of second person in conversation.), and later since I was reading the news, all three linguists were sitting in one row and (we) were reading news through internet (Online). The advisor/mentor

that we used to work with, major Broder (Brudder) took my name, "(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)" and said that I want to talk with captain of "Cipher and code" who was standing face to face. They started questions and answer (session) related to MI-17 Helicopters that was ordered by MOD (Ministry of Defense) so the commander of 111th division of Kabul could be taken to security belts which are placed in and around the city. (the purpose of commander's visit was to) control and (examine) investigate posts (check) and check points of (Afghan) National Army (ANA). The question of Major Brudder was related to received guidance (orders) with all details of (order), that how many individuals are (will be present) and how long air craft (Helicopter)


will remain in air. It was exactly between 9-10 (nine to 10 o'clock). The meeting ~~was~~ has been held in center of command and control daily, and, ^{Briefings} reports, planning, formation of time schedules used to be decided upon during this meeting. I myself, major Brudder and ANA Captain, whose name is not known to me, were standing between tables (desks) and on the way. We were talking, when major general Ahmad Gul entered through door. As usual he smiled and said Salam (hello). I didn't hear his voice but I saw his smile. probably, only, $2\frac{1}{2}$ or 3 meters (of distance) were taken (~~step~~ by taking steps towards) inside of Salon (Command and Control Office), that immediately his eyes got large, making the look at his face very frightening and scary.

He drew (took out) his pistol or waist gun and took aim exactly toward us 3 and started shooting, since we three were standing on his way, and ~~we~~ were talking,

I saw all bent down, and started to run here and there. First I sat down with considerable scare then I ran with increased speed from one side toward door and hallway. I couldn't find any moment to look back that (what is going on). At that moment when Ahmad Gul started shooting toward us, and when I was sitting and wanted to scape, I felt pain in my left hand, I thought I must have hit chairs or table (with my left hand). I only remember that when I wanted to scape Ahmad Gul was standing and ^{was} shooting at all directions, the sound of shooting was a lot (loud). I escaped with very much speed and got far from Headquarter Building, when I reach to the ~~the~~

probably (about) less than an hour later ISAF guys came and brought me to ISAF Hospital, and ISAF doctors helped us with pleasure (meaning happily) and kindness and took the bullet out of my hand. I didn't exactly know major general Ahmad (Bul). I have seen him, only, in command and control. I used to see him sometimes, when going and coming to the office related to daily tasks of my duty. He had a white corolla (Toyota) probably 2003 or 2002 model (he means year). He used to drive very fast even in jumps (speed breakers) he wouldn't slow down. I remember one day I joked with him, I said you must be rich that is why you don't care. He replied, don't mind, I have made my car get used to this habit. It won't get damaged, it is a car (it's just a car).

I never noticed any of his suspicious actions (activities) since we are very busy. Each one and every individual in command and control need advisors / mentors for their questions and answers and cooperation beside translation of papers, documents and meetings. This is all the things that I remember and I have written, which is in good health. (meaning is correct.)



"Signature."

IV. STATEMENT

See Attached

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

V. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE

OF

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 28 day of April, 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)". At the bottom of each page, print or type "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT

WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY 10 U.S.C. 8013 44 U.S.C. 3101 and EO 9397

PRINCIPAL PURPOSES Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc. and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.

ROUTINE USES Information may be disclosed to local, county, state and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.

DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY. SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No.)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (If known)
2011 04 29	1700	Bldg 200, Rm 02, Keesler AFB	AF-032 2087 2405	OFFENSE COMPLAINT

B. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last First Middle Initial)	SSN	STATUS/GRADE
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	Act Guard E-6
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (If required)	TELEPHONE
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	HOME DUTY
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER	DEROS
James M. Jones	156 th Military Police Det	ALLA

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last First Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
S	E	L	E	

III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank)	INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF special agent, etc.)
	Special Agent

SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
	I have the right to remain silent. This is to say nothing at all.
	Any statement I make oral or written may be (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
	MILITARY ONLY If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
	CIVILIANS ONLY If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Circle One)
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.
	I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

IV. STATEMENT

See Attached 11

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

TRUE

I, **[REDACTED]**, hereby and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initiated all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 29 day
of April, 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page print or type "Last name of individual making the Statement; on (Date)." At the bottom of each page print or type "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

29APR2011

On Wednesday 29APR2011 I, SSG (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 156 MP DET, was at the IMP station during the Blue Screen alert. I was wearing full combat gear with a full MP combat load (210 5.56, 45 9mm, 6 M-203mm HE). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who works in Building 100 (where the IMP station is located) was attempting to gain access to the ANA Compound and asked if I would escort him as a security element. I entered a vehicle with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) CPT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (I believe it was (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and an interpreter. We drove up to Building 101 on the ANA Compound. There were approximately 40 to 50 ANA in uniform and a handful of personnel in civilian attire. Upon exiting the vehicle, I tasked SSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to help me secure our personnel while we waited outside to gain access into the building. I noticed that the front door glass had been shattered and had a few more bullet holes in the other glass. Most of the front entry way was glass. I then met CPT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who wore the MP patch, a CID guy named (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (wearing US multi-cam and speaking with a British accent, and another interpreter. After about ten minutes we were allowed just inside the foyer. We entered alongside a French team that I heard was some sort of post blast investigation team. I noticed blood on the stairwell and stairwell wall. I overheard (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) negotiating with an ANA COL to get to a blast scene then the COL stated that there were 7 confirmed US KIA inside the building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was adamant about entering the room immediately. The COL told him that there were two more suspected insurgents still inside the building. An ANA Commando team was clearing rooms as we waited. After about 20 minutes we were allowed access to the hallway where the room was located. I noticed Arabic writing in blood on the wall on the right as we headed down the hall. This was after (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) negotiated between GEN Rodriguez and an ANA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) CPT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went upstairs to investigate the scene where the shooter (Gul) expired. CPT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took over the room with the US casualties and asked me to secure it and only allow access to his people and Americans only. I blocked the door and was at one point approached by approximately fifteen ANA soldiers with weapons attempting to gain access to the room. I got into a slight shoving match with the ANA soldier in the front and called for their COL. The COL talked to them and moved them to the end of the hallway. I notice blood on the door handle immediately across the hall from the doorway and a trail of blood on the floor. I also noticed bullet holes in the wall that were fired toward the south (approximately 5) I also noticed about six rounds fired in the same direction in the ceiling. There were also bullet holes in the glass of the locked door at the north end of the hall. After about an hour, the Belgian QRF came into the building and secured the hallway. I was then allowed access to the room to see if I could assess any information. I noticed some furniture had been moved around during the incident (chairs tipped over desks moved, etc.). Approximately fifteen feet from the door in between two rows of work stations I saw one male wearing a tan flight suit lying on his back with his head toward the back of the room. Partly lying on top of him was another male in Air Force ACU also on his back with his head toward the front of the room with a visible head shot wound. Both had pools of blood under them. The rows of work stations were on platforms about 6 to 8 inches in height in a stadium layout. There were three platforms to my best recollection. The two aforementioned Officers were on the first raised platform. On the second platform I recall a male in civilian attire (tan khaki

pants and burgundy shirt) pinned between a cubicle and the wall with his head toward the front of the room on the right side as looking from the door. His entire head was covered in blood. On the same side on the third platform I saw another male in a tan flight suit lying face down with his head facing the rear of the room at about a 45 degree angle to the left. There was another small African American male in Air Force ACU lying face down facing the opposite direction as the man next to him. In a small room immediately behind those two I noticed a closer door that appeared to have a hole kicked in it approximately three feet in height and two feet in width. On the left side of the room as looking from the door, I recall two more males but cannot recall with any great accuracy their exact location and position. I noticed footprints across the top of a table on the first raised level with a map on the floor between the table and the first two Officers. The map had bloodstained footprints on it. That could have been done by the Commandos clearing the rooms. I noticed that five of the victims' side arms were missing but cannot recall exactly which five. I then recall approximately 6 to 8 Officers requesting access to the room. I was told they were part of the Command that some of the victims belonged to. They entered the room and talked with CPT (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) and (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) for about 15 minutes then brought an Air Force CPT (I assumed he was a medic since they called him Doc) along with a team of Officers and Enlisted to help move the bodies. The Belgians supplied the body bags. That took approximately one hour. SSgt (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) came to the room and informed me that the group that I rode over with was ready to depart. I asked CPT (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) and (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) if they wanted me to stay for security for them and they said yes. So they returned to KAIA. CPT (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) and (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) interviewed someone who claimed to be a witness. He said he was an Afghani IT worker. I noticed that he stated that Gul was seated at the front of the room and stood up and started firing at the Americans. He also said he hid under the desk adjacent to the civilian victim until it was over then escaped. I then saw him walking CPT (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) through the events. I did not hear any more of his story. Something stood out with me in his story. I noticed during my walk through that the evidence said that the shots were more likely fired from the back of the room. There were casings on the floor in the rear of the room but not in the front. After the evidence and personal belongings were bagged, they were placed in a conference room across the hall and I secured the room. CPT (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) and I were alone in that wing of the building for a few minutes when I heard a lot of commotion on the second floor above us. I informed CPT (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) as he was on the phone and we had eyes on both directions of the hallway. We saw ANA running down the outside stairwell beyond a locked door at our end of the hall. They were running out into the street. Some screaming went on for a few minutes but no rounds went off. The situation seemed to settle down and CPT (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) the interpreter, and myself loaded into their vehicle and headed back to KAIA. I was dropped off at Building 100 and gave CPT (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) my contact info.//////////END OF STATEMENT//////////

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT
 WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013, 44 U.S.C. 3101 and EO 9397
PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI, special agents, etc. and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.
ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.
DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY. SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD): **2011 04 29** TIME: **1855** LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No): **Rm 12 Bldg 200, Kabul, Afghanistan** UNIT TAKING STATEMENT: **AFOSI** REPEAT (if known):
 OFFENSE:
 COMPLAINT:

II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial): (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SSN: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) STATUS/GRADE: **ACT. ARMY / PFC E-3**
 LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code): (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (if required): (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TELEPHONE:
 HOME: DUTY: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code): (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER: **ARMY** DEROS:

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial): GRADE: **SELF** SSN: ORGANIZATION: DUTY PHONE:

III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank): INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF special agent, etc.)
Special Agent

SUSPECT INITIALS: **and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.**

- I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
- Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
- I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
- I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
- I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
- I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
- If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
- MILITARY ONLY:** If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
- CIVILIANS ONLY:** If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS: **I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)**

- I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both about the offense(s) under investigation.
- do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
- want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.

I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

IV. STATEMENT

- SEE ATTACHED STATEMENT -

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 29TH day of APRIL 2011 (year)

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

9. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type the last name of individual making the Statement and Date. At the bottom of each page, print or type: "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

STATEMENT OF:

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X I (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) work at the Thunder Lab on 2-Block. X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

At approximately 1020 hours, SSG (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (my NCOIC) gave PFC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I the order to collect our 10TVS and KEVLAR from downstairs and link up with LTC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (Thunder Lab OIC) At approximately 1025 hours, LTC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) informed me to secure to Northern end of the compound with FG OFF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (U.K.) OFF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stationed himself at the top of the stairs on building 551; while I took position at the top of the guard tower at the Northern North Eastern section of the compound. Unable to enter the tower itself, because it was locked, I held ground at the top of the stairs for a better vantage point. At approximately 1035 hours, LTC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) came to get FG OFF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), and informed me that they were going to check the compound for security. At approximately 1040 hours LTC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) returned with a radio (walkie-talkie) and said it was on the "Command" channel and to listen incase anything happened. At that time he told me that he and FG OFF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were going to secure the exit gate at the back of the compound. I informed FG OFF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that I had seen what looked to be someone peeking thier head over the far T-Wall perimeter, and the very edge of the ANA (Afghan National Army) compound. FG OFF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told me to keep a close watch and to notify him immediately if anything changed. He and LTC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then proceeded on thier patrol. Moments later ~~soon~~ at approximately 1040-1042 hours, I saw ~~an~~ an individual, wearing an ANA uniform, hop up and onto that same T-Wall perimeter that I had informed FG OFF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) about. It wasn't until I saw the wooden ~~stock~~ stock of what appeared to be an AK-47, that X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stock of what appeared to be an AK-47, that X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Page 3 of 3

X (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

I felt some thing was seriously wrong. Normal ANA X (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) soldiers are issued standard M-16's. The ANA uniformed person appeared to be attempting to slide under, or cut, the wire atop the T-Wall. The uniformed person was lying face down atop the T-Wall. I immediately called out Distance and Direction; "12 o'clock, 400 meters." I did this twice before looking behind me and saw that nobody was there. I felt in danger, and thought beyond all doubts that this person was a threat. At this point I made a judgement call and fired a round (tracer) at the target. I was aiming center mass towards the targets' hip/ab area. My round missed the target, and instead hit the T-Wall approximately 4 to 6 inches below the target. At that time the target dropped back over the far side of the T-Wall, and out of my line of sight. I never managed to regain sight of the target. Aside from wearing an ANA Uniform, the target had a shortly-cropped beard, and black boots. The target looked to be about 5 foot 5 inches and approximately 140 pounds. It was a few hours later before I was able to leave my post and notify FG OFF

X (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

. he then informed LTC

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

X (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

X (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

END OF STATEMENT

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT
 WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY 10 U.S.C. 8013, 44 U.S.C. 3101, and EO 9397

PRINCIPAL PURPOSES Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc. and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.

ROUTINE USES Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.

DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY. SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20110508	TIME 1455	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No) Bldg 200 Rm 13	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT AFOSI	REPEAT (if known) OFFENSE COMPLAINT
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II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last First Middle Initial) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	SSN (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	STATUS/GRADE E-7/MSGT
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (if required) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	TELEPHONE HOME (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DUTY
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER 439 ACAS/ SF AIG. 50X	DEROS

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last First Middle Initial)	GRADE SELF	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
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III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 8TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank)	INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.)
---------------------------------	--

SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 8th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as noted above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.
	I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
----------------------	----------------------------------

IV. STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

See Attached Statement

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 8 day of May 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)". At the bottom of each page, print or type "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

On 27 Apr 11, at approximately 1000 I was standing outside of the Life Support Office in KSPAN 2 and I received a cell phone call from TSgt Tara Brown. She stated to me (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) "their shooting in the ACCC! Help me!" I could hear gunshots in the back ground and I heard them get closer to her and prior to the phone going dead I heard the shots right on top of her. During the call I started heading in the direction of the Afghan Conference Center. I stopped just outside of the gate of KSPAN 1 to put rounds in the chambers of both my weapons. MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked me what was wrong and I told him Tara was being shot at in the ACCC. He immediately loaded his M9 and as we were running off I yelled at someone that there was a shooting going on in the ACCC and to tell the WOC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I worked our way to the Conference Center running past many Afghans, who were trying to stop us. I peaked around the corner of the Conference Center and then decided we needed to go around the backside of the building to keep as much cover as possible. We worked our way around and up the side of the building adjacent to the target building. One of the Afghan Generals stopped us at that point and refused to let us go any further. I was attempting to run communications between us and my Captain (Captain (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)) so he could relay to the WOC what was going on. At about this point Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) jumped out of a window (not sure if it was the first or second story) and I signaled them to come to me. We pushed everyone back into a bunker for their safety. I then moved to the hospital with Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). We took up security for the hospital, trying to protect the US personnel inside. At some point the French and the Belgium's showed up, at which time, six of us entered the building. We initially had to enter through the second story since the first floor door was pad locked from the inside. We enter the second floor door closest to the flightline. We saw blood in the hallway and followed the trail to ensure there was no one at the end of it. I then saw Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) /AAF QRF company CC, he signaled for us to follow him. As we were going down the stairs there was blood on them, we followed him toward the ACCC. As we were approaching I saw ABU hats in a conference room, so three us entered the room looking for US personnel. We didn't find any. I then heard one of the guys scream they had found them. We entered the ACCC from the conference room door and that is when I saw the first two bodies in the center of the room. As I approached I noticed one of them didn't have a weapon in his holster, just not sure which one. I noticed the one on the left had a bullet hole in his forehead. We started checking everyone in the room, one of the guys yelled out we found more and then I believe it was MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who told me not to come to the area. They then yelled out she was alive and that they were going to Fireman Carry her out of the room. I watch them carry her out and I saw her weapon hanging off of her. I then check on the guy on the left side of the room and we thought the Afghan's might be taking stuff, so we decided we needed to take their name tapes, weapons and anything else that would make it easier to identify the dead. I took the M9 off of the guy on the left side of the room and placed into my pocket. I then worked my way up to where Maj Ambard and a Captain were. I took the Captain's weapon (M4) by cutting the sling and pulling it off of him. The weapon wasn't loaded; the magazine was on the floor by the filing cabinet. I handed the weapon off to one of the other guys since he didn't have a rifle and I also gave him the magazine. I pulled off the Captain's name tape and then we cut off Maj Ambard's ID holder and took it with us. We decided to evac the building since this seemed to be all of the personnel and there were reports of explosives in the building. We ran back to the Afghan hospital, where they were working on Tara. We started screaming for an Ambulance to take her to the NATO hospital, but couldn't get one. So one the guys grabbed a Prada and we pushed her into the back. Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) rode in the passenger seat and MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I sat

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

MSgt, USAF

439 AEAS/SF Advisor

X in the back holding Tara in. We talked to her all the way to the hospital and then turned her over to the French Medics. After being taken into the hospital I turned over my M9, M4 and the M9 I took from the dead to the French Security. ///End of Statement/// X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

X

X 4 of 4

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT
 WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 16 U.S.C. 8013, 44 U.S.C. 3101, and EO 13397

PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc. and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.

ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.

DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY. SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD): 20110429	TIME: 1505	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No): BLDG 200 / Rm 12	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT: AFOSI	REPEAT (if known): OFFENSE COMPLAINT
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II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial): (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	SSN: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	STATUS/GRADE: CAPT / ACTIVE
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code): (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (if required): (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	TELEPHONE: HOME (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DUTY (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code): 1406 AUSTIN ST (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DEROS: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial): (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	GRADE: CAPT	SSN: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	ORGANIZATION: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DUTY PHONE: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
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III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank):
INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.)
Special Agent

SUSPECT INITIALS: and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

- I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
- Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
- I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
- I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
- I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
- I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
- If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
- MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
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- do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
- want a lawyer. will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.
- I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT:	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER:
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IV. STATEMENT

X

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

X

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

STATEMENT ATTACHED

X

X

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF WITNES INTERVIEWER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 30TH day of APRIL 2011 (year)

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "Last name of individual making the Statement on (Date)." At the bottom of each page, print or type "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries, and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

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Details of ACCC attack on U.S. personnel

By Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) USAF Active Duty

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X **Background:** I have been in country since 8 Apr. My first day of work was 9 Apr. I have attended the "1000 meeting" Saturday-Wednesday every day since I have been in AOR. The meeting is not held on Thursday or Friday. This meeting occurs in either the main conference room or the ACCC room (where the shooting occurred) dependent on who has the main conference room (based on rank). This particular week we had held the meeting in the ACCC room twice (Sunday, Tuesday). Every day we are in seats at 1000 and we call the Ministry of Defense (MOD). It begins with an afghan intel report, weather report, discussion of aircraft available from maintenance (fixed wing and rotary wing), intercolot briefs what cargo needs to be moved and where. MOD then tasks each of the flying squadrons for the next day. We hang up with MOD and then verify which aircraft will fly, where they will go and who the flight crews will be. There are typically 18-23 people in this meeting with a couple of occasions exceeding 25 people. This usually consists of 4 or 5 American Mentors, 10-15 Afgan National Army (ANA)/Afghan Air Force (AAF) and 3-5 interpreters. The key American personnel are Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) USAF (Maintenance Mentor), AC1 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) USN (Flight Operations Mentor), Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (Rotary Wing Scheduler Mentor), Lt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) USN (Fixed Wing Scheduler Mentor). Each of these mentors brings an interpreter. My interpreter is (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (not sure of last name)...AKA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I don't know the other interpreters names. I typically walk over between 0950-0955. It is not unusual for the meeting to start late, up to 20 minutes late. These meetings are disorganized by American standards but do follow the general format stated above. Key Afghan personnel that I recognize by name are Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (Current Operations/Short Term Plans), Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (ACCC), Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (Maintenance), and Abdul Gul (Intercolot=ATOC/PAX Movement). On a normal basis during this meeting, Maj David "Klepto" Brodeur and Lt Col Frank "Bruiser" Bryant and the civilian contractor are the only U.S. mentors in the ACCC room. Character: Abdul Gul has always struck me as very mild-mannered and respectful. He had what I considered a professional demeanor. I would not have suspected him of this attack based on at least 20 interactions with him.

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X **27 April:** On the day of the incident, I walked to the Wing building at approximately 0950. I noticed at least one Afghan guard armed with an M-16 standing at the West entrance of the building on the porch. This was common. Inside there was another guard on the right behind a semi-circle desk. He did not have a rifle visible. I did not notice whether or not he had a handgun on his uniform. I got there at about 0955 and took my normal seat at the table on the South side of the room (ref. Diagram). Seated to my right (in order) were AC1 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Capt Nylander and Lt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Across the table from me was Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were all present at 1000. The Weather Afghan (unknown name) was present and to my recollection so was the Intel Afghan (unknown name). There are typically 3 Afghan personnel who sit to my left (other side of my

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X interpreter) whose jobs and names I do not know. Those seats were filled as well. My interpreter (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X was sitting directly to my left. I know (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) IT was present and I think that Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) IT was there as well. I am not sure if Lt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) IT was present. Abdul Gol was not present at the meeting at the time. I remember checking my watch at 1015 and we had not called MOD which frustrated me. This was the second day in a row that we were late getting started. It did not strike me as odd that Abdul Gol was not yet in the conference room, because the Afghans are not always punctual and we had not initiated the call to MOD. This was the Wednesday meeting so we were discussing the details for Thursday, Friday and Saturday. We had already exchanged all of the tail numbers that we expected to report to MOD for the next 3 days flying schedule. At that point we were just waiting for the phone call. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Nylander and I were talking to each other and exchanging jokes. This was within 5 minutes of me checking my watch at 1015.

I was looking down at my ID holder and fiddling with a credit card when the first shot was fired (no later than 1020). Pop. Everyone looked up at this moment, but no one reacted except for my interpreter who kicked his chair over and started running out the door to the west side of the room. About one second later the second series of shots began. Pop, Pop, Pop. Pause. Pop, Pop, Pop. Pop, Pop. At this point the volume of fire escalated to a constant volley. When the second series of shots was fired everyone in my conference room began to react. Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) got out of his chair and chambered a round almost immediately. He moved to the Northwest corner of the room and kept his weapon trained on the Northeast door in the room which connected our room to the ACCC room where the gunfire was occurring. At the second series of shots I was scrambling to get out of my chair. All of the chairs in this room are big and plush. They also do not have rollers on them. This made it very difficult for me to push away from the table. I got tangled in the chair attempting to get out from behind the desk and ultimately dropped/tripped to the floor to get behind cover and draw my weapon. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), Nylander and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) all ran over me as they egressed the room. I was already on the ground and behind a reasonable amount of cover provided by the large conference table directly behind the place I had been seated. At this point I began to unholster my weapon. I struggled to draw (probably 4-6 seconds). I finally got my weapon out, chambered a round and placed it on fire. This is actually the first point that I had situational awareness on the position that Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had taken. I put my weapon on the same door that Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had his weapon trained on (Northeast). He and I were the only people in the room that had weapons out and trained. I moved myself to the southwest corner of the room and remained there shifting my eyes between the threat door and the entrance/exit door. There were at least 15 people trying to run out a standard sized door at the same time. To be clear this is a double door that always has one side locked in place. Only half of the door was open. I knew that there was no way I could get out until all the other people had exited the room. The last thing I remember was an Afghan shorter than me wearing a yellow shirt exiting the room. Once he was out of the door the exit was clear for myself and Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to GO. The volume of fire at this point had never let up. I would estimate that this was 25-30 seconds from the time the first shot was fired. All of the shots that I heard fired sounded like pistol fire. I never heard anything that sounded automatic to me. I shouted to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) "Let's get the fuck out of here." From this point I began a dead sprint head and shoulders low. I was the second to last person to leave the room, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was the last. I did not look North up the hallway (toward ACCC). My goal was to run hard use the people behind me as cover X

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(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X (no Americans) and to put distance between me and the threat. There were still people in front and behind me leaving the building. As I rounded the corner that led into the main foyer an Afghan in ANA uniform had grabbed my collar. I don't feel that he was a threat. He was not pushing me so much as riding me. When I turned the corner I shook him and he lost his grip and his feet. He slid down the hallway and I kept running to the main entrance on the West side of the building. I lost Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) after I turned my back in the room. He communicated to me later that he had put 5 shots down the hallway at an Afghan who exited the ACCC room with what appeared to be a weapon in his hand. When I cleared the main entrance I scanned about a 120 degree sector directly in front of me and did not assess any threats. There were still a lot of shots being fired, but it seemed to be at a slower rate as I made my way to the 2-2.5 ft berm located in-between the ACCC building and the rotary wing building. At the point that I reached the berm, I estimate that I had covered roughly 100 meters from the conference room. I was gassed and I dove down behind the berm and turned to face the threat building. There were still shots being fired, but there were no gunmen outside. Afghans were still trickling out of the building just a couple people at a time but were not moving with the sense of urgency that I had at this point. I got back up and got to the western edge of the road (west of the berms) and continued jogging to my building. I passed some Afghans who were gawking and some that were in a bunker. I got to the rotary wing building and several people directed me to holster my weapon. I saw my interpreter already in the building panting and scared shitless. He was happy that I made it out. I walked past him directly to my desk and donned body armor, Kevlar helmet and Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) M-4 and took post on the South side of my building in the hallway (1st floor) guarding the stairwell. By the time I had completely kitted up and assumed the watch, it was barely 1030. I stood watch until 1230 at which point I asked for relief. I took about 15 minutes and then took up post again. I asked for relief on and off until approximately 1810ish at which point we were evacuated by armored escort in a bus.

Takeaways/Conjecture: I know where Capt Nylander was found shot dead. I know he got out of the room before me. The entire time that I was running I heard gunfire. Shooters had not breached the hallway when I left, well after Nylander. Nylander had enough time to escape the building completely. It is impossible that this attack was perpetrated by 1 shooter.

There are typically 30-50 personnel (no more than 10 U.S., and this is high estimate) between ACCC and the conference room on any given day between the hours of 1000-1100. The fact that not a single Afghan was killed indicates to me that this attack was calculated. Furthermore, no Afghans came to the aid of U.S. personnel.

Interpreters were telling me who the shooter was within 1 hour of the shooting starting. They had received this information via text message (from other interpreters) or overheard our Afghan squadron pilots (Mi-17) discussing it from texts that they had received. Point is that someone had identified the shooter, but did nothing to stop him. And then left the building.

The interpreters did communicate to me that Abdul Gol did have (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) members who also worked on the base. I can't remember the relationship (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). It was some combination (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) of the four (i.e not (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)). One worked at the hospital or clinic. The other somewhere X

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X else that I do not recall. As I am typing this I am remembering the relationship of the clinic to the building and where Capt Nylander was killed. Something to think about. X

Around 1300 all of the Afghans in our squadron left the building to go eat lunch at their chow hall. We had not even had a QRF (ISAF) respond at this point in time. This is an indication to me that they are either extremely stupid (which I don't believe) or they felt secure.

The Interpreters have a strong social network and are generally spot on from what I have noticed from my short time here. They informed that no Afghans were going to attend the Victory Day parade at the city stadium because they were concerned with the security risk. Two days later the Afghan military called off the planned flight demonstration that they had flown 7 or 8 practices for, in preparation. This was on the 24th or 25th of April. The reason was never exactly clear from the actual Afghan squadron commander's, but the Intel on our side was that it was cancelled because President Karzai was not going to attend because of the security risk. Once again...Point is the IT's know the pulse of what's happening. They do not trust the ANA. The ANA are abusive of them and resentful because IT's make roughly 2 times as much money per month. IT's have to lie about their real jobs in town for fear of reprisal. I say this to demonstrate that the IT's don't gain much from lying to the coalition. We are their biggest protection and every single one's end game is a U.S. Visa.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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X **Going Forward:** It is my belief that the Afghan's have learned that we are soft targets and that they can be successful again. There are people out there who harbor hate and discontent with motive. If I had to pick one individual who I believe to be the next threat, it would be a Mi-17 pilot in my squadron. His name is (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Lt Col - said ad Maj. Corruption abounds here and rank displayed is not always accurate. He was fired from the Presidential Airlift Squadron (PAS) on the recommendation of an American mentor still here (Maj. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)). The details of his firing need to be discussed with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). I can say that he is disgruntled and has been demonstratively angry and disrespectful to Americans twice in my short tenure. This is out of character for Afghan's as these emotions are viewed as a sign of weakness.

If we do not provide a coalition security force on the Afghan side of this base, it is my fear that another attack like this will occur and more troops will die. X

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END OF STATEMENT

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(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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PAGE 6 OF 6

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STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT

WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY 10 U.S.C. 8013 44 U.S.C. 3101 and EO 9397

PRINCIPAL PURPOSES Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc. and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken

ROUTINE USES Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings

DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY. SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD): 20110429	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No): Bldg 200 Rm 12	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT: AFOSI	REPEAT (if known): OFFENSE: COMPLAINT:
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II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial): (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	SSN: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	STATUS/GRADE: Major
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code): (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (if required): (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	TELEPHONE: HOME: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DUTY:
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code): (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER: USAF 400th AFB NM	DEROS:

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial):	GRADE:	SSN:	ORGANIZATION:	DUTY PHONE:
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III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank):
INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF special agent, etc.)
Special Agent

SUSPECT INITIALS: *MAJ*
and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

- I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all
- Any statement I make oral or written may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings
- I have the right to consult with a lawyer
- I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview
- may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government
- may request a lawyer any time during this interview
- if I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time
- MILITARY ONLY If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge
- CIVILIANS ONLY If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities

SUSPECT INITIALS: *MAJ*
I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)

- I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation
- do not want a lawyer and do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions
- want a lawyer will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer
- I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT: SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER:

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

IV. STATEMENT

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) STATEMENT ATTACHED X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Maj USAF

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 30TH day

of APRIL 2011 (year)

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "Last name of individual making the Statement, or Date." At the bottom of each page, print or type "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries, and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subject: 27 April Incident Report
By: Major (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

29 April 2011

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X 1. The purpose of this report is to relay the events as I perceived them during the 27 April attack at Kabul International Airport rendering 9 US KIA, 1 EKIA, and 4 AAF WIA. Throughout this document I will be referencing Attachment A for the purposes of general area and objective building orientation. Additionally, for clarity, my role during this deployment has been as the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for the 438th Air Expeditionary Squadron (AEAS) and as the mentor/pilot to the Afghan Presidential Air Service (PAS) tasked to provide VVIP transport to President Karzai and visiting Heads of State. My duties routinely require interface with high-ranking Afghan General Officers and at the time of the attack I was 11 ½ months into a 365 day deployment.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. My involvement with the incident in question begins at 0900 26 April when I went to the PAS headquarter building (immediately south of the objective building labeled Corps - ACCC.... ref Atth A) for a meeting with the Afghan squadron CC BG Wahab - First name unknown (For the remainder of this document he shall be referred to as the PAS CC). The purpose of this meeting was to prebrief for a 1000 meeting with LtGen (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) - First name unknown - the Afghan Air Corps CC (For the remainder of this document he shall be referred to as the AAF CC). This meeting between the PAS CC, AAF CC, and myself had been confirmed a day prior via cell hone from the PAS CC to AAF CC late in the afternoon. Expectation was that the recently appointed AAF CC would be briefed on the unique requirements and skill sets of the PAS squadron as part of his indoc as he assumed commanded from the previous AAF CC (LtGen (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) only 2 to 2 ½ weeks prior by the PAS CC. However, upon arrival to the PAS CC's office I was informed that our 1000 meeting would have to be rescheduled due to the fact that the AAF CC called for a last minute meeting of his commanders/key staff at the Afghan Conference Center with an in place time NLT 0950. After conversing for about 20-25 minutes regarding upcoming missions I informed the PAS CC that I would leave to begin mission planning for an upcoming air assault with the 438th AEAS so he could attend his all Afghan meeting at 1000. He said that that 'would be good if I stayed over there to plan'. Assuming that the AAF CC's impromptu meeting was regarding security for the upcoming national holiday on 28 April I then departed the squadron and left for the rotary squadron (ref Atth A) where I began mission planning.

3. In hindsight three things were odd about this exchange: 1) I have never known Afghans to hold last minute meetings without mentor involvement (tasking is usually always via cell phone command and control) 2) AAF leadership never holds meetings at odd times such as 0950 nor with NLT criteria 3) The PAS CC choice of words conveying that it would be good to stay in the rotary building to plan.

4. Now on 27 April there were two additional meetings scheduled to take place in the Air Corps HQ Bldg besides the one with the AAF CC, PAS CC, and myself on the second floor in the AAF CC's office. These were both scheduled for the first floor in the ACCC ops Center and ACCC conference room. The meeting in the ACCC ops center was for the purpose of planning MI-35 rocket box patrols (security over Kabul city) on 28 April and maximum mentor participation was requested. I was X

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3 OF 8 PAGES

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notified of this meeting that morning and it is not recurring. The second meeting in the Air Corps building takes place in the ACCC conference room adjoining to the ops center and occurs daily at 1000 for the purpose of planning out the next day's schedule. Involvement in this meeting is usually 5-7 US mentors and approximately 12-15 Afghans.

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

5. Upon reaching the rotary building I began mission planning for an air assault the next day with AAF pilots and Croatian mentors. At approximately 1030 I heard Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) run in with a 9mm drawn and shouting that there had been a shooting in the ACCC. Upon looking outside I noticed several people uniformed AAF, US contractors, and individuals dressed in civilian clothing moving away from the Air Corps in a panicked state. We promptly brought all personnel into the hallways, closed doors to avoid line of sight from windows, and posted two-person security at all 6 building exits. After security was set I took over the LMR and trained guards eyes on the objective building. Throughout the next 10-15 minute individuals began to sporadically come out of the Air Corps building and a small Afghan cordon unit set up security around the perimeter. It was then that I observed an individual with a long gun (type unknown) on the second floor third window from the sw corner of the Air Corps HQ Bldg. Shortly there after I perceived what I assessed to be muzzle flashes and started preparations to handle possible barricaded shooter/hot hallway scenarios. The radio net was saturated at the same time with reports of multiple Afghan wounded and 1 US critical in the medical clinic (Bldg 305... ref Atth A)). Due to the delayed QRF response, perceived ineffective Afghan cordon, and urgency of the medical situation I took MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with me in a white van to aid in the situation at the clinic.

6. After entering the clinic I first encountered SSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who had set up a triage for 4 Afghan WIA. I asked if any were critical to which he replied no and then asked where the US patient was. He replied that it was Capt Nylander who was KIA. Immediately I had him take me to the body that was under armed guard and uncovered the blanket to which I confirmed no vital signs/no pulse and palpated a single gunshot wound to the left rear of the skull with no exit wound. At that time I moved back to the Afghan patients while several other US soldiers prepped Capt Nylander's body to move. Taking the handoff on each patient I then consulted via cell phone with Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (Fight Surgeon) who wanted Nylander's body moved up to the French hospital stat. With the handoff of injury I then departed Bldg 305 with Capt Nylander (plus IDs & weapon), MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and LtCol (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) whom we picked up from the rotary building per his request via cell phone to MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) as Capt Nylander's supervisor. In the minute transit from Bldg 305 to rotary I began chest compressions with no patient response. After pickup of LtCol (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I stopped chest compressions of Capt Nylander and focused on the tactical movement of the patient.

7. Initial plan was to drive to the ISAF hospital via H taxiway until we heard on the LMR that the Belgium berm gate had opened. Upon reaching the open gate at approximately 5 mph I dismounted and put my hands in the air shouting US critical patient so as to dissuade being misperceived as possessing a VBIED. After reaching the hospital the ER docs promptly helped offloading Capt Nylander but were unable to resuscitate in the ER. X

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4 OF 8 PAGES

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8. From this point on I remained working the situation from either the Kabul hospital or Kabul Command post. I became aware shortly after delivering Capt Nylander to the ER that there was a second patient inbound who turned out to be TSgt Tara Brown. 5 Americans apparently entered the Corps HQ upon learning from exiting Afghans that there were still Americans inside. Their initial actions were to begin clearing the building until an Afghan AAF soldier gestured to them where the Americans were. What they found were several bodies and only one critical patient in the ACCC. Deciding to pull ID cards off the KIA they focused their attention on TSgt Brown and ultimately delivered her to the French hospital with weak vitals. After about 10 minutes we received word that she expired shortly after admittance to the ER due primarily to a fatal gunshot wound to the head.

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. Debriefing the team that entered the building for intelligence to aid the Belgium QRF I learned of Dari writing in blood on the walls and a large number of spent rounds/clips on scene. This made me think there were multiple shooters both due to the time involved in grandstanding with blood writings and the volume of fatal headshots. Additionally the fact that Capt Nylander's body was found by our medic team outside the west entrance to the building and the remaining KIA in immediate vicinity of the ACCC made me think that we had additional shooters who exited with the mass crowd of civilians/AAF troops. We decided to prep the QRF accordingly for roving threats and hours later they breached and finally secured the building for the last time. After all KIA were delivered to the Afghan hospital I began the task of cataloging personal effects and acquiring weapons from the hospital armory for later exploitation (ref Atth B). Later that evening I was appointed by Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (438th AEW CV) as the weapons custodian to ensure safe storage of all firearms and weapons throughout the investigation process.

10. At no time did I ever observe what I could ID as a potential shooter exiting the Air Corps building although it would be impossible to differentiate at a range of approximately 300m from the rotary building. It would have been very easy for additional enemy to exit the scene, as it was nearly 15 minutes after the initial shots before any effective perimeter defense was established. Furthermore, the strange coincidences in meeting change time and removal of key leadership from the scene just prior to the incident lead me to believe that there was prior knowledge of the impending event by AAF members other than the shooter.

11. In summary, this successful attack was timed when mentors were at their peak numbers in the Air Corps HQ building and AAF leadership was conspicuously absent. Additionally, the lack of professionalism inherent with the AAF QRF capability puts our force in a compromising environment where it would be nearly impossible to positively identify active shooters as friends or foes. Based upon my experience with the individuals KIA it would be also be unlikely that all 9 would be fatally wounded given their heightened alert posture & weapons proficiency prior to effectively returning fire.

12. For additional questions or clarification please contact me at

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(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

, or (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

@swa.army.mil, or

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

@hotmail.com.

X

~~END OF STATEMENT~~

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Major (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
438th AEAS DO/PAS Mentor

5 OF 8 PAGES

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

27 April Weapons Accountability

Weapon Type	Serial #	Assigned	Biohazard	Controlled	Clips/Ammo
SW9VE	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		N	Y	N
SW9VE			N	Y	N
SW9VE			N	Y	N
SW9VE			N	Y	N
SW9VE			N	Y	N
SW9VE			N	Y	N
SW9VE			N	Y	N
SW9VE			N	Y	N
SW9VE			N	Y	N
SW9VE			N	Y	N
SW9VE			N	Y	N
SW9VE			N	Y	N
SW9VE			N	Y	N
SW9VE			N	Y	N
SW9VE			N	Y	N
9mm Lugar	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		N	Y	N
9mm Lugar			N	Y	N
9mm Lugar			N	Y	N
9mm Lugar			N	Y	N
9mm Beretta	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	Nylander, Nathan	N	Y	N
9mm Beretta	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	Brodeur, David	N	Y	N
9mm Beretta	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		N	Y	N
9mm Beretta			N	Y	1 x 15 Round
9mm Beretta			Y	Y	N
GAU-5	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		N	Y	N
M4			N	Y	1 x 30 Round
M4			N	Y	N
Loose 9mm Clip	N/A	Unknown	Y	Y	15 Round
Loose 9mm Clip	N/A	Unknown	Y	Y	15 Round
Loose 9mm Clip	N/A	Brodeur, David	N	Y	15 Round
3 x 9mm Clips	N/A	Unknown	N	Y	15 Round
Loose 5.56mm Cli	N/A	Unknown	N	Y	30 Round

ATTACHMENT B

PAGE 2

Rank	Last	First	Weapon Type	Weapon Serial	Recovered	Weapon Type	Weapon Serial	Recovered
Maj	Ambard	Philip	M4	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)				
Maj	Ausborn	Jeffrey	M4					
Maj	Brodeur	David	M4					
TSgt	Brown	Tara	M4					
Lt Col	Bryant	Frank	M4					
Capt	Nylander	Nathan	M4					
Capt	Ransom	Charles						
Maj	Estelle	Raymond	M4					
LtCol (Ret)	McGlaughlin	James						

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

NOT USED - END OF ATTACHMENT

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

PAGE 8 OF 8

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT
 WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY 10 U.S.C. 8013 44 U.S.C. 3101 and EO 9397

PRINCIPAL PURPOSES Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc. and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.

ROUTINE USES Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.

DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY. SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (If known)
20110430	2000	Bldg 2000 Rm US 13	AFOSI EDET 2405	OFFENSE COMPLAINT

II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	SSN	STATUS/GRADE
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	AD-03
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (If required)	TELEPHONE
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER	DEROS
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	n/a

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
		Self		

III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 6TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank)	INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF special agent, etc.)
	Special Agent

SUSPECT INITIALS and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 6th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

- I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
- Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
- I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
- I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
- I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
- I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
- If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) any time.
- MILITARY ONLY:** If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me.
- CIVILIANS ONLY:** If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)

- I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both about the offense(s) under investigation.
- I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
- I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.
- I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

IV. STATEMENT

See Attached III

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 30 day of April 2011 (year)

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page print or type "Last name of individual making the Statement on Date." At the bottom of each page print or type "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

STATEMENT FROM (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) CAPT, USAF

REGARDING EVENTS OF 27 APR 2011 AT AAF AIR CORPS HQ BUILDING

KABUL AFGHANISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

KABUL AFGHANISTAN

Begin statement: On 27 Apr 2011, I began my day arriving at the Oquab compound on the AAF side of KAIA at 0650. I then attended the regularly scheduled Kabul AW MXG/CC maintenance meeting which ran from 0700 to approximately 0745. Nothing out of the ordinary occurred during that meeting so I went to the Operations building across the street to talk to Capt (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) about the daily flying and maintenance status. At approximately 0800 I concluded meeting with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and decided to go to the ISAF side to visit the dental clinic for a sore tooth. As I was walking across the AAF compound towards ISAF I noticed a convoy of vehicles with an AAF 2 star general and security detail driving towards the Air Corps HQ building. I continued walking to the ISAF side and visited the dental clinic at approximately 0830. My dental clinic visit ended at approximately 0940 at which time I walked back to the AAF compound and decided to attend the regularly scheduled 1000 Wing scheduling meeting which is held in the AAF Air Corps HQ building. I texted my commander Maj (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) that I was back on the AAF compound and then texted my IT, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) to meet me at the scheduling meeting. As I was approaching the HQ building I noticed that the AAF 2 star vehicle convoy was departing but did not seem to have the same amount of security members and that two of the trail vehicles did not have the heavy machine guns that they had earlier in the morning. At that time I entered the HQ building through the front door and proceeded to the 1st floor conference room where the daily scheduling meeting was held. As I was turning to go down the hallway to the conference room I passed a USAF African-American female Tech Sergeant and an USAF Male Captain talking in the hallway. I caught a portion of their conversation, where the Tech Sergeant stated to the Capt that they had lost track of someone. Due to the recent issues with imbedded AAF attackers, I assumed that they were talking about someone they were supposed to be escorting. However, since I was running late for time, I proceeded to the conference room where I arrived at approximately 1000. As I entered the room, I greeted several of the Afghans and US Mentors that were already sitting at the table, to include (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Petty Officer (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (sic), Capt Nylander, and Major (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) my Kabul AW RW MX Deputy Sq/CC, of whom I mentor for maintenance (MX) and flight scheduling. I sat down next to Maj (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) along the wall adjacent to the ACCC and proceeded to discuss the next 3 days of scheduling with him. I had probably not been at my seat for more than 5 minutes when I heard what sounded like a gunshot coming from the ACCC followed by multiple gunshots in rapid succession. I immediately stood up, drew my 9mm pistol from my shoulder holster, chambered a round and put the weapon on fire. I faced the door at the back of the conference room which adjoins the ACCC and proceeded to move

Page 3 of 4

(b)(6)
(b)(7)
(C)

towards the front (West side) of the conference room. I looked over my shoulder to check the front door to see that the room occupants (AAF and US) were exiting, so I continued to cover the back door and moving to the main conference room door. I met (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) at the the main door and he and I exited the conference room into the hallway. I immediately pointed my weapon North down the hallway to cover the front ACCC door in case anyone attempted to exit. At that time, an Afghan male, possibly 5'9-5'11" and approximately 200 lbs, wearing what looked like a light blue shirt exited the ACCC front door with what appeared to be a weapon in his hand. Fearing for my safety and the safety of my fellow mentors I decided to fire on that individual at which time I fired approximately 8 rounds from my 9mm. As I was about to fire, I noticed someone standing next to me which I believed to be Capt Nylander. I looked at him and he looked at me and then I began to fire. I believe at that time that he also fired shots at the individual. As we were firing and as the individual was exiting the door, the individual fell to the floor into the hallway. Believing that my life was still in danger, I turned and fled from the hallway into the main entranceway of the HQ building and out through the front door. At that time I proceeded down the front of the HQ building where I passed an ANA guard fumbling with his M-16. I ran passed him, crossed over the road next to the round-about and moved behind the building just South of the HQ building. I continued South behind the MXG building where I saw PO (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and then turned east towards JAF I aircraft hangar where I met my follow Rotary Wing MX mentors in the RW tool room. That was at approximately 1030. End statement. ///

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

page 4 of 4

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
(C)

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT

WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013, 44 U.S.C. 3101, and EO 9397

PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc. and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.

ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.

DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY. SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No.)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (if known)
26/10/30	1630	Bldg 200 RM 02, Kabul, Afghanistan	AFOSI	OFFENSE COMPLAINT

II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	SSN (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	STATUS/GRADE AD/E-7
LOCAL ADDRESS (include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (if required) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	TELEPHONE (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OR RECORD (include Zip Code)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER	DEROS
Seymour Johnson AFB, NC	USAF	8 MAR 12

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
	SELF			

III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank)

INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF special agent, etc.)
Special Agent

SUSPECT INITIALS and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

- I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
- Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
- I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
- I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
- I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
- I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
- If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
- MILITARY ONLY** If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
- CIVILIANS ONLY** If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)

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- do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
- I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.

I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)
X

IV. STATEMENT

X (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

X (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

- Statement Attached -

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

X (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C) hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 1ST day of MAY 2011 (year)

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH
(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "Last name of individual making the Statement; on Date: ". At the bottom of each page, print or type "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

X (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) On the morning of 27 April 2011, I, MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was working in my office in K-span 3. At approximately 1010L (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Afghan interpreter for JS came running into the office saying, "there is shooting at the HQ Bldg". At that time I donned my gear, a few minutes later, and when more info started to come in I received a call from my interpreter (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (sp) he said that "there was shooting in the ACCC and people are hurt". At that time the phone went dead. I immediately called the Kanoc (ISAF Command Post) and reported what was going on. I then briefed Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW/CV on what I had heard; he attempted to dispatch me to K-span 2 to work the Wing Ops Center (WOC), I could not get there because the Afghan QRC was on scene and it would have been too dangerous. When I returned I attempted, numerous times to reach Maj Brodeur, Lt Col Bryant and my interpreters via cell phone. I reached (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and he was safe in another part of the base, he told me that Amad Gul (sp) was the shooter, he was 100% sure. I also reached (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and asked him repeatedly where Maj Brodeur and Col Bryant were; he said that he did not know, he also said that Amad Gul was the shooter. He said he saw him come in and starting shooting everyone. At that point we were locked down to the K-span and information was coming in very slowly, I learned that Lt Col Bryant was dead, and a while later I learned Maj Brodeur along with the others were dead. Later in the day, around 1700L I accompanied CMSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SMSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to the ACCC to retrieve some personal effects and for CID and the Afghans to interview (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I then returned to my office in K-span 3 and waited to be evacuated.

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) In my three months in the ACCC have had never seen Amad Gul angry, nor had any negative experiences with him. He was the guy that we all thought understood what we were trying to do. He was a breath of fresh air with his smile, he was always first to come in a shake everyone's hand and exchange greetings. He was trusted. When I learned he was the shooter I thought there was no way, it had to have been someone else. He just didn't seem like someone who could have done what he did.

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) We all, myself, Lt Col Bryant, Maj Brodeur, and Jim Mclaughlin had very good working relationships with all of the Afghans. Lt Col Bryant spoke their language; they almost all came to him for advice. Maj Brodeur and Jim had formed very strong relationships with them all as well, including Gul. The tone that we use in mentoring is one of understand, of helping. There is never any aggressive behavior and/or talk; we normally do not make demands, just suggestions. This allows for the Afghans to take our advice and do what they want with it, as apposed to telling them the way things need to be done. We allow them to make the decisions. We felt very confident in this method and felt respected for the most part.

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) *End of Statement* X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT
 WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY 10 USC 8013 44 USC 3101 and EO 9397

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DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY SSA is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (If known)
2011 05 01	1600	Room #2 Bldg 200, Kabul, Afghanistan	AF251	OFFENSE
				COMPLAINT

II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	SSN	STATUS/GRADE
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(2) A1 AF
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (if required)	TELEPHONE
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	HOME
		DUTY
		CELL
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER	DEROS
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	USAF	

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
	SELF			

III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

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ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank)

INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF special agent, etc.)
Special Agent

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- I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
- I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
- I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
- I may request a lawyer any time during the interview.
- If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
- MILITARY ONLY** If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
- CIVILIANS ONLY** If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice: (Initial One)

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- I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
- I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.

I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

IV. STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SEE ATTACHED STATEMENT

X

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 1ST day of MAY 2011 (year)

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "Last name of individual making the Statement" on (Date). At the bottom of each page, print or type "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Statement for 27 Apr 2011

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X Around 1000, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (not sure of spelling, Afghan Surgeon General) grabbed me and said shots were fired outside. I immediately went red and ran out the front of the Afghan clinic began setting up security with Afghan soldiers. I could hear shots coming from behind me and to my left when I exited the front of the Afghan clinic. From the corner, I put an Afghan soldier and myself there. I saw MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) running from cover to cover and yelled for him to come and that we had him covered. I had my IT inform the Afghan soldier to cover him. Then we saw a Maj and a contractor (I do not remember their names) and we covered them. I was pulled inside to go treat wounded that were coming in. There was an IT shot in the arm, an Afghan with a broken leg or ankle and an Afghan with a gunshot to the stomach. I believe I had three or four more wounded but I do not remember the extent of their wounds. I informed the Afghan medics and docs what to do and ran back outside since I deemed their injuries not life threatening and that they were stable. X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

When I got back outside, I could hear heavy gunfire coming from the building. I was told that there was an American down. I asked for a vest and an Afghan medic threw it on me. I told MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to cover me, drew my M9 and I took off to where I heard shots being fired. I came around a burm on the backside of the building and saw an American down. As I approached, I waved to two Afghan soldiers to cover me because I had to cross a double door with a hallway and the shooting was still coming from the inside the building. They stood up off the burm and waved me to go to the other side. I grabbed Capt Nylander and drug him about 200 yards until the IT and an Afghan medic got to me with a litter. X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

I began working on Capt in the back of the ambulance and continued resuscitation efforts in the ER. I pronounced him deceased at 1034. I had MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) inform Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) over the phone that the Capt was KIA. I ordered for the Capt to be moved to a secure room and MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was posted to guard the room. He was shot in the leg and back of the head. We verified he fired his weapon and only had one bullet left. X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

The Afghans brought in the suspected shooter. We immediately went to work on him. Cutting his uniform, I could see the shots to his chest and arm. MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) performed chest compressions for me as I tried intubating. I want to say I pronounced him deceased 1100. He was shot in the chest three times and once in the arm. At some point, MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and E4 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (navy) showed up. I immediately ordered (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I believe (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to give me security out the back of the Afghan clinic. MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was on the phone and informing leadership I needed help this whole time. I heard a single gunshot when I was outside but it was not from the building but outside in the distance. X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

We heard there where American's that were down inside the building and we immediately set up a fire team to go in. Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), E4 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), my IT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I headed in. We cleared rooms as we went until we got to the room. There was writing on the walls in blood. When we arrived, we X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) immediately found two in the center aisle, one on the left second row I believe and three X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X in the back right of the room. This is where we found Tara Brown. She was still alive. I X
tried dragging her then MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) helped put her on MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) so he could fireman
carry her out. We placed her on a litter and in the ambulance. She was alive and had a
strong grip on my hand. In the ER, her hand released mine, I checked her pulse and she
no longer had one. I begin resuscitation efforts as MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) cut away her clothes. I
ordered EPI that my Afghan medic gave her. Her pulse came back and she immediately
grabbed my arm again. MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told me there was a vehicle of opportunity and I
ordered to wrap her up and go instead of waiting for help to arrive. MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), MSgt
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) elected to take her in the SUV. She was shot in the
back and the back of the head. Her M4 was red when my IT and I cleared it, I cannot
confirm if she ever fired her weapon. X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

I heard reports that others were missing. During this time, the French, Belgians showed
up. They said they were doctors. I pointed at the building and asked for them to go with
me but they only ran into the clinic. The doc asked me what do I have and told him. They
wouldn't go in the building so I told them to get the wounded out. X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X
As they were loading, I yelled to E4 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and said we need to go back in. TSgt
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said they would go to. I have no idea when these two
arrived to help. I put (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on point and we moved back in, clearing rooms again as we
went. When we got back to the room, we began checking to see if anyone was alive, this
is when we found two more off to the right. We found another airman and a contractor
that we had missed the first time we entered the room. X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X

I called Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on the phone because we were unable to get the net clear to speak. I
informed him I was back in the building, we checked, counted the deceased three times
and I gave him 7 as KIA in the room. He told me the building may be rigged with
explosives and to get out. I ordered my fire team that we were leaving. The guys didn't
want to leave our guys behind but I made the decision to post two Afghan soldiers on the
back door and closed the front door. I asked my IT to inform the soldier to guard the front
door of the room. I informed the guys that we had to leave because we didn't know if the
building or the deceased had been rigged with bombs. As we left, I asked for a pen. I
wrote on the door 7 KIA and my last name. X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X

We made our way back to the Afghan clinic. During this event, I remember speaking to
the command chief, the first shirt and commander (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on the road in front of the
building. I also remember at some point that Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entering the clinic and
asking me the situation and how quickly I needed to evacuate the wounded. Though I do
remember speaking to them, I do not remember at which point that I ran into during this
timeline.

CLASSIFICATION IS THIS WAS
MY IT'S NAME IS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) NOT GROWING MY (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
The last part was evacuating to the Thunderlab.

This statement is how I remember things transpiring that day.

MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

//Signed//

END OF STATEMENT X

PAGE 4 OF 4

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Major

Report Date 4-02-90 Wednesday.

came to work

6:30 in the morning, and later had my morning tea. After that (I met) with chiefs of four departments at 7:00 in the morning. These departments are Engine Body, Electrical devices of helicopter, Radio devices of helicopter, and weapons of helicopter. We would spend 10 to 15 minutes talking and discussing with each other, about technical situation (of helicopters) and about (Number) of those helicopters that are active (functioning) and non-functioning, so we could (Pinpoint) which helicopters could be worked on. Afterward 7:30 (am) all maintenance squadron personnel get in line so their duties could be explained for them. 8:00 o'clock we went to flight line close to helicopters with working personnel. Two helicopters were in flight plan and ^{other} two helicopters in condition of "stand by". I controlled daily the "log book" that kept track of the helicopters

that are going to fly, so we ^{could} be sure that Pg#2
(helicopters) don't have any defects. After log book
is checked till 9:10, the rest of documents got
checked. Afterward defected helicopters would need
some parts and it would be necessary that (defec-
-ted) helicopters get fixed. After that I went
to supply office at 9:40 so I could Form 14
the parts that we need. At 9:50 I came toward
my own office from flight line and at 9:55
we went to video conference office because
we have had our daily 10:00 o'clock meetings.
I sat down in video conference room and my
advisor (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also arrived as previous days we sat
beside each other and we were talking about
flights' plans. My advisor asked me, that which
Helicopters did I selected for duty (to fly) and
which ones will be on "stand by". I replied
that today is Wednesday and for three days
there will be planning, for Thursday, Friday,
and Saturday. I and my advisor arranged

plans of helicopters for (next) three days. ^{Pg # 3}

At this moment the operational officer ^{(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)} wanted to start communication with Defense Ministry, that we heard in next room called "command and control"; a fire got shot, behind that two more fires got shot. The first shot made us notice and we were questioning that what happened. My advisor captain ^{(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)} immediately pulled out his pistol and (aimed) toward the direction of door which is between conference room and command and control office. The (number) of shooting increased, all members of conference ran toward exit door. we also ran toward exit door and came out of building. Condition was very intense, we thought (a) suicid bomber has entered inside office of command and control.

During our escape I and my advisor fell on the ground we rose up and my advisor whose name is ^{(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)} ran toward flight line and I went toward (medical center) to get bandage which is on left side of Republic presidency building. After a few moment I went to my own office which is in Technical group building. The guards of security unit went to the building where command

and control office is situated and scattered ^{pg# 4}
shootings could be heard. This was report
of incident that occurred on 17thth Saur (thaur).

With respect

Major

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Mobile #

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Statement of Events That Occurred At Kabul International Airport: 27 April 2011

TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

NATC-A Intelligence Air Advisor

438 AEAG/J2

-----BEGIN STATEMENT-----

At approximately 1010hrs 27 April 2011, I, TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG/J2, was notified by MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG Kabul Convoy Duty Officer, that he had been informed of shots being fired at the Afghan Air Force (AAF) Headquarters building. I immediately called BDOC on VOSIP and informed an Army Specialist that answered the phone that shots had been reported as fired from within the AAF HQ building. He acknowledged and I hung up the phone, and proceeded into the KDO office where I began to assist in notifications via the KDO base-station radio. I begin to take notes in my notebook (copies provided to investigators) as we worked the base-station radio and telephones. At this time, we announced that the base was in arming condition Delta and that the base had been "locked-down." At 1017hrs we received notification of additional shots being fired across from Building 106, the AAF Rotary and Fixed-Wing Squadron. DEFENDER 1, Captain (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 439 AEAS Security Forces, relayed QRF (Quick Response Force) en route. At 1020hrs we received notification of 1 ANA armed with an AK-47 and that QRF was on scene. At 1021hrs additional shots were reported at Building 106. At 1025hrs DEFENDER 1 reported that the shooter was down.

I didn't begin to take notes until after I notified BDOC, but MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked me to write down convoy MSN 18 had completed Leg 2 at 1010. He said he didn't remember to write it down in his log because that's when he had heard about the shots being fired so I wrote it down in my notes. I instructed the convoy to stay at their current location and to not move without permission due to an event at KAIA.

There was a lot of confusion by personnel on the radio and within the WOC (Wing Operations Center) as to what building was Building 106 (AAF Rotary and Fixed-Wing Squadron) and Building 101 (AAF Headquarters). The building referenced in my notes referred to Building 106 as the AAF HQ until we found a map that identified appropriate building numbers which occurred at 1028hrs.

At 1026hrs we received a report of a possible suicide bomber located in Building 106, probably meant AAF HQ. At 1027, we received notification of 4 Afghans in stable condition that were with a US Mentor. At 1028hrs we received a report of additional shots being fired in Building 101. At this time, I located a map that had the building numbers on it, and we began to refer to AAF HQ as Building 101, and the AAF Rotary and Fixed-Wing Squadron as Building 106.

At 1028hrs we received additional reporting of shots fired from Building 101. At 1034hrs, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TALON 1, relayed that he had Belgian QRF marshaling for support. DEFENDER 1 stated that he had the Belgian QRF at the "Shoot" Gate (AAF Main Gate). At 1037hrs a NATO ambulance was ordered to go to Building 305 (Afghan Clinic). The Afghan Clinic is actually Building 303.

We received a report that PFC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) fired one round at an individual wearing ANA uniform trying to climb over the "wall" at the Thunder Lab (NFI).

At 1038hrs OSCAR 1, Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) called for the location of Captain Nylander. At 1040hrs, DEFENDER 1 relayed that Captain Nylander was located in the ISAF ambulance at the Afghan Clinic.

At 1041hrs, PAPA 1, Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that all PeH personnel were accounted for.

At 1042hrs, OSCAR 1 tried to contact Captain Nylander on the net. At 1043hrs, MIKE 1, Major (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that Captain Nylander was accounted for.

At this time we knew that Major Ambard, TSgt Brown, and possibly Mr. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were located in the AAF HQ Building. We also received information that Advisors: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were accounted for and safe, but possibly WIA.

I spoke with Captain (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW/J1, on the KDO phone and she stated that all personnel were accounted for except Major Brodeur, MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (whom we located at the Afghan Clinic), Major (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (possibly in his dorm), (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), Major Ambard, TSgt Brown, Mr. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Major Ausborn, and MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). At this time I asked Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to ascertain MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) whereabouts and status. I had received a report early (time unknown) that she had ran into the AAF HQ Building when shots had been fired. I also heard that there was a meeting with all of the Communications personnel in the AAF HQ as well; therefore I assumed they were still located within the AAF HQ Building.

At 1045hrs, we were notified that the Belgian QRF and an ambulance were at the Berm Gate with DEFENDER 1. At 1048hrs, DOC 1, Captain (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) confirmed he was located at the Afghan Clinic via landline. At 1049hrs, DEFENDER 1 requested a MAT-V transit to the Afghan Clinic. At 1051hrs TALON 1 requested that the Berm Gate be opened to allow the ambulances to transition to the Afghan Clinic. At 1052hrs, ROMEO 1, Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) began to ready MEDEVAC standby. At 1053, MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Security Forces, stated that he was in a MAT-V and en route to the Berm Gate.

At 1054hrs DOC 1 stated that he had a white van with 3 injured personnel, and an assisting MEDIC, and that he wanted to go to Tower 6 across the Afghan Flighline in order to get his patients to the French (KAIA) Hospital. At this time DEFENDER 1 notified DOC 1 that the Berm Gate was open and ready to receive him. At 1057hrs DOC 1 was notified that we were in DELTA and to standby. At 1058hrs, TALON 1 requested medical assistance at the AAF HQ and the Afghan Clinic. DEFENDER 1 acknowledged, and stated that he was in a vehicle and en route to the Afghan Clinic. We were notified that there were 2 injured Americans at the AAF HQ, and 4 injured "personnel" at the Afghan Clinic. I believe the 4 injured personnel related to injured AAF personnel.

At 1105, DOC 1 relays that he has 5 CASUALTIES; 1 CRITICAL and 4 STABLE at his location in the Afghan Clinic. At 1112hrs we dispatched one vehicle from the Afghan Clinic with 3 US members and OSCAR 1 on board en route to the French Hospital.

At 1114hrs DEFENDER 1, accompanied by a Fire Team, entered the AAF HQ building. He stated that he was going to clear the building and believed that there may be 3 additional "shooters" in the area and possibly a suicide bomber in the building on the second floor. At 1121hrs DEFENDER 1 relays that he has 5 KIA (US) and 1 (US) WIA, and that their weapons and ammo were missing. At this time I announced on the net that there are possibly additional hostiles in/or about the OQAB (AAF side of KAIA). I requested all personnel to take shelter, and to notify the WOC of any sightings of potential hostiles.

At 1123hrs TALON 1 relays to DEFENDER 1 to remove all CASUALTIES ASAP. DEFENDER 1 acknowledges. At 1125hrs DEFENDER 1 stated that he was about to roll to the French Clinic, and at 1127hrs DEFENDER 1 began to move all CASUALTIES from the AAF HQ to the Berm Gate. DEFENDER 1 had to move the CASUALTIES because of some issue trying to get the ISAF ambulance onto the AAF side of KAIA. So, he brought the CASUALTIES to the ambulance. He arrived at the French Hospital at 1131hrs.

At 1131hrs ROMEO 1 requested MEDEVAC for Afghans to Bagram Air Force Base. We contacted the French Hospital to coordinate a MEDEVAC and at 1133hrs they stated that they were prepped to receive Afghan Casualties.

At 1135hrs, we, the WOC, began to conduct our own accountability because of the reports of CASUALTIES we needed to identify the KIA, WIA, their locations, and any additional KIA/WIA we were not aware of. We were having issues contacting a lot of people due to poor communication signals.

At 1140hrs DOC 1 reported 1 Afghan KIA (shooter), 4 Afghan WIA located at the Afghan Clinic. He also stated that he had an interpreter that was being treated for gunshot wound by a French physician. He also stated that he had transported a second US CASUALTY to the French Hospital from the Afghan Clinic. We were also notified that Captain Nylander was KIA at 1140hrs.

At 1150hrs DEFENDER 1 relays to Major (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG/J2 OIC that all interpreters and Afghan civilian contractors need to be sent home. At which time Major (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) notified Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C).

At 1155hrs, DEFENDER 1 relays 5 US KIA located at the ACCC. DOC 1 requested to know if a medical member had determined the KIA status and DEFENDER 1 relayed that MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Firefighter, had made the determination. DOC 1 then acknowledged.

At 1158hrs DEFENDER 1 relayed that the Afghans had cleared the AAF HQ Building, but he did not trust them so he was going to clear it himself. He believed that there was possibly another shooter with explosives still within the building. At this time CHIEF 1, CMSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that he wanted to move to Building 101. We coordinated with DEFENDER 1, and authorized the move. At 1201 CHIEF 1 moved to DEFENDER 1's locations.

At 1207hrs DOC 1 stated that there were currently 15 CASUALTIES; 9 KIA, 6 WIA, 0 Delay, 2 Immediate, and 4 Minimal.

At 1209hrs we were informed by DIAMOND 1, SMSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEW/First Sergeant, that he had recovered 1 US and 2 interpreters from the AAF HQ Building. DIAMOND 1 and CHIEF 1 departed the AAF HQ at 1215hrs.

At 1210hrs Belgian Force Protection called my cell phone and notified me that there were 4 total insurgents. They stated that 1 was KIA and that 3 were still unaccounted for. I asked if they had any additional information and they stated that the 1 KIA "shooter" was wearing an ANA uniform.

At 1215hrs the WOC was notified of 3 possible shooters moving from the Afghan Flightline towards Building 106 (Rotary and Fixed Wing Squadrons). They were described as wearing black and walking from the Flightline ECP (entry control point) towards the southwest corner of Building 106.

At 1217hrs we were notified that TSgt Brown was seriously injured and that Major Brodeur was KIA.

At 1230hrs ROMEO 1 stated that he had 3 crews on the Flightline ready for MEDEVAC.

At approximately 1230hrs I was notified that the shooter's body was in the Afghan Clinic. The caller stated that they had grabbed all of the shooter's effects that were on his person, but they had to leave his body. At this time we requested the Belgian QRF to secure the shooter's body.

At 1230hrs Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) in-coming 438 AEAG/CC, arrived in the WOC. His direction was to identify where everyone was at and to identify their status. At this time we began to find out where each person was located, who was with them, what weapons they had, and if they were able to evac themselves or if they required evacuation. I pulled TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to help TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 438 AEAG/J2, and IS3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to begin contacting all personnel under the 438 AEW via cell phone. This enabled us to identify, and their current status, as to where everyone was located so that we could later coordinate a tactical evacuation.

At 1240hrs DEFENDER 1 stated that he was at Building 100 on COMKAIA for a debrief. At this time PAPA 1 called for evacuation information for personnel located at PeH. I informed them that Belgian QRF will begin to evac once they get the order to go.

At 1244hrs we received a report of a second shooter heading towards the Afghan Clinic. I informed all personnel on the net there were reports of additional shooters within the area of the Afghan Clinic.

At 1248hrs CHIEF 2, CMSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relays that there was a missing radio. I notified all personnel on the net that communications have possibly been compromised. I requested all personnel to monitor their transmissions and to landline when possible. At this time I opened up the Intel Office's line to enable us to receive more calls. I notified all personnel on the net to use (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) if they could not get through on the KDO line. I also asked all commanders to landline

their accountability status and holdup locations. At 1249hrs CHIEF 2 reports DOC 1 has left the Afghan Clinic.

At 1255hrs Col (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) gives the order for the Belgian QRF to recover 3 US Advisors that were trapped outside of "Shoot" Gate.

At 1259hrs we initiated the Wing Recall to establish who needs to be picked up. At this point all holdup locations; Thunder Lab, Building 106, Afghan Clinic, Building 105, JAF1/2, and KSPAN 1/2/3 all replied.

At 1300hrs all US personnel evacuated the Afghan Clinic.

Thunder 1 relayed that he was in JAF 1 and working his way to JAF 2 to recover personnel. At 1315hrs THUNDER 1 cleared JAF 1 and proceeded to JAF 2 in which he also cleared.

Warrant Officer Langley (CAN), SSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were held up in Building 209, 1st Floor, at the Central Doors.

MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) and CIV (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were located in the central KELTC Advisor's Office.

In Building 105 (AAF Maintenance Squadron), US personnel (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) were all barricaded in Room G06C located on the 1st Floor QA Office.

At 1405hrs CHIEF 1 dispatched THUNDER 1 to recover all personnel in Buildings 105 and 209.

At 1408hrs TALON 1 relays that he is headed to the AAF HQ and that DELTA 2 was the Senior Ranking Officer (SRO) and taking command while he was at the AAF HQ.

At 1415hrs SIERRA 1, Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) began to round up all contractors in preparation for evacuation via the Belgian QRF. The interpreter were sent home earlier, but returned because the "Shoot" Gate was closed and the AAF guards would not let them leave.

By 1425hrs we had most of the Coalition Personnel, including interpreters, contractors, 2 Local National (LN) bus drivers, and 1 Local National (KBR) contractor in KSPAN 1 Gym. The remaining personnel were in KSPAN 2, 3, and Thunder Lab.

At 1428hrs THUNDER 1 recovered all personnel located in Building 209 (Afghan Barracks).

By 1431hrs DEFENDER 1 relayed that Army CID was ready to move within 10-15 minutes.

At 1500hrs we reported 8 KIA (USAF), 1 KIA (CTR-US).

By 1647hrs we were evacuating all holdup locations; JAF 1 and JAF 2 clear. The Belgian QRF were responding to all locations we called out and retrieving personnel to transport to the ISAF-KAIA side. At this point we began to secure all classified information into "burn-bags" and removed all SIPR and CENTRIX hard drives from classified systems. Major (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) instructed me to go directly to Building 200 on the ISAF-KAIA side to establish a new WOC ASAP. I grabbed all of the hand-held radios and grabbed 2 charging stations and all spare batteries and packed them into a bag to take over to the Alternate WOC. I, Major (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), IS3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and IS3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) packed up supplies necessary to help establish an

alternate WOC. At approximately 1800hrs, I, TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) IS3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and IS3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) exited KSPAN 1 and proceeded directly to an up-armored HMMWV driven by TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Security Forces. I instructed TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that it was imperative that we go directly to Building 200 to establish the Alternate WOC. At that time, we departed OQAB, AAF side KAIA via the AAF Flightline directly down the taxiway towards the PAX Terminal on KAIA. Upon arrival at Building 200 we established the Alternate WOC along with MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I broke off of radio communications to provide Intel support.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

At some point around noon DEFENDER 1 pulled personnel to assist in removing CASUALTIES from Building 101 (AAF HQ). Major (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sent IS3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to help. IS3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) returned with information on the scene as he saw it before the CASUALTIES were removed. He described to us in detail what he saw. We had IS3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provide a statement, which I provided to investigators. IS3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) is assigned to Kandahar Air Base, Afghanistan and can be located there if more information is required from him.

In the early afternoon TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Public Affairs, was pulled to photograph a vehicle that was driving erratically around the American Complex, KSPAN 1, 2, and 3. It was described as a White SUV, possibly a Toyota Landcruiser.

-----END STATEMENT-----

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT	SUSPECT
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013; 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397
PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc.; and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.
ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.
DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (if known)
20110501	1130	Bldg 200, Rm 5 KAIA, Afghanistan	AFOSI	OFFENSE COMPLAINT

II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) <small>(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)</small>	SSN <small>(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)</small>	STATUS/GRADE AD/O-4
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) <small>(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)</small>	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (if required)	TELEPHONE HOME DUTY <small>(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)</small>
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code) <small>(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)</small>	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER USAF/ NATC-A/ 438 AEW	DEROS

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
<i>SAME</i>				

III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank)	INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.)
---------------------------------	--

SUSPECT INITIALS	<i>and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.</i>
	I have the right to remain silent—that is to say nothing at all.
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS	<i>I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)</i>
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.
	<i>I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.</i>

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
----------------------	----------------------------------

IV. STATEMENT

X On 27 April, 2011 I was in my office in KSPAN 1. Normally, I begin advising about 0900, but this day my interpreter, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had called in sick. I took the opportunity to catch up on work that had been piling up. Shortly after 1000, someone came running into the building yelling that there was gunfire in the AAF HQ building. The WOC that had recently been set up with radio equipment immediately put out the information on the net and ordered personnel to Arming Condition Delta. We herded the interpreters and other unarmored/unarmored personnel into the inner core of the building (gym) and began the command and control process for the event. TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and IS3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) augmented the WOC, answering phones, keeping records, and helping man the radio. We put guards on the doors and outside and hunkered in place awaiting further attack. We also initiated a recall process to take accountability. TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) has a log of events.

X Today, 1 May, 2011, I interviewed with the joint investigative team. We covered the above information, but also covered some additional information. I advise the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MG (Col) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). Reportedly, the assailant Col (unknown billet rank) Mohammad (Ahmad) Gul, was calling out for MG (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) as he walked the hallway after the initial assault. He died in the outer office to where I normally advise, and where I would have been that morning. There are long-standing allegations against MG (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) of corruption, though none of the allegations have been proven to my knowledge. Afghan intelligence functions include intelligence, counter-intelligence, and force protection elements. Additional to these items, the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) oversees the land-use contracts for Ramp 5 for MoD. This is a large source of the corruption allegations.

X We also spoke about the how it's been reported that two of the victims had been working on a plan to make the transport of personnel and equipment more transparent in the AAF. Something that if there truly was corruption within the AAF, would have cut their ability to run illicit activities.

X Several of our discussion points were on sensitive and ongoing issues and investigations. **/// END OF STATEMENT ///**

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

X "I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge."

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 5 day of May, 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)." At the bottom of each page, print or type: "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT

WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013; 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397

PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc.; and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.

ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.

DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY. SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (If known)
20110502	0939		AFOSI	OFFENSE COMPLAINT

II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	SSN (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	STATUS/GRADE E-4 / P03
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (If required) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	TELEPHONE HOME DUTY
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER US NAVY	DEROS

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) SELF	GRADE -	SSN -	ORGANIZATION -	DUTY PHONE -
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III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank) _____ INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.) _____

SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
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SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
----------------------	----------------------------------

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

IV. STATEMENT

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

NOT USED - STATEMENT ATTACHED

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

"I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge."

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 2ND day of MAY, 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)." At the bottom of each page, print or type: "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Incident Report

Rank and Name: PO3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Home station: USS Enterprise/Norfolk Naval Station

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X I awoke around 0530/0600. I dressed and went to eat at DFAC one. I stayed there until 0630 and then headed back to my room. After that I headed off to work and arrived there at about 0700. I sat around my office at KSPAN one until about 0900 until I headed to JAF Two to take photos of Afghans, Coalition members and Americans working on engines and Mi-17s. I stayed there for about 30 minutes or so. After that I returned to my office to download the photos from my camera to my computer.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

After sitting down for a while I decided I was going to head to the other side of the base so I could get my voice recorder so I could interview my subjects at JAF 2 since I didn't take down their information and what they were doing. I told my IT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) good bye and that I would return later. At that point TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told me that I could not leave. I asked him why and he told me that there had been a shooting. At that point I walked out my office to see other 438th Air Expeditionary Wing members on the second floor on their phones. While standing there MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran past me with his IBA on and headed down the stairs. I then decided that I was going to head down the stairs as well. I saw coalition members and ITs in the gym. I walked past them and went towards the front of the building where I saw other members of the 438th wearing their IBAs with their guns drawn and some even on their phones. I remember seeing IS3 that works for Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) in Intelligence posted at the front door with his M9 out. At this point someone said to me that I couldn't be down here without my IBA on so I headed back upstairs.

I walked back into the gym to where an American was telling an Afghan to get off the phone. The Afghan reported he was calling another IT to make sure that he got to KSPAN one right away. I proceeded to go up the stairs to my office and put on my IBA and get my M16. At this point I told my TSgt to put on his IBA as well. I decided to head back down but before that my TSgt told me to take a camera with me. I told him "Fuck that. It's about security right now" and headed down stairs. From there I posted myself behind IS3. Soon after Navy Chief (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) came inside and said that he needed people posted outside. Myself and two other people were the only ones at the time with long rifles so we went outside. I went in front of the KSPAN compound in front of a van and pointed my gun at the Afghan security forces at flight line. I remember seeing that the fence was closed and there were a lot of Afghans at the location. I saw Afghans on either side of the fence sitting down next to the JAF two. The Afghans saw that I was pointing my gun in their direction. They kept giving me the thumbs up which I took as them saying that they were the good guys. I didn't want to have issues with them so I repositioned myself behind an

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X MRAP so I could have better protection and still keep an eye of the Afghans. X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

PAGE 3 OF 7

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X After being at that location for a couple of minutes Chief (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told me to get into X the MRAP so I could have a better view of the base and be have better protection as well. At this point many of the Afghans at the flight line fence head down the street to in front of JAF 2. After that I saw some Afghans military and civilians come around the conference center, which is directly in front of the KSPAN compound, and head to the bunker to the back of the conference center to where other Afghans were already posted. I also saw a black SUV that was in the parking lot to the left of the conference pull out of the parking lot and head to the direction of the Afghan headquarters building.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Chief (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) again appeared and told me to get into another MRAP and head with MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and another MSgt and check that the berm was secure and see what assistance was needed at the Afghan clinic. We proceeded to the berm where I saw the berm gate open, one American Air Force member down on one knee and a couple of Belgian security members behind him. Once we decided that the berm was secure we drove on where I saw Afghan security members posted in a ditch. We took the left turn and from there headed towards the Afghan clinic. Once we arrived at the clinic we pulled into the parking lot behind the clinic. Once we arrived MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) got out of the MRAP to take post around the clinic. Once he was out I took position in the turret. We were told to take the MRAP and post in front of the clinic on the right side. The MSgt driving drove the MRAP out of the clinic and down the street and took position.

Once we reached our position Capt. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) came to the MRAP and told me to get with the security detail that he had formed to go into the Afghan headquarters building. He said there was a report that there was two more injured in the building. So the security detail made of Capt. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) an IT that works in the Afghan clinic and myself headed to the headquarters building. We crossed the street and positioned ourselves on the right of the building next to the side door. We tried to get into the door but it was locked and the Afghans came to the door and were trying to tell us to go around to the front of the building. I was at the rear of the secure party and looked up and saw that the door on the second floor was broken. I then looked to the right of the door and saw that there was an Afghan security member there and that the door he was standing next to was open. I told the members of my party and they headed up the stairs and into the building to search for more wounded. I stayed at the stairs to keep an eye on the door. At this point I noticed that there was blood on the stairs. After being on the stairs for a couple of minutes I went around the front of the building to where a group of Afghan military members were standing. They let me pass and I got back with the members of my party. They said there was on more wounded in the building. So we formed back up and headed back to the Afghan clinic.

Now back at the clinic I decided to go in to get members of my security party water. As soon as I walked in I saw MSgt Brown to my left on a stretcher. I continued to walk down the hall asking the Afghans for water and seeing some of the Afghan Air

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X Force wounded as well. I continued to walk into the clinic to where I ran into MSgt X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

from safety, another MSgt and a Major. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was posted in front of a door.

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

I told him that I was looking for water for the security members. At this point he told me to take a seat. I did, taking of my helmet, loosening my IBA and placing my M16 down. I sat there for maybe a couple minutes and decided that was enough and headed back outside to the front of the building.

It was at that point that the members of my Belgians and French arrived to give assistance. After that members of my party besides MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and myself got a vehicle and put MSgt Brown in it and drove to the other side of the base so she could be looked after. Shortly after arriving members of the French and Belgian party left for some reason. Sometime while I was in the building TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had arrived. I decided to go through the van that they had arrived in and looked for water bottles and handed them out to them, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who was posted on the side of the clinic and myself. After that Doc (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) decided that we needed to shut the clinic down to prevent other people from walking into the clinic. Everyone behinds TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and myself went into the clinic. We started talking and decided that we were going to form another security party and head to Afghan headquarters building and retrieve our dead. The other MSgt at works at the clinic with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told him not to go but (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) replied back to him "Fuck that. This isn't my first deployment" and headed out.

I took point on the security party and we went to the building to where there were Afghans in front of the building. They waived us in and we came in the building. At this point I noticed the back door in the middle of the building was busted. After that we headed up the stairs to the second floor. Once we reached the top of the stairs there were two Afghan Air Force members and they pointed down the left hall. We went down the hall and TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I started to check the first office on the left. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said not to touch anything and I walked up to the doors that were in the room. All of them were shut but had holes in the bottom of them. After being in the room (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) came in and said that he realized that we were in the wrong room and that the dead were on the first floor. We formed back up and headed down stairs. Once down stairs we got to the center of the building and took a left. At this point I saw on the beginning of the hallway on both sides either Dari or Arabic written in blood. We past that and continued down the hall and went to the ACCC room where the dead were. As soon as I walked in the room I noticed two dead bodies. I was posted at the door to make sure no one came into the room while the others were counting the bodies. We had reports that there was five KIA but soon came to realize that we had seven instead. Now that everyone else was counting the bodies I asked the IT that was with us what was written on the walls and he said "Allah". I then asked him to go down the hall to where an Afghan security guard was posted to see how the Afghans that work in Public Affairs and that I mentor were. He quickly returned and said that they were fine. In the meantime MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) managed to make contact with someone who told them to get out of the building due to the fact that bombs might be there. We formed back up and

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

headed out of the building.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X Once we reached the street I noticed two vehicles, a land cruiser and a hummer on X the left side of the road. Located in the first vehicle was the Army PFC from Logistics driving the vehicle, two ITs in the back of the car with Maj. In the humvee was Senior MSgt. and next to the humvee was Chief Master Sgt. Chief was talking to the . During this time I fell back the first vehicle and told Maj. the situation in the headquarters building. After that I headed back with the members of my party towards the clinic.

Now that we were back at the clinic I started to see many Afghans walking down the street. I walked to the right of the building so I could get a better view of where they were going due to the fact that so many of them were in headed in that direction. It was at this time that one of the Afghan Air Force members that could speak English told me that they were heading to lunch. During this mass movement to chow Lt. Col. in charge of the Thunder Lab and the British Air Force officer that works for him came towards the clinic. Col. told us that their was reports of three individuals walking around the base with guns and that we needed to evacuate to the Thunder Lab. We rounded up the military members in the clinic, roughly about 14 of us altogether including the ITs, and headed to the Thunder Lab. Before we left the clinic I looked right at the Afghan headquarters and saw three vehicles pull up and who I believed to be EOD exit the vehicles.

Once at the Thunder Lab Col. said that he was heading to JAF one and two to get the civilian contractors and their ITs. I volunteered my group to help since we were already suited up and ready to roll. We formed up and headed on our way. Immediately upon heading to our destination we picked up an American Air Force member and his IT. We keep walking and headed to JAF one where were one American and his IT were outside waiting for us. Once we had him we went inside into the hangar. Now that we were inside we broke up into two groups with TSgt. and myself heading to the right of the hangar. As soon as we turned I noticed the hangar doors open and around 20 members of so standing there. TSgt. yelled something to the effect of "What's your battle plan" to them. They came up to us and I informed them that we were here to take them and their ITs to the Thunder Lab. Those contractors and their ITs and the rest of the security party headed back the Thunder Lab. Lt. Col. TSgt. and myself proceeded to the flight line and towards JAF two.

Now on the flight line Col. informed us that both a Mi-17 and C-27 had members of in them in case they had to medevac someone so not to worry about them. As we headed down the flight line and approached JAF two Col. begin to try and open the door but it was locked and we headed towards the next door. Once we did that an Afghan Air Force member came in our direction and in his broken English told us the doors were locked. TSgt. pulled out his cell phone and called someone in the JAF two to let them know that we were outside the building and for someone to open the door. Shortly after Staff Sgt. and another Air Force member opened a door and let us in. Once in locked the door and

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X headed towards 30 or so people located in JAF two. Once we had everyone we went outside and we ended up forming two groups, which Lt. Col. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) led on the left and I led on the right and we headed towards the Thunder Lab.

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Now back at the Thunder Lab the British officer that works for Col. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told us that he wanted us to take post around the Thunder Lab. I headed to the Afghan classroom located right next to the door that we used to get into the Thunder Lab. The classroom is located on a two-story building and next to it I had a clear view of most of a good bit of the base and some of the flight line as well. During my time on watch, which lasted for maybe an hour, I looked again at the Afghan headquarters and saw the people that I had seen earlier enter the building exiting. I looked in the direction of the KSPAN compound and saw a MRAP pull out and go around the base. Shortly after that I saw a Belgian QRF vehicle and two Belgians doing patrol of the Afghan side of the base. I was later relieved of watch by MSgt. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). Once I was relieved I headed into the main building where everyone else was located. I then sat around with everyone in the compound until we were evacuated to the other side of the base and taken the MWR tent. Eventually after going to the MWR tent everyone was allowed to go to DFAC 2 where we could eat and were then spoken to Col.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

and

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

After that we were free to return to our rooms in buildings

503 and 504.

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

END OF STATEMENT

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

PAGE 7 OF 7

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Report of lieutenant colonel

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Pg#1

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Date 1390/2/7

Hereby when entered inside command and control it was approximately 7:30 ~~o'clock~~ in the morning. Later I went behind desk, which is in front of screen, that is ^{fixed} on the wall. I sat down and started to do my duties, this day I had the duty of registering flights of aircrafts and helicopters of AirForce for Kabul and provinces, on the screen.

At this moment I received a call from department of plan, General chief of staff, which was regarding question, "that do you have a helicopter for transportation of commander of 111th division", who was supposed to check (control) the checkpoints present at security belts of Kabul city. I communicated the (topic) message to AirForce commander and that (He)

(Guided) instructed me to communicate this Pg#2 message to your advisors so that could contact advisors of Helicopter department, and prepare one helicopter for flight. I told this message to advisor of command and control, they accepted and replied, it is correct, (meaning ok.) Next (He/she) went toward (his/her) assigned desk, time was 8:00 o'clock. And then I got busy with registering duty of flights regarding aircrafts and helicopters on the screen, and continued my duties.

At this time, approximately 10 o'clock, officers and advisors of different departments, who were supposed to be present in briefing, gathered, at this moment a few shots got fired in the saloon (salon). I feared for my life dropped my self from chair, toward lower part of table (desk), and hide my self, shots continue, and one shot got fired.

between me and [redacted], from which one of bullets' sharpnel contacted his face. He being frightened didn't move and pretended (played) dead. Next the sound of shooting moved toward hallway and got away from saloon (Salon). At this moment I stood up and saw that the body of our advisor is on the floor of salon, I got scared and ran toward second salon and dropped my self out of window of that salon.

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT

WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20110502	TIME 1915	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No) Kabul Afghanistan BUILDING 200, RM 02	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT AFOSZ	REPEAT (If known) OFFENSE COMPLAINT
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II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	SSN (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	STATUS/GRADE SMSGT
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (If required) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	TELEPHONE HOME DUTY (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER USAF	DEROS

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) SELF	GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
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	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.
SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.
	I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
----------------------	----------------------------------

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
X

IV. STATEMENT

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

STATEMENT ATTACHED

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful... Initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

S (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 2nd day of MAY 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)." At the bottom of each page, print or type: "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

ACCOUNT OF ACTIONS ON 27 APRIL 28, 2011

SMSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

The following statement is an account of the events that occurred 28 Apr 2011 according to my X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

recollection. As with most mornings I arrived to KSPAN 3 on the AAF side of KAIA at approximately 0700. Upon arrival at the KSPAN I went into my office, grabbed the American, Afghan and POW flags to hoist them up the flag pole. Upon returning to my office I began to work on various projects behind my desk. At approximately 1000 I walked out of my office into the hallway and Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was on the phone. She screamed to me "Shirt, shots are being fired at the AAF HQ Bldg!" I immediately asked her who was reporting the shots. She told me she as on the phone with Maj. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Upon hearing the news I alerted Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Chief (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Further communication with Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) revealed Maj. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Maj. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) locked themselves in the G1 office where they were advising there Afghan counterpart. There were advised to stay put until an accurate assessment of the situation could be determined. Some time shortly after notification the decision was made by Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to don our body armor and helmet and the call was made from the WOC to go to arming condition black. Guards were posted at both entrances of KSPAN 3 and an accountability of personnel was initiated by our J1 staff. Personnel who were outside the building were told to take cover. At least one advisor and one interpreter entered the building and gave a preliminary report to Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Chief (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and myself inside the conference room. We immediately identified the need for Crash maps and I called Maj. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with the request. He promptly brought them over so we could have better situational awareness of the events location. Accountability measures were still in effect to ascertain who was where and with whom. Additional information arrived via phone that Maj. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Maj. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were exiting the building via a window to go to the nearest bunker. We were informed there were casualties; specifically that Capt Nathan Nylander was injured. My cell phone records indicate I called the IJC medical clinic at approximately 11:03 that call lasted for approximately two minutes. I was unable to ascertain if Capt Nylander was admitted to the clinic or not. I reported my findings to Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) As I assisted with the C2 and accountability piece I noticed Maj. David

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X Brodeur was not accounted for; I tried to call his cell phone at 11:29 with no answer. The next report was that

TSgt Tara Brown was injured and may have been in the care of MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I called MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) phone

at 12:24 and MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) answered and informed me he and MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had brought TSgt Brown to the

clinic. She had at least three gunshot wounds; one to the head one to the arm and one elsewhere. Her status

was listed as critical. I continued to check on personnel in the KSPAN and assisted with and C2 issues Col

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) requested. Sometime around 1300 a decision was made that Maj. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Maj. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

needed to be recovered from their location and brought back to KSPAN 3. Chief (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I volunteered

to accomplish the recovery. We grabbed LCDR (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and PFC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to assist in the recovery.

Chief (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I led the formation and recovered the Majors in a bunker south of the AAF HQ building

(101). Upon arrival of the location we rallied with MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and MC2 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) They

identified they were first on scene and there were seven confirmed dead Americans on scene. They were taking

cover in the AAF Medical Clinic. Chief (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) myself, LCDR (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and PFC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recovered the

Majors, MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and 4 MPRI contractors plus two interpreters. Upon returning

to KSPAN 3 we reported the information to Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) We were informed the scene was secure and a

decision was then made to put eyes on our fallen and physically identify who was in the room. I place a call to

Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) at approximately 13:45 to inform him we were going to the scene if he and Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) wanted to accompany Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) CMDR (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Chief (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and myself to the scene. We all linked up at KSPAN 3 and drove to the scene. Upon

arrival there were several Afghan military members surrounding the door. We entered the building and were

met by an Army CID Capt who identified himself as the scene commander. My recollection of the room is as

follows. There was a double door with a desk near it I was told later was used to barricade personnel inside the

room to prevent anyone from entering. Desks and file cabinets were scattered around. On the first level, Lt Col

Frank Bryant and Maj. Jeffery Ausborn lay dead both with shots fired to the head. Immediately to their left one

level up, looking from the front of the room lay Maj. Brodeur also with a shot to the head. Directly to the right

Maj. Raymond Estelle lay behind a desk dead from a gunshot. To his right Mr. James McLaughlin lay between

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X the desk and a wall also dead. I was told by CID his shot was to the ribcage under his arm. One more level up, X

PAGE 4 OF 5

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X On the right hand side laid Capt Charles Ransom and Maj. Phil Ambard. Dr. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Dr. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) examined X the bodies and Dr. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) pronounced them dead at approximately 1600. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) directed a detail to be formed to extract the bodies and recover them to the IJC side of KAIA. CMDR (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Chief (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stayed at the scene while Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I returned to KSPAN 3 to coordinate a recovery team and to extract all personnel from the AAF side of the base to the IJC side. Prior to entering KSPAN 3 after our return I went to the flag poles located next to the building and lowered the flags to half staff. I along with Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) coordinated to get the Belgian QRF to escort the detail and the fallen service members back. Once it was confirmed they were enroute extraction began with all US, contractor and interpreters to the IJC compound. First to go were the Fixed and Rotary wing squadrons. Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was placed in charge of accountability and coordinating the extraction effort. Second to move were the maintenance personnel and contractors from JAF 1 and 2 (hangars) and Thunder Lab. The third order of march was the Group Staff and support Squadrons. Finally, all personnel in KSPAN 3 were extracted after all secure communication equipment was shut down and secured. Everyone was directed to the MWA tent where ID cards were collected and accountability was accomplished. Personnel were then directed to DFAC 2 for a briefing from MG Mallory, MG Lyon, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Chief (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I. Previously during the day I had made contact with the Chaplin and Combat Stress Team to rally with personnel as they arrived at the MWA tent. It was approximately 19:45 when all personnel were accounted for and released to their dorms. The remainder of the day was spent standing up the Battle staff and coordinating efforts for a Ramp Ceremony as well as checking on personnel. I turned in for the day at approximately 00:45 28 Apr 11. At 03:45 we were all awoken to the sound of rocket sirens where we again put on our body armor and helmets and massed in the hallway. All personnel were released from the attack at 04:27. X

END OF STATEMENT X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SMSgt, USAF

First Sergeant, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing

PAGE 5 OF 5

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT
 WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013; 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397
PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc.; and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.
ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.
DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (If known)
20110502	1950	Bldg. 200, KAIA	AFOSS FORT 2405	OFFENSE COMPLAINT

II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	SSN (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	STATUS/GRADE AD103
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (If required) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	TELEPHONE HOME (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DUTY
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER 438 A2A6	DEROS

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
S	E	L	F	

III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank)	INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.)
---------------------------------	--

SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.

I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
----------------------	----------------------------------

IV. STATEMENT

See Attached // X

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful ducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. X (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 2 day of May, 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)." At the bottom of each page, print or type: "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

2 May 2011

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) My name is (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) CAPT, USAF, FS with 438th AEAG. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
I am one of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with 438th AEW who are stationed at Kabul. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) At the time of the initial announcement of "shots fired" (at approx (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
1000) I was on OQAB with Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) We were in our Medical
Conex/office.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I immediately bunkered down, donned my IBA, and loaded my weapons. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
I initiated the 438th AEAG Med team recall. I immediately phoned MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who reported he was in the AAF Med Clinic. Next I phoned
MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who reported he was outside in a "bunker".
I text messaged TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for them to report back to me
ASAP, as they were flying on the MEDEVAC mission.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) As I remained in the Medical Conex/office on OQAB, I heard frequent (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
updates on the status of the situation via Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) radio (as all (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
team leads have a radio). I continued to stay in touch with MSgt
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) via our cell phones. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) called (time unknown)
concerning Capt Nylander; reporting that Nylander was brought to the AAF
Med Clinic, he (nylander) clearly sustained a gunshot to the head, was
unresponsive and not breathing. I instructed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to
immediately start CPR. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also report other casualties
(Afghans) though none were life threatening.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) As Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was having difficulty contacting the NATO ROLE 3 hospital (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
to request an ambulance, I contacted the Dr. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) at the ISAF
ROLE 1 clinic, in an attempt to expediate the ambulance response. I
informed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) of our most up-to-date casualty count, including a
"critical" American Service member (nylander).

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) At approximately 1053 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I were again in contact via the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
cell phone. He reported that they stopped CPR on Nylander at 1044. He
then reported his known casualties (all afghan at this time).

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) From the reporting back to me via (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) the ISAF ambulances were (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
having difficulty getting onto the AAF side of KAIA, so Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I
decided to instruct (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to try to get Nylander to the ROLE 3 as
quickly as possible, not to wait for the ambulance, but take him via POV
down the flight line. I was then in contact via cell phone with Major
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who had driven to the AAF Med Clinic. We advised him to take
Nylander to the ROLE 3 ASAP.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I continued to stay in touch with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) via cell phone. At some (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
point he reported that there was another American (TSgt Brown) brought
to the AAF clinic and she was badly wounded as well. The ISAF
ambulances had not arrived, so I again recommended utilizing the most
expeditious transport available- POV, in order to get Brown to the ROLE
3 ASAP, which did happened shortly thereafter.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

3 of 4

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) I continued to stay in touch with (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (and (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) via (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). At some point it was reported to me that there were several American suspected to be KIA in the AAF HQ building. I talked to (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) directly as he was in the AAF HQ building, ACCC room. He stayed on the phone as he counted the number of KIA. We then instructed him and his team to depart the building ASAP, as the building had not been cleared and there was suspicion of explosives within the building.

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Sometime later, Col (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and I got the report that the situation was under some control. We were requested/volunteered to go to the AAF HQ ACC room to officially pronounce the American KIA. I went into AAF HQ with several members of 438th leadership including Col (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Col (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Cmdr (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Shirt (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Chief (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). We were met at the ACCC door by ISAF Army MP.

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) I immediately noticed the Arabic writing in Blood on the hallway wall leading to ACCC room. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Within the ACCC room, I identified LtCol Bryant and Maj Ausborn lying in the middle of the ACCC room lying head to feet, each obviously dead. Then noted Maj Brodeur lying to the left of the first two, again clearly deceased. Then noted one body (estrelle??) to the right of Bryant/Ausborn. I did not immediately notice Mr. MacGlofflin lying to the extreme room right, as he was lying out of sight behind the cubicle wall. Then saw Ambard and Ransom (?) in the far back of the room. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) All members were obviously deceased, however, Col (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and I went around to officially check for carotid pulses, though it was clear it would be for nothing. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) After discussing with leadership and afghan CID and ISAF MP's we decided to begin to organize the removal of the bodies from the scene. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) After some coordination with the French, Belgians and more American military, we loaded each of the deceased into a body bag and onto a stretcher.

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) I followed the vehicles moving the bodies to ROLE 3. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) CAPT, USAF, FS
438th AEAG, KAIA, Kabul, AFG

4 of 4
(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT
 WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013; 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397

PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc.; and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.

ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.

DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20110502	TIME 1250	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No) Bldg 200 Rm 02, Kabul Afghanistan	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT AFOSI	REPEAT (If known) <input type="checkbox"/>
				OFFENSE <input type="checkbox"/>
				COMPLAINT <input type="checkbox"/>

II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)		SSN	STATUS/GRADE MSgt.	
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code)		DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (If required)		TELEPHONE
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code)		MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER USAF 9AS	DEROS	
SPONSOR INFORMATION				
NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
		Self		

III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:


ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank) _____ INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.) _____

SUSPECT INITIALS	<i>and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.</i>
	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
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I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

X 

IV. STATEMENT

SEE ATTACHED STATEMENT

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

"I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge." X

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 2ND day of MAY 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

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X

Events of 27 April 2011

X At approximately 1000 hrs I, MSgt [redacted] and my other C-5 brother TSgt [redacted] released our Afghan loadmasters for a break from the classroom setting we were in that morning. My M9 was not in an amber state as to help gain the trust of our Afghan counterparts, as was done by some of our other aircrew advisors. As we proceeded into the second floor hallway of our squadron bldg 106 we were met by one of our translators yelling that a suicide bomber was outside. In tow was one of our Afghan pilots Lt Col [redacted] out of breath stating there was gun fire at the ACCC. I then went into our main office directing everyone to put on their helmets & body armor. I proceeded to put on my own aircrew vest, helmet, go to amber & chambered a round in my M9.

X As I was trying to decide where the gun fire was coming from I made my way down the middle of our bldg onto the first landing of the stairwell. I held that location trying to decipher what was going on downstairs and outside for three to five minutes before realizing that we had no eyes on what was going on outside in front of the sq. Then, I heard what sounded like side arm firing but definitely gun fire from our nine to ten o'clock position referencing the east side main entrance of bldg 106. I yelled up to [redacted] that I needed a long gun to get eyes on where the gun fire was coming from and he gave me Maj [redacted] M4 with 2 magazines that I chambered immediately because we could hear more gun fire. I then sat guard at the main entrance yelling everything I saw up/out to the commanders who were by now on the radios trying to figure out what was going on and getting accountability.

X I witnessed two injured Afghans come out the front of bldg 101 and more Afghan military garbed personnel moving about the front and south side of the building. I also saw what might have been a gun barrel out the 3rd window of the east side of the second floor twice. Afghan HMMWV's rolled into place with afghan police/military surrounding the building with multiple people evacuating the building going into the bunkers. Sometime during these events I heard on a nearby LMR that an American military person was critically wounded over at the Afghan hospital. It seemed like 20 minutes went by and the info coming over the radios kept saying the ambulances were enroute but stuck at the gates because the Belgium police could not get the gate opened. I then asked if we could use our van parked twenty feet from our front door to go and pick up our wounded for transport to the French hospital. My commander, Lt Col [redacted], and the helo commander, Lt Col [redacted] had the balls to make right decision to allow myself, MSgt [redacted] and Maj [redacted] to drive over & retrieve the critically wounded. Maj [redacted] drove since MSgt [redacted] knew the fastest way to the berm gate and I rode with the sliding door open as to use my long gun if needed.

X We arrived at the Afghan hospital only to find MSgt [redacted], jobbing it hard by triaging the wounded Afghans. He told us that Capt Nylander was in a back office and that he had expired after [redacted] had dragged him from the back of bldg 101. [redacted] stated that he tried to revive Capt Nylander because he was still breathing when he was moving him. I then asked to help [redacted] in any way since he was the only military medic there while we were making our way back to the office that held Capt Nylander. We walked into a crowded room of at least ten, possibly fifteen Afghan personnel that [redacted] was told by his Afghans was locked taking pictures with their cell phones and writing notes.

X There was another deceased person of Afghan decent in the room but I did not care and proceeded to push the Afghans out of the way and out the room while yelling for the door keys to lock it. I then looked around the corner to see a glass door and a short hallway where I then saw one of our unaccounted for pilots Maj [redacted] guarding the halls. I went back to the room immediately only find a MSgt I could not identify standing guard. I told him that I was going into the room to collect Capt Nylander's info and secure his gun which I saw earlier by his foot on the gurney. While I was doing, so MSgt [redacted] Maj [redacted] and [redacted] came

X in saying that they had orders to move him to the French hospital. After we loaded the Capt into the van I told MSgt [redacted] that I was staying to help [redacted] since he was very much overwhelmed. X

X Shortly after the van left I noticed MSgt [redacted] knelt behind one of the Afghan ambulances keeping all of us covered without any helmet or body armor. I offered her my helmet and armor since [redacted] and I were to be inside caring to the wounded. [redacted] stated that he had some more armor in the clinic and started to get it when I heard over an LMR I found at the Afghan hospital that there is two more American military still in bldg 101 wounded. At this time I was trying to communicate on this radio that I can't remember picking up what was going on and trying to get help or permission to get the two wounded Americans. I tried three more times to communicate in the clear on channels 12-13-14 but had no replies. X

X [redacted] and I made our way to an armored vehicle that had pulled up and decided we were going in to get our two suspected wounded military. [redacted] said the three guys walking west on the path/road by the hospital were an AF patrol. The group was led by Capt [redacted] MSgt [redacted] and a Navy guy named [redacted]. I stated that we were going in to get the two wounded Americans and not one single person batted an eye...we were off! We first tried to breach the south side entrance but it was locked. There were bullet holes in the metal bottom halves of the doors with 3 Afghan military personnel in the hallway all with long guns not letting us enter. I almost kicked the door in but [redacted] said not to because they might shoot us, this very second [redacted] started yelling to an interpreter on the second floor entrance of the same south side. The interpreter said the Americans were up there so we ran up the stairway and I told [redacted] to stay on the landing to protect us from the first floor and our backs. [redacted] was the second or third person in the bldg might I ad with no helmet or body armor on. We started clearing the rooms one by one until someone yelled the Americans were down @ the other end of the building, someone was getting this info from an afghan interpreter, I think. We started running and clearing the first room on the left of the middle stairwell when we were informed that the American wounded were in fact downstairs in the north hallway in the ACCC. X

X We then ran down the staircase with 2-3 Afghan people on the landing and possibly 8-10 Afghans in the main lobby area. Some armed some just standing around with radios most not looking too afraid or excited about what was going on. We pushed thru the Afghans asking where the Americans were and some of them pointed down the north hallway. There was blood splatter on the walls and steps coming down the stairwell with blood smears on the floor leading out the back entrance. Broken glass was also all over in the lobby area. I think this is the next time I saw [redacted] (medic) telling some Afghans to get some litters. X

X I think Capt [redacted] and [redacted] went to the end of the hall to the north backside entrance of the ACCC because I entered the conference room by myself did a quick sweep when I heard yelling in the ACCC from those guys. I entered the ACCC noticed the first 2 bodies in the middle of the room. The 1st person I assessed was Oz (Maj Ausborn) since he is my pilot from my unit. He had no pulse or respirations with I think an abdominal and head wound. He was lying on his right side with his eyes open. The 2nd person was what I thought @ the time was a Capt/Maj but was in fact LT Col Bryant with a neck / head or possible upper chest wound with no pulse / respirations. He was lying on his back with his eyes open. Both bodies were with their heads facing the conference room. Next to Bryants' head / body was an empty shiny nickel plated hand gun clip, and I think I saw another shiny clip or maybe the same one because I did two sweeps around the room by the conference room doorway but in the ACCC. The 3rd person I assessed was Klepto (Maj Brodeur) who just two weeks ago gave me his own 8pt hat that he hated. He was lying on his back next to the wall halfway behind a desk with no pulse or respirations. At this time someone said we have a live one. It was Tara. [redacted] was having some problems getting her up and out from behind the cubicle wall where there were three bodies kind of piled on one another. Capt Ransom, whom I knew from air advisor class and was in my flight, was on his back with a head shot still holding his M16 in the very corner. Someone else was against the cubicle wall that I did not work on or initially assess but Tara was alive and [redacted] did not have the gas to get X

X her moved so I picked her up and put her on [redacted] shoulder for him to carry her out. The next thing I X
remember is everyone leaving the room because someone said there was movement down the hallway and
the room is not safe so I started double checking everyone's vitals one more time as I did not want to leave
anyone whom I might have missed. Then I cut off everyone's ID's and ran out of the bldg to the clinic. During
all this activity in the room, I set down the M-4 I was using by [redacted] and did not retrieve it before I left the room
but I do not remember seeing it when I did my second sweep. I don't remember who exactly had their guns in
hand or could tell who had fired but I do remember a lot of spent casings and clips on the tiered floors. That's
why I somehow remember 2 silver / nickel plated clips in the room. Furniture was flipped over and pushed
about; I later found out that I had missed an American behind a desk to which I still feel like shit. X

X I ran back to the Afghan clinic to see [redacted] working on Tara with a lot of people around her and asked if
the ambulance was here or coming. Nobody answered me, so I ran back across the quad area to my squadron
yelling for someone to get me the Commander's Prada keys. As I got into the bldg I ran halfway up the stairs
to [redacted] still yelling for someone to get the Prada keys and handed off all the name tags / ID's I had cut off to
[redacted] I got the keys and drove the vehicle back to the clinic where we loaded Tara into the back of the Prada
then speed across base to the French hospital. X

X The rest of the day was spent detained at the French hospital and I didn't have any idea what time it X
X was until I looked at my watch at 1547.

MSgt [redacted]

END OF STATEMENT

PAGE 5 OF 5

X [redacted]

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT
 WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013; 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397

PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc.; and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.

ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.

DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20110502	TIME 2015	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No) Bldg 200 Room: 03 Kabul Afghanistan	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT AFM1	REPEAT (if known) OFFENSE COMPLAINT
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II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	SSN	STATUS/GRADE E-9
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (If required)	TELEPHONE HOME
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER USAF	DEROS

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
SELF				

III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank) _____ INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.) _____

SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.
	I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
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IV. STATEMENT

See Attached STATEMENT

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

"I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge."

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 2 day of May, 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)." At the bottom of each page, print or type: "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

ACCOUNT OF ACTIONS ON 27 APRIL 2011

CMSgt [redacted]

X [redacted] [redacted]

The following statement is an account of the events that occurred on 27 Apr 11 according to the best of my recollection. At 0730 I arrived at the Wing HQ and began the normal routine of checking e-mail and talking to staff. At 0830, my interpreter, [redacted] came in and we called my Afghan counterpart, CSM [redacted] to setup a daily meeting for 0900. We walked the 400 yards to the Afghan Air Force (AAF HQ) at 0850 for this meeting and met in the CSM's office, on the 2d floor of the building at 0900. I was armed with my 9MM, one magazine loaded on safe and one additional magazine was carried in an ammo pouch. We met for approximately 45 minutes and [redacted] and I left the AAF HQ. On the way out I met some of my teammate advisors, Maj Estelle, Capt Ransom and TSgt Brown ... I cannot recall if Maj Ambard was with them or not. I chatted with Maj Estelle and Capt Ransom and told them it was nice to see them again. I also told TSgt Brown hello as she was a bit behind them, and continued the walk with [redacted] back to my HQ. I entered the HQ at approx. 1000 local and was met by Lt Col [redacted] our JAG yelling that shots had been fired at the AAF HQ. She relayed to the HQ leadership; myself, Col Bill [redacted] (CV), Lt Col [redacted] (DS) and SMSgt [redacted] (FSgt) that our J1-Afghan advisor, Maj [redacted] had called her on cell phone and relayed shots were being fired on the first floor of the AAF HQ building. Col [redacted] ordered the battlestaff formed and for our personnel to lock down facilities and run 100% accountability. We posted 360 security on our advisor compound in the meantime and ordered donning of IBA, helmets and ordered personnel to go "red," rounds chambered. An interpreter was brought in from outside, escorted by his advisor and reported some preliminary information from the AAF HQ. In the meantime, Maj [redacted] (and Maj [redacted] who was with her at AAF HQ) had eggressed the AAF HQ and had made it to a nearby AAF bunker and reported in that they were safe and were being guarded by AAF SF personnel. As battlestaff had begun to form, we had several phones and radios X [redacted] in the office and a report came across that we had wounded US advisors, and Capt Nylander was X [redacted]

[redacted] named as one of them. Once we had the above response measures implemented, my concern was [redacted] X
for who was unaccounted for and possibly in AAF HQ injured or worse. I contacted our lead SF,
Capt [redacted]. He relayed that the AAF SF had secured the building and the shooter had been
terminated or was in custody; I don't recall which. About this time we received reports that TSgt Tara
Brown was also injured. I discussed the situation with Col [redacted]. We were receiving reports via
radio of more shooters and possible explosives in the AAF HQ. As we were unable to verify the
security of the AAF HQ, aside from the AAF SF sweep, we requested assistance from NATO forces
on the other side of the airport to sweep AAF HQ for us. At approx. 1230, we received reports that
some of initial responders had secured TSgt Brown and Capt Nylander, both with multiple gunshots
from the AAF HQ and evac'd to the AAF clinic, where they were treated by MSgt [redacted] a medical
advisor. At approx. 1300, we verified that hostilities had ceased and the AAF SF and our SF
advisors had the AAF HQ complex secure, at which point I requested permission to form a
movement up to retrieve the numerous personnel who called in on our accountability check as being
in a bunker, or neighboring building. Col [redacted] OK'd it and we formed a team of two armored
vehicles including myself, SMSgt [redacted], LCDR [redacted] and PFC [redacted], SMSgt [redacted] and I
drove in lead and LCDR [redacted] in trail. We coordinated the movement with Capt [redacted] and
AAF SF and once cleared entered the AAF HQ complex. Although we'd contacted Maj [redacted]
that we were coming to get her and her fellow teammates, we were unable to raise her upon arrival
in the vicinity. I briefed LCDR [redacted] that we'd exit the vehicles and tactically move to locate our
personnel. We bounded around the complex and located over a dozen personnel; our advisors, our
contractor teammates and ITs. We found all of our personnel remaining outside our advisor
compound and returned them to the USAF complex. While loaded PAX, I ran into MSgt [redacted] and
PO1 [redacted] who were first responders and they passed that we had 7 dead in the ACC. Upon
return, Col [redacted] was working with NATO forces to get the AAF HQ secure so we could retrieve
our personnel. Once this was accomplished, Col [redacted] myself, CDR [redacted], SMSgt [redacted],
LtCol [redacted], Col [redacted] (doc) and Capt [redacted] (doc) meet at the AAF HQ and entered the
[redacted] X facility. Upon entry on floor 1, we saw Arabic script on the wall in blood and blood spray over all the [redacted] X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) walls leading to the ACCC, where our folks were. We met Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) USA/CID, entered the room (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and identified our 7 personnel. While we identified them, the docs verified they were dead. I called back to our CP and requested Chief (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) my group Sup here, assemble a team of litter bearers to come help us get our team to the hospital. Team consisted of Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) myself, Chief (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), PO3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), SGT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) CPO (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and CDR (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). We requested 7 body bags and litters from the NATO hospital as well as TRANS. They showed up, we transferred our folks to the bags, litters and vehicles. As we were leaving the AAF HQ (we had MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) IT with us, as he was a witness that CID wanted to speak with) the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) attempted to keep him back to interview him. I told his aide that he was going with us and we returned to the USAF complex and awaited escort to NATO side. The wing returned at approx 1630. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) *This is my STATEMENT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) CMSgt, USAF
438 AEW Command Chief

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X-5095

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT
 WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013; 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397
PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc.; and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.
ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.
DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20110503	TIME 2018	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No) KAIA - Kabul Afghanistan International Airport	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT ARVN PDET 2405	REPEAT (If known) OFFENSE COMPLAINT
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II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	SSN (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	STATUS/GRADE O-3
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (if required) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	TELEPHONE HOME DUTY (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER 439 AEAS	DEROS

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN Self	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
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III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank) _____ INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.) _____

SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the go (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.
	I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
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(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

IV. STATEMENT

First, I won't have any accurate time line of events as once the incident started I was going nonstop and never paid attention to time of day. I do know that when I first got notice of small arms fire it was sometime between 1000-1030 hours.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I was at the AAF Security Forces building talking with the deputy commander about security for the upcoming change of command. At that moment, his radio went off with people yelling and I saw out from the window of his office, my Afghan quick response forces (QRF) sprinting to the HMMWVs and loading up. I asked what they were saying on the radio, the report was of small arms fire at the Afghan Air Corp building (bldg. 101). At that point, I grabbed my interpreter and got in my MATV to race back to our KSPAN to get my gear. At the same time I was reporting to our wing operations center (WOC) of small arms fire and to initiate arming condition delta. They announced arming condition delta and ordered everyone to bunker down. I parked my truck in front of my group building (KSPAN 2) and retrieved my IBA and M4 rifle. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) When I had my gear I came out and set up initial security on the northeast corner of KSPAN 2 with MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7) (Fire Rescue) and MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (Security Forces). I was at that point for about 10-15 mins. I was relaying to the WOC on the radio of situation status as well as relaying info from MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (Security Forces) who was near the AAF Wing Building (bldg. 201) which is just west of bldg. 101. I also was making contact with the ISAF KANOC (ops center) to let them know of the attack. During that time is when the second round of gun shots rang out. It was at this point that I wanted to get a better view on the scene so I could properly relay information to the WOC. I instructed MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) take my position on the corner as I moved out. I had (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) come with me and we made our way over to the building across the street to the south of bldg. 201. That's when I had the heard the first report of a US member injured and they were moving him to the afghan clinic (bldg. 305) which is across the street and just south from bldg. 101. I called the KANOC to request a medevac from the ISAF French hospital because he was in critical condition. I would say (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I were at that location for 10 mins or so. We then made our way to the afghan clinic so that we could get eyes on to give proper directions to the ISAF medevac. Right after we arrived at the clinic the afghan medics brought an injured soldier, they said it was possibly the shooter but I didn't get a look at his face. I just saw that he had multiple gunshot wounds to the chest. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) started working on him and he went with the medics into the clinic. At that point, the WOC announced that they would need someone to meet the ISAF medevac at the Berm Pass to escort them to the clinic. Everyone else was bunkered down so I said I was en route. I ran as fast as I could to the Berm Pass. After about 4-5 mins I was about 1/4 of the way there, and the WOC said they were going to send a vehicle, but at that time I was only 50 yards away so I said I had it. When I reached the Berm Pass I saw the Belgian security forces and the ISAF medevac had just arrived. I said I was there to escort and one of the medics came up to talk to me. He wanted me to talk to Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (DCOMKAIA) to verify the injured. I said we had a US member who was injured and was in critical condition. The ISAF medevac said they were ready to go and for me to jump in with the lead vehicle. I don't know what they were doing but it then took them 10-20 mins to move. I kept yelling at them that we needed to go now but they seemed more concerned with getting their vehicles in the proper order. Once they finally got their ass in gear I instructed them where to go and lead my driver to the afghan clinic. Once we arrived, I linked back up with MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who said that US member had died. At that point MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) linked back up with me and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and stated there reports of possibly 2 more Americans still trapped in the Air Corp building as well as possible explosives planted in the building. She said that Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) wanted our people out of there now. Rather than wait for any QRF, I grabbed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and a Navy troop with the last name (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). I can't remember what his full name is but I needed all the people I could take. At that point I told them regardless what the building status was in we were going in to get our people out and we didn't know where in the building they were at. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) didn't have any IPE and just a weapon but wanted to go anyways. I told her to stay in the middle of our fire team for at least some protection. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) *"I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge."* (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) _____
SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) _____
3-May-2011

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 3 day
of May, 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) _____

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)." At the bottom of each page, print or type: "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

They agreed and we went for the south entrance of the building. The south entrance door was locked and an AAF member who was inside wouldn't help us. We found out later that the door was padlocked from the inside. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) yelled that he heard someone from the second floor and that the entrance might be open. So we went up the stairwell to the second floor. Once we entered we started to clear the first rooms we came too and yelling that we were US forces. I noticed all the doors had been kicked in like someone was searching for people along with broken glass on the floor. We cleared the first room to our right and then we saw an AAF member down the hallway. We started yelling Mushawen (dari for mentor). He pointed down the center stairwell of the building. I lead the team down the hallway and stairwell. While in en route I saw a blood trail on the stair well as well as blood marks on the wall to our right as we went down the second set of stairs. We kept yelling for mentors and the afghan air force members point around the corner to the left on the 1st floor hallway. We rounded the corner I saw blood on the walls and looked like someone had written a message on the wall in blood. As we went down the hallway the AAF members pointed into the ACCC. Upon entering the ACCC, I cleared the room and saw initially 4 US bodies lying on the floor. As I was clearing, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were checking the bodies for signs of life. Two bodies were in the center of the room on the middle tier lying face down. There was a third body on the top tier to the left and another body on the middle tier, north side of the room. There was blood everywhere as well as 9mm round casings. We made it to the back of the ACCC (northeast corner) and found TSgt Tara Brown lying next to another US member who was in ACUs. When (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) checked Tara he found that she was still alive. As (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were working on Brown, I held security facing the front of the room, but was standing just on the other side of the filing cabinets where Tara was. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was getting IDs from the KIA in the room. I didn't treat anyone in the process because everyone else was and wanted to ensure security. In communication with everyone we found that all the kill shots were head shots from the side and rear as the bodies were mainly lying towards the south end of the room. Also, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had made the comment of "where the fuck are their guns". That's when I noticed I didn't see any guns or magazines on the two bodies in the middle tier. We found that Tara's M9 was loaded and the M4 on the Navy member was not loaded. I don't remember if Maj Bruder's weapon was loaded or not. Tara had multiple gunshot wounds; one grazed her head, one to the arm and one to the back. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) dragged Tara out from the corner and to the middle of the top tier. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were initially going to 2 man carry Tara out but because of so many doors they decided to go with a one man fireman's carry. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) helped pick up Tara and put her on (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) shoulders. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) picked up Maj Bruder's (Call sign Clepto) M9 and also the M4 from the navy guy next to Tara. It was still strapped to his body so she cut it off. Before leaving we double checked to make sure no one else had any sign of life. I made the notification to the WOC that we had at least 5 KIA and 1 critically injured and requested medevac as well as that we were about to exit. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) handed me an M4 which I believe was the Navy member's. I slung my own M4 around my back because of the cut strap on the other one. Before leaving we all made sure we were on the same page about body counts and who had front/rear security. I lead the team out and we met up with the Afghan medics at the main entrance to the building on the West side. They put Brown on a litter and into their ambulance to take her to the afghan medical clinic. We made our way to the clinic where a doctor had said she needed to be medevac'd to the French hospital immediately. For some reason the French medics who were there standing around all left on foot for building 101. Rather than wait on them after witnessing their methods previously that day, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I decided we would take her (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ourselves. I made notification to the WOC of our plans. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) secured an SUV which was parked in the lot next to the afghan clinic as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went in to tell them what we were going to do. They brought Brown out on a stretcher and loaded her into the back of the SUV. I jumped in the front seat and grabbed onto the front of the stretcher. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) climbed in the back with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to help hold the stretcher so it wouldn't slide out since our rear hatch wouldn't close completely. We then left and drove as fast as possible to the French hospital. Once we arrived the ER personnel took over and rushed her in. As we waited outside the ER entrance I was in contact with the WOC and KANOC of our status and KIA report. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had gone into the hospital because she was pretty shook up and they wanted her to speak with counselors. About 15-20 mins later a nurse came out and told us that Brown was in stable condition and they had sedated her. DCOMKAIA called and wanted to verify the KIA count. He then left the KANOC to come to us and take us to the IJC situation room. He stated that we were the only ones reporting at least 5 KIA. He wanted (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and me to come to the IJC to brief the NATO generals because at that point they had sounded the all clear and had no idea of the extra deaths with the possibility of more than one shooter. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Once in the IJC, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I met with a Maj Gen Laster (Marine Corps), COMKAIA, a couple other NATO generals. We explained to them everything we did and what we saw. During our debrief Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (438 AEW Vice CC) called into to report and request help in evacuation. It was then they decided to put an evacuation plan together to get all US and Coalition personnel back to ISAF. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told them what buildings everyone was located in. Since (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and myself had essay on where the buildings were they wanted us to aid in planning. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stayed in the IJC as I left with DCOMKAIA to the KANOC. After a plan was laid out, and also speaking with Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on the phone in the KANOC it was decided that the priority was to get our fallen soldiers out of the ACCC room. DCOMKAIA got a Belgian QRF together and I left with the QRF team to show them where to go. We linked up with Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who as in a UA HMMWV at the Berm Pass and made our way to bldg. 101. As we arrived at bldg. 101 I went with the Belgian QRF to secure the inside and outside of the building. At that point we found that Army CID had secured the crime scene and was conducting their investigation. I then went and stood guard out front of bldg. 101 while we waited for the French medics to arrive with body bags. After about 20-30 mins, the French medevac arrived and had also with them my two other Security Forces members, TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). It was at that point that they informed me that TSgt Tara Brown didn't make it and had died at the hospital. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Soon after they arrived I got the call from my Sq/CC, Lt. Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that there were more US members stuck at the intercolot building which is located in the parking lot adjacent to the Afghan compound entrance. They were trapped there because the AAF/SF had locked down the gate area and wouldn't let anyone in or out. Because of the extreme insider threat and the fact there were still possibly shooters on the loose, LtCol (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) requested that I get a team together to go retrieve our people. I notified WOC to get a driver to come to our location with one of our MATVs. The WOC contacted our trapped personnel and had them get in contact with me via cell phone. The US personnel who were still trapped then told me where they were in the building and how many they had with them. I quickly put a plan together with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on how to extract them. Our MATV soon arrived with a gunner in the turret and since we were picking up 3 US personnel and 2 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Interpreters I had (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) get in the back with guns out while I jumped on the side of the truck rails. We made our way to the afghan compound gate and went to the south side of the building where they were located. When the US personnel saw us they exited the building and I instructed them to all get inside of the MATV as they didn't have any IPE. In all, we picked up Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and their 2 interpreters. Once they were secured inside, I jumped back on the truck rails and we went back to KSPAN 2 where they would be secure. Once there, I debriefed LtCol (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on what I had seen and what my actions had been. After debriefing, SSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I went back to bldg. 101 to assist in security (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) When we arrived, they were in the process of moving the KIA into the trucks to be transported to the French hospital. I then linked up with Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (438 AEAG/CC) outside of the main entrance to bldg. 101. The Belgian QRF requested that I go with them to escort them back to the ISAF compound with our KIA. I asked Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) if he still needed me and if I would be able to aid in taking our fallen back to the hospital. He agreed and I then jumped in with the QRF to lead them back to ISAF. After arriving at the French hospital, I aided in carrying our fallen soldiers from the trucks to the morgue. Once we were complete, we instructed to make our way to the MWR tent for accountability. It was around 1800 -1900 hours when I arrived to the MWR tent. At the MWR tent I linked up with OSI and Counter intel to debrief them on everything I had done and scene. That was pretty much the end of the day for me. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

End of Statement

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT
 WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013; 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397
PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc.; and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.
ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.
DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY. SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (If known)
20110503	1147	B Bg 200 Rm 02, Kabul Afghanistan	AFOSI	OFFENSE COMPLAINT

(A) PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	SSN (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	STATUS/GRADE E5/SGT 6513 CIV ARMY
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (If required) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	TELEPHONE (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DEROS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
		Self		

(B) ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank) _____ INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.) _____

SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.
SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.
	I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
----------------------	----------------------------------

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

IV. STATEMENT

X

SEE ATTACHES

X

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X "I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge." X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 3RD day of May, 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

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X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

X On 27APR2011, I received a call to proceed to KAIA-N to exploit cell phones involved in the shooting X incident at the ANAF compound. I was accompanied by GS-13 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) from the NATO SOF Forward Support Base at Camp Souter, Kabul. We proceeded to KAIA N from Camp Souter, and were met at the SOFFC by LTC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SOFFC OPS Dir. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I then proceeded to the ANAF compound. On arrival, LTC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I entered the building and met with a US Army CID CPT (FNU, LNU) and explained we were present to exploit the Afghan cell phones. We were directed to the second floor, where the Afghan body had been found.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

On our walk to the second floor, I photographed two (2) areas with writing on the wall, and a large blood splatter on the stairwell, and noted a blood trail. (Photos given to SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) AFOSI, 03MAY2011). We asked a few ANAF soldiers standing around if they could tell us the name of the body, which they identified as ANAF COL Ahmad GUL. At the top of the stairwell, we walked right and noted numerous doors that had holes kicked in them. There was no blood trail or splatter noted in this area. We returned to the stairwell, picked up the blood trail, and went to the room where GUL was found.

The room where GUL's body had been found also had holes in the doors, and evidence of barricading inside the doors. There was no blood splatter or trail noted near these doors. The couch where the body had been found showed two holes, which I assumed were from bullets. I collected a blood swab for DNA. (Swab given to CIV (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) NATO SOFFC Biometrics Analyst, 27APR2011).

We asked an unidentified Afghan soldier to take us to the body, which was located in the Medical building. We were taken to the building, and given access to GUL's body by the medical director (FNU,LNU). The Med Director identified the body as ANAF COL Ahmad GUL. I performed two biometric enrollments on the corpse, using a Crossmatch SEEK, to ensure good fingerprints. Flat prints were all that were taken, as rigor had set in, and I was not comfortable breaking the fingers for rolls in front of 6 Afghan soldiers. I also captured his right iris image.

I noted what appeared to be two (2) entry wounds on his chest, one (1) at the right clavicle, and the other on the inside of the left breast. The body also discharged a lot of blood out the back when it was reposition for access to the hands, but I did not have access to see a wound in the back.

After collecting biometrics, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I returned to the SOFFC where JDEC-A was exploiting two (2) Nokia cell phones, and one (1) locked Apple iPhone. MAJ (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) from CJ2E was also present with NCO's, and they were photographing a S&W M&P pistol, and a Beretta pistol, and other evidence.

At this point, NDSA Agent and LNO (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) expressed concern over the possibility of rounds in the couch, and stated his desire to recover any evidence still at the scene. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I accompanied (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and another NDS agent (FNU,LNU). We returned to the ANAF compound, and to the room where COL Gul's body had been found. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and his partner then recovered the rounds, by cutting open the couch and feeling through the padding. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and his partner were gloved, and performed in a forensically sound manner). Two (2) rounds were recovered, bagged separately, and labeled.. The

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

X appeared to be 9mm. We returned to the SOFFC, where (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took custody of all evidence for the NDS. X

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

PAGE 3 OF 3

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT
 WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013; 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397
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ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.
DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (If known)
20110503	1708	Building 300, Rm 02	AFOSI	OFFENSE COMPLAINT

(1) PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	SSN AX	STATUS/GRADE N/A
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (If required) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	TELEPHONE HOME (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DUTY
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code) 438 AEW	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER N/A	DEROS

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN N/A	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
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ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank)	INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SP, special agent, etc.)
---------------------------------	--

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	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.
	I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
----------------------	----------------------------------

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

IV. STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

X

Statement Attached

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

F

X

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

"I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge."

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 3RD day of MAY, 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

statement

27/4/2011

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

I was working in ACCC first thing in the morning with MAJ Brudether. We were about to have a dally VTC at 10:00 I was in the ACCC where this incident happened.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

I remember few mentors got in the ACCC, they had conversation with my mentor which are LTC Bryant and MAJ Brudether and also Mr. Jame from MPRI, the rest of mentors were unknown to me they were new. I was on my desk when I heard shooting, at first I thought one of the mentors pistols went off. I turned around I saw COL Ahmad Gul shooting the US guys a meter away from me. Suddenly I lied down and found myself under the desk, when I was under desk I did not look around because I was almost death. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) is one of the officers in ACCC, he got shot at hand, and the blood I have on me its (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) blood he was laying down next to me. I was hidden under there about 15 or 20 minute. After while I heard shooting from outside of the ACCC shooting was in hallway. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did run and locked the doors from inside. After that the ANA security personnel showed up and took us out of there.

- Ahmad Gul had pistol on hand, he was shooting a lot
- There were ANA and IT'S in there, somehow they made it out
- I thing Ahmad Gul was the Air movement officer.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

ACCC (IT)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

PAGE 3 OF 4

X -

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

statement

3/may/2011

After the verbal translation with Maj Brothur, I went to my desk to work on Kandahar check list. I was about to get drink from all the way end of the room. Suddenly I heard a signal gunshot like pop, pause, pop that was alot. When I turned around I saw Ahmad Gul Shooting. I found myself under desk. I was hidden there the whole time when Ahmad Gul was Shooting. I did not look around the entire time when I was there. I saw Ahmad Gul for the first time that day when was shooting, I had not seen him before that day. I think the shooter shot LTC Burine and Maj because those two were the nearest people. Gul had pistol in right hand and had two Mags in left hand. After he shot everybody I mean, shot the US guys. He shot them again and again no one said a word except the US lady, she said please don't shot me, please. She said that a few times. I could hear Gul switching of his Mags because of the noise they made when the mags hit the ground, and also his top shirt was unzipped and opened. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) got shot on hand; he was right next to me the whole time, when we heard the Gun shot went for away, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran and locked the doors from inside. I was hidden under the desk about 20 or 25 minutes. When Gul got in and started shooting two IT's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran out from conference room door. The third IT, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) got shot at arm. When security personnel showed up there we were locked in, they pushed the door. They saw the door is closed. The security guys were thought we are suicide too. They called to their commander and said the doors are closed. Then I said I am in here. Then I said I will open the door but make sure do not shoot me, I am not suicide. Then I opened the door. After check they took me out of there.

This is my statement

X _____ X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

End of Statement

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X _____ X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
PAGE 0 OF 4
X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Algham Air Force Commanding Center
 Legal office
 CID office

Answering sheet to section 2nd and 3rd parts of 2nd article of M.P. code

Location: Air force legal of office CID office

Assigned Investigator's name: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Rank C/lt

As an eye witness were used.

name	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
nick name	
FI name	
Date and place of birth	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Ethnicity	Pashtoon
Native language	Pashtoon
Current add	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
original add	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
occupation	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Educational degree	
Marital status	
wife occupation	
How many kids	
Criminal Background	don't have
Immediate relatives	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
ID number	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Phone number	
Date and time of statement	01:15 pm 10-2-1390
weather	clear
Email add	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) @gmail.com

Signature or finger print ()

Please tell us about the incident on date
7-2-1390 with all details and how it gets
starts.

When i left communication Room Mr [REDACTED] (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
told me He want A.T.C system responsible
person. So in this time i used the duty officer
desk telephone and called communication department
i still was on the phone suddenly i heard shooting.
i saw Ahmad Gul from front side shooting
toward us and every where. Since i couldn't
find a chance to react i put down my self on
the ground and laid down. Then i saw his
legs a little away from my self in this time
he shoot on me. bullet hit ~~near~~ the floor
very close to my head. maybe my head was
targeted.
after a while quietness i stood up and walked
to the doorway and hid my self in the
bathroom and i called E.F.C and told them
there is a perso shooting on us. after a while
i heard security forces soldiers i opened
the door and yeled "i hid my self here"
and then they also start shooting on me and
again i yeled "it is me". they told me
to rise my hands and guided into the middle
of hallway then i guided to left exit way
that time i was threatened very badly till i took off
my jacket and after that [REDACTED] (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
and [REDACTED] (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) called the security forces
so that is way they didn't shoot me after that
i went to clinic. Sirone i dont have license i am not
carrying gun.

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT
 WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013; 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397
PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc.; and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.
ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.
DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (If known)
2011 05 04	1050	Bldg 200, Rm 02 Kabul, Afghanistan	APos.	OFFENSE COMPLAINT

II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) <small>(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)</small>	SSN N/A	STATUS/GRADE N/A
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) <small>(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)</small>	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (If required) <small>(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)</small>	TELEPHONE HOME DUTY
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code) N/A	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER N/A	DEROS

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN N/A	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
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III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank)	INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.)
---------------------------------	--

SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the Government.
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.

I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
----------------------	----------------------------------

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 X

IV. STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

Statement Attached

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

"I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge."

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

X

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATE

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4TH day of MAY, 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)." At the bottom of each page, print or type: "Page ____ of ____ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X As usual we start work at ACCC normally at 08:15 am I mirwais was working on ACCC manning X
 documents to fix the errors on IT s computer MAJ brother came in and had greeting with everyone .
 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MPRI mentor and his IT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also was in ACCC . he was fixing email net work.
 His IT was close sitting next to me. I was fixing the errors on a IT's computer and having a conversation
 at time the 1000 meeting and lots of mentors and other mentors and AAF for meeting so suddenly I
 hear the shots so in that time I look to my right and saw Ahmad Gul ACCC airlift team chief, he was
 shooting to my back side shooting toward the backside of room or hall. Then for my safety I run away
 and past the conference room door and entered in to the conference door and I left out the conference
 door, then I run to the Okab where the mentors are. So I told the mentors that at the ACCC there is
 attack at ACCC, and I don't know about my mentors and IT's. So after that I was told to go the OkAB
 building where the mentors are. They told me to stay there. We were there for a long time before the
 evening and they moved us to the KAIA side and here up to 10 p.m. Then by bus to the Aphgna airforce
 gate then out. X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

This is my statement

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

End of Statement

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Page 3 of 3
X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT

WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013; 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397

PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc., and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.

ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.

DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (if known)
20110504	0900	Bldg 200, Rm 04, Kabul Afgh.	Arosi	OFFENSE COMPLAINT

II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	SSN (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	STATUS/GRADE AD/E-7
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (if required) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	TELEPHONE HOME (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DUTY
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER 422 Comm Sq. / SCPF	DEROS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
	SELF			

III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank) _____ INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.) _____

SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.
	I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
----------------------	----------------------------------

IV. STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

See Attached STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

"I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge."

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 5 day of May, 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)". At the bottom of each page, print or type: "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.


(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X
On the morning of 27 April 2011 I arrived at KSPAN 1 at approximately 0730. Maj Phillip (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X
Ambard, Maj Estelle, and Capt Ransom were having a conversation in the Communication Advisor office while seated in folding chairs in the middle of the small room. I exchanged "good mornings" with our guests after Maj Ambard introduced me to them. Maj Estelle and Capt Ransom were on a local site visit to get better situational awareness on the Afghan Air Force's Communication advising program. At approximately 0750, TSgt Tara Brown entered the office after her normal morning exercise routine. TSgt Brown was introduced to the visitors (Estelle and Ransom) and we began our normal morning routine of small talk, checking emails, and preparing for the day's events. Let me note that Brown was wearing her ABS-G uniform and carrying here 9mm pistol in her shoulder harness. The harness was a tan-reddish color and it held 2 extra magazines too. I am pretty certain that Brown had a magazine in her weapon at this time. At some point within the next hour, Brown left the room and that was the last time I saw her. I'm not sure where she went or who she was with. I did find out later that she was being escorted around by TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) due to the recent policy requiring female advisors to never be alone. During my morning contact with Maj Ambard, he instructed me to meet him, Maj Estelle, and Capt Ransom at the Afghan Communications Squadron at 0845. He explained he was going to take our guests to the Comm Squadron and introduce them to leadership, followed by a briefing in various areas. And he wanted me to brief my respective areas to them at 0845. I did as instructed and took Maj Ambard, Maj Estelle, Capt Ransom, and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (One of Our Comm Interpreters) to the Radio shop, the Telephone shop, and the Crypto shop and briefed those areas. There were various Afghan soldiers in the rooms and let me note that Mr. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a contractor in the Comm Advisor section, was in the room when the radio section was being briefed. We spent approximately 15 to 20 minutes in each shop discussing strengths and weaknesses of these areas. After the brief, Maj Ambard asked if I wanted to go with the him and our 2 guests to the Maintenance Support Group building and to visit the G6 at the Afghan headquarters building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was going with them in order to interpret as needed. I respectfully declined and told him I had some stuff to deal with in the Radio shop with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and that I would catch up with them later. That was the last time I saw Maj Ambard. I walked back to KSPAN 1 at approximately 1020 and within moments of sitting down at my desk, my Squadron Commander and Director of Operations were coming down the office hallway telling everyone that there were shots fired on OQAB. I immediately tried to call Ambard and Brown to inform them, but did not get an answer. I then texted them that "Shots Fired on Oqab. Take Cover." I also sent this message to everyone else in my address book that was at Kabul. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was the only one I heard from. As the day progressed and events unfolded, I eventually heard over the radio from Defender 1 that "5 Americans KIA". I knew at that moment that at least Maj Ambard was dead. He was the kind of guy that would call as soon as possible to let everyone know he was alright. He hadn't done so at the time of hearing this from Defender 1. I would also like to state that I have never been in the ACCC and that Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X

X (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) Ambard did not mention to me that they were going to go in there. I had never even heard of (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) the ACCC until this event occurred. That is all I recall in the events leading up to the murder of my co-workers (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C) _____ X (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

X (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) Tara Brown had informed me shortly after I arrived at Kabul Int'l Airport that she had been (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) hollered and stared at many times by the Afghans on the Afghan compound. She would normally go to the gym at KSPAN 1 on the Afghan compound a little after 0600. She travelled alone on several occasions. She did say she didn't feel safe at times. Approximately a week before the shooting occurred, Brown told me (as well as Squadron leadership) that she was physically harassed by some Afghan soldiers on her walk into work/gym. She said that she felt threatened enough to put a magazine in her 9mm and show it to the Afghan soldiers. I do not really know what she meant by this, i.e. drew her weapon or simply showed it while it was hoistered. She told me that MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) had recently had some similar troubles (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) with the Afghan soldiers too. That is all. X (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)


(b)(6) (b)(7) (C) _____ This is my statement _____ X (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)



(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

C.S.G.



Col

(b) (7)(C)

3 May 2011

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT

WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013; 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397

PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc.; and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.

ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.

DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (If known)
20110504	1325	KABUL, AFGHANISTAN BUILDING 200, Rm 03	AFOSI	OFFENSE COMPLAINT

II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	SSN	STATUS/GRADE
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	N/A	CIVILIAN
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (If required)	TELEPHONE
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	HOME DUTY
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER	DEROS

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
		N/A		

III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank) _____ INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.) _____

SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
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	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.
	I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
----------------------	----------------------------------

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

IV. STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

AA

Statement Attached

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4TH day of MAY, 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

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(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X was at the ACCC with my mentor, Major Ambard, Tara Brown, Estelle, and Ransom. All were talking to each other. All of a sudden, a man comes through the door and starts shooting. He had the gun in his right hand as he made his way toward the middle of the room. This is where the first shots were fired. Then I went around my desk and hid underneath it with my chair pushed up against it. I stayed here for a short time until the shooter moved toward the back of the room. Not a word was said during my time in the room. As the shooter moved closer away from my area, I suddenly ran out of the room through the main door. Outside in the hallway I saw ANA running toward the front entrance and to the outside of the building. I got outside and then went to the JF-2 Building. I called (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) when I got to the JF-2. I told him what happened. I stayed here for several hours from this time. I think the mentors were all in shock and they could not react to the shooter.

There was one of the Communications people (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) in the back Radio room with the Operator. I did see (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) in the ACCC this day, he was in the rear Radio room. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told shooter tried to get in the

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X radio room, but (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) held the handle so SUBJECT could not enter. X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

End of Statement

STATEMENT OF:

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

PAGE 3 OF 3

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT
 WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013; 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397

PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc.; and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.

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I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (if known)
20110505	1256	KABUL	AFOSI	OFFENSE COMPLAINT

II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	SSN	STATUS/GRADE
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	U/A	CIV CONTRACTOR
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (If required)	TELEPHONE
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	HOME (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DUTY
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER	DEROS
	AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY CONTRACTOR	

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE

III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank) _____ INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.) _____

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	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.
SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.
	I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

IV. STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

STATEMENT ATTACHED

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

"I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge."

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 5TH day of MAY 2011 (year)

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "Last name of individual making the Statement on Date." At the bottom of each page, print or type "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Statement of: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) / 5 May 2011

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X At approximately 0945, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) tara brown, ambard, ransom, and estelle, and I walked from Building X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 105 to Building 101, to the HQ ACCC room. Two Americans with flight suits, or Air Force dress, were there next to each other talking and they started a conversation with our group. Me and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were behind them as they talked. After one minute, I told (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I had to check the computer and would talk to him later. Then in less than one minute I started walking toward the back of the room and met (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and asked about the white haired man since I was supposed to come and fix his computer at ACCC. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked for the name of the person.

Next, TARA faced me and asked about the email problem with receiving messages with the MOD server. I explained it to Tara, referencing yesterday's conversation. TARA told me she would mention it to the two mentors who were talking in the middle of the room. Next (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) showed up and I made joke with him, I introduced (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to Tara; introduced him as (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) from the help desk and Tara laughed loudly at this joke.

At this time I heard gunshots. After the first shot was fired, me (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran for the radio room and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) locked the door. The shots were continuous, at least 10 to 12 shots total. I hear, ah, ah, ah from the mentors who were being shot. From the radio room I could hear very well because of the very thin wooden walls. I heard the shooter leave the room because I could hear his footsteps, which were normal footsteps. I think he went into the hallway and then I heard at least two or three shots. After about one minute, I heard glass breaking after one of the gunshots. After the first round, many mobile phones began to ring on the bodies of the mentors. I thought it was strange how fast people started to call.

For the second round of shooting, he came back to finish off the mentors that may have still been living from the first round of shots. Again I heard footsteps. I then heard a lady's voice pleading, No, No, No, Please. The man then shot four shots. I heard him reload the gun after he shot the woman who begged for her life. I think he reloaded the gun one time, I am not sure. Then the shooter checked the door to the radio room, but (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) locked the door so he could not get in. The shooter also checked the duty officer, or computer room, but could not get in. Then the shooter went out of the room and I heard one or two gun shots from the second floor. The shooting started about two minutes after he last left ACCC.

Directly after the shooter left the room I heard someone from inside the ACCC use the key pad to enter the door to the small computer room next to the radio room where I was hiding. The person may have been hiding under the big table in the back of the room. I did hear about one to two very fast footsteps from this person, also they were quicker than those of the shooter. He was in a hurry. This makes me think he may have been in the room the whole time. They went into the small room, locked the door behind them and opened the second door also. I am certain the second door was unlocked.

This person was not on the rescue team because the rescue team didn't get to the room for about four or five minutes after the second round of shooting. I don't know if they went into the hallway through

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X another door or not, I have only been in that room maybe three times and I am not sure if there is a X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

PAGE 3 OF 4

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

X door that opens up to the hallway. The radio room has a door that opens up to a stock room, according X to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) but it is usually locked. The computer room may have the same set up.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

At the same time of the upstairs shots, I heard a man gasping for air and making gargled noises. For two or three minutes everything was quiet except for the many mobile phones that kept ringing I could hear people talking near the ACCC entrance and they were trying to get into the room. I then heard a loud voice yell who is in here, come out with your hands up. Three ANA soldiers had their guns pointed at us. One soldier had a pistol drawn and the other two ANA had their long weapons pointed at us. The soldiers checked the room for more bad buys as one was guarding each doorway while the other searched the room. Me, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) left the room and went to safety. ANA insisted we leave through the Conference room door instead of the main door. This is all of the information that I have

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

X about the 27 April shootings. X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

- END OF STATEMENT -

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

PAGE 4 OF 4

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT

WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013, 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397

PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc.; and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.

ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.

DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (If known)
20110505	1335	Bldg 200 Rm	KAJA, AEG AFOSI	OFFENSE
				COMPLAINANT

II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	SSN	STATUS/GRADE	
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	O-3/1LT	
LOCAL ADDRESS (include Zip Code)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (if required)	TELEPHONE	
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	HOME	DUTY
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (include Zip Code)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER	DEROS	
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	USN, 538 th AEGAS		

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
		SAME		

III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank)	INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.)

SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the Government.
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me.
	I make the following choice. (Initial One)
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.
	I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

NOT USED SEE ATTACHMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

OATH/SIGNATURE

"I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge."

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C) SI(

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 5 day of May, 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH (b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)." At the bottom of each page, print or type "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

At approximately 0955 on 27 April 2011 I left the 538 AEAS office in building 106 on the Afghan compound of KAIA. With me were Major Jeff Ausborn USAF and Colonel (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) of the Afghan Air Force. We arrived at the AAF headquarters building at approximately 1000. On the way to the ACCC office I noticed Lt Col Frank Bryant in the hallway talking with someone though I don't remember who. We entered the conference room adjoining the ACCC office at 1002 by my watch. Several of the normal meeting attendees were already seated at the table. Maj Ausborn and Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sat down at the table and I walked to the other side of the room to distribute copies of the 538 AEAS next day's flight schedule to Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and another Afghan whose name I don't know but who is a normal attendee at the meeting. I then took Maj Ausborn into the ACCC to introduce him to Maj David Brodeur. Maj Brodeur was standing on the second or third tier of the room on the left side having a conversation with someone, I didn't notice who. That ended and I introduced Maj Ausborn to Maj Brodeur and then returned to the conference room. Approximately 2-3 minutes after returning to the conference room I heard the first shots fired. Before exiting the conference room into the hallway I heard approximately 20 shots that seemed to come from at least two locations. As I exited I saw Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with his pistol drawn covering the door from the ACCC. I exited the building via the main hallway to the front entrance and returned to the 538th office in building 106.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

END OF STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT				SUSPECT
				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WITNESS/COMPLAINANT
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT				
<p>AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013; 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397</p> <p>PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc.; and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.</p> <p>ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.</p> <p>DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.</p>				
I. STATEMENT INFORMATION				
DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (If known)
20110507	200	Kabul Afghanistan Bldg 200 Rm 02	AFOSI	OFFENSE COMPLAINT
II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)				
NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)		SSN	STATUS/GRADE	
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	04 AD	
LOCAL ADDRESS (include Zip Code)		DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (if required)	TELEPHONE (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	HOME	DUTY
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (include Zip Code)		MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER	DEROS	
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		
SPONSOR INFORMATION				
NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)		GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION
SELF				
III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)				
I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:				
ADVISOR BY (Full Name and Rank)				
INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.)				
SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.			
	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.			
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.			
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.			
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.			
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.			
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.			
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.			
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.			
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.			
SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)			
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.			
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.			
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.			
I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.				
SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT			SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER	

IV. STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SEE ATTACHED STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6 day of May, 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)." At the bottom of each page, print or type: "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

Major (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

- I asked Major Ambard to provide training to Major Estelle and Major Ransom on how he advised the Afghan Wing G6 and the Afghan Communications Squadron Commander.
- I asked him to give them a tour of the areas that he and MSgt Brown advised in to include areas that they provided comm. support
- One area is the ACCC where the GPG System is located. The SPG System is what the Afghans use to send secure message traffic. I had a meeting with both Major Estelle and Major Ransom the day prior to layout some of the things that they needed to have implemented at each of their bases and I told them that the GPG System should be one of their first priorities. This is the reason I believe that they were over there.
- Major Ambard was not a regular visitor to the Afghan Headquarters building, the only times that I know that he went over there was at my request.
- The day Major Ransom arrived I noticed that he did not have his 9M, I asked him why and he stated that all needed was his M4 and that he left his 9M at Kandahar.
- I also know that Major Estelle was not issued any ammo upon arrival at Kabul. I do know that sometimes individuals give others a loaded clip sometimes until they can get issued ammo. It was about 2 weeks before I was able to get mine.
- Major Estelle was slated to go to Shindand, I asked him to come to Kabul first for about 3 to 5 days of training prior to going there. I also asked Major Ransom to come up for the same amount of time for training.
- MSgt Brown was a very active learner and she would take any opportunity to learn that she could get. One reason she may have been over at the ACCC was to learn about the GPG System. Another reason may be to simply help troubleshoot some the MoD Network PCs that are over there.
- MSgt Brown primary job was to advice the Afghan Comm. Sq helpdesk; in this capacity she had duties in many of the Afghan buildings. She went on trouble calls with the helpdesk personnel on a regular basis.
- I also know that every time I saw MSgt Brown out of the office she always had her weapon with her and that she carried two clips.
- MSgt Brown also told me of one incident where she felt threatened by a group of Afghan males that were approaching her, she told me that felt it was necessary to load her weapon. At the time of the incident we were only allowed to be green with our weapons.

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

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(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

Submitted by: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

END of Statement

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT

WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013; 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397

PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc., and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.

ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.

DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20110506	TIME 1700	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No) Room 02 Bldg 200	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT AFOST	REPEAT (If known) OFFENSE COMPLAINT
-----------------------------	--------------	---	--------------------------------	---

II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	SSN (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	STATUS/GRADE E6-AD NAYU
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (If required) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	TELEPHONE HOME (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) DUTY
DEPARTMENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER Navy	DEROS

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
SELF				

III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 6TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank)	INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.)
---------------------------------	--

SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
	I have the right to remain silent - that is, to say nothing at all.
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the Government.
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
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	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)
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	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.
	I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
----------------------	----------------------------------

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

IV. STATEMENT

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X

Statement Attached

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 06TH day of MAY 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)." At the bottom of each page, print or type: "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

I (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Capt Nylander and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) left the office for the meeting around 0945-50. We get to the Air Corps bldg and proceeded to the conference room. The room was locked so we walked into ACCC. I said hello to Major Brodear and then went into the conference room. I unlocked the conference door to the hallway, then sat down by Capt Nylander and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sat next to him. Shortly after many start to arrive and taking their seats around 1000, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Major (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 2 fixed wing maintenance guys, LT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Afghan C-27 pilot, Major Ausborn, Capt Bradley, maintenance Major, Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and his IT sits next to me. LT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) walks out of ACCC and tells Major Ausborn that LTC Bryant wants to meet or something to that nature. Major gets up and walks into ACCC and LT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) rejoins our meeting. About two mins go by and I hear 3-4 gun shots fired from the ACCC. Everybody starts running to the entrance, while Capt Nylander runs towards ACCC door that joins with the conference room. I start towards the door and see Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on the floor reaching for his gun, I jump over him and continue towards the exist. Once getting out the main entrance of the Air Corp bldg I hear shots fired again about 3. Me and my IT continue running behind the buildings. Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) yells for us to get in the bunker, I glanced in and decided to continue running back to work. To conclude leadership had us

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

End of Statement

X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

PAGE 3 OF 3
X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT
 WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013; 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397

PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc.; and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.

ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.

DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY. SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20110506	TIME 1050	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No) Kabul, Afghanistan Bldg 200 Rm 02	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT AFOSI	REPEAT (if known) OFFENSE COMPLAINT
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II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	SSN (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	STATUS/GRADE CIV/CG-14
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (if required) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	TELEPHONE HOME (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	DEROS (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE SELF	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
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III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank) _____ INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.) _____

SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.
	I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT _____ SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER _____

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

STATEMENT

SEE ATTACHED STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE

I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6 day of May, 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "[Last name of individual making the Statement] on (Date)." At the bottom of each page, print or type: "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

At approximately 1100 hours on 27 April 2011, I was contacted by the IJC NDS LNO requesting support to get through the NKAIA perimeter to go to the site of the attack on the ANA side of the compound. He had twice tried to gain access, but the Coalition Forces would not let him leave the Coalition base. Attack sirens had been sounding on KAIA for approximately 1 hour. I went to the CJOC floor and confirmed with COL (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), CJ2 Operations that he wanted me to assist access to the ANA side of the installation for the NDS. I coordinated with KAIA Force Protection for passage through the perimeter. I knew there had been an attack and that some US KIA may be involved. JDEC-A was on site at my office due to a previously scheduled "Counterintelligence Surge" on KAIA that day in which all ANSF entering the Coalition side of KAIA were being screened by Counterintelligence personnel. I took CPT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) JDEC-A, USAF; SSG (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) KAIA Force Protection MP, USA; Ssgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), JDEC-A, USAF; and MAJ (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), NDS LNO to IJC. We got in the truck of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (driving) and proceeded to the gap in the berm between the ANA and Coalition Compounds. When we arrived at the gate to the ANA compound, the Belgian QRF Force Protection Forces stopped us. I exited the vehicle and coordinated with the Force Protection Forces, they radioed in to their command center for approval, then told me that we could proceed, but that the situation was not cleared on the ANA side of the compound and that it could be unsafe as there could be shooters on the ANA side of the compound. I returned to the vehicle and we proceeded to the building where the shooting had taken place. While we were pulling up to park, the French ARTEC team arrived with approximately 4X French Soldiers, one other US person wearing a military uniform, but appeared to be civilian and CPT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) NMCC Military Police, USA. We proceeded to the entrance of the building where the attack had taken place. There were approximately 15 ANA Soldiers at the entrance and they denied entry to the site because it was unsecure and ANA Commandos were still clearing the building, we were not allowed entrance past the lobby of the building. At this time the NDS investigative team arrived on site and was not allowed into the scene either, there were approximately 4 NDS team investigators. There was a hand print in blood on the wall by the stairwell, broken glass in the lobby and a bullet hole in the glass panel near the entrance, I did not see any shell casings in the lobby. There was an ANA general on site, but I do not recall his name. We were told we would be allowed in once the building was cleared. Once the building was cleared by the Commandos, none of the Coalition elements or NDS elements were allowed access to the site. We continued to push for entrance to the site and were denied because the ANA said that COL (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (the USAF Mentor to the ANA Air Force) had told them not to let anyone into the site. I called COL (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on the IJC JOC floor and told him we were denied entry and asked if MG Laster could call LTG Karimi of the ANA to secure entry. In the hallway on the first floor we noted something written on the wall in blood and asked a translator (not sure who he was or where he came from, could have been ANA) what it said, he said it says "god is one". French ARTEC and JDEC took photographs of the writing. After a short time we were allowed entry to the site (approximately 30-45 minutes, the French ARTEC team and CPT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered the room where the 7 US KIA were first, followed by NDS. I notified the IJC JOC that there were 7 US KIA in the building. The American civilian that was with CPT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) put two 9MM pistols and a wallet on the front left table of the room. The French ARTEC Team took photos of the scene and the NDS took videos and pictures of the scene. SSG (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) guarded the door and then stayed at the site to guard it and assist CPT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with the situation from that point forward. CPT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I then entered the room to see if there were any cell phones or the shooters weapons (C)

(b)(6)
(b)(7)
(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
3025

(b)(6)
(b)(7)
(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

none were located. We observed US KIA throughout the room. Some appeared to have been shot in the head, as they were bleeding from the back of the ANA head and biological matter appeared present. I did not see any shell casings in the room. We asked about the shooters weapons and his cell phone. CPT [REDACTED] was pressing the ANA for items associated with the shooter and asked if he had a workspace or computer, the ANA told us he did not have a workspace or computer. The ANA reps noted that these items were with the ANA base G2, we asked to see them without delay. We also asked where the shooters body was. We were told that the shooter killed himself on the second floor of the building. We asked to see the shooters body to see if there was any exploitable evidence on the body, we were told the body was in the afghan hospital on the ANA compound. We then went with the IJC NDS LNO, NDS investigators and the French ARTEC team to the hospital and the NDS LNO coordinated entry to see the body of the shooter. The shooters body had been stripped to his underwear and was laid on the floor. There was a large puddle of blood under him indicating he was bleeding from the back. We asked about his clothes and his ANA uniform was displayed form a black trash bag on the floor, it was very bloody. I asked the NDS reps to go through the pockets to see if there was anything in them, they did and there was nothing in the pockets. The French ARTEC Team left after we had seen the body of the shooter and took my e-mail address so they could forward their report. We then returned to the building where the shootings occurred. The Belgian QRF had then arrived on site. We pushed the ANA to see the weapons used in the shootings, the ANA began to bring the weapons downstairs to the first floor, we asked about the pocket litter and the ANA rep told us it was upstairs in the G2's office. We pushed to go to that office. There was a blood trail up the stairs, just drops, not heavy bleeding and some pools of blood in the hallway on the second floor. We entered the area where the shooter dies and there was a large streak of blood on the floor, so it appeared as though the shooter had been dragged out of the room to the hallway and that is where the pools of blood came from. Once inside, the JDEC-A team ([REDACTED] and [REDACTED]) began exploitation of the weapons which were bloody, they were one Berretta that appeared to be US issued and one Smith and Wesson. I asked where the pocket litter was, I went into a room with the ANA Base G2 and he unlocked grey filing cabinet and took out the pocket litter associated with the shooter - some Afghan money and other papers. I saw three cell phones in the drawer, and asked if the belonged to the shooter. The ANA base G2 said no and closed the drawer and locked the cabinet. I asked who the phones belonged too, he said the ANA. I called for the IJC NDS LNO to get the ANA G2 to open the drawer again. The base ANA G2 opened the drawer again and I asked about the phones and if they belonged to the shooter he said no. He then told me that the phone in the back of the drawer belonged to an ANA soldier "in his custody" for contact with a suspicious mullah, the ID card of the shooter was also in a plastic bag in the drawer. He then closed the drawer and locked it. I asked the drawer be re-opened and delivered all of the phones, two standard phones and 1 Iphone to the JDEC-A team ([REDACTED] and [REDACTED]) for exploitation. I also asked about a small black book in the drawer and the ANA G2 told me it was his. I did not look at the book. At some point during the exploitation on the 2nd floor, LTC [REDACTED] form ISAF SOF came by and asked if we could ensure the exploitation findings got to ISAF SOF as well once exploitation was complete. At some point during this period, two members of the Belgian QRF approached me for assistance with finding some body bags they had brought to the site but that had gone missing.

(b)(6) (b)
(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)
(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

4 of 5

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

I attempted to assist the Belgians and after some time, I found that the body bags had been located when I checked with the personnel in the room where the attack occurred. At that point there were other US personnel in the room that appeared to be coordinating the removal of the US KIA.

Once the JDEC-A Team finished exploitation on the cell phones all of the evidence was put on a desk on the second floor office. The ANA then received a call to bring all of the evidence to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) in a neighboring building. CPT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I were concerned that the Coalition would lose access to the evidence and we followed the evidence to a neighboring building along with the IJC NDS LNO. We followed the evidence into an office where (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and a significant number of other Afghan sr officers were, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were stopped from entering. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not appear pleased. I explained that the Coalition would require access to the evidence and asked if we should call (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said yes. I called COL (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on the 1oc floor and he agreed to have (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) call (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). We then had tea and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) expressed his regret at the situation. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then called (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and advised that the evidence would be turned over to NDS as he had been directed. The NDS LNO brokered a deal with the NDS investigators to allow the Coalition forces access to the evidence for 1 hour before it was transferred to NDS HQ. We then left with the IJC NDS LNO and NDS lead investigator. Once outside, it was determined that the NDS had to sign for the evidence. The evidence was brought inside the building to a room on the first floor where it was inventoried and signed for by NDS. Before departure from the ANA compound, I asked (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to check with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) before we departed, and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) came back and noted (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was going to stay and assist (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with the close out efforts on the attack site. The NDS lead investigator then accompanied (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) the IJC NDS LNO and myself to the IJC HQ, and the evidence was brought to the ISAF SOF area. I believe I returned to the HQ IJC area at sometime between 1600 and 1700. I then went to the CJOC floor and provided an update to COL (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) wrote a quick summary of the incident (provided earlier). I did not see any additional US casualties other than the 7 US KIA in the room at the attack site.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

END OF STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

x 5 of 5

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT
 WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C 8013; 44 U.S.C 3101, and EO 9397
PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc. and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.
ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.
DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20110507	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No) French Hospital Bldg Kabul Afghanistan	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT AFOSI	REPEAT (If known) OFFENSE COMPLAINT
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II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	STATUS/GRADE French Army AD Major
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER French Army
	DEROS -N/A-

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE SFC	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
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III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank)	INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.)
---------------------------------	--

SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.
	I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
----------------------	----------------------------------

IV. STATEMENT

I undersigned, [redacted], MTF [redacted] certify that the clothes of American soldiers, killed on 04/27/11, were put in bins, under the decision of the American officers who were present in the mortuary while funeral toilet (Colonel (OFS) US [redacted] were present). These containers were removed by the Ecology company as the waste to be burnt in the incinerator.

END OF STATEMENT

V. OATH SIGNATURE 04/03/11 CDT [redacted]

"I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge."

SIGNATURE OF

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 3rd day of May, 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)". At the bottom of each page, print or type: "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT				SUSPECT
				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WITNESS/COMPLAINANT
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT				
<p>AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013; 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397</p> <p>PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc.; and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.</p> <p>ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings.</p> <p>DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.</p>				
I. STATEMENT INFORMATION				
DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (If Known)
20110507	1428	Bldg 101 Conf. Room	AFOSI	OFFENSE COMPLAINT
II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)				
NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		SSN	STATUS/GRADE	
		-	AAF	
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (If required) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	TELEPHONE DUTY	
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code)		MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER	DEROS	
N/A		N/A	N/A	
SPONSOR INFORMATION				
NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)		GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION
			N/A	
III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)				
I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:				
ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank)		INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.)		
SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.			
	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.			
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.			
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.			
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.			
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.			
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.			
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.			
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.			
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.			
SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)			
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.			
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.			
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.			
I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.				
SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT		SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER		

IV. STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

See Attached Statement

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

"I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I understand the contents of this statement, including all omissions and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge."

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7 day

May, 2011 (year)

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)." At the bottom of each page, print or type: "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

(2)
That we noticed entrance
of Ahmad but for a second,
and he moved on. After
1 1/2 or 2 minutes we heard
sound (voice) of shooting
from left and back, later
[REDACTED] and myself
left the room, and we
thought that it is on a
suicide bomber and room
will explode. I ran [REDACTED]

Report of

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

①
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Related to incident of 7th of
2014, in summary this is
my witnessed events. In

the morning of that day

I and


(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

were sitting in the first
desk side by side. we were
busy (starting to) schedule
plans for next 3 days,

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(3)

toward hallway close
to stairways of first floor
near main entrance my
right leg got weak and
I fell my right shoulder
hit the ground. Because
I was in shock
went upstairs took right
in hallway and entered
the first door on right
which is office of



(4)
Commander center for radar
air defense. we were
5 persons inside the room.
shooting was continued all
along this time, but was
in burst fashion. we stayed
in there till security guards
came and recognized us,
and helped us get out of
building. I am (including
my colleagues are ~~are~~ very

sad to loose such (5)
advisors who were
helping us in our profession
It affected me considerably.

7th - may - 2011

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)



STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT
 WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY 10 U.S.C. 8013, 44 U.S.C. 3101 and EO 9397
PRINCIPAL PURPOSES Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors security police, AFOSI special agents etc. and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken
ROUTINE USES Information may be disclosed to local county, state and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings
DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20110507	TIME 1506	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No) Bldg 101 Conference Room	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT AFOSI	REPEAT (if known) OFFENSE COMPLAINT
-----------------------------	--------------	---	--------------------------------	---

II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	SSN N/A	STATUS/GRADE Captain
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (if required) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	TELEPHONE HOME (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) DUTY
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (include Zip Code) N/A	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER Afghan National Army	DEROS N/A

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
		N/A		

III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank)	INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF special agent, etc.)
---------------------------------	---

SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities

SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer

I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
----------------------	----------------------------------

IV. STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)
X

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

SEE ATTACHED STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

"I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge."

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

STATEMENT

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7 day of May, 2011 (year)

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL ADMINISTERING OATH

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)". At the bottom of each page, print or type "Page ___ of ___ Pages". The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

Captain

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Air Force, National Army.

Report of incident of Wednesday, that day

Hereby that day I and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were sitting behind a computer around 10 o'clock before noon.

We were working on schedule and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

was doing the same, this was the situation when a shot was fired behind us, we were close to entrance door. As soon as we heard gun shot I pulled myself from computer site and started running with a specific speed.

I got in hallway and was thinking that I would be shot from behind, I pulled myself out of Air Force Block (Building) and even outside I tried to get distant from building. I was tired and was out of breath, to the extent of coughing. This was the report regarding incident to extend your awareness, Presented to you. with respect (Signature) Captain (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

139012/14

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT

WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY 10 U.S.C. 8013, 44 U.S.C. 3101 and EO 9397

PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc.; and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken

ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings

DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg./Room No)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (If known)
20110509	11:30	BLDG. 200 ROOM 2 KABUL, AFGHANISTAN	AFO SI	OFFENSE COMPLAINT

II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	SSN	STATUS/GRADE		
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	N/A	CIVILIAN		
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (If required)	TELEPHONE		
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	HOME (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DUTY		
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER	DEROS		
1	MPCI MENTOR TEAM			
SPONSOR INFORMATION				
NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE

III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank) _____ INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.) _____

SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time
	MILITARY ONLY If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge
	CIVILIANS ONLY If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities

SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer

I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT _____ SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER _____

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
X

IV. STATEMENT

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

STATEMENT ATTACHED

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 09TH day of MAY 2011 (year).

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING OATH

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)". At the bottom of each page print or type "Page ___ of ___ Pages". The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

statement about the
27 Apr. 2011 incident.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

It was around 10:15 to 10:30 AM, time of VTC, & the mentors were talking to each other, and I was drinking tea with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (one of AFCC's IT). I was facing (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), behind me was the door of AFCC. I didn't see Col. Ahmad Gul walked into the command centre. When Col. Ahmad Gul shoot first bullet, I was scared. I took down my head, it was very fast, I decided to get out of the AFCC, when I stand up, I turned my face to get out of AFCC I saw him shoot an officer (US Air Force), and I saw him walking towards Col. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) desk / big plotter, he was just shooting and I was running. I saw Col. Ahmad Gul had a hand gun (pistol), then I get out of there while I was running towards the door - (Hatch door). I heard a rifle shooting.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

outside door X (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

PAGE 5 OF 6

X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

X It was around 8:30 in the morning, when me (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) walked over to the ACCC with X Mr. Jims McLaughlin. When we arrived there as a usual we started help the Air Force command and control center personnel with their (tracker, printer, excel, and etc). it was after 10:15 to 10:30 some time that I went and grab a cup of tea and came back to my desk (the first desks) sit down and start talking with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (one of ACCC ITs). I was facing back to the main door of the ACCC and facing directly to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) when the first shot went off. I took down my head and looked through my left shoulder to see what happened. I saw the shooter (Ahmad Gul) shooting towards the side of mentors (where the mentors were standing and talking next to Col. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Desk). Ahmad Gul moved towards the mentors side, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) jumped on the desk and I didn't see him where did he go I think he went out through the Conference room door, then I stand up and turned my face towards the direction of the shooter I saw Ahmad Gul shot an officer (US Air Force Officer) with a tan flight suit I didn't see the face of fallen down officer it was just for a second I saw that. Then I start running towards the main door of the ACCC to get out of there, I was running and still looking from my right shoulder to the direction of the shooter, I saw him still shooting and I run out of the ACCC to the hall I was still running towards the main door of the Afghan Air Force Headquarters before I get out of the hall door I heard a rifle shooting like (burst shooting). In that day the Afghan Air Force personnel that were present in the ACCC are as follows:

1. Ltc (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
2. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
3. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
4. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
5. Tea guy

On that day the ITs that were present in the ACCC are as follows:

1. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
2. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
3. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
4. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)


(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X

- END OF STATEMENT -

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) X




(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

col.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Air Mob. Team Chief



STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

SUSPECT

WITNESS/COMPLAINANT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013; 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397

PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc., and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken.

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DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.

I. STATEMENT INFORMATION

DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (if known)
20110610	1100	Bldg 1360, AFOSI, OAB, ROK	AFOSI 5 FIS	OFFENSE COMPLAINT

II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	SSN (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	STATUS/GRADE AD 103
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (if required) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	TELEPHONE HOME DUTY (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER 51SFS/OSAN	DEROS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SPONSOR INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION	DUTY PHONE
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III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)

I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:

ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank) _____ INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.) _____

SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.

SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)
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	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.

I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.

SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER
----------------------	----------------------------------

(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)

I. STATEMENT

I was deployed to the Air Corp Advisory Group at Kabul Afghanistan in Jan - Dec 2008 as the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

For the first 6 months (estimate) only two were assigned to the Security Advisor mission. TSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (now MSgt) was my training assistant. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) departed prior to July (estimate) and was replaced by MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

After the 6 month mark, I was able to get approved a short 6 month plus up of 6 enlisted and one officer to do security training, QRF training, and weapons training. The intent of the plus up was to quickly train the Afghan Infantry Battalion to assume security of a newly constructed Corp compound. It later evolved to training other members of the Afghan Corp. My interpreter was (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who worked for the advisors for a couple of years. He would be able to fill in more info if needed as to the character of the subject. I held him as a very trusted agent. I don't recall the first meeting. But, I do remember him from coincidental meetings during my deployment at least weekly. It was common knowledge (common speculation) he was not a stable person. He was quite often angry and when I or anyone else would extend a greeting his expression would change and wouldn't speak or grunted as if disapproval. He would on occasion quite often verbally and physically attack the Afghan security force if they would try to ask for ID or vehicle pass. He would give the motion of attempting to back hand them. On two to three occasions, I witnessed him pick up rocks and toss them at a Afghan soldier when the soldier was trying to enforce standards. But, even though I did remember him doing this...I also remember this happening quite often by other officers. It was not a unique form of correction of soldiers by officers. When it was witnessed by me or any other Cadre member, we quickly corrected it and sent it up the Afghan chain of command. Additionally, It wasn't necessarily that I didn't want to train this person specifically, I didn't want my USAF SF NCOs training any of the pilots because it was common knowledge they wanted to take the pistols home. The pistols were a status symbol and all the officer felt they needed to have them 24 hours a day. This was not a favorable in my opinion for several reasons. 1) None of them were trained on safety and use of either the pistol or rifle. 2) The pilots were not allocated any pistols on the Afghan equipment document 3) Afghan pilots and one of the American advisors (LtCol (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)) was adamant they be given pistols for personal use. 4) The only pistols available for issue were used by the Security Force. So, issuing pistols to pilots for personal use would create security issues. My responsibility was to train the Afghan Army to conduct training and my team was only to observe. The Afghan Army OIC of Combat Arms (Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)) was to conduct the training. But, he proved to be unreliable so very close mentorship was required. This meant my SF team closely conducted/monitored most of the weapons training for whomever was deemed as needing training. On several occasions, AK weapons were found in closets in the Afghan flying squadrons. Usually, these were left over weapons hidden prior to the US arrival. Weapons training consisted of, Smith and Wesson 9mm pistol and the Afghan/Check/Chinese for of the AK47. We trained in the move and shoot aimed fire training instead of the pray and spray the Afghans were famous for. Pilots wanted to receive pistols...but, not necessarily ant training. They were not allotted pistols only rifles. Since pistols were a status symbol, rifles were not important. I continually refused to allow the Afghan Security Armory to issue pistols to anyone other than infantry soldiers going to duty. Pilots wanted to receive pistols...but, not necessarily ant training. They were not allotted pistols only rifles. Since pistols were a status symbol, rifles were not important. I continually refused to allow the Afghan Security Armory to issue pistols to anyone other than infantry soldiers going to duty. Ies to the pilots. But, I insisted the pistols only will be issued to pilots if they would go through rifle and pistol training prior to being issued weapons. I insisted on this because I felt the continued force protection vulnerability was immense and it was dangerous for poorly trained Afghan people with questionable weapons safety awareness to be walking around with loaded weapons who weren't trained. Especially since US military personnel were not allowed to be armed for self defense. My first commander, Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (sp) did not allow personnel to carry bullets in weapons while off the ISAF installation. His justification was stated often...If someone had a accidental discharge, then the headquarters would block them from getting a medal. This non-arming policy carried on despite my objections from a Force Protection stand point. While the Americans did have weapons and Ammo, they were not allowed to insert bullets into the weapons for fear of the accidental discharge. This was not true for the SF advisors, I required all of them to be armed at all times when conducting business. Training consisted of two daysI instructed rifle firing on day one (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

V. OATH/SIGNATURE

"I hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make this statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. I swear (or affirm) I have read this statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge."

SIGN (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) EMENT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10th day of June, 2011 (year).

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

VI. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION PAGE(S)

Use plain bond paper (both sides optional). At the top right of each page, print or type "(Last name of individual making the Statement) on (Date)." At the bottom of each page, print or type: "Page ___ of ___ Pages." The individual must initial the top and bottom entries and sign his/her name at the bottom of each page.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Capt, USAF

10 JUN 11

51 Security Forces Squadron

(b)(6) (b)(7)
(C)

X and pistol firing on day two. This is because we did not think the Afghan pilots would show up for rifle training if it was day two. So, the only people issued a pistol were those who conducted both days of training. All pilots had rifles while flying but very few of them know how to operate and employ them. In fact, most of them that carried rifles didn't know how to install a magazine. I did not keep records of Afghan Army firing range qualification; this was the responsibility of the Capt (b)(6) (b)(7) (C) of the Afghan National Army. Training and background: Enlisted as Security Police Law Enforcement Specialist May 1986; Commissioned in 2001 as Security Forces Officer. My reactions to the incident: I just kind of said "I knew it" Felt tons of anxiety and then anger. I didn't realize exactly who it was at the time. Im thinking I saw a photo on the news or the name was recognized. /// END OF STATEMENT///


(b)(6) (b)(7)
(C)


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
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
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
(b)(6)
(b)(7)
(C)



























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





















































































North




ANA Air Force Command Building
Air Command Control Center

Case # 2405-C-118B-15882111171250

SA [REDACTED]

8 May 11

Green Numbers Correspond to Swabs Taken



Bullet Holes in Wall

Projectile Recovered from Hole

Fire Alarm

Projectile Recovered by First Responders

Projectile penetrated bookshelf at floor level; recovered underneath

Projectile lying on top of seat

Projectile impact site in floor

Projectile lying on top of papers

Projectile impact sites (X4) in floor under bodies

Against base board on floor

9'4" to front wall

main floor on floor

NOT TO SCALE



ANA Air Force Command Building 2nd floor
Couch in Intel Office

Case # 2405-C-118B-15882111171250



2 May 2011

To: 438 AEW/OSI

From: L. [REDACTED] MPRI

Subject: Events of 27 April 2011 surrounding the attack on U.S. personnel
In Afghan Air Force Headquarters, Kabul, Afghanistan

On the morning of 27 April, I left my office and walked with my Interpreter/Translator (IT) to the AAF HQ building at approximately 0930 Afghan Local Time. On arrival, we entered the G3 office in the midst of a discussion between the Afghans involving operations on Victory Day. As there appeared to be some confusion on the scheduling and coordination of the directed operations, I left the G3 office alone and went downstairs to the Air Command and Control Center.

On arrival there, I spoke to Major Brodeur and Mr. McLaughlin to alert them to the impending change in the flying schedule and to get a phone number for Lt Col [REDACTED].

At that time, Major Brodeur and Mr. McLaughlin were seated on the left side of the third tier up (looking from the doorway to the hall). Four Afghan officers were busy working on the computer to their immediate right (my left from the door). Several I/Ts were seated toward the front (lower end) of the room (to my right). Few, if any, others were in the room. The alleged shooter was not in the room.

I then left the ACC and attempted to contact Lt Col [REDACTED] from the main lobby on the HQ first floor. (My phone log indicates these initial calls were made at 0946 and 0947 Afghan Local Time.)

I then proceeded upstairs toward the G3 office. Arriving in the G3 area there was another exchange of phone calls between Lt Col [REDACTED] and myself—this time successful. (These phone calls and two others I made that morning are not in my phone log for reasons unknown to me.)

I terminated the phone call with Lt Col [REDACTED] as I entered Gen [REDACTED] office (AAF/G3) and sat down on the couch adjacent to his desk.

As soon as I sat down, I heard what sounded like four or five shots from a small caliber weapon. The shots sounded almost like a short string of firecrackers and the interval between shots was about that speed. I stood and said to the General "That was gunfire." He and his assistant both motioned for me to sit down and indicated they did not think it was. Almost immediately, there was another report that distinctly sounded like an M-9, followed by more reports from the original source.

From the window—second floor, front of building- I could see people running away from the front doors in all directions, some with weapons drawn, and some possibly firing back towards the door. As weapons discipline seemed to be in short supply, I moved well away from the windows and turned my attention ensuring the Afghan officers present were securing the room. For the moment, the doors were locked and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and two of his officers were armed with pistol and guarding the doors. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received word by phone that the shooting had started in the ACCC.

At this time, I received a call from Mr. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (MPRI) who was located in the AAF Safety Office on the first floor of the HQ building. He informed me there was gunfire in the HQ building. The time of that phone call was 1017 Afghan Local Time. After the obvious response, I encouraged the armed officers to try to work to the top of the stairs in order to secure our end of the top floor.

As the sound of gunfire appeared to be getting closer and moving up the stairs, one of the officers covered the hallway while the second kicked down the boarded up door at the west end of the hallway. They motioned for me to head for the door, which I did, and stopped just outside the door to help the two women present get started down the stairs and watch for any signs of attackers outside as the operations officers withdrew to the stairs.

As headed down the stairs some individuals were reaching the top of internal stairway in the middle of the building. We proceeded down the stairs and ran away from the building to the west, turning back once to assist an Afghan officer who had jumped from a window on the second floor of the HQ building. Eventually, my IT and I took cover in an empty bunker at the far end of the maintenance unit building directly across from the hangars.

Shortly after arriving at the bunker, I heard a single small caliber report from the HQ building. I believe that was the last gunfire I heard.

After the initial exchange of fire, it was difficult to keep track of the firing as windows being kicked out and furniture overturned made similar sounds inside the building. During the firing, I am relatively certain I heard M-9, M-4/16, AK-47 firing in addition to the weapon that fired the initial shots.

After some time, my IT and I moved toward the HQ bunker where the large majority of the US and Afghan personnel for the HQ building were sheltering. From that point on, I was just a passenger.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) **Report about the incident on 04/27/2011**

Ahmad Gul s/o Mohammad Gul was a pilot; he belonged to pastun tribe and was permanent resident of Tarakhil village, Dehsubz distric and Kabul province; he currently lived in Taimany area, district 1 of Kabul city. Ahmad Gul was born in the year 1343(1964); he was graduated from air force university and earned BS degree. Ahmad Gul by the order #0737 dated 07/24/2010 assigned as an officer for ANA air force command and control, operation chief office, management travelers and cargo in the position of Captain.

On 04/27/2011 COL Ahmad Gul came to the office around 09:45am entered into air force headquarter and then got into management command and control office where he was working then opened fire by an American pistol # PDH-1324(the pistol is registered with the air force) on military cooperators, at the result (8) people from foreigner cooperators got killed and another one wounded. Then the subject went to the 2nd floor of the air force HQ building and entered into the air force Intel office and started sporadic shooting on the doors and windows; Intel employees dropped themselves from the windows to the ground. at the result (9) officers got wounded and at the end Ahmad Gul killed himself by the pistol he possessed.

Information about Ahmad Gul's family:

He was (b)(6) (b)(7) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7). His (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) by the name of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) is first year student at the literature faculty. Ahmad Gul has (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) two of his brothers by the name of Rahmat Gul and Mohammad Husain had been past away. The other (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) are as following:

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

COL. Ahmad Gul was marijuana addict. Before reform he was working independently and spent his time into hotels at the Shar-e-Now area in Kabul. He was a religious guy and most of the time goes to religious place "Tamim Ansar Khanaqa" and follows Sufi procedures. He had good relationship with his (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) but was living in solitude.

He had a corolla vehicle model 2006 and lived with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) mentioned as above) in a house which belongs to their (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). His personnel telephone

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) two American pistols PDH 1324 registered and 1204650 unregistered pistol with two magazines were found with his body.

Sincerely,

Signed by:

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Note: His (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) by the name of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) works for the anti narcotics at the airport.

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Ministry of Public Health
Presidency of Forensic Services
(Commanding) Office of Autopsy and Ambulatory

Issue Number: 6773 Act Exercise
11/2/90

Record number: 57
Date: 7-8/2/1390

To Honorable Position of:	Forensic View (Suggestion)
Dispatched authority (Reference) :	Ministry of National Defense I.R.A (G.A.A.)
In physical conditions:	Air Corps (General Physician)
Time and location of examination:	Light, ordinary
By:	Examination room
In presence of :	Forensic Doctors
Popularity (Identity) of Examinee:	Technical members
Type examination:	Ahmad Gul (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
	External examinations

Examinations:- Corpse of a tall, young man, about 45 years old; wrapped in a cumin (brownish /green) colored, and white plastic bed sheet; clothing, bloody, orange colored T-shirt (used as upper body underwear), lower body black and blue underwear, gray socks, military uniform, camouflage scattered bloody, flowery scarf (handkerchief), hat with governmental emblem, a brown leather belt wrapped in a plastic bag; reaction to stimuli/ mental intelligence black, hair black with a few white hair without signs of trauma, eyes half open, pupils dilated with sign of "Larcher"; nose, face, and ears are sound, mouth half open, teeth present in mouth, neck is sound without signs of trauma; chest in relation to (compared to) abdominal area is in lower level, on the right side of chest over clavicle bone there is a entrance bullet hole with contaminated and scratched circles including gunpowder smoke around it, which has caused the fracture of clavicle measuring approximately 1 x 1 centimeter in oval shape, which is visible. On left side of the chest, closer to midsection, approximately 6 centimeters lower than clavicle bone there is an entrance bullet hole that has been contaminated and scratched circles including gunpowder smoke around it. On back toward left side 2 centimeters farther away from midsection an external hole wound approximately 1 x 1 centimeter oval shape visible, the wound seems to be a passing canal (of bullet) which has caused the tearing of skin toward outside, visible. On the lateral side of left hand, in region of forearm joint, on the posterior side an entrance bullet hole, circular shape measuring approximately 1 x 1 centimeter with contaminated and scratched circles including smoke of gunpowder, visible. In proximity of forearm region an external bullet hole which has been a wounded passing canal measuring approximately 2x2 centimeters, visible, where the skin has ruptured from inside toward outside. 8 centimeters farther away and toward left of experience (meaning the immediately previous wound that we discussed) is an entrance bullet hole measuring approximately 0.8 x 0.8 centimeter with contaminated and scratched circles and gunpowder gas is visible. On back approximately 10 centimeters lower than armpit an external hole bullet, measuring 1.6 x 1.6 centimeters in oval shape that has been passing canal and due to skin rupture, has ejected from inside toward outside, visible. 6 centimeters lower than armpit, toward left side an entrance bullet hole measuring 0.8 x 0.8 centimeters circular shape having contaminated and scratched circles and gunpowder gas is visible. A sample of blood has been obtained and been sent to Toxicology Laboratory, Reference/ document number 1390/2/10 (6762), which has been received back through reference/ document number 1390/ 2/11 (11074) that been communicated as this: the blood sample of subject was examined by Toxicology Laboratory and descriptive tests of Alcohol (Methyl Alcohol, Ethyl Alcohol) and Carbon dioxide were performed over sample, the result was negative.

Conclusion:- From external forensic examination of deceased we reach to this conclusion that the subject has offered life to impacts of (armed) fire, that by keeping in mind the existence of present wounds with the characteristics, that have been mentioned above, in body of subject, his death been of forced nature. The above mentioned wounds are consists of entrance and exit wounds which in process (of getting wounded) due to intense (heavy) blood loss and damage of internal viscera which constitutes death.

With respect

Signature and Seal

Presidency of Forensic Services



MPRI

MPRI NATO Air Training Command
Afghanistan (NATC-A) Support Program

Memo

To: Air Force Office of Special Investigations
From: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Date: 1 May 2011
Re: Attack on Afghan Air Force Base, Kabul, 27 Apr 2011

1. I am the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) of the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that supports the mission of the NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan (NATC-A). In that capacity I supervise 11 employees and our overall support efforts. I also serve as the Mentor to the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (unofficially) to the new (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). The office of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) is on the second floor of the HQ building, approximately in the middle, facing the flagpoles (i.e. west side). On 27 April 2011 I was present in the Afghan Air Force (AAF) Headquarters building on Kabul Airbase when the attack of that morning took place. This is my account of what I personally witnessed.
2. At approximately 0930 I walked to the AAF HQ to talk with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). The only thing I noted that was different from the norm was the presence of several Ministry of Interior (Moi) Ford Rangers outside the main HQ entrance. I presumed (correctly) that they were the transportation for a visiting group from that Ministry. I proceeded to the office of the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and he and I settled into a discussion about normal topics. At about 1015 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) came into the office with the group of senior officers from the Moi to exchange pleasantries with the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). They were in the office just a minute or two before (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) followed the entire group out of the office, I presumed to see the Moi officers off. My interpreter, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), and I sat down and waited.
3. A few minutes after the group had departed the office, I heard the first shots of the attack. I immediately had the thought that someone had opened fire on the group mentioned above and I was immediately concerned for their safety. I looked out the window and, to my relief, saw that the vehicles had already departed the building. I was unsure of the status of the AAF generals. I noticed several people running away from the HQ building. Because we were on the second floor, we had no idea what was going on in the building. Because I was unarmed and had no protection as well as no knowledge of what was going on I elected to stay in the office with my interpreter. I eventually barricaded the door as we had no key with which to otherwise secure it.

4. The initial gunfire appeared to be a series of shots fired in rapid succession. From my second-floor interior vantage point the rounds sounded like small caliber (i.e. handgun) rounds being fired from inside the building. Shortly, those shots were followed with what sounded like larger caliber weapons (i.e. rifle/automatic weapon) fire. Some of these rounds seemed to originate from outside the building, others from inside. The firing then (a few minutes later) appeared to move up to the second floor into the hallway somewhere outside the office where I was still located. Over the course of the next 45 minutes or so I heard hundreds of shots fired. The firing tapered off after approximately 10 minutes, but the situation was still uncertain enough that I elected to stay where I was and stay away from windows.
5. Within a minute or two of the outbreak of shooting I initiated a telephonic alert/recall of my Program personnel. I was able to contact all personnel present for duty in Afghanistan except for Mr. James McLaughlin. I repeatedly attempted to call him, to no avail. I became increasingly concerned about his status.
6. After the gunfire appeared to have stopped, someone came to the office in which we were waiting and attempted to force the door open. We yelled to them to wait, we removed the barricade, and an Afghan Army individual grabbed my hand and ran me rapidly down the second floor hallway, to the south exit, and out the door to the stairwell then directed me to the Presidential unit building. My interpreter and I ran to cover.
7. As I was running down the hallway I noted a bloody area in the hallway outside the door of the AAF G3 offices.
8. Upon arrival outside the Presidential Squadron building, while waiting for the "all clear", I spoke with two Afghan interpreters who stated that they had been in the ACCC and saw the shooting happen. A Mr. [REDACTED] (worked for 438 AEAG I believe) stated that he had been standing next to the shooter when he pulled out a weapon and began to fire. He further stated that he immediately ducked for cover and could not remember anything beyond that initial snapshot before he ran from the room. Mr. [REDACTED] (he works for our Program and was the interpreter assigned to Mr. McLaughlin) stated that he was in his usual location in the ACCC. He did not see the first shot, but that as he heard it he then looked to see the shooter firing in the direction of where James and other advisors were standing. He seemed to have a detailed recollection of the attack and was able to diagram the scene when I asked him to do so about an hour later.
9. I have no further information to add at this time. Should you have questions for me, contact me at [REDACTED]@yahoo.com. I am currently in the US providing escort for the remains of Mr. McLaughlin to his [REDACTED] I can also be contacted at [REDACTED] until my return to Kabul which I estimate will be about 13 - 15 May.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Ministry of Defense

Legal Directorate

Staff Office

Questioner

Text	Date	Answer
<p>To the respectful Intel chief office,</p> <p>To make clear the incident on 04/27/2011 please provide the following information accurately:</p> <p>1- Does the MOD order you to not conduct meetings on 04/27/2011?</p> <p>2- When COL. Ahmad Gul's reform happened and what was his job at air force corps?</p> <p>3- In the above incident how many people from ANA and ISAF forces got killed or wounded?</p> <p>4- What kind of weapon used by the subject to shoot these individuals and from which sources received these weapons?</p> <p>5- Is there any evidence about the subject to show his connection with the anti governments?</p> <p>Sincerely,</p> <p>Signed by:</p> <p>Head of delegation member member</p> <p>Note: Number for the registered pistol is</p>		<p>1- G5G2, CI deputy ordered by the telephone to not conduct meetings and collection of information on 04/27/2011 and 04/28/2011 because the enemy had plan to perform terrorist activities; we compliance with the order. The incident happened was inside command and control office where daily our personnel and military cooperators perform their duties.</p> <p>2- COL. Ahmad Gul assigned as an officer for ANA air force command and control, operation chief office, management travelers and cargo by order #0737 dated 07/24/2011.</p> <p>3- From ISAF at the scene 8 people got killed and 1 wounded who later past away and total (9) people lost their lives. From ANA (9) people wounded.</p> <p>4- The subject used 2 pistols to shoot the victims; one of these pistols has been registered with ANA air force under subject's name but the other one is not registered.</p> <p>5- Up to date there is no signal to show the connection of the subject with enemy; the subject was marijuana addict.</p> <p>Sincerely,</p>

PDH-1324

Number for the unregistered pistol is 1204650

We found 159 Afghani, entrance permit to air force, one set ally phone and 2 set NKIA phones with the body of subject.

Sincerely,

Signed by:

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

afghan Air force commanding center
 Legal office
 C-I-O office

Answering sheet based on 2nd and 3th parts of 2nd article of M.C.P. code
 Location:

assigned investigator: name nickname F/name Rank

As a () were used.

name	Legal (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
nick name	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
F name	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Date and Place of birth	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
ethnicity	Tajik
Citizen	Afghan
native language	Dari
current add	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
original add	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
main occupation	Airforce Acc Helicopter Planning officer
education degree	military license -
matrimonial status	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
wife occupation	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
How many kids	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Criminal Background	don't have
Immediate relatives	uncle passed away, other wife also
ID number	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Phon no	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Date and time of statement	09:00 Am 10-2-1390
weather	clear
email add	don't of application

signature as finger print ()

(i)

at call [REDACTED] please write down
the incident on date 7-2-1390 with
all explanation and also tell us what
it stands?

I and my colleague [REDACTED] were busy with
3 days flights planning as we starts on the
planning suddenly we heard shaking and
look little dust and smoke around. I and
my colleague immediately left the room and run
out of the room i went to upstairs second
floor very quickly to the Air defense
commander office and there was the Air defense
commander, chief of ACC [REDACTED]
Air defense logistic officer and one civilian
office cleaner. i saved my self with them
there. while we were there were hearing
shooting til our door forcefully opened by
security forces soldiers and i raised my hands
walked out and told them we stucked here
please help us. then they helped us and we
all come out of room and completely went out
at the building and joint the other officers
were outside of the building. we stayed
out til the situation got normal and later
in the day was over and we were hearing that
this incident happened on date 7-2-1390 and
it was about 10.05 or 10.10 Am -

[REDACTED]

(2)

CID office

Questions	Date	Answers
<p>1 - When this incident happened what was your exact location at ACEE and who else's were there?</p>	<p>0 0 M 1</p>	<p>1 - I was at the first desk close to the entrance doorway with Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) setting behind the computer and before the incident occurred Mr (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and a few</p>
<p>2 - Did between Ahmad Gul and mentors (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) discussion or argument happened?</p>	<p>1 0 1</p>	<p>ingests one of them named (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and mentors were there.</p> <p>2 - since we were busy with scheduling so we didn't pay attention.</p>
<p>3 - By your opinion did Gul has good condition of health or what?</p>	<p>0</p>	<p>3 - when Gul entered to ACEE without saying salam or passed us and walked behind us.</p>
<p>4 - Do you have handgun for self protection if you do, write the type and number of that?</p>	<p>0</p>	<p>4 - yes i do have a pistol walter Germany. no. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)</p>

Questions	Date	Answers
<p>5- Although you had a handgun for self protection why you didn't use it for your self protection what is the reason?</p>		<p>5- Sir i didnt have that courage, immediately i left the room and saved my self and my mind was completely shocked.</p>
<p>6- When did you get the handgun from and How many magazines and bullets does that hand gun hold</p>		<p>6- I recieved this handgun from security forces chain of command and has two magazines on that day it had one and total 14 rounds on that day it had 7 rounds.</p>
<p>7- Did Guk before this incident had any arguments with mentors or did he talked to you as a friend about this type of ^{illegal} action?</p>		<p>7- Guk normally was present every day to his job. He was doing his daily job without argument with mentors or Afghans and he was treating everyone friendly and has not talked with anyone about this action and i cannot believe it.</p>

Questions	no	Answers
8- As a colleague with Carl do you give me us information about if Carl was addicted with any type narcotics or drugs?		8- I don't know about his addiction.
9- By your view How was his life or economic condition and those that action caused by poor economic condition or There is ^{an} other facts behind it?		9- I don't have any hard knowledge of his life condition and I don't know what was the reason behind the act.
10- what do you mean by friendly. was he very social? person means threatening with every one equally or different?		10- He was socially person and he was threatening everyone equally.
11- Are you in full agreement with all the answers you gave?		11- I am agree with all my answers.

(5)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MSgt, USAF
439 AEAS/SF Advisors
5 May 2011

Key to Maps for Events of 27 Apr 2011

1. (Page 1 of Maps) KSPAN 2, Outside the office of Life Support, approximately 1000. I received a cell phone call from TSgt Tara Brown. She stated (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) "They're shooting in the ACCC! Help!", I heard gun shots in the background, they got closer, they sounded like they were right on top of her and the phone went dead. I ran to the front of KSPAN 1 and through the gate with the chain on the top. I yelled to someone at the door of the KSPAN 1 that there was a shooting at the ACCC and to tell the WOC. I was charging both my M9 and M4 when MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked me what was going on, I told him Tara was being shot at and he loaded his M9 and came with me.
2. (Page 1 of Maps) We ran to the back of the AAF Conference Center (Bldg 301), I looked around the corner and could see people running toward me from the gunfight building.
3. (Page 1 of Maps) We worked our way around the back of the AAF Conference Center, ran (to the southwest side) across the open area to the far side of the center building next to the AAF Conference Center. I again stop to observe the gunfight building and had (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) cover me while I ran across another open area.
4. (Page 1 of Maps) I covered (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) while he ran across the open area, which put us at the second center building (Bldg 103).
5. (Page 1 of Maps) We worked our way up to the Northwest corner of the second center building (Bldg 103), where we could see the gunfight building, where we were stopped by an AAF General and not allowed to go any further. I know at some point along the building I sent Tara a text telling her "QRF was coming, to lock and load weapon". I didn't get a response. I could see an AAF HMMV on the south end of the gunfight building. There were a lot of AAF personnel around. I called Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and told him where I was and what I could see and hear. I was watching personnel exit the building with some injuries. Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told me to tell the QRF that Americans were going to start jumping out the windows because they could hear someone kicking in the doors. I told the QRF and then saw Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) as they were hitting the ground, not sure where they jumped from. I signaled for them to come to me. They ran pass me, headed for a bunker, I think I told them to go there (not 100% sure though). Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) came back and asked what I needed her to do, at that point someone was yelling for everyone to get in a bunker, and I told her I needed her to go to the bunker.
6. (Page 1 of Maps) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I escorted the Majors to the bunker, where I checked at least one interpreter with blood on his legs for wounds, he had none.
7. (Page 1 of Maps) An American was yelling for me to come to him, I ran to him to see if he was alright, we briefly talked and I told him to get to a bunker or Oqab compound where it was safe.
8. (Page 1 of Maps) I ran back to the bunker behind the second center building (Bldg 103) where Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were at, this is where I met up with Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C).
9. (Page 1 of Maps) Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I ran to the AAF clinic (bldg 303) and setup security at the emergency door. Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went to the berm gate to get it up to transport wounded to the NATO

Key to Maps for Events of 27 Apr 2011

hospital. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went inside to help with a wounded AAF soldier brought in. He had wounds to his torso. He had on only a t-shirt, AAF pants and boots, someone (AAF) was yelling he was the shooter. I kept hearing gun shots, they sounded like AK47 shots. I watched as the AAF pulled a wounded AAF soldier from the second story window on a litter. They used the bunker to get him down and brought him straight to the hospital. He had wounds to his torso also. I sent another text to Tara asking if she was ok. I didn't get a response. Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) showed back up and I said let's get a MATV over here to move the wounded. MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and someone else showed up in a MATV shortly afterwards. I told one of the guys to go on the other side of the clinic and setup security, I told MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to take the MATV to the other corner of the clinic and setup security. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) or (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran out of the emergency room saying there were at least two wounded Americans in the building and we needed a team to go in. I ran to Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and told them we had wounded in the building, we needed to go in. Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) grabbed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) out of the MATV and we rallied up.

10. (Page 1 of Maps) We (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) me, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) attempted to enter the south side first story door, however it was locked and none of the AAF would open it. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) yelled there was an AAF on the second floor and we went up. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) posted on the stair way to watch our back as we entered the second floor.

11. (Page 2 of Maps) There was an AAF/SF guarding the door. I saw blood on the floor outside the first door on the right side of the hall.

12. (Page 2 of Maps) I believe it was Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that entered the room following the blood trail. I stayed in the hallway. They back out of the room. I saw movement at the other end of the hall, but couldn't make out who it was.

13. (Page 2 of Maps) I saw Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) /AAF/QRF/CC, he was signaling for us to come to him. He said something like "Advisors" or "Americans", I ran to him and saw blood on the stair way.

14. (Page 3 of Maps) I saw multiple AAF/SF personnel in the lobby laughing and lounging around. I turned to my left and headed for the hallway.

15. (Page 3 of Maps) I realized I got ahead of everyone and saw an AAF/SF down the hall to my right, I started to go to him because he signaled me to. I stopped because everyone else went left and there was blood in the hall.

16. (Page 3 of Maps) As I approached the conference room door, I saw a ABU hat on the table in the room so I turned into the room.

17. (Page 3 of Maps) I went straight down the wall. I did glance to my left as I entered the room to look for a threat and bodies. I check under the table as I was going for bodies, there was none. I heard someone in the next room yell they found them. I look down the opposite side of the conference table prior to going through the door to the ACCC.

Key to Maps for Events of 27 Apr 2011

18. (Page 3 & 4 of Maps) I entered the ACCC through the conference room door and saw the first two bodies in the center of the room.
19. (Page 4 of Maps) I approached the two bodies, looking at the one on the left first; he was on his back, head toward the front of the room (position in the picture is different then I remember). He had a bullet hole in his head and pasty color. I looked at the second one on the right. I just remember he was dead too. One of them was missing a gun (M9, empty holster). Someone yelled we found more.
20. (Page 4 of Maps) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (I think) said (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) "don't come up here." I stopped and turned left and spotted the third body and headed for him. He was lying on his back with his head pointed toward the front of the room.
21. (Page 4 of Maps) I heard someone say "she is alive, help me. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) do you want to do a Fireman's carry?" I checked the third body and he was dead too. I turned to see (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) carrying Tara out of the room, her M9 dangling off of her (in shoulder holster) as they went by. Someone said we need to take their weapons and name tapes since one of the M9s was already missing. We were afraid the AAF were stealing their stuff. I pulled the M9 out of the third bodies holster with a magazine in the weapon. I think it was (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that pulled the name tape off of the body while I was standing there.
22. (Page 4 of Maps) I then went to where they had pulled Tara from. The fourth body had a M4 on it, with sling around the torso. The M4 had no magazine in it. I placed a radio (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I think) and my cell phone on top of the filing cabinet. I knocked the cell phone off as I went forward, it landed in blood and I left it there.
23. (Page 4 of Maps) Body 4, chest was covered in blood from what look like multiple gunshot wounds. There was blood on the floor. I stepped over body five (Maj Ambard). I pulled my knife out and cut the sling to get the M4 off of him without moving him too much. I handed the M4 off to one the guys, not sure which one. Whoever it was didn't have a rifle. I pulled the name tape off of the body and handed it to the same guy with the M4.
24. (Page 4 of Maps) I looked down at Maj Ambard (fifth body), I was standing between body four and five. Maj Ambard was face down with head toward the back of the room. The guy I handed the M4 to and I reached down to get Maj Ambard's ID holder that was around his neck. One of us cut it off, I can't remember who. I think Maj Ambard was lying on his weapon, I couldn't bring myself to roll him over, and I didn't want to look at his face. There was another cell phone on the floor and it began ringing, I left it where it laid. I don't remembering being able to see the other side of Maj Ambard, something was there blocking my view. The guy with the M4 said something about needing Ammo for it and I looked around on the floor spotting a magazine between the filing cabinet and the desk to my right. I handed it to him and we evac the room since we couldn't do anything for the rest of the personnel and we were being told there were explosives in the building.
25. (Page 4 & 3 of Maps) We exited the room via the door to the hallway.

26. (Page 3 of Maps) I turned left to go to the lobby pass multiple AAF personnel milling around, still laughing.
27. (Page 3 & 5 of Maps) I exited the building; at least one of the doors was missing glass in it. I turned left outside the building and ran along it (front side of building)
28. (Page 3 & 5 of Maps) I turned left and headed back to the AAF Clinic.
29. (Page 5 of Maps) I entered the emergency room of the clinic and looked and talked to Tara. She didn't have a weapon on her and they were working on her. They were screaming for an ambulance to take Tara to the NATO hospital. The French initially came up and then turned around and left walking toward where the gunfight building was. I think it was (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who got a Prada from somewhere and we loaded Tara into the back. I think (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was driving, Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in the front passenger seat, I was behind the driver holding onto the stretcher (we couldn't get the back door closed), and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was behind the passenger holding onto the stretcher. We left the hospital and turn right, went straight to the road adjacent to the berm and turned right.
30. (Page 5 of Maps) We crossed through the berm gate yelling we had wounded. We then traveled straight to the emergency room.
31. (Page 5 of Maps) We stopped at the emergency room entrance and the French medics grabbed Tara out of the Prada and took her inside. The French at some point grabbed me, took custody of my M4 and M9, they also took the M9 I took off of body 3. During this time I was informed that Tara didn't make it through surgery.

At some point I was released to US medical personnel and then they had me cleanup back at my barracks under escort of a female medic, we returned to the US clinic and I was given medication to help calm me down. I was finally escorted with my guys to the MWA tent for accountability and then we were sent to DFAC 2. When we left the DFAC 2 and headed to the barracks it was dark.

27 May 2011 (Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C))

Afghan Air Force (AAF) Air Command & Control Center (ACCC) & other Command & Control (C2) Initiatives.

There is a distinct lack of transparency in the way the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) & AAF like to schedule and fly their missions. The Afghan's don't like to plan ahead, use a printed schedule or use a commonly agreed upon priority matrix for mission tasking. They prefer to use the cell phone to task aircraft for short notice "emergency" missions. It is difficult to determine the details of these mission most of the time. The Afghan's ether don't know or don't want to tell us who or what they're flying around the country. All of this activity looks very suspicious to the NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan (NATC-A) mentors who have been in country for more than a few months.

The Afghan's don't like to screen passengers or their bags for weapons, drugs, explosives or anything else...especially if the passengers are senior officers or "VIPs." This "ticketing" & screening process is the responsibility of an organization called "Interclot" (sp?). (Note: I've heard that Interclot has some "private investors who are also senior officers & officials within the AAF, MoD, & GIRA. Rumor is these key players include MG (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Lt Gen (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ... These were just some of the things that Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) & Maj Brodeur were trying to "fix."

The ACCC has existed for over three years but the ~30 Afghan personnel working in there still couldn't produce a complete daily flight schedule... nor did they know where or what all the AAF aircraft were doing during the day. The AAF leadership didn't seem very concerned that the ACCC wasn't effective or efficient and only visited the ACCC when encouraged by the NATC-A mentors. Lt Col Bryant (& Maj Brodeur) had been working VERY hard to turn the ACCC a functional command center that could and would enforce disciplined policies & procedures while being able to track the movements of every AAF aircraft throughout Afghanistan.

Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had drafted & sent two C2 orders to the MoD's Chief of General Staff (Gen (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)) in an effort to clarify the tasking, prioritization, scheduling, and tracking process within the MoD & AAF. The first (one page order) was signed by Gen (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) under threat of grounding the Mi-17 fleet. The second (four page C2 policy letter has been lost, found, revised, and delay at the MoD for several months now... I don't know its current status. The MoD & AAF leadership have been getting a lot of pressure to sign and adhere to these orders that we helped them draft in an effort to put some transparency into the way the AAF's aircraft are used.

It is clear that the Afghan leadership at all levels don't want "transparency" in the way they are scheduling & executing mission. I suspect it is because they see the AAF aircraft as a way to make money and garner influence by flying around passengers and cargo for a select few influential and connected people. I think this is the way they kept a handful of aircraft flying during the ~90's and want to continue these nefarious & profitable activities w/ the billions of dollars worth of aircraft we're buying them and the hundreds of millions of dollars we spend every year on maintenance and fuel for these valuable aircraft.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION KAIA	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20110510	3. TIME 1300	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	6. SSN (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	7. GRADE/STATUS O-5	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 438 AEAG / OPS TEAM.			

9. I, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 27 April 2011, I was in the 538th AEAS briefing room on the east side of the 2nd floor of the building with the briefing room door closed, briefing a flying sortie. At approximately 1000L I heard a noise outside of the building that sounded like 2-3 gunshots. We exited the room and found everyone in body armor with weapons.

I spoke to Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who told me there was a shooting on the base. I immediately called back to my office and directed my deputy (Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)) to begin gathering accountability of all office personnel. Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I monitored the handheld radios and multiple phone calls. At approximately 1020L I was notified by my deputy that everyone was accounted for except for Capt Nathan J. Nylander, the Weather Advisor. I made a couple of cell phone calls to his cell phone and left a message but he did not return my calls. Shortly afterward, Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received word that Capt Nylander was possibly one of the wounded in the AAF HQ building.

A few minutes later, it was confirmed by one of Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) men that Capt Nylander was a casualty and his body was being transported by 538 AEAS van from the AAF hospital to the French Hospital on the ISAF side of the base. Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) directed the van to stop by the 538th enroute to the hospital to pick me up. The van picked me up with MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) driving and Major (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) in the back of the van with Capt Nylander on a stretcher.

I climbed into the van to take Capt Nylander to the French hospital and we departed south, then east, then back to the north, and along the road between the Thunder Lab and AAF dorms to the berm gate (see diagram). On the way to the hospital, I checked for a carotid pulse on Capt Nylander, but there was no pulse. From the blood on the sheet/blanket that he was wrapped in, it appeared that he was wounded on the right side of his head, behind his ear. By the time we arrived at the gate, the Belgians had it open and we continued east directly to the hospital. We were met at the hospital by medical personnel who helped offload the stretcher directly to the Emergency Room.

The hospital personnel would not allow me to remain in the emergency room with my weapons so I was escorted back into the Role 1 clinic to a break room where I was advised I could leave my body armor, M4 and M9. By the time I got back to the Emergency Room and was allowed back in, the medical personnel had given up on trying to get Capt Nylander back.

I began coordinating with Role 1 personnel to determine what needed to be done to take care of Capt Nylander's body. I also notified the Deputy AEAG Commander, Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that I was able to confirm that Capt Nylander was dead.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	PAGE 1 OF <u>2</u> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

TAKEN AT

1300

DATED

20110510

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Capt Nylander's body was sent to the morgue and I was given his personal effects. The medical personnel advised me that they intended to destroy his clothes because they had to cut them off of his body to work on him and they were soiled with blood. His personal effects were given to me in a yellow biohazard bag. I did not inventory anything at the time, but later placed his 9mm into the bag and I didn't notice anything obvious missing.

TSgt Tara Brown was transported to the hospital shortly after (exact time unknown) and she was alive when she arrived with four (?) Afghans that I remember to be two civilians (assumed to be interpreters) and two AAF military. We were advised after about 90 minutes that TSgt Brown had died. A short while later I was asked by the medical staff to provide positive identification of Capt Nylander which I did in the morgue. Shortly after that, I returned with the Chaplain back to the morgue to accompany him as he provided Last Rites to Capt Nylander and TSgt Brown. I again identified both bodies at that time.

We were then notified via radio that additional bodies would be arriving at the hospital. I joined a detail that unloaded the remaining bodies into the morgue. I remember carrying 3 of the bodies from ambulances and an armored personnel carrier into the morgue. Shortly after that I received a phone call from the Wing Operations Center (WOC) that they wanted me to go to the U.S. offices in building 200 to get NIPRnet/SIPRnet working and establish an alternate WOC, then advise the WOC when we were set up so they could shut down and relocate to our location. I took CMSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with me and we proceeded to building 200 and started up the computers as tasked. I retrieved my weapons from the Role I clinic and proceeded to building 200.

While we were setting up the WOC I was told via cell phone to return to the morgue to positively identify the body of Maj Jeffrey Ausborn. I ran back to the morgue and following the morgue personnel preparing his body, I positively identified Maj Ausborn. On my way out of the hospital and back to building 200 I ran into a number of personnel from my office who were just returning from the AAF side of the base. They were enroute to the MWA tent.

After arriving back at the alternate WOC, the WOC personnel from the AAF side arrived a short time after. I then went into a Battle Staff meeting with Wing Staff personnel and commanders. The meeting ended at approximately 2300.

During the time at the Emergency Room I made frequent calls to my personnel barricaded in our offices in KSpan 2 on the AAF side. I verified that the remainder of our personnel were accounted for. I also passed Capt Nylander's status to Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) my deputy, for accountability purposes. He advised that he'd passed that information to the WOC. We helped receive additional personnel arriving at the clinic and transported bodies from vehicles to the morgue.

NOTE: I misspoke during my interview. A 9mm weapon that I previously understood to belong to TSgt Brown that I saw in the Role I clinic break room belonged to a different person. I never positively identified TSgt Brown's 9mm.

NOTHING FOLLOWS

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10 day of May, 2011 at KAITO BLDG 200, RM 13

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Investigative Officer
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9387 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION KATA	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2011 05 10	3. TIME 0845	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	6. SSN (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	7. GRADE/STATUS O-6	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
438 AEW

9. I, _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Weds AM:
I do not remember if we came in as a group or individually Weds AM. I asked Capt (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to meet with me on a few topics in our OQAB med conex office and thus delayed his departure to ACCC that morning. Because we were meeting, MSgt (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and MSgt (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) went on to the AAF clinic on their own vs going as a group as we sometimes do.

Weds AM (between 10-11AM):
While sitting in the OQAB med conex across from Col (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) office (exact time unknown) a female airman rushed up outside our window and in excited voice announced gunfire was reported on the AAF compound and for all mbrs to take cover in their offices. Capt (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and myself donned our IBA/gear, went red and took cover in the room. We immediately called MSgt (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and MSgt (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) at the AAF clinic for accountability and let them know what we had heard. Our other 2 medics were in flight on a C-27 MEDEVAC to Kandahar. We heard over the brick the increased protective posture and arming condition. We then kept up routine and intermittent contact via cell with both men over the next several hours. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) was on the cell phone talking to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) or (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and I was in the DSN phone and/or brick with the WOC and WG leadership. We shuttled messages between us. In general, we obtained updated information, casualty counts and status of events with MSgt (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) via MSgt (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) /cell phone and relayed pertinent information to the WOC. The new brick I was issued in the previous several days was very helpful for situational awareness and vital info updates. Casualty counts were updated as available. Occasionally Capt (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) spoke with MSgt (b)(6); (b)(7)(C), but he was very busy so most comms were via MSgt (b)(6); (b)(7)(C).

Time unknown:
At one point we were informed MSgt (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) departed the building and brought Nylander to the AAF clinic. They informed us of Capt Nylander, his injury and his condition. I spoke with Col (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) on the phone regarding Nylander and he asked to assist and work "magic" to get an ambulance on station. I called the French Role III operations desk (as per agreed ROE with them) but they could not locate anyone who could speak English in a timely manner. I hung up and then called the USA Role I and provided a request in English for urgent support and if they could assist with French Role III coordination. The OIC was not present so I provided the information and request to a USA female medic.

At that moment, a French physician had just presented to the USA Role I to gather information on the event so I repeated the initial report of casualties present at the Afghan AF clinic and the requirement for urgent medical support. I was asked for location of casualty Nylander and I requested they refer to the AAF map previously provided to the ER by myself and Capt (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (previous NATC-A MEDEVAC advisor) in fall of 2010. They had no knowledge of the map.

Capt Nylander initially received CPR by MSgt (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and MSgt (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) provided additional support.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	PAGE 1 OF <u>3</u> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TAKEN AT DE45 DATED 10 May 2011

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

We learned via brick the Role III ambulance arrival was delayed at the berm gate and Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived with a NATC-A vehicle to the AAF clinic. Due to the extended delay there was a request on the brick if they should transport via the civ type vehicle. My self and another on the brick (unknown) said "go go go" and I think others came to the common sense answer given the delay. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) transported Capt Nylander to the Role III hospital.

During the time period after Nylander was brought to the clinic there was a mix of casualties brought into the AAF clinic including the Afghan shooter, several other Afghan casualties and Tara Brown. Brown was not brought in until after Nylander was transported out. MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had returned to the ACCC and retrieved Tara Brown with a NATC-A improvised fire team. Tara was mortally wounded but was responsive to MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) at this time. Due to ambulance delay secondary to the perceived threat she was also transported via vehicle (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opportunity to the Role III. MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) returned again to the ACCC to evaluate casualties a total of 3 times. On his arrival (#3 I think) it was reported over the brick there may be a bomb in the building and the building should be cleared. He was told by Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) via cell to leave the building immediately. He returned to the AAF clinic. He cont to care for the casualties with MSgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C).

He also directed AAF medics for assistance with the Afghans. US medics utilized the AAF clinic ER as the primary treatment area. Fortunately, within the last week (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had totally re-organized the AAF ER and improved capabilities for urgent patient care. The Afghans had recently turned it into a storage room for equipment overflow which the advisors corrected.

Back at the clinic they continued to have problems getting the Afghans to secure the building. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) directed Afghans to secure the building and also (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was posted on the front door. I was later informed that the AAF/SG and the Lead AAF Flight Doc (Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did a very good job in herding the Afghans to assist with care and secure the building. They were calm, directive and effective in helping the 2 US medics. I did not find out until later there were other US who had rallied to the building. When the WOC asked for personnel in outlying buildings I reported the total US count and that they were presently secure. They were subsequently transferred to the T-lab for a higher level of security.

I contacted WOC or Shirt and told them as SG I would accompany US team to ACCC. Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I traveled with Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and the Shirt to the ACCC in the WG HMMV. Belgian QRF was already in place in front of the building and Afghans were scattered outside of the Belgian door team. I entered HQs building and saw blood marks and writing on several walls. Blood was also on the floor. On entering the ACCC room, I examined the casualties and pronounced 7 dead. No clothes were removed. From memory, most were already stiff from the prolonged down time. I required one mbr who was face down and large to be partially rolled over for the evaluation so an adequate carotid pulse could be taken. All name tags had been previously removed. Some weapons were present and some were not. Of weapons present, I noticed magazines not present. The floor and some desk tops had 9mm casings present.

A team of kitted up caucasian security type force was present and from memory I do not think they were from KAIA but I could be wrong. I remember them saying they did not know US were "over here."

One had a police background and noted the 9mm rounds were "Russian type" with red around the primer cap on the spent casing. One also showed me a gray water type mark to the front of the room and at 1 o'clock from the two middle bodies. It was on paper on the front desk and he called it "gray matter". He said it suggested the shooter came from the back of the room.

There were more mbrs who entered in civ type clothes with yellow vests who appeared to be part of an investigative team. They rotated through the room with the military mbrs kitted up I referred to before. There was one in civ type clothes taking pictures with a flash before we could move the bodies. The apparent investigative team told us when we were allowed to bag and move the bodies.

Chairs, desks, and file cabinets were moved by my team to gain access to the bodies. With a body detail the casualties were lifted, bagged and loaded onto litters. A US detail was used to bag, carry, load and unload the dead until movement was completed at the Role III. I briefed the team prior, asked who had previous experience with dead bodies or situations like this and then outlined the plan. I repped them for what they would see. I do not remember all mbrs of this team but I know Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were present. I was mostly concentrating on directing traffic for stiff bodies that did not fit into the bags easily. I sent the Belgians back to obtain litters and more body bags as they did not come with enough of each.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATE (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

STATEMENT OF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TAKEN AT DEPT DATED 10 May 2011

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Also, I asked the Afghans for sheets so we could cover exposed body areas/blood as the bodies were stiff, the cheap bags were tearing and we wanted to add some measure of dignity. Sheets were strapped in place. We ran out of litter straps so we improvised by putting US pants belts together. One mbr became dizzy and had to stop and sit down. It was a very methodical work flow to keep us all focused on the job at hand while bagging our friends.

I coord'd the movement of bodies out of the room and the loading into the Belgian trucks x 2 and APCx1. Belgians allowed me to put our team on the trucks to the drive to the Role III. Our NATC-A team did all of the contact with our men all the way to the morgue. A hasty formation was made at the Role III as we unloaded the trucks and saluted for each one transported. Nylander and Brown were already in the morgue. We had 2 bodies that overflowed into the outside refrigerator. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Lt Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I started to sort ID cards to help confirm ID of bodies at the morgue for arm bands. I had taken possession of available ID cards and or drivers licenses from the Shirt and had then in my blouse pocket. French were cleaning and preparing the bodies (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived and brought us water.

I was called to the MWR tent as we had some mbrs with stress reactions. CST was already in place and COMKIA and AFCENT reps were already in place. COMKIA J1 was a huge help as was Deputy COMKIA /CC Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) representing AFCENT. I spoke with several stressed mbrs and discovered CST team had the job well under control. I cont to let the pro's do their job at that point. They ID's particular folks they were concerned about and we made a CST plan for the next 24 hours to include 24 office and counseling hours (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I met (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for the first time here. They were emotional and we provided support. I connected them with CID so they could provide statements.

We moved the entire NATC-A group over to the DFAC 2 for food, rest and de-brief. CST and way forward for group was briefed as well as other topics.

After this, leadership team moved to set up WOC at building 200. Rooms were occupied and comms established. Multiple meetings held into the morning. Transfer cases ordered (coffins) via the Shirt/Chief and Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). Chief/Shirt and I went to ID route for C-130 Ramp ceremony for the next day as we knew caskets would have to be carried. I went back to coord delivery of coffins and AM ops with French Role III. I think I went to my room about 0300.

Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

NOTHING FOLLOWS

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10 day of MAY, 2011

at (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

INVESTIGATIVE OFFICER
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

CellTech Kit Number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 DOCEX Batch Number
 IIR Number
 MSC | Unit | Producer Name JDEC Bargram
 DOI 20110607
 Circumstance NKAIA Shooting
 Date of Capture 20110427
 Capturing Unit NDS
 Location Captured MGRS
 Location Captured - LAT
 Location Captured - LON
 Location Captured - Country Afghanistan
 Name of Detainee
 Detainee Number Or ISN
 Operator Comments
 Handset Information
 Handset Make Nokia
 Handset Model 1202
 Handset Owner

MSISDN 1: MSISDN-
 MSISDN (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 IMSI
 IMEI
 Return IMEI
 Service Provider AWCC
 SIM Card Number (ICCID) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 Hardware Version
 Software Version
 Time Set To
 Actual Time 2011-06-06T23:50:32
 Memory Card
 Greeting Message Hello. Whats up.

Index	Name	Number
01	This Phone	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Index	Name	Number
01	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
02	Chief (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
03	Lt col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	
04	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	
05	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	
06	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	
07	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	

Original
This Phone

Original
 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 Chief (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 Lt col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

10 (b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

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18 Capt (b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

19 (b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

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24 (b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

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31 Capt (b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

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33 (b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

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36 Maj (b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

37 Capt (b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

38 (b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

39 Msgt (b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

40 (b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

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Capt (b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

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Capt (b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

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Maj (b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

Capt (b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

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Msgt (b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

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54 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
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(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

61 Lt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
62 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
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Lt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

82 Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
83 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
84
85

Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

86 Sgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
87 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
88

Sgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

89 Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
90 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

91 Lt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
92

Lt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

93 Wo (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
94 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
95

Wo (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

96 Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

97 Bel Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Bel Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

98 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
99

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

100 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 101 Ltcol (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 102 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 103
 104

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 Ltcol
 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Dialed Calls Memory

Index	Name	Number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	Date/Time	Duration	Original
01			2011-04-29T09:28:52		
02			2011-04-29T09:27:55		
03			2011-04-29T09:27:37		
04			2011-04-18T12:38:48	00:00:15	
05			2011-04-12T07:25:20	00:00:43	
06	Cdo Cell		2011-04-27T12:34:33		Cdo Cell
07	Cdo Cell		2011-04-27T11:15:12		Cdo Cell
08	Cdo Cell		2011-04-27T11:14:59		Cdo Cell
09	Cdo Cell		2011-04-27T10:45:40		Cdo Cell
10	Cdo Cell		2011-04-27T10:11:37		Cdo Cell
11	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-04-26T12:51:35	00:00:36	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
12			2011-04-19T15:52:44	00:00:26	
13			2011-04-18T16:04:37		
14			2011-04-18T16:03:11		
15			2011-03-26T09:22:52		
16			2011-04-29T13:04:44	00:00:32	
17			2011-04-19T06:42:10		
18			2011-04-16T16:33:46		
19			2011-04-03T15:14:36	00:00:59	
20			2011-03-29T10:38:40	00:00:19	
21	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-04-26T17:28:59	00:00:30	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
22			2011-04-03T14:00:02		
23			2011-04-03T13:45:55		
24			2011-03-23T09:59:07		
25			2011-03-07T01:44:52	00:00:21	
26			2011-04-27T16:38:37	00:00:16	
27			2011-04-18T12:34:01	00:00:24	
28			2011-04-14T12:58:28	00:00:51	
29			2011-04-13T15:10:53	00:00:32	
30			2011-04-13T10:25:56	00:01:15	
31			2011-04-29T17:53:12	00:00:10	
32			2011-04-29T13:07:52	00:00:48	
33			2011-04-27T12:05:34	00:00:23	
34			2011-04-26T17:42:45	00:01:11	
35			2011-04-20T12:03:43	00:01:08	
36			2011-04-27T14:40:17		
37			2011-04-07T09:11:00	00:01:15	
38			2011-03-23T09:57:15	00:00:54	
39			2011-03-07T01:27:26		

40		(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	2011-03-07T01:26:46		
41 Maj	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)		2011-04-24T11:19:14		(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
42 Maj			2011-04-22T19:20:51		
43 Maj			2011-04-05T06:05:22	00:00:01	
44 Maj			2011-03-16T05:34:51	00:00:34	
45 Maj			2011-03-06T05:48:24		
46			2011-04-25T13:08:20	00:00:38	
47			2011-04-24T17:21:11	00:03:39	
48			2011-04-03T13:58:30		
49			2011-04-03T13:45:01		
50			2011-03-13T20:44:09		
51	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)		2011-04-22T18:45:03	00:00:18	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
52			2011-03-31T13:17:24	00:00:16	
53			2011-03-22T17:59:00		
54			2011-03-22T17:57:25		
55			2011-03-22T17:56:46		
56			2011-04-23T08:50:47	00:00:10	
57			2011-04-16T08:43:52	00:00:09	
58			2011-04-10T15:51:29	00:00:37	
59			2011-03-23T09:14:52	00:00:12	
60			2011-03-21T10:14:27	00:01:23	
61			2011-04-23T08:29:45		
62			2011-03-26T15:11:54		
63			2011-03-11T02:44:27	00:00:08	
64			2011-03-07T01:15:16	00:00:17	
65			2011-02-21T03:34:16		
66 Capt	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)		2011-04-27T17:10:31		Capt (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
67 Capt			2011-04-27T17:09:19		Capt (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
68 Capt			2011-04-27T10:57:42	00:01:31	Capt
69 Capt			2011-04-27T10:56:41		Capt
70 Capt			2011-04-27T10:33:31	00:00:19	Capt
71	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)		2011-04-20T17:10:09	00:00:46	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
72			2011-04-05T17:10:07		
73			2011-04-05T06:02:51	00:00:25	
74			2011-04-02T16:39:00	00:00:16	
75			2011-03-31T10:09:23	00:01:31	
76 Mov.con			2011-04-26T16:48:34	00:00:13	Mov.con
77 Mov.con			2011-04-26T16:10:55	00:00:13	Mov.con
78 Mov.con			2011-04-26T10:28:22	00:00:15	Mov.con
79 Mov.con			2011-04-15T15:53:46	00:00:13	Mov.con
80 Mov.con			2011-04-15T15:36:25	00:00:44	Mov.con
81			2011-04-22T10:06:21		(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
82			2011-04-18T12:33:05	00:00:39	
83			2011-04-15T14:26:05	00:00:26	
84			2011-04-15T11:46:55	00:00:12	
85			2011-03-29T08:58:33	00:00:25	

86	Ltcol	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-27T17:10:03		Ltcol	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
87	Ltcol			2011-04-27T17:09:55		Ltcol	
88	Ltcol			2011-04-27T17:08:49		Ltcol	
89	Ltcol			2011-04-27T16:36:04	00:00:37	Ltcol	
90	Ltcol			2011-04-27T16:25:43	00:00:53	Ltcol	
91	Lt col	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-04-27T16:24:55		Lt col	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
92	Lt col	(C)		2011-04-14T17:34:47	00:00:13	Lt col	(C)
93	Lt col			2011-03-28T17:16:49	00:00:33	Lt col	
94	Lt col			2011-03-28T17:08:14	00:01:17	Lt col	
95	Lt col			2011-03-11T02:54:00	00:00:07	Lt col	
96	Cdo			2011-04-27T16:23:16		Cdo	
97	Cdo			2011-04-07T14:24:06	00:00:11	Cdo	
98	Cdo			2011-04-07T14:23:53		Cdo	
99	Cdo			2011-04-07T14:20:47	00:00:30	Cdo	
100	Cdo			2011-03-21T07:46:30	00:00:53	Cdo	

Dialed Calls SIM

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Duration	Original
01	@@@@@@@@@@@@	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)			@@@@@@@@@@@@
02	Myloot				Myloot
03	@@@@@@@@@@@@	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)			@@@@@@@@@@@@
04	@@@@@@@@@@@@	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)			@@@@@@@@@@@@
05	@@@@@@@@@@@@	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)			@@@@@@@@@@@@
06	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)				(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
07	@@@@@@@@@@@@	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)			@@@@@@@@@@@@
08	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)				(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
09	@@@@@@@@@@@@	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)			@@@@@@@@@@@@
10	@@	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)			@@@@@@@@@@@@

Received Calls Memory

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Duration	Original
01	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-28T03:24:37	00:00:36	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
02			2011-04-26T14:20:35	00:01:15	
03			2011-04-24T16:34:25	00:02:07	
04			2011-04-19T07:21:58	00:00:29	
05			2011-04-12T08:54:12	00:00:29	
06	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-29T11:47:36	00:00:07	Maj
07	Maj		2011-04-27T18:59:43	00:00:39	Maj
08	Maj		2011-04-27T18:53:18	00:00:12	Maj
09	Maj		2011-04-27T10:44:20	00:00:43	Maj
10	Maj		2011-04-24T14:31:41	00:03:45	Maj

11	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-27T13:00:49	00:00:55	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
12			2011-04-27T12:27:35	00:00:35	
13			2011-04-27T10:09:09	00:00:16	
14			2011-04-26T13:53:36	00:00:14	
15			2011-04-23T09:09:26	00:00:22	
16			2011-04-29T08:49:57	00:01:49	
17			2011-04-27T12:22:14	00:00:22	
18			2011-04-25T14:42:51	00:02:22	
19			2011-04-22T07:45:41	00:00:40	
20			2011-04-19T17:26:06	00:00:09	
21	Ltcol (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-04-28T03:55:11	00:00:17	Ltcol (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
22	Ltcol		2011-04-27T19:25:15	00:05:06	Ltcol
23	Ltcol		2011-04-27T19:24:01	00:00:41	Ltcol
24	Ltcol		2011-04-27T19:22:43	00:00:54	Ltcol
25	Ltcol		2011-04-27T19:21:51	00:00:35	Ltcol
26	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-04-28T20:29:03	00:00:36	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
27			2011-04-27T10:05:06	00:00:30	
28			2011-04-22T16:03:22	00:00:41	
29			2011-04-20T15:14:30	00:00:16	
30			2011-04-19T18:17:34	00:03:02	
31			2011-05-02T08:16:02		
32			2011-04-27T12:57:47	00:00:14	
33			2011-04-27T10:14:23	00:00:17	
34			2011-04-24T13:08:52	00:00:20	
35			2011-04-24T12:54:31	00:00:28	
36	Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-04-27T18:22:32	00:00:26	Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
37	Capt		2011-04-27T16:57:40	00:00:29	Capt
38	Capt		2011-04-27T10:22:43	00:02:57	Capt
39	Capt		2011-04-27T07:44:03		Capt
40	Capt		2011-04-26T14:01:18	00:00:47	Capt
41	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-04-29T08:25:33	00:01:58	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
42			2011-04-29T08:21:55	00:03:21	
43			2011-04-27T12:21:03	00:00:36	
44			2011-04-24T17:15:30	00:00:06	
45			2011-04-19T17:17:18	00:00:19	
46			2011-04-27T15:41:14	00:00:42	
47			2011-04-25T15:58:29	00:00:41	
48			2011-04-24T11:59:21	00:00:35	
49			2011-04-18T12:31:48	00:01:09	
50			2011-04-13T10:11:15		

Missed Calls Memory

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Duration	Original
01	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-16T13:53:26		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
02			2011-03-26T21:29:41		
03			2011-03-22T08:20:16		
04			2011-03-02T07:27:36		

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(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Room Mate
Room Mate
Room Mate
Room Mate

10 Room Mate

11 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

12
13
14
15

16 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

17
18
19
20

21 Wo (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

22 Wo
23 Wo
24 Wo
25 Wo

26 Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

27 Capt
28 Capt
29 Capt
30 Capt

31 First Sgt
32 First Sgt
33 First Sgt
34 First Sgt
35 First Sgt

36 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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38
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(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

[Large redacted area]

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Room Mate
Room Mate
Room Mate
Room Mate
Room Mate

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

[Redacted area]

Wo (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Wo
Wo
Wo
Wo

Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Capt
Capt
Capt
Capt

First Sgt
First Sgt
First Sgt
First Sgt
First Sgt

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

[Redacted area]

Fixed Dialing Numbers SIM

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
01		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	8 2011-04-27T09:59:01	Ok doc sounds good to me	Ok doc sounds good to me
02			8 2011-04-26T19:38:13	WTF	WTF
03			2011-04-27T09:59:54	You guys on your way back yet	You guys on your way back yet
05		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-27T10:26:49	Go out window	Go out window
06			2011-04-27T10:38:12	Good still going on	Good still going on
07			2011-04-27T10:51:27	You ok	You ok
				Its maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) is ok	Its (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) is ok
08		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-28T10:56:22	accompanying folks to bagram back tonight	accompanying folks to bagram back tonight
				Ill let u know my num is (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	Ill let u know my num is (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
				call anytime she is expected back	call anytime she is expected back
09			2011-04-28T14:10:33	bout 11ish tonight	bout 11ish tonight
				Its maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) is with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	Its maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) is with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
10			2011-04-28T15:05:05	may try her phone	may try her phone
11			2011-04-26T18:15:01	Just kidding	Just kidding
12			2011-04-26T18:18:09	I am	I am
13			2011-04-26T18:19:57	So you do have a new boyfriend	So you do have a new boyfriend
14			2011-04-26T18:23:39	LOL sorry couldn't help myself	LOL sorry couldn't help myself
15			2011-04-26T19:24:02	WTF	WTF

SIM SMS Received

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
01	Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-24T14:42:42+04:30	Do there badges show escort authority(QUESTION MARK)	Do there badges show escort authority?
02	Capt		2011-04-24T14:44:54+04:30	I doubt they do. I'm just thinking of our own system.	I doubt they do. I'm just thinking of our own system.
03	Capt		2011-04-24T14:49:02+04:30	As of now its badges only and us mentors.	As of now its badges only and us mentors.
04	Capt		2011-04-24T14:52:33+04:30	Not if the others dont. Its an issue we'll have to address.	Not if the others dont. Its an issue we'll have to address.
05	Capt		2011-04-24T14:58:12+04:30	It'll have to wait. I have battle staff.	It'll have to wait. I have battle staff.
06	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-04-24T19:28:45+04:30	Huh(QUESTION MARK)	Huh?
07			2011-04-24T19:54:57+04:30	Oohhh! Did it come in(QUESTION MARK)	Oohhh! Did it come in?
08			2011-04-24T19:58:18+04:30	Woo hoo! I'm kicking it's ass!	Woo hoo! I'm kicking it's ass!

09

10	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-26T17:41:50+04:30	Nope we are all on our way back from oqab	Nope we are all on our way back from oqab
11	Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-26T17:43:44+04:30	Not sure we are waiting on [redacted]	Not sure we are waiting on jones
			2011-04-26T18:11:27+04:30	I 2nt do thai two nights n row Good morning. I' m 4th platoon deputy from fp coy. I' ll come for a combined patrol at 2o' clock this afternoon. Is that ok for you (QUESTION MARK) I must tell you that I' ll have 2belgian média with my squad. Is that right for you (QUESTION MARK) OR 5 GERVAIS Platoon deputy.	I 2nt do thai two nights n row Good morning. I' m 4th platoon deputy from fp coy. I' ll come for a combined patrol at 2o' clock this afternoon. Is that ok for you ? I must tell you that I' ll have 2belgian média with my squad. Is that right for you ? OR 5 GERVAIS Platoon deputy.
12		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-20T09:26:07+04:30	It is all right but you will receive schedule with combine patrol of saturday. See you later. Thanks.	It is all right but you will receive schedule with combine patrol of saturday. See you later. Thanks.
13		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-20T12:55:58+04:30	yuck not like that	yuck not like that
14	Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-26T18:13:24+04:30	She lyin	She lyin
15	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-26T18:14:38+04:30	Hell no	Hell no
16	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-26T18:15:30+04:30	Beter be thats just disgusting	Beter be thats just disgusting
17	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-26T18:18:51+04:30	Just jokn with ya	Just jokn with ya
18	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-26T18:20:32+04:30	Hell no	Hell no
19	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-26T18:24:56+04:30	Thanks for the training. I will practice and you can test me later.	Thanks for the training. I will practice and you can test me later.
20	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-27T09:03:16+04:30	Are you guys ok(QUESTION MARK)	Are you guys ok? I got a text about
21	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-27T10:22:31+04:30	I got a text about shots fired there	shots fired there
22	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-27T17:40:10+04:30	Stay strong. be safe. i love you guys. Thanks for the heads up. please let me know if anyone needs anything seriously. can i have your number(QUESTION MARK)	Stay strong. be safe. i love you guys. Thanks for the heads up. please let me know if anyone needs anything seriously. can i have your number?
23	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-28T11:01:49+04:30	how u holding up	how u holding up
24		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-28T15:00:03+04:30	I'm thinking of u	I'm thinking of u
25		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-29T07:14:31+04:30	çan u give me a call when u get a min(QUESTION MARK)	çan u give me a call when u get a min?
26	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-29T09:05:11+04:30	You have a 1300 interview at bldg 200 today. Let me know immediately if there are any issues.	You have a 1300 interview at bldg 200 today. Let me know immediately if there are any issues.
27		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-05-02T08:20:27+04:30	Interview pushed to tomorrow 3rd	Interview pushed to tomorrow 3rd
28		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-05-02T08:45:49+04:30		

SIM SMS Sent
Index
SIM SMS Drafts

Name

Number

Date/Time

Message Text

Original

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
SIM Deleted SMS Received					
Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
01	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-22T13:38:32+04:30	Thx	Thx
02	Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-22T14:12:31+04:30	I got it mostly done and turned in	I got it mostly done and turned in
03	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-22T14:19:41+04:30	What u doing over there	What u doing over there
04	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-22T14:20:29+04:30	Ha ha dont knock urself out	Ha ha dont knock urself out
05	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-22T14:22:09+04:30	I know	I know
06	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-22T14:22:33+04:30	But u know i luv ya	But u know i luv ya
07	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-22T14:23:13+04:30	What i am being nice	What i am being nice
08	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-22T14:24:31+04:30	Ok i hope	Ok i hope
09	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-22T14:25:39+04:30	:-)	:-)
10	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-22T15:19:35+04:30	What time is the walk	What time is the walk
11	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-22T16:53:58+04:30	Thanks se ya then	Thanks se ya then
12	Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-22T17:28:45+04:30	With belgians	With belgians
13	Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-22T17:31:56+04:30	No	No
14	Capt	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-22T17:32:39+04:30	On my way	On my way
15	Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-22T19:05:50+04:30	Checkn out now	Checkn out now
16	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-22T19:11:35+04:30	We be there just n time i think	We be there just n time i think
17	Doc (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-23T06:28:54+04:30	At chow.	At chow.
18		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-23T09:05:24+04:30	On my way	On my way
19	Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-23T11:05:08+04:30	Sory	Sory
20	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-23T10:55:04+04:30	No eatn afghan chow	No eatn afghan chow
21	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-23T11:02:27+04:30	Im not in ofice but wil text her	Im not in ofice but wil text her
22	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-23T11:46:10+04:30	I dot want to talk about it	I dot want to talk about it
23	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-23T16:38:44+04:30	Ok im taking a pre test so i may be late	Ok im taking a pre test so i may be late
24		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-23T17:17:46+04:30	Almost done	Almost done
25	Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-23T17:22:30+04:30	Not going	Not going
26	Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-23T17:25:46+04:30	We didnt he just showed me the aerial port bldg and we walked down by their gym	We didnt he just showed me the aerial port bldg and we walked down by their gym
27	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-23T17:32:53+04:30	On my way gonna have to review results later	On my way gonna have to review results later
28		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-23T17:40:50+04:30	In my room getting pretty	In my room getting pretty
29	Maj (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-23T17:51:36+04:30	I know :-)	I know :-)
30	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-23T18:08:46+04:30	Thanks for checkn on me	Thanks for checkn on me
31	Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-24T10:59:56+04:30	Yes maam	Yes maam
32	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-22T11:01:10+04:30	Its lunch time	Its lunch time
33	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-22T11:17:25+04:30	Nasty as usual did you at least get some good grub(QUESTION MARK)	Nasty as usual did you at least get some good grub?
34		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-22T11:19:12+04:30	Do explain	Do explain
35	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-22T11:21:50+04:30	How does (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) think you are me(QUESTION MARK)	How does (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) think you are me?

36	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-22T11:25:45+04:30	Ha ha what did you say(QUESTION MARK)	Ha ha what did you say?
37			2011-03-22T17:36:47+04:30	Let me know when you get there i'm still at the shop with the boys	Let me know when you get there i'm still at the shop with the boys
38			2011-03-22T17:38:09+04:30	Ok	Ok
39 Maj	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-03-22T18:28:55+04:30	So sorry. U can come watch a movie in my room	So sorry. U can come watch a movie in my room
40 Maj			2011-03-22T18:31:08+04:30	Got to set it up first	Got to set it up first
41 Maj			2011-03-22T21:02:59+04:30	Trust me i have comments	Trust me i have comments
42 Bel Capt			2011-03-23T10:30:22+04:30	Ok.we will there a time 13h45.	Ok.we will there a time 13h45.
43	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-03-23T13:40:19+04:30	Im still at 200 wanna just run over here today(QUESTION MARK)	Im still at 200 wanna just run over here today?
44			2011-03-23T13:53:04+04:30	Im not sure i will have to look when i get back to my room	Im not sure i will have to look when i get back to my room
45			2011-03-23T13:57:43+04:30	Ok what time(QUESTION MARK)	Ok what time?
46			2011-03-23T14:01:52+04:30	Ok	Ok
47			2011-03-23T15:43:20+04:30	On my way now	On my way now
48			2011-03-24T08:47:16+04:30	Mam to day i can't come to work bcz my (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) she is ill	Mam to day i can't come to work bcz my (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) she is ill
49 Capt	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-03-25T17:25:05+04:30	Dont worry about it. No problem.	Dont worry about it. No problem.
50			2011-03-26T18:02:33+04:30	Thanks	Thanks
51	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-03-27T11:55:29+04:30	On my way	On my way
52			2011-03-27T17:11:46+04:30	Yeah woke up at 1115	Yeah woke up at 1115
53	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-03-28T14:51:39+04:30	R u eating @ 530	R u eating @ 530
54			2011-03-28T15:12:01+04:30	Still at 200 working on a numbers project for the maj due today	Still at 200 working on a numbers project for the maj due today
55	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-03-28T15:12:01+04:30	Thank you for reminding me!:-)	Thank you for reminding me!:-)
56			2011-03-29T07:25:25+04:30	Morning mam; can u tell (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I'll meet him at south gate at 8	Morning mam; can u tell (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I'll meet him at south gate at 8
57			2011-03-29T07:48:47+04:30	Yes	Yes
			2011-03-29T17:37:26+04:30	Yes	Yes
58 Capt			2011-03-30T09:33:26+04:30	Can either you or (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) go pick up sgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) at ten(QUESTION MARK)	Can either you or (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) go pick up sgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) at ten?
59			2011-03-30T11:02:28+04:30	Yes, THANKS	Yes, THANKS
60 Capt			2011-03-30T11:43:37+04:30	He forgot it. He'll bring it tomorrow.	He forgot it. He'll bring it tomorrow.
61 Cdo Cell			2011-03-31T06:09:06+04:30	Copy	Copy
62	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-03-31T10:58:58+04:30	Roger	Roger
63	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-04-01T13:34:20+04:30	Sure i think my office is planning our normal friday night dinner there as well	Sure i think my office is planning our normal friday night dinner there as well
64			2011-04-01T13:35:59+04:30	well	well
65			2011-04-01T14:07:28+04:30	Ok	Ok
66			2011-04-01T15:44:06+04:30	I reserved for 10 seats	I reserved for 10 seats
67	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-04-01T15:44:22+04:30	10 I meant	10 I meant
				Sounds great. Is 1 enough(QUESTION MARK)	Sounds great. Is 1 enough?

68	(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)	(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)	2011-04-01T15:47:36+04:30	Ha! Okay I'm platoon leader, belgian fp coy, is it possible to meet you in kaia north regarding questions for a lecture given in a few days to QRF coy	Ha! Okay I'm platoon leader, belgian fp coy, is it possible to meet you in kaia north regarding questions for a lecture given in a few days to QRF coy ?
69		(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)	2011-04-01T16:47:17+04:30	(QUESTION MARK) Any time between 1300hr and 1600hr. In front of airforce one, ok for you (QUESTION MARK)	(QUESTION MARK) Any time between 1300hr and 1600hr. In front of airforce one, ok for you ?
70		(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)	2011-04-01T17:08:38+04:30		
71	(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)	(b)(6) (b)(7) (C)	2011-04-01T18:04:15+04:30	Almost	Almost

SIM Deleted SMS Sent

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
MultiMedia Messages					
Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Content (picture, video, file)	
MultiMedia Inbox					
Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Content (picture, video, file)	
MultiMedia Outbox					
Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Content (picture, video, file)	
MultiMedia Sentbox					
Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Content (picture, video, file)	
Files					
Index	Type	Name	File Size	Date/Time	
Events					
Index	Message	Date/Time	Precedence		
Notes					
Index	Message	Date/Time	Precedence		





CellTech Kit Number **Celibri** (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 DOCEX Batch Number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 IIR Number

MSC | Unit | Producer Name JDEC-A MEDEX
 DOI 20110607
 Circumstance NKAIA Shooting
 Date of Capture 20110427
 Capturing Unit NDS

Location Captured MGRS
 Location Captured - LAT
 Location Captured - LON
 Location Captured - Country Afghanistan

Name of Detainee
 Detainee Number Or ISN
 Operator Comments

Handset Information
 Handset Make Nokia
 Handset Model 1202
 Handset Owner

MSISDN MSISDN 1-N/A
 IMSI (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 IMEI

Return IMEI
 Service Provider AWCC
 SIM Card Number (ICCID) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Hardware Version
 Software Version
 Time Set To
 Actual Time 2011-06-07T00:17:31

Memory Card
 Greeting Message Hello Tara

Phone Book Memory
 Index Name Number Original

Phone Book SIM
 Index Name Number Original

01	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
02	My number	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	My number

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Home

Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

10 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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23

24

25 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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27 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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34

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Home

Col (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

35 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

36

37 capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

38 Capt

39 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

40 San Antonio

41 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

42 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

43 Fire Departm

44 IMP

45 Medical Emer

46 CDO

47 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

48 Ms (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

49 Cpt

50 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

51

52 Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

53

54 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

55

56

57 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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59

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61

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64

65

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
capt (C)

Capt

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

San Antonio

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Fire Departm

IMP

Medical Emer

CDO

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Ms

Cpt

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Capt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

66 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
 67
 68
 69
 70
 71
 72
 73
 74
 75

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Dialed Calls Memory

Index	Name	Date/Time	Duration	Original
01		2011-04-19T11:41:24	00:00:09	
02		2011-03-29T18:14:19	00:01:20	
03		2011-03-29T18:13:23		
04		2011-03-06T14:39:58	00:03:53	
05		2011-03-06T13:51:28	00:02:06	
06	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	2011-04-26T17:41:09	00:00:16	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
07		2011-04-15T09:45:27	00:00:09	
08		2011-03-27T11:39:59	00:00:53	
09		2011-03-27T10:59:48		
10	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	2011-03-12T13:46:40	00:00:16	
11		2011-04-19T12:37:27	00:01:27	
12		2011-04-02T14:39:36	00:01:16	
13		2011-04-02T14:39:29		
14		2011-04-02T12:05:05		
15		2011-03-26T16:52:14	00:00:43	

16	CDO	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-19T11:44:11	00:00:19	CDO
17	CDO	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-19T11:41:59	00:00:33	CDO
18	CDO	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-01T17:07:22		CDO
19	CDO	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-07T13:23:12	00:00:13	CDO
20	CDO	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-07T13:21:44		CDO
21	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-15T11:50:56	00:00:09	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
22	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-27T17:12:40		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
23	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-27T17:12:36		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
24	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-27T17:11:30		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
25	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-01-05T13:47:55		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
26	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-22T18:52:32		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
27	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-19T18:20:49		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
28	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-19T18:12:58		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
29	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-19T18:12:22		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
30	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-05T17:54:54		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
31	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-20T14:58:54	00:06:06	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
32	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-20T13:34:45		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
33	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-20T08:21:29	00:02:13	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
34	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-03T10:59:22	00:00:39	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
35	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-30T10:40:58	00:00:45	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
36	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-19T18:03:41	00:01:02	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
37	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-19T18:02:53		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
38	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-02T19:17:37		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
39	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-02T19:17:03		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
40	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-02T19:16:54		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
41	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-21T10:01:15	00:00:50	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
42	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-09T17:55:43		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

43	(b)(1) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(1) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-09T17:54:08		(b)(1) (b)(7)(C)
44			2011-04-09T17:53:28		
45			2011-04-09T17:52:50		
46			2011-04-22T20:58:52	00:00:39	
47			2011-04-22T18:49:55	00:00:45	
48			2011-04-22T18:49:38		
49			2011-04-21T20:11:00		
50			2011-04-21T20:10:26		
51 Home			2011-04-21T21:27:40	00:01:56	Home
52 Home			2011-04-15T06:40:06	00:01:51	Home
53 Home			2011-04-15T06:39:42	00:00:10	Home
54 Home			2011-04-05T08:54:27	00:05:31	Home
55 Home			2011-03-08T08:37:08		Home
56	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-04-22T18:51:18		(b)(1) (b)(7)(C)
57			2011-04-20T19:35:01	00:02:29	
58			2011-04-20T18:45:56	00:00:06	
59			2011-04-07T10:04:05	00:01:01	
60			2011-04-07T09:07:45	00:01:34	
61			2011-04-19T18:19:49		
62			2011-04-19T18:19:40		
63			2011-04-19T18:19:36		
64			2011-04-19T18:19:23		
65			2011-04-09T12:40:59	00:00:12	
66			2011-04-24T09:22:18	00:00:55	
67			2011-04-23T10:36:21		
68			2011-04-23T10:35:53	00:00:05	
69			2011-04-20T15:20:06	00:03:05	
70			2011-04-20T14:58:38	00:01:45	
71			2011-04-22T16:28:22	00:00:15	
72			2011-04-22T16:09:02	00:02:40	

73	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-10T12:59:47		
74	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-15T08:39:23		
75	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-15T08:39:05		
76	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-22T16:27:03	00:00:42	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
77	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-11T19:06:17	00:01:20	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
78	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-16T11:05:20	00:00:26	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
79	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-16T10:54:08		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
80	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-25T09:45:24	00:00:53	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
81	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-15T06:41:35		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
82	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-24T17:35:56		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
83	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-24T17:35:44		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
84	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-24T17:35:26		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
85	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-20T17:19:00		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
86	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-20T17:17:42		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
87	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-20T15:17:59	00:00:34	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
88	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-19T10:50:17		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
89	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-19T10:49:38		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
90	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-23T10:05:08	00:00:33	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
91	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-12T14:47:33		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
92	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-12T14:44:21		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
93	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-12T13:42:24	00:03:05	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
94	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-22T18:06:28		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)



96	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-22T16:07:45	00:00:41	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
97			2011-04-20T15:18:55	00:00:16	
98			2011-04-19T18:22:09	00:03:02	
99			2011-04-19T18:21:07	00:00:09	

Dialed Calls SIM
Index

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Duration	Original
01	@@@@@@@@@@@ @@	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)			@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
02	@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @@				@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
03	@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @@				@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
04	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) @@@@@@@@@@@@@				(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
05	@@ @@@@@@@@@@@@@				@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
06	@@				@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
07	BDNIK				
08	Sqd Commande @@@@@@@@@@@@@				Sqd Commande
09	@@				@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@

Received Calls Memory
Index

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Duration	Original
01	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-04-21T10:11:49	00:03:21	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
02			2011-04-19T12:22:22	00:00:43	
03			2011-04-19T11:49:10	00:00:30	
04			2011-04-10T17:14:24	00:00:40	
05			2011-04-03T15:44:21	00:05:49	
06			2011-04-21T07:31:04	00:04:01	
07			2011-04-19T11:29:01	00:00:01	
08			2011-04-10T16:07:01	00:01:01	
09			2011-04-03T11:01:38	00:01:13	

10	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-03-28T21:45:35	00:01:49	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
11	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-25T11:00:56	00:00:14	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
12	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-19T21:24:09	00:00:38	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
13	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-15T17:27:15	00:04:17	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
14	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-15T17:25:27	00:00:58	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
15	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-09T16:16:27	00:00:34	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
16	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-26T17:33:02	00:00:20	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
17	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-19T14:24:30	00:00:43	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
18	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-19T13:56:20	00:00:54	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
19	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-12T17:01:17	00:00:12	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
20	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-07T08:31:37	00:02:23	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
21	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-23T21:22:34	00:01:30	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
22	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-22T20:25:21	00:30:10	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
23	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-21T21:55:26	00:03:03	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
24	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-20T20:41:13	00:03:32	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
25	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-18T12:43:43	00:00:15	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
26	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-27T09:54:10	00:00:31	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
27	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-27T09:53:48	00:00:13	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
28	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-27T09:17:19	00:00:52	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
29	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-21T17:26:53	00:01:42	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
30	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-21T08:36:31	00:01:10	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

Missed Calls Memory Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Duration	Original
31	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-23T10:36:54	00:00:53	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
32			2011-04-20T14:49:50	00:03:14	
33			2011-04-16T12:09:46	00:00:30	
34			2011-04-09T17:12:50	00:00:34	
35			2011-04-03T15:01:38	00:00:43	
36			2011-04-19T17:49:56		
37			2011-04-19T17:49:35		
38			2011-04-19T17:49:15		
39			2011-04-19T16:51:56		
40			2011-04-19T16:51:08		
41			2011-04-19T18:21:23	00:00:44	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
42			2011-04-15T14:05:34	00:00:50	
43			2011-04-15T11:41:46	00:00:12	
44			2011-04-15T09:41:04	00:00:59	
45			2011-04-08T17:38:44	00:00:32	
46			2011-04-20T19:10:52	00:05:04	
47			2011-04-18T12:37:46	00:00:54	
48			2011-04-10T15:51:41	00:00:17	
49			2011-04-10T15:49:07	00:02:04	
50			2011-04-06T12:51:43	00:00:20	

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(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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2011-04-27T21:54:55
2011-04-27T21:49:28
2011-04-27T21:45:47
2011-04-27T21:44:19
2011-04-25T21:44:03
2011-04-27T11:24:54
2011-04-27T11:23:59
2011-04-15T15:32:11
2011-01-02T15:53:04
2011-04-27T11:40:17
2011-04-27T10:48:51
2011-04-27T10:47:54
2011-04-10T11:04:17
2011-03-31T08:54:11
2011-04-27T10:18:46
2011-04-27T10:16:38
2011-04-27T10:13:56
2011-04-27T10:12:59
2011-04-18T09:25:45
2011-04-27T11:43:06
2011-04-18T06:02:00

22	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-10T11:01:18	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
23			2011-03-22T10:37:00	
24	CDO		2011-04-19T11:28:44	CDO
25	CDO		2011-03-27T17:03:42	CDO
26	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-27T10:54:05	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
27			2011-04-27T10:44:29	
28			2011-04-27T10:26:12	
29			2011-04-05T08:42:40	
30			2011-04-03T09:58:16	
31			2011-04-19T17:56:21	
32			2011-04-19T17:52:48	
33			2011-04-19T17:51:45	
34			2011-03-30T21:53:58	
35	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)	2011-04-27T12:25:32	(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)
36			2011-04-27T10:17:30	
37			2011-03-31T09:03:04	
38			2011-04-27T10:52:57	
39			2011-04-12T08:23:57	

Fixed Dialing Numbers SIM
 Index Name Number
 Own Numbers SIM
 Index Name Number
 Memory SMS Inbox
 Index Name Number Date/Time Message Text Original

Memory SMS Draft

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
01		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-20T14:29:51	Doing great, im at Mez	Doing great, im at Mez
02			2011-04-20T16:20:59	Im ok, dang i wont b able to see u I will b on this base til fri, we flew	Im ok, dang i wont b able to see u I will b on this base til fri, we flew
03			2011-04-20T16:40:07	here	here
04			2011-04-21T12:56:13	Were u able to get letter(QUESTION MARK)	Were u able to get letter?
05			2011-04-22T23:01:43	Yes	Yes
06			2011-04-23T09:25:32	Yes im bac, how r u(QUESTION MARK)	Yes im bac, how r u?
07			2011-04-24T11:52:49	Happy Easter	Happy Easter
08			2011-04-25T11:03:04	Its broke	Its broke

SIM SMS Received

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
01	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-20T13:48:15+04:30	Hey how are you doing(QUESTION MARK)	Hey how are you doing?
02	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-04-20T14:29:50+04:30	Ok. Never heard of it. Ill be out there later. Was seeing if you were ok, had a feeling to contact you	Ok. Never heard of it. Ill be out there later. Was seeing if you were ok, had a feeling to contact you
03			2011-04-20T16:18:57+04:30	Yea... (Yea... (
04			2011-04-20T16:38:01+04:30	Ok! Glad youre doing ok	Ok! Glad youre doing ok
05			2011-04-22T16:00:36+04:30	i need a tracker how do i get one(QUESTION MARK)	i need a tracker how do i get one?
06	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-04-22T21:37:28+04:30	Think i found it a gnc container right(QUESTION MARK)	Think i found it a gnc container right?
07			2011-04-23T07:54:19+04:30	Hey did you made it back yet safely(QUESTION MARK)	Hey did you made it back yet safely?
08			2011-04-24T20:47:33+04:30	Happy Easter!	Happy Easter!
09			2011-04-25T10:58:08+04:30	Let me know if its workin or not	Let me know if its workin or not



12	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-27T10:22:17+04:30	I got a text about shots fired there	Are you guys ok(QUESTION MARK) Are you guys ok? I got a text about shots fired there
13			2011-04-27T10:27:45+04:30	You alright(QUESTION MARK)	You alright?
14			2011-04-27T10:28:25+04:30	Go out window	Go out window
15			2011-04-27T10:28:25+04:30	Go out window	Go out window
16			2011-04-27T10:27:45+04:30	You alright(QUESTION MARK)	You alright?
17			2011-04-27T10:29:58+04:30	Do you have capt Ransom and major with you(QUESTION MARK)	Do you have capt Ransom and major with you?
18	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-04-27T10:39:58+04:30	You alright(QUESTION MARK)	You alright?
19			2011-04-27T10:40:43+04:30	Where are you	Where are you
20			2011-04-27T10:40:43+04:30	Where are you	Where are you
21			2011-04-27T10:43:49+04:30	Status check	Status check
22	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-04-27T10:53:31+04:30	You ok	You ok
23			2011-04-27T11:06:40+04:30	Are you ok(QUESTION MARK)	Are you ok?
24			2011-04-27T11:24:08+04:30	Are you guys okay al is looking for you guys	Are you guys okay al is looking for you guys

SIM SMS Sent

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Name

Number

Date/Time

Message Text

Original

SIM SMS Drafts

Index

Name

Number

Date/Time

Message Text

Original

SIM Deleted SMS Received

Index

Name

Number

Date/Time

Message Text

Original

01

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2010-12-21T10:31:17+04:30

Can you please bring laptop back to shop after lunch

Can you please bring laptop back to shop after lunch

02

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2010-12-21T11:24:13+04:30

Really(QUESTION MARK)

Really?

03
04
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21

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2010-12-27T17:54:25+04:30	Wanted to see if u could help in 503 tomorrow(QUESTION MARK)	Wanted to see if u could help in 503 tomorrow?
2010-12-27T18:13:06+04:30	Cool	Cool
2010-12-28T07:42:01+04:30	K	K
2010-12-31T18:26:23+04:30	Please contact help desk need help on COMSEC.	Please contact help desk need help on COMSEC.
2011-01-01T17:15:25+04:30	1000 confirmed	1000 confirmed
2011-01-03T18:47:55+04:30	Have sub keys meet me @ dorms @ 0715 if u need a ride ft col v	Have sub keys meet me @ dorms @ 0715 if u need a ride ft col v
2011-01-08T08:05:06+04:30	r u going to be able to pu ur replacement(QUESTION MARK)	r u going to be able to pu ur replacement?
2011-01-15T17:57:49+04:30	Maj Could you have the projector, projector screen and white board ready for tomorrow class(QUESTION MARK) Thank you.	Maj Could you have the projector, projector screen and white board ready for tomorrow class? Thank you.
2011-01-18T17:18:10+04:30	I'll be right down	I'll be right down
2011-01-29T20:38:27+04:30	You staying or going(QUESTION MARK)	You staying or going?
2011-02-04T13:05:20+04:30	Give me an hour please	Give me an hour please
2011-02-04T15:27:25+04:30	I'm in the day room right now trying to copy the movie for you	I'm in the day room right now trying to copy the movie for you
2011-02-05T20:46:24+04:30	Text once you're ready	Text once you're ready
2011-02-05T20:59:57+04:30	Meet you out front	Meet you out front
2011-02-07T12:40:59+04:30	Chocolate chocolate chip	Chocolate chocolate chip
2011-02-07T12:42:27+04:30	Thank you	Thank you
2011-02-08T17:26:57+04:30	Sorry, i will not be going tonight	Sorry, i will not be going tonight
2011-02-08T17:26:57+04:30	Sorry, i will not be going tonight	Sorry, i will not be going tonight
2011-02-12T11:12:14+04:30	Call me when you return from lunch so we can go to the bldg	Call me when you return from lunch so we can go to the bldg

22	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-02-21T20:21:09+04:30	He's not playing tonight	He's not playing tonight
23	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-02-21T21:37:37+04:30	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said you should come upstairs and play spades	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said you should come upstairs and play spades
24	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-02-21T21:40:43+04:30	I tried to tell him but he doesn't listen	I tried to tell him but he doesn't listen
25	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-02-27T18:06:50+04:30	Where are you	Where are you
26	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-02-27T18:06:50+04:30	Where are you Some other people are playing.	Where are you Some other people are playing.
27	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-02-28T20:13:58+04:30	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) are in the dayroom cause they don't have another table	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) are in the dayroom cause they don't have another table
28	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-01T11:15:39+05:00	Hi good morning this is (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) A00 Course contractor i want inform you that today i am going to come to see the class from near if you will thier i will appreciate. The project team doesnt knows about my visit keep it secret.	Hi good morning this is (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) A+ Course contractor i want inform you that today i am going to come to see the class from near if you will thier i will appreciate. The project team doesnt knows about my visit keep it secret.
29	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-01T17:27:55+04:30	Are you already at Thai	Are you already at Thai
30	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-01T17:29:21+04:30	I'm on my way did you already order	I'm on my way did you already order
31	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-01T17:34:12+04:30	On my way from work	On my way from work
32	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-01T17:40:58+04:30	How many people do I need to get a table for	How many people do I need to get a table for
33	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-01T17:41:37+04:30	Ok Good afternoon i just send an email to you and AMBARD regarding PBX training	Ok Good afternoon i just send an email to you and AMBARD regarding PBX training
34	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-03T14:01:14+05:00	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
35	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-06T11:23:10+04:30	When you get back from lunch let me know.	When you get back from lunch let me know.
36	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-07T13:29:15+04:30	Can you go with your boss tomorrow	Can you go with your boss tomorrow

37	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-08T08:34:01+04:30	Pls keep me in the loop on pai Maj ambard	Pls keep me in the loop on pai Maj ambard
38		2011-03-09T17:48:16+05:00	Who is dis	Who is dis
39	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-11T07:02:28+04:30	I over slept	I over slept
40		2011-03-11T13:30:26+04:30	Awesome c u in 2 morrow	Awesome c u in 2 morrow
41	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-12T14:09:47+04:30	Um....you might go missing!	Um....you might go missing!
42		2011-03-14T08:55:47+04:30	Out today	Out today
43	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-14T17:22:43+04:30	says do you want to play cards tonight	says do you want to play cards tonight
44	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-14T17:25:26+04:30	I'll ask	I'll ask
45	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-14T17:28:52+04:30	At 7	At 7
46	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-14T17:35:34+04:30	Yes ma'am	Yes ma'am
47	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-14T19:26:18+04:30	Did he show up I'm so sorry to hear about your loss, my condolences to you and your family, as you will continue to be in my prayers. Please don't hold it all in, I know that I might not be the person you choose to share with but I'm always here.	Did he show up I'm so sorry to hear about your loss, my condolences to you and your family, as you will continue to be in my prayers. Please don't hold it all in, I know that I might not be the person you choose to share with but I'm always here.
48	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-15T14:44:22+04:30	I'm always here.	I'm always here.
49	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-15T19:16:59+04:30	No I'm not, I'll come to your room	No I'm not, I'll come to your room
50	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-16T06:06:38+04:30	Morning running late	Morning running late
51	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-16T06:06:38+04:30	Morning running late	Morning running late
52	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-17T06:03:05+04:30	Im outside where r u	Im outside where r u
53	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-17T18:55:44+04:30	8:30 upstairs	8:30 upstairs
54		2011-03-18T14:05:31+04:30	Yeah had cramp	Yeah had cramp

55	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-19T06:29:20+04:30	[REDACTED] have works! Would you like to watch Spit on my grave. [REDACTED] told me to ask,	[REDACTED] have works! Would you like to watch Spit on my grave. [REDACTED] told me to ask,
56	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-20T16:55:35+04:30	tonight at 7	tonight at 7
57	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-20T19:44:22+04:30	We ready	We ready
58	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-20T19:46:33+04:30	We ready	We ready
59	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-21T13:17:30+04:30	What is the name of the movie u want(QUESTION MARK)	What is the name of the movie u want?
60	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-21T13:22:27+04:30	I thought so my roommate dont have it i will try and get him 2 download it. Was that movie that bad yesterday(QUESTION MARK) 2 answer your (QUESTION MARK) Yesterday, men want 2 feel wanted or needed. And when we get rejected it hurts! An we dont know how 2 express feeling. Unless we	I thought so my roommate dont have it i will try and get him 2 download it. Was that movie that bad yesterday? 2 answer your ? Yesterday, men want 2 feel wanted or needed. And when we get rejected it hurts! An we dont know how 2 express feeling. Unless we
61	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-21T13:30:52+04:30	read zhane books!	Unless we read zhane books!
62	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-22T11:37:19+04:30	Hey lady, I did make the reservation at Thai for 8 people at 1800. Myself and [REDACTED] might not make it back for dinner, hopefully we will.	Hey lady, I did make the reservation at Thai for 8 people at 1800. Myself and [REDACTED] might not make it back for dinner, hopefully we will.
63	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-24T12:15:04+04:30	Yes, glad you didn't lose it. I'm almost at the dorms	Yes, glad you didn't lose it. I'm almost at the dorms
64		2011-03-24T13:05:16+04:30	I have your boots. Will be at oqab around 4 pm.	I have your boots. Will be at oqab around 4 pm.
65		2011-03-24T15:55:43+04:30	Change of plans. Will be at dorms. Back home. Good	Change of plans. Will be at dorms. Back home. Good
66	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-25T02:42:10+04:30	Lookin out. Can't wait to tell u bout it tomorrow :)	Lookin out. Can't wait to tell u bout it tomorrow :)
67	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-25T15:22:46+04:30	What u doing today(QUESTION MARK)	What u doing today?
68	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-25T15:25:06+04:30	[REDACTED] Naw, i can't stay focus! Have u taken your daily nap,	[REDACTED] Naw, i can't stay focus! Have u taken your daily nap,
69	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-25T15:32:41+04:30	yet(QUESTION MARK)	yet?

70	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-25T15:38:54+04:30	Holla at me when u done relaxing. Is there a good time a could come by and get the episodes of desperate housewives(QUESTION MARK)	Holla at me when u done relaxing. Is there a good time a could come by and get the episodes of desperate housewives?
71	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-25T16:16:23+04:30	Ok thanks Is there a good time a could come by and get the episodes of desperate housewives(QUESTION MARK)	Ok thanks Is there a good time a could come by and get the episodes of desperate housewives?
72	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-25T16:17:08+04:30	Ok thanks Is there a good time a could come by and get the episodes of desperate housewives(QUESTION MARK)	Ok thanks Is there a good time a could come by and get the episodes of desperate housewives?
73	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-03-25T16:16:23+04:30	Ok thanks Is there a good time a could come by and get the episodes of desperate housewives(QUESTION MARK)	Ok thanks Is there a good time a could come by and get the episodes of desperate housewives?

- SIM Deleted SMS Sent
- Index
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Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
Name	Number	Date/Time	Content (picture, video, file)	
Name	Number	Date/Time	Content (picture, video, file)	
Name	Number	Date/Time	Content (picture, video, file)	
Name	Number	Date/Time	Content (picture, video, file)	
Name	Number	Date/Time	Content (picture, video, file)	
Type	Name	File Size	Date/Time	
Message	Date/Time	Precedence		
Message	Date/Time	Precedence		



Cellebrite:

CellTech Kit Number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

DOCEX Batch Number

IIR Number

JDEC-A

MSC | Unit | Producer Name MEDEX

DOI 20110606

NKAIA

Circumstance shooting

Date of Capture 20110427

Capturing Unit NDS

Location Captured MGRS

Location Captured - LAT

Location Captured - LON

Location Captured - Country Afghanistan

Name of Detainee

Detainee Number Or ISN

number taped
on back of
phone

Operator Comments (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Handset Information

Handset Make Nokia

Handset Model 1280

Handset Owner

MSISDN 1-

N/A MSISDN

2-N/A

MSISDN 3-

MSISDN N/A

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

IMSI 1080

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

IMEI 9976

Return IMEI

Service Provider AWCC

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIM Card Number (ICCID)

Hardware Version

Software Version
Time Set To
Actual Time
Memory Card
Greeting Message
Phone Book Memory

Index Name Number

Original

Phone Book SIM

Index Name Number

Original

01	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	
02		
03		
04		
05		
06		
07		

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

08	Jim McLaughlin	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
09	Fire	
10	Police	
11	Police Two	
12	Med Emer	
13	Kiai Duty Offi	

Jim McLaughlin
Fire
Police
Police Two
Med Emer
Kiai Duty Offi

14	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

20	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		
29		
30		
31		

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

32 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 33
 34
 35

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Dialed Calls Memory

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Duration	Original
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Dialed Calls SIM

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Duration	Original
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01	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)				(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
02					
03					Azimi Cable

04	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)				(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
05					
06					Sgt

07		(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)			
08	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)				(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
09					

10 #47398

Received Calls Memory

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Duration	Original
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Missed Calls Memory

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Duration	Original
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Fixed Dialing Numbers SIM

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Duration	Original
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Own Numbers SIM

Index	Name	Number
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Memory SMS Inbox

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
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Memory SMS Draft

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
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Memory SMS Outbox

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
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SIM SMS Received

Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
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01	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-03-17T08:06:36+04:30	Klepto, I will be in building 200 most of the day.	Klepto, I will be in building 200 most of the day.
02	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-03-30T10:55:56+04:30	Are the interseterr going to lunch Aussie in the dfac there is none higher	Are the interseterr going to lunch Aussie in the dfac there is none higher
03	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-03-31T18:30:41+04:30	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) has keys for you to bring one of the trucks over tomorrow.	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) has keys for you to bring one of the trucks over tomorrow.
04	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-04-03T15:20:50+04:30		

05	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-04T08:16:32+04:30	Copy	Copy
06	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-10T07:28:30+04:30	PFT canx due to rain. --(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Pls pass to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) if u c him, his name not on recall roster	PFT canx due to rain. --(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Pls pass to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) if u c him, his name not on recall roster
07	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-10T07:34:48+04:30		
08	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-10T09:47:16+04:30	Copy	Copy
09	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-18T21:35:19+04:30	Gonna get haircut in mornin tried to trim and Fd gt up	Gonna get haircut in mornin tried to trim and Fd gt up
10	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-24T18:47:51+04:30	Et tu brutae(QUESTION MARK) I passed what I could to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I will be at the Mod all afternoon	Et tu brutae? I passed what I could to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I will be at the Mod all afternoon
11	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-25T10:08:34+04:30		
12	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-25T12:03:33+04:30	K(QUESTION MARK) What are you talking	K? What are you talking about?
13	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-25T12:04:33+04:30	about(QUESTION MARK) The schedule your guys just sent out is rubbish.	What are you talking about? The schedule your guys just sent out is rubbish.
14	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-25T15:58:52+04:30		
15	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-26T10:30:58+04:30	Sir, could you please tell me if MoD tasked for AN-32 to fly to Kandahar or Herat today(QUESTION MARK)	Sir, could you please tell me if MoD tasked for AN-32 to fly to Kandahar or Herat today?



17	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-27T10:15:54+04:30	Unconfirmed reports of suicide bomber in ACCC avoid if you are not there	Unconfirmed reports of suicide bomber in ACCC avoid if you are not there
18	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-27T10:20:00+04:30	Was asked to make contact with you. Please send status when able	Was asked to make contact with you. Please send status when able
19	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-27T10:23:11+04:30	We need you to call now. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BRUISER IN CRITICAL CONDITION. NEED YOUR STATUS.	We need you to call now. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BRUISER IN CRITICAL CONDITION. NEED YOUR STATUS.
20	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-27T10:52:51+04:30		

SIM SMS Sent

Index Name Number Date/Time Message Text Original

SIM SMS Drafts

Index Name Number Date/Time Message Text Original

SIM Deleted SMS Received

Index Name Number Date/Time Message Text Original

SIM Deleted SMS Sent

Index Name Number Date/Time Message Text Original

MultiMedia Messages

Index Name Number Date/Time Content (picture, video, file)

MultiMedia Inbox	Name	Number	Date/Time	Content (picture, video, file)
Index				
MultiMedia Outbox	Name	Number	Date/Time	Content (picture, video, file)
Index				
MultiMedia Sentbox	Name	Number	Date/Time	Content (picture, video, file)
Index				
Files	Type	Name	File Size	Date/Time
Index				
Events	Message	Date/Time	Precedence	
Index				
Notes	Message	Date/Time	Precedence	
Index				



Cellebrite:

CellTech Kit Number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

DOCEX Batch Number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

IIR Number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

JDEC-A

MSC | Unit | Producer Name MEDEX

DOI (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

NKAJA

Circumstance shooting

Date of Capture 20110427

Capturing Unit NDS

Location Captured MGRS

Location Captured - LAT

Location Captured - LON

Location Captured - Country Afghanistan

Name of Detainee

Detainee Number Or ISN

number taped
on back of
phone

Operator Comments (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Handset Information

Handset Make Nokia

Handset Model 1280

Handset Owner

MSISDN 1-

N/A MSISDN

2-N/A

MSISDN 3-

N/A

MSISDN

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

IMSI

IMEI

Return IMEI

Service Provider AWCC

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SIM Card Number (ICCID)

Hardware Version

Software Version
Time Set To
Actual Time
Memory Card
Greeting Message
Phone Book Memory

Index Name Number

Phone Book SIM

Index Name Number

01	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	
02		
03	Sgt (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	
04	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	
05	Fw Sched (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	
06	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	
07		

08 Jim McLaughlin (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

09	Fire	
10	Police	
11	Police Two	
12	Med Emer	
13	Kiai Duty Offi	
14	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		

20	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		
29		
30		
31		

Original

Original

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Fw Sched
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Jim McLaughlin

Fire
Police
Police Two
Med Emer
Kiai Duty Offi
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Dialled Calls Memory					
Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Duration	Original
32	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)				(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
33					(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
34					Capt
35					(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Dialled Calls SIM					
Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Duration	Original
01	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)				(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
02					
03					
04					(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
05					
06					Sgt
07					
08					(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
09					(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
10					
Received Calls Memory					
Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Duration	Original
Missed Calls Memory					
Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Duration	Original
Fixed Dialing Numbers SIM					
Index	Name	Number			Original
Own Numbers SIM					
Index	Name	Number			
Memory SMS Inbox					
Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
Memory SMS Draft					
Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
Memory SMS Outbox					
Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
SIM SMS Received					
Index	Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
01	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-03-17T08:06:36+04:30	Klepto, I will be in building 200 most of the day.	Klepto, I will be in building 200 most of the day.
02	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-03-30T10:55:56+04:30	Are the interseterr going to lunch Aussie in the dfac there is none higher	Are the interseterr going to lunch Aussie in the dfac there is none higher
03	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-03-31T18:30:41+04:30	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) has keys for you to bring one of the trucks over tomorrow.	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) has keys for you to bring one of the trucks over tomorrow.
04	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		2011-04-03T15:20:50+04:30		

05	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-04T08:16:32+04:30	Copy	Copy
06		2011-04-10T07:28:30+04:30	PFT canx due to rain. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Pls pass to Seminario if u c him, his	PFT canx due to rain. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Pls pass to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) if u c him, his
07		2011-04-10T07:34:48+04:30	name not on recall roster	name not on recall roster
08		2011-04-10T09:47:16+04:30	Copy Gonna get haircut in mornin tried to	Copy Gonna get haircut in mornin tried to
09		2011-04-18T21:35:19+04:30	trim and Fd gt up	trim and Fd gt up
10		2011-04-24T18:47:51+04:30	Et tu brutae(QUESTION MARK) I passed what I could to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I will	Et tu brutae? I passed what I could to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I will
11		2011-04-25T10:08:34+04:30	be at the Mod all afternoon	be at the Mod all afternoon
12		2011-04-25T12:03:33+04:30	K(QUESTION MARK) What are you talking	K? What are you talking
13		2011-04-25T12:04:33+04:30	about(QUESTION MARK) The schedule your guys just sent	What are you talking about? The schedule your guys just sent
14		2011-04-25T15:58:52+04:30	out is rubbish.	out is rubbish.
15	+93706170244	2011-04-26T10:30:58+04:30	Sir, could you please tell me if MoD tasked for AN-32 to fly to Kandahar or Herat today(QUESTION MARK)	Sir, could you please tell me if MoD tasked for AN-32 to fly to Kandahar or Herat today?



17	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-27T10:15:54+04:30	Unconfirmed reports of suicide bomber in ACCC avoid if you are not there	Unconfirmed reports of suicide bomber in ACCC avoid if you are not there
18	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-27T10:20:00+04:30	Was asked to make contact with you. Please send status when able	Was asked to make contact with you. Please send status when able
19	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	2011-04-27T10:23:11+04:30	We need you to call now. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BRUISER IN CRITICAL CONDITION. NEED YOUR STATUS.	We need you to call now. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BRUISER IN CRITICAL CONDITION. NEED YOUR STATUS.
20	+93702551892	2011-04-27T10:52:51+04:30		

SIM SMS Sent	Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
SIM SMS Drafts	Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
SIM Deleted SMS Received	Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
SIM Deleted SMS Sent	Name	Number	Date/Time	Message Text	Original
MultiMedia Messages	Name	Number	Date/Time	Content (picture, video, file)	

Multimedia Inbox	Name	Number	Date/Time	Content (picture, video, file)
Index				
Multimedia Outbox	Name	Number	Date/Time	Content (picture, video, file)
Index				
Multimedia Sentbox	Name	Number	Date/Time	Content (picture, video, file)
Index				
Files	Type	Name	File Size	Date/Time
Index				
Events	Message	Date/Time	Precedence	
Index				
Notes	Message	Date/Time	Precedence	
Index				

IS3 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)


Air Intel Advisor for Kandahar Air Wing


DSN: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Cell: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

On April 27th, 2011 I was in Kspan 1 when the attacks began. After the building was secured I was asked to be part of the team to move the fallen's bodies. When we arrived at the building I walked up the steps and saw two bullet holes about a foot above the door that appeared from a distance to be two different calibers. When we went inside the building the first thing I noticed was a large handprint in blood on the wall immediately left of the staircase approximately 5 feet up the wall. The palm of the print appeared to be facing the stairway leading me to suspect that the person who made the print was facing away from the doorway when it was made. Then we started to walk up the staircase to the left of the entrance. There was a small trail of blood up the first flight. As soon as you reached the second flight it appeared to be a lot more blood however I only saw about 3 pints on the stairs before the chief downstairs told us to turn around that the bodies were in a different room. We walked down the stairs and waited in the intersection of the hallways. As we stood there I noticed what was possibly a bullet hole approximately 4-5 feet up the wall on the wall immediately opposite of the one where the hand print was. The bullet hole appeared to be coming from the left side of the entrance outside of the building. We stood there and prepared ourselves then began to walk down the hallway to the left to the room. As soon as you turn down the hallway on the right hand side there was what appeared to be words written in blood in dari on the wall. As we walked down the hallway I noticed I very small trail of blood leading to the room. as we entered the room on the right they handed us gloves. The first tier of the room nearest the door had no bodies and appeared to be minimally disturbed. As soon as we walked in the room and turned to the left on the second tier of the class there were two bodies laying in the middle of the walkway created by the two cubicles on each side of the classroom. The body on the left was feet were toward the front of the class and the one on the right had his head facing the front of the class. They were both laying in a large pool of blood next to each other. We carried out both of these bodies and returned to the room. the next body we moved was located on the third tier of the class in the cubicle on the right if facing towards the back of the classroom. This individual was found laying on his stomach face down with his face towards the aisle. We rolled him over and carried him out. After returning to the room the next body was already bagged up for us in the middle of the fourth tier in the back of the room so I am not sure where his body was originally. There was another body in the back of the classroom in a cubicle on the right if facing the back. As they were loading him into a bag I was standing in the very back of the class and stood in the doorway in the back of the classroom. I looked in the small room in the very back of the room where the incident occurred. There was a brown wooden door to the right. The door appeared to have been kicked in from the outside. There was a large hole in the lower half of the door and I noticed it was dark inside the room beyond. After we carried the next body out and returned to the class, we prepared the next body. He was laying in between the cubicle and the wall on the right side of the class if facing the back, in between the 2nd and 3rd tier. We pulled him out and carried him outside. I was trying to not focus on the bodies as much as possible so I saw no entry or exit wounds on any of them. statement ends.

EXH 82-01








(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)


EXH B2-03



(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)





(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)




(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)



(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)




(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)



(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)



(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

(b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(C)





FHM 82-07



EXM B1-08

(b) (7)(C)


(b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(C)


(b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(C)




(S) (D) (7) (C)






EXN 02-13




ERM 01-28



EXH 91-29

(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)




IRM 02-91



EXM 02-32



EXW 82-33




01-28 01-14



EXM 82-35




EXM 02-36




EXH B1-37

EXM 02-38




EX 11 81-39




EXN 02-40



EXH B2-4)



EXU 01-42



EXH B2-43





EXH B2-44

OXN 02-45




EXM 82-46






EM 82-47



74 82-57



EXH 01.51



EXH B2-53



Q11 82-54



214 81-55



EXH 01-56



EM 82-57




EXM 01-58



GRN 82-59






EXH 81-61



EXH 82-62



EXH 02-63



EM 81-64




92-10 N12




CH 82-67



89-18 HX8




EXH B2-69




EXN 81-70



614 81-71




ERM 81-72



EXU 82-73



EXH 82-74



RM 82-75