



# Office of Inspector General

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**United States Department of State  
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors  
Office of Inspector General**

## **Office of Inspections**

### **Compliance Follow-up Review of Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan**

**Report Number ISP-C-11-53A, June 2011**

#### **~~Important Notice~~**

~~This report is intended solely for the official use of the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, or any agency or organization receiving a copy directly from the Office of Inspector General. No secondary distribution may be made, in whole or in part, outside the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, by them or by other agencies or organizations, without prior authorization by the Inspector General. Public availability of the document will be determined by the Inspector General under the U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C. 552. Improper disclosure of this report may result in criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

## **PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY OF THE INSPECTION**

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections, as issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).

### **PURPOSE AND SCOPE**

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the BBG, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- Policy Implementation: whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- Resource Management: whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- Management Controls: whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

### **METHODOLOGY**

In conducting this inspection, the inspectors: reviewed pertinent records; as appropriate, circulated, reviewed, and compiled the results of survey instruments; conducted on-site interviews; and reviewed the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review.



United States Department of State  
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

*Office of Inspector General*

## PREFACE

This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by OIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management, accountability and positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge available to the OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "H.W. Geisel".

Harold W. Geisel  
Deputy Inspector General

## Table of Contents

Key Judgments	1
Background	3
Executive Direction	6
Evaluation of Compliance	9
Political, Refugee, Economic, and Political-Military Affairs	10
Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs	11
Office of Interagency Provincial Affairs	13
Border Coordinator	14
Rule of Law and Law Enforcement	15
Public Diplomacy	16
Consular	18
Resource Management	20
List of Formal Recommendations	24
List of Informal Recommendations	26
Principal Officials	28
Abbreviations	29
APPENDIX I: Status of 2009 Inspection Formal Recommendations	30
APPENDIX II: Status of 2009 Inspection Informal Recommendations	53

## Key Judgments

- Embassy Kabul complied with most of the formal and informal recommendations in both the main report and the security annex of the 2009 inspection.
- Embassy Kabul is unique and as complex as the mission of the embassy itself. The Ambassador and his deputy are effectively directing embassy resources toward the transition to a post-combat Afghanistan that the President has mandated for the end of 2014. Balancing the urgency of transition with the needs of the ongoing counterinsurgency demands continual and close civilian-military coordination, a high priority for the Ambassador.
- Three additional ambassadorial-level officers have well-defined span of control, with a clear delineation of chain of command for each agency and section under chief of mission authority. This high-level oversight aims at strengthening the whole-of-government approach that the Ambassador has adopted. All issues are managed along functional rather than agency-specific lines. Some interagency tensions persist, however, and need attention. The executive secretariat continues to improve.
- The field structure, with senior civilian representatives coordinating the work of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture at five regional commands and facilitating good civilian-military communications, was maturing at the time of this compliance review. With the opening this year of two consulates, the civilian presence outside Kabul is evolving in accord with the Ambassador's vision of creating an additional two parallel offices in other Afghan cities.
- Under the direction of the assistant chief of mission, the political, economic, and political-military sections are being well managed by experienced officers. Morale is high, despite the prodigious workload and exceptional conditions all face. Rule-of-law and anticorruption oversight has been completely restructured since the previous inspection. An ambassadorial-level coordinating director of rule of law and law enforcement position has been created with responsibilities that include anticorruption. The incumbent oversees a robust coordination and program staff, including a USAID senior anticorruption adviser and numerous U.S. law enforcement agencies, who work integrally with military colleagues.
- The coordinating director for development and economic affairs (CDDEA) provides oversight and coordination of an enormous assistance program and a complex civilian-military planning process. Its mandate is very broad, and the front office greatly values its work. CDDEA's oversight of USAID has exposed differences in bureaucratic culture that partly explain the stress in the relationship and highlight the importance of finding solutions. CDDEA also supervises the work of the Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA) section and its civilian field personnel.
- Analytical reporting faces three challenges—inexperienced personnel, an emphasis on other types of reporting, and inefficient processes—that combine to make it less efficient than it could be.

- The border coordinator is among the highest ranking officers in the embassy but has no staff and has not been given authority over the activities of other embassy sections and agencies to actually achieve the intent of establishing the position.
- The public affairs section (PAS) has done a remarkable job of managing a budget that has increased 100-fold since the autumn 2009 inspection. An addition of 35 new positions has ensured the resources to launch many new initiatives, including a comprehensive civilian-military strategic communication plan. The section has also put in place procedures to handle its large contracts and grants. Public affairs staff recognizes that the current level of funding and staffing is unsustainable. The section is making preliminary plans to deal with the transition to a smaller and more typical PAS.
- Normal immigrant visa processing is now authorized to begin in Kabul in May 2011. The section is prepared to handle this new workload. Details of special immigrant visa processing for Afghan applicants remain to be worked out with the Department of State (Department). Another consular investigator will be required for the program, but the embassy should be ready to begin this process in earnest this year.
- The management office during the 2009 inspection was dealing with an atmosphere of massive personnel surges, constant reinvention, and multiple construction and infrastructure projects. One-year tours, massive summer turnovers, and a relatively new locally employed (LE) staff added to the management challenges during the civilian staffing surge. The current staff has been able to focus more on bringing policies and procedures in line with Department standards and consolidating the improvements they have made. Management controls have improved significantly, although some issues remain. With an eye to large savings, the embassy is fine-tuning the fare basis used for cost construct travel to overseas rest and relaxation (R&R) locations.

All findings and recommendations in this report are based on conditions observed during the on-site review and the standards and policies then in effect. The report does not comment at length on areas where OIG did not identify problems that need to be corrected.

Compliance follow-up reviews (CFR) by OIG provide senior managers of the Department with progress reports on the status of recommendations that result from inspections and provide OIG with a quality assurance assessment of its work.

This CFR took place in Washington, DC, between March 21 and April 1, 2011, and in Kabul, Afghanistan, between April 4 and 12, 2011. (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

## Background

Embassy Kabul in 2011 is a mission in transition. There has been a steep increase in civilian staffing in Afghanistan since the 2009 inspection; a spike in funding for U.S. Government programs that is likely to drop off sharply in coming years; and massive construction projects that will disrupt normal life on the compound in Kabul for the next 2 to 3 years. The numbers are daunting. When the inspection took place in autumn 2009, the mission had a staff of 538 U.S. direct-hire employees and a total staff of 1,245. In FY 2009, the actual appropriation for Department operations (Diplomatic and Consular Programs funds) was \$654 million. At the time of this compliance follow-up review, the mission had grown to a staff of just over 1,000 U.S. direct-hire employees and a total staff of 1,942. FY 2010 appropriated funding for State Operations was \$935 million. Final FY 2011 budget figures were not available at the time of the CFR; however, the FY 2011 expected Diplomatic and Consular Programs funds total is \$897 million. This is the infrastructure that supports the largest development and assistance budget in the world, with \$14.5 billion in Economic Support Fund and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds appropriated between FYs 2006 and 2011.

The rapid turnover of American staff has continued, given that 1-year tours of duty remain the norm. Despite the upsurge in the numbers of individuals serving in Afghanistan, continuity across the “generations” of these individuals is a commodity in short supply. Lessons learned in one generation do not easily or automatically pass into the work plans of those who come after.

This context adds importance to OIG’s CFR of the comprehensive 2009 inspection of Embassy Kabul. A pilot scheme to introduce longer tours of duty for some positions in Afghanistan is in the design phase. This initiative, if enacted, would add some depth to the work force assigned to Afghanistan, but the numbers would be small in the immediate future, and the rapid turnover of staff would likely continue until major changes are implemented.

Ten years after the U.S.-led invasion that ousted the Taliban from power, the U.S. diplomatic presence in Afghanistan is at a critical juncture. Planning for transition has begun as the embassy responds to presidential initiatives that seek a political solution and reduction of our military presence. At the same time, the core objective of the U.S. effort in Afghanistan remains to prevent that country from again serving as a haven for militant extremists and a launching pad for terror attacks. These dual objectives will require both an Afghan Government able to assume responsibility for its own security and direction and an important civilian presence in Afghanistan after the military combat effort ends.

The keystone of this transition process is civilian-military coordination. Much of the embassy’s approach is designed to enhance this civilian-military process and find ways to align the strategies and resources of both parties.

The joint counterinsurgency strategy developed with U.S. military counterparts aims to deliver U.S. nonmilitary assistance to support licit economic development, rule of law, security, good governance, and effective law enforcement. This endeavor is a whole-of-government

undertaking that calls for strong coordination among numerous mission components. The coordinating structure in place, designed by the embassy in coordination with the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (S/SRAP) and others in the Department, aims at ensuring nonmilitary assistance programs are developed and managed along functional rather than agency-specific lines. The Ambassador proposed the assignment of senior civilian representatives (SCR) in five regional commands throughout Afghanistan to oversee and coordinate the work of the regional platforms and provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) and to direct the interagency development effort that is demanded. They report to the embassy in Kabul via the IPA section.

This structure continues to evolve, and will change further as transition planning matures. In the short term, the number of individuals assigned to field locations outside Kabul to work with military and local government officials will grow as the surge in overall numbers that has characterized the last 18 months plateaus. In the longer term, leading up to the end of 2014, embassy leadership envisions both a smaller civilian presence in the field and one that is concentrated in regional centers. Two of the SCRs now wear two hats as consulates are being established in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. Additional consulates may open in two other Afghan cities (evolving from the current Regional Command South and East platforms), but in the post-combat period, the number of platforms from which civilians will carry out their functions will be far fewer than now. Life support and security for these locations will present special challenges. In fact, it is in these regional centers that the identification and ordering of priorities between pursuing counterinsurgency efforts and implementing transition to post-combat conditions will be most apparent.

As the last 10 years have demonstrated, nurturing an effective Afghan Government that is responsive to its people is enormously difficult. For generations, authority has resided not with a central government but with local power brokers and tribal militias who see little benefit in surrendering power to the center. To date, the election experience has been mixed, with manifold allegations of fraud. The Afghan Government has yet to build an administration that can begin to address expectations for services, jobs, and security. Corruption remains a major problem. Afghans' patience with their government and with the international community is waning after years during which many have seen little or no improvement in their lives. Support in the United States and other countries for assisting Afghanistan is also fraying.

Defining success in Afghanistan will demand strengthening the bonds between Afghans and their government. Supporting this goal, however, is a costly endeavor. Its continuation comes at a time when budgets are tightening in Washington. However large the U.S. Government's outlay in Afghanistan has been in recent years, it is not immune to substantial cuts in the present climate. These budgetary truths will be critical to both the counterinsurgency effort and the transition to normal operations. Given current economic conditions, the Afghan Government lacks the ability to make up shortfalls in funding. Jump-starting the economy to meet the challenges of a post-war slump in funding is an essential part of transition planning.

To achieve its goals, Embassy Kabul has put in place a vast bureaucratic structure. The management of this behemoth and the security of its personnel and facilities in the face of ongoing challenges are daunting. Teams of individuals who, like most of their embassy



~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

colleagues, rarely stay in country long enough to become experts in their functions in Afghanistan are charged with institutionalizing both effective management controls and comprehensive security procedures. The challenges for both are stiff and will require continuous external oversight throughout the transition.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

## Executive Direction

The structure of executive direction at Embassy Kabul is unique and as complex as the mission of the embassy itself. The Ambassador heads up a large organization that includes four additional senior officers with ambassadorial experience and rank. The first of these, the deputy chief of mission, supervises the work of the other three: the assistant chief of mission, the coordinating director for rule of law and law enforcement, and the CDDEA. The ambassadorial title facilitates the civilian-military exchange, where people of like rank interact easily with one another. An executive secretariat answers to the assistant chief of mission.

The Ambassador and his deputy have led the embassy constructively to focus on the transition to post-combat conditions in Afghanistan that the President has mandated for the end of 2014. While the counterinsurgency effort continues, the Ambassador has clearly transmitted the urgent U.S. Government priority of transition to all embassy personnel both in Kabul and in field locations across Afghanistan. His emphatic message on transition frames directly the civilian-military campaign planning that is ongoing at the embassy. It also challenges the many civilian U.S. Government agencies in Afghanistan to align their work with presidential priorities.

Each of the latter three ambassadorial-level officials has a well-defined span of control, ensuring clear responsibility for each agency and section under the authority of the Chief of Mission. The assistant chief of mission has direct oversight over most of the Department's traditional sections: political, political-military, refugees, management, consular, regional security, and the community liaison office. The coordinating director for rule of law and law enforcement exercises oversight over the legal attaché, the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Marshals Service. The CCDEA has responsibility for USAID, U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Treasury Department, the economic section, IPA, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the border coordinator. In a few areas such as rule of law and border security, responsibilities can overlap.

This high-level oversight is aimed at strengthening the whole-of-government approach that embassy leadership has mandated by insisting that all issues are managed along functional rather than agency-specific lines. Diplomacy and development are seen as twin pillars of civilian power in Afghanistan. The scope of this endeavor is vast. In the face of these enormous challenges, the oversight model in place at Embassy Kabul has worked reasonably well. One example of the determination to coordinate across agency lines is IPA, where the work of civilians from multiple agencies at regional platforms and PRTs comes together under the supervision of a Department SCR.

This whole-of-government approach is commendable and broadly recognized as such throughout the embassy. It places Embassy Kabul squarely in line with those who have embraced the need to maximize collaboration among agencies, build on existing partnerships, tackle common problems, and align U.S. Government programs. At the same time, however, interagency tensions persist.

The USAID-CDDEA relationship is a case in point. Given the very large sums of money involved and the unique structure established in Afghanistan for the coordination of foreign assistance, some of these tensions are inevitable. Overall, CDDEA's oversight role has been an admirable success story. For example, the creation of a unit within CDDEA to monitor program development and tighten financial controls was a sound initiative. However, the disagreements that have emerged between CDDEA and USAID need urgent attention. These disagreements are discussed in more detail elsewhere in this report.

The 2009 inspection highlighted the shortcomings of the executive secretariat in facilitating the clearance process and speeding up paper flow to the executive office. Since 2009, the embassy has increased the number of professional staff in the secretariat, cross-trained them, and put into place a series of standing operating procedures. Protocol assistants and interpreters now jointly fall under the supervision of the executive secretariat, in response to an informal OIG recommendation that is now closed. Despite these improvements, the clearance process continues to cause problems that are manifested in missed deadlines, delays in transmission of cables, and frustrations for people drafting memos or cables. All four staff assistants are on duty simultaneously, and for long hours. A rotating schedule for these staff assistants will help to avoid burn out.

***CFR Informal Recommendation 1:*** Embassy Kabul should organize a roster of staff assistants in the executive secretariat so that no more than two individuals will be on duty at the same time.

Similarly, having staff assistants travel with the Ambassador detracts from their staff function and often leads to over-long days as they continue working in the office after traveling all day. Having officers from the relevant sections throughout the embassy join the Ambassador or other senior staff on in-country travel would both contribute substantive knowledge and note-taking skills while giving them valuable experience and context outside Kabul.

***CFR Informal Recommendation 2:*** Embassy Kabul should use section officers rather than staff assistants to accompany the Ambassador on his in-country travel.

The executive secretariat is located at the farthest point from the front office on the same floor. This is a major obstacle to good communication and both monitoring and responding to the needs of the Ambassador, his deputy, and the assistant chief of mission.

***CFR Informal Recommendation 3:*** Embassy Kabul should relocate the executive secretary to the space in the front office freed up by reducing staff assistant presence from four to two. The deputy executive secretary could remain in the current office of the executive secretariat, which will provide needed file, work, and swing space.

The inspection team was repeatedly told that embassy personnel were recalled from their residences to transmit cables that had been approved by the front office. The Department's message handling software permits any authorized user to edit and release a cable.

***CFR Informal Recommendation 4:*** Embassy Kabul should empower staff assistants to make final edits and release cables and memoranda approved by the Ambassador, the deputy chief of mission, and the assistant chief of mission.

The OIG team also learned during this compliance review that the executive secretariat only processes paper and clearances for the Ambassador, the deputy chief of mission, and the assistant chief of mission. Neither of the two coordinating directors has comparable executive secretariat structures in place. This lack of staff dedicated to the clearance process contributes to inefficiencies in moving that paper forward.

The Department has established consulates in Herat in the west and Mazar-e-Sharif in the north. In each case, the current SCR is also the consul. Officers from the regional platform have yet to occupy the buildings that are being readied for them but hope to do so soon. The year-long delay in doing so is affecting morale and productivity, as the expanded staffing foreseen for the new buildings are shoe-horned into existing office and residential facilities. The emergence of consulates in these two provincial cities is a concrete manifestation of the Ambassador's focus on transition toward a more normal civilian presence in Afghanistan after combat ends. The Ambassador's vision for the future is to create similar or parallel offices, depending on start-up costs, in two other Afghan cities. This decision accords with the Presidential directive for a future U.S. civilian role in Afghanistan.

## Evaluation of Compliance

The CFR team found that Embassy Kabul had complied with the majority of the formal and informal recommendations from the 2009 inspection. A CFR automatically closes all formal and informal recommendations from the inspection, but these may be reopened, revised, and/or reissued by the CFR, as appropriate. A complete list of the compliance status of all formal recommendations from the 2009 inspection is in Appendix I of this report. A complete list of the status of all informal recommendations from that inspection is in Appendix II of this report.

Of the 89 formal recommendations in the 2009 inspection, 53 were closed before the CFR, 31 were resolved/open, and 5 were unresolved. As a result of the CFR, 30 of the 31 resolved/open recommendations were closed. All five of the unresolved recommendations were closed. Three of the closed recommendations were reissued.

Recommendation 38, which deals with who provides audio-visual assistance, was closed prior to the CFR; it has been reissued. Recommendation 70, concerning a comprehensive training plan for the local staff, was closed prior to the CFR; it has been reissued. Recommendation 74, concerning standard operating procedures for computer-related procurement and installation, was open prior to the CFR. It has been reissued. Recommendation 79 regarding a contact management database was open prior to the CFR. It has been reissued.

Of the 46 informal recommendations, 43 were closed by the CFR. Informal Recommendation 34 regarding a time line for eligible family member hiring was reissued as a formal recommendation by the CFR team. Informal Recommendation 42 regarding medical kits in official vehicles was also reissued as a formal recommendation under the CFR.

## **Political, Refugee, Economic, and Political-Military Affairs**

The political, economic, and political-military sections are well managed by experienced officers. Morale appears high, despite the prodigious workload and extraordinary conditions all face, although a common theme in interviews was the tax on productivity that preparation for, and attendance at, meetings and briefings represented.

The embassy's internal process for clearing and approving cables is inconsistent and frustrating. The team found that while some section heads were empowered to release cables, others were not. No explanation could be provided for the discrepancy. During the OIG team's visit, written guidance to clarify the authority of section heads to release cables was approved by the Ambassador and circulated by the executive secretary.

The inspection report's recommendation regarding women's grants clearly intended that the political section not administer such a program. The Embassy nevertheless implemented a program of small grants monitored by the political section and totaling \$4.5 million in FY 2009 to FY 2011. The political section now includes a newly trained and warranted grants officer who spends between 50 and 75 percent of her time on the program, and a local employee who serves as grants officer representative; they rely informally upon field personnel to monitor grants outside Kabul. It is not readily apparent that devoting this amount of staff time to this small program, when experienced grants officers are readily available in other embassy sections, is an effective use of resources. The OIG team did not have time to review grants documentation, including evaluations of their effectiveness.

## **Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs**

The Ambassador has a firm vision of a whole-of-government approach to the civilian effort in Afghanistan, predicated upon broad chief of mission authority as envisioned in the recent Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). CDDEA was thus created to assist in his oversight of and direction to all U.S. Government civilian assistance to Afghanistan. The front office relies upon, values, and supports CDDEA's financial management and coordination efforts, both within the mission and with military, third country, and nongovernmental actors in Afghanistan.

CDDEA provides extensive oversight and coordination of an enormous assistance program—arguably the United States' largest in the world—and a complex civilian-military planning process. It is a unique structure with a broad mandate and with significant differences in staffing, size, and scope even from similar functions in Baghdad and Islamabad. Creation of a unit within CDDEA to monitor program development and tighten financial controls has deepened discipline in the assistance program. It has had considerable impact in both cataloging the assistance programs of the many U.S. Government agencies operating in Afghanistan and identifying weaknesses and overlaps.

CDDEA's oversight of USAID in Kabul has highlighted differences in bureaucratic culture that exist between the Department and USAID at missions throughout the world. Although the QDDR envisions chiefs of mission as the "chief executive officer" of a multi-agency organization, this remains a work in progress and unresolved questions remain about their roles, authorities, and oversight responsibilities for assistance programs largely implemented by other agencies. These bureaucratic differences exacerbate feelings of professional misunderstanding—some perceived, some real—that in Kabul extend beyond the immediate CDDEA/USAID relationship to the embassy's relationship with USAID as a whole. Taken together, these problems should be addressed at the mission with the goal of having an improved working relationship in place when a new generation of personnel arrives this summer. Getting this relationship right could provide important validation of the QDDR's vision, but these problems primarily require resolution at the Washington level.

**CFR Recommendation 1:** The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Office of the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, Embassy Kabul, and the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, should clarify with the U.S. Agency for International Development the oversight and managerial roles of the various offices and agencies within Embassy Kabul dealing with foreign assistance. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with D(N), Embassy Kabul, and F)

On the one hand, USAID widely perceives CDDEA as having few program-level staff with substantive experience or training in development assistance or field project management. USAID also perceives CDDEA's approach to financial management as aggressive. Concerns were also raised about the appropriate level of financial management by CDDEA of USAID programs. USAID staff were concerned that this added layer was causing staff to spend undue

amounts of time on increasingly detailed internal embassy briefings and meetings with growing CDDEA staff. The demands for increasingly detailed briefings and decision documents by the embassy's multiple ambassadorial-level senior officers are sometimes perceived as a diversion from doing "real" development work. Broader perceptions of second-class status for USAID staff in housing and office space contributed to friction between staff. Despite a good relationship between senior leaders, the two institutions often talk past each other.

At the same time, many in embassy upper management, including the front office, view the commitment of some in USAID to the Ambassador's whole-of-government approach as grudging at best. The mission provided the CFR team with several examples of what they felt were failures by USAID to inform, much less seek approval from, the Ambassador on major programmatic decisions. In other cases, weak USAID project oversight was felt to have contributed to failures with significant political fallout, which fed the demand for more and more detailed documentation.

Perceptions matter, and arguments over right and wrong do nothing to resolve them. To a certain extent, interagency tensions are routine, but attaining U.S. goals in Afghanistan requires a local relationship that is on better footing than it is now. Resolving organizational differences needs leadership from Washington as well.

Bringing USAID expertise into CDDEA's policy structure would be a prudent move. The embassy and USAID recognized the potential benefits of this when a senior USAID officer was recruited to succeed the current CDDEA coordinator, although that assignment did not work out. No one from USAID is now assigned to CDDEA and all 2011–2012 position openings have been filled with Department officers, but it should not be difficult to carve out a meaningful role for a USAID detailee were one made available. The CFR team believes that there will be clear value added in bringing USAID experience into CDDEA's policy apparatus.

**CFR Recommendation 2:** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, should evaluate with the U.S. Agency for International Development the advantages of detailing one or more U.S. Agency for International Development officers to positions in the coordinating office for development and economic affairs, first and foremost as a deputy coordinator, and recruit officers for those positions. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with S/SRAP)

Recently, the USAID mission director stood in for the CDDEA director during a temporary absence from Kabul. This experience was helpful in both providing USAID perspectives to the CDDEA coordination process and learning about it from the inside. The embassy should institutionalize this procedure.

**CFR Informal Recommendation 5:** Embassy Kabul should include the U.S. Agency for International Development mission director in the rotation to act for the coordinating director for development and economic affairs during the latter's absence from post.



## Office of Interagency Provincial Affairs

CDDEA also supervises the work of IPA and its civilian field personnel. Here too, improvements have been solid, and field personnel laud the IPA linkage. The executive structure that was established to provide oversight of and support for those in the field appears to be working well. Communications have improved between the embassy and the field since the inspection, but there is an undisputed need for IPA to continue to filter taskings from the embassy to the field.

Five SCRs now operate at the five regional commands across Afghanistan. Their senior rank has facilitated the easy and effective civilian-military communications that are essential to effective operations in the provinces. Their links to the embassy—supplementing biweekly nation-wide conferences with videoconferencing—keep them integrated with the national effort. These SCRs are responsible for coordinating the work of all civilians within the regional command. In practice, this has meant close working ties with both USAID and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, who are represented at the regional command level by senior development and senior agriculture officers. SCR interaction with personnel from other entities in the field, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, are less well defined.

The SCRs were created to have civilian leadership in the field with equivalent rank to their military counterparts. Assigning Department officers to stretch assignments across the senior threshold is at odds with this intent. It also appears to have made it more difficult to cement relations between Department and USAID personnel when the latter are at Senior Foreign Service ranks.

***CFR Informal Recommendation 6:*** Embassy Kabul should work with the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Bureau of Human Resources to minimize the number of stretch assignments for the senior civilian representative positions in Afghanistan.

While the roles of the SCR and IPA have been clarified since the 2009 inspection, their authorities as envisioned by the Ambassador remain a source of interagency tension. The Ambassador dealt with the thorny question of the appropriate locus for performance evaluation that was highlighted in the inspection report by issuing an amended letter of instructions to the SCRs. The role of IPA and contract performance reports was similarly clarified, with IPA to receive a copy of the reports being sent through normal channels to contracting personnel.

Improved analytical reporting from the field continues to face several obstacles. Many field personnel are either temporary Department employees who lack reporting experience or employees of other agencies who often believe that reporting detracts from their agency's primary field goals. Beginning with predeployment training materials and courses, the embassy has emphasized informal event- or project-based input for IPA's daily activities report (e.g., conferences attended, projects launched, and visitors received). Finally, formal cables must pass through as many as four levels of clearances in the field before beginning a sometimes-cumbersome embassy-level clearance process. This can delay reporting for days or weeks, affect

the timeliness of a response, and serve as a disincentive for further reporting. IPA uses a spreadsheet to track cables once they reach the embassy, but it is not provided to field personnel. The CFR team and IPA discussed how to make this a more productive and transparent management tool.

***CFR Informal Recommendation 7:*** Embassy Kabul should review and streamline its clearance procedures for cables, including those from the field, by issuing formal guidance from the front office underscoring its informal 48-hour rule for clearance and transmittal of reporting cables, allowing drafters to consider nonresponses after that time as acquiescence, and making approvers responsible for transmission rather than recalling drafters.

***CFR Informal Recommendation 8:*** Embassy Kabul should build upon the Office of the Interagency Provincial Affairs cable tracking system by moving it to a SharePoint platform, which would allow input by, and offer visibility to, those in the field.

### **Border Coordinator**

The border coordinator is among the highest ranking officers in the embassy but has no staff and has not been given authority over the activities of other embassy sections and agencies to actually achieve the intent of establishing the position. The incumbent has made useful contributions and is well regarded by both embassy and field personnel. However, truly empowering the position would cut across the lines of other established coordination mechanisms, adding to an already complex and heavy management structure.

**CFR Recommendation 3:** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Bureau of Human Resources, should reevaluate the border coordinator position, clarify its authorities and responsibilities, and determine a more appropriate grade and organizational placement for it. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with S/SRAP and DGHR)

## Rule of Law and Law Enforcement

The rule-of-law and anticorruption offices have been completely restructured since the 2009 inspection. Comprehensive strategies for both rule-of-law and anticorruption activities were approved by the National Security Council in 2010 and are being implemented in conjunction with the Civilian Military Integrated Campaign plan. An ambassadorial-level coordinating director now has program and policy responsibilities for the full range of rule-of-law activities, including justice sector assistance programs, counternarcotics, and anticorruption. He oversees the Embassy Kabul offices of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Marshals Service, and the rule-of-law and anticorruption elements of USAID, and works closely with both U.S. and international military structures.

A rule-of-law deputies committee—composed of representatives from all related civilian agencies and counterparts from the military—meets weekly to coordinate and determine rule-of-law policy, program direction, and operations in order to link subject matter expertise with operational capabilities. An interagency planning and implementation team (IPIT) supports the coordinating director and the deputies committee. IPIT is a “one stop shop” for rule-of-law practitioners in the field, whether civilian or military, and the repository of information and guidance on related policy and practices. It provides operational and logistical support to rule-of-law project or program developers at regional centers, PRTs, or district support teams. The IPIT maintains a Web portal that allows U.S. Government military and civilian rule-of-law personnel to share information about ongoing projects throughout Afghanistan.

## Public Diplomacy

In October 2009, the inspection team found a public affairs section in disarray. It was facing a significantly increased amount of new money without adequate staffing, organization, or planning to deal with a 100-fold increase in funding from a FY 2009 base of \$1.5 million to an estimated FY 2011 budget of \$150 million. Eighteen months later, the PAS has seen its staff increase from 13 to 44 Americans (35 Department employees and an embedded 9-person military information support team) and from 19 to 23 LE staff. In anticipation of the surge in resources, the 2009 inspection team made recommendations in four main areas: strategic planning, coordination, staffing, and management controls.

Since that inspection, the section has responded effectively to the challenges noted above, developing a comprehensive strategic communication plan that has buy-in from both civilian and military partners. They have put in place a staffing structure that effectively matches human resources with program funds. They have resolved duplication and confusion of roles that arose from several ad hoc appointments. While the resulting structure is complicated, it avoids duplication of functions and operates effectively. The section has undertaken an ambitious, diverse, and innovative array of new programs tied to the goals and objectives in their strategic plan.

Interagency cooperation remains a challenge, as there are many players in the public diplomacy arena, but coordination is, for the most part, good. The mission makes every effort to avoid duplication and conflict through frequent meetings and working groups. While interagency coordination will always be a challenge, the mission appears to be dealing successfully with the territoriality inherent in any whole-of-government effort.

Several recommendations of the 2009 inspection focused on ensuring adequate control over grants and contracts that would emerge from the massive infusion of program money. The section brought on board a number of grant and contract specialists and has established policies and procedures to track and manage the flow of program money.

Public diplomacy (PD) is an important component of the work of the PRTs. Since many of the individuals who have elements of PD in their portfolios are not PD specialists, PAS, working with S/SRAP and the Office of Press and Public Diplomacy in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA), has made reasonable efforts to provide predeparture training and to incorporate both on-site training and advice to officers serving in the PRTs.

Recognizing that the level of funding that currently exists is probably unsustainable, the section has begun to plan for several transitions: from PRTs to consulates/branch offices, from American contractors to LE staff, and from an exceptionally massive program budget to a merely large one.

With the explosive growth in programs and the expanding pool of participants, ensuring that the mission remains in contact with the alumni of Department public diplomacy programs is essential if the Department is to build on their experience to create bridges between our two

nations and peoples. The 2009 inspection made a formal recommendation on the need for a consolidated database. This recommendation is being reissued.

**CFR Recommendation 4:** Embassy Kabul should review contact management options, including those currently in use by protocol, public affairs, and other embassy sections; decide which option best meets the needs of all embassy sections; and require all embassy elements to use the same contact management system. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

PAS continues to handle the audio-visual requirements for the embassy. While the general services office staff is working with PAS to take over these responsibilities, as detailed in a formal recommendation in the previous inspection, they have so far only handled small, in-house community events. The responsibility for non-PD events should be turned over to the general services office.

**CFR Recommendation 5:** Embassy Kabul should develop the capacity in the general services office to handle non-public diplomacy audio-visual work, as well as an arrangement in the information management office for handling non-public diplomacy digital videoconferences. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

The mission has made great strides in ensuring that the full-time PD officers at the regional platforms are either experienced PD officers or have had adequate training. At the same time, the creation of the field program unit ensures that these officers, regardless of background, receive adequate support and guidance. However, these officers do not uniformly receive direct input regarding their performance from the PAS. Since they are solely devoted to PD work, input from the PAS leadership should be included in any annual performance review.

**CRF Informal Recommendation 9:** Embassy Kabul should establish a mechanism for the public affairs officer to either review the employee evaluation report of the full-time public diplomacy officers in the regional platforms or provide written input to the rating officials.

With the devolution of grant decisions to the regional platforms, it is unclear that small-grants committee meetings are being documented. While the field program unit in PAS makes every effort to avoid duplication, there is no single database. Given the rapid turnover of staff, minutes of each grant committee meeting at the regional platforms should be documented.

**CRF Informal Recommendation 10:** Embassy Kabul should document all small-grants committee meetings at regional platforms as well as in Kabul and should create a single database of all grants considered.

## Consular

The 2009 inspection's characterization of consular operations at Embassy Kabul as busy and effective remains true despite the rapid turnover of staff. With the addition of an assistant regional security officer for investigations to the consular office in 2010, staffing of the section is appropriate. Another investigator will be required if special immigrant visa processing begins in earnest. The LE staff members have received some consular training and have matured in their roles, providing much needed continuity in the face of the short tours of duty of the American officers.

The 2009 inspection identified confusion over future consular space in Kabul and included a recommendation on this issue. The design of a new office annex, now scheduled for completion in 2013, included space for a consular section that was based on requirements approved by both the embassy and the Bureau of Consular Affairs. Subsequently, the bureau and the embassy expressed a preference to keep the consular section in its current space, asserting that the newly designed space in the annex did not meet staffing and workload requirements. This change was discussed during a May 2010 site visit to Kabul by the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, and during in-house discussions at the Department the following month. The decision that emerged was to move forward with the project as planned, including the new consular section, with the understanding that the embassy and the Bureau of Consular Affairs would choose the preferred location for the consular section locally and use the alternative space for other functional requirements. The embassy, based on an assessment of its workload growth and projected staffing needs, has decided to keep the consular section in its current premises. The intent of Recommendation 41 in the previous report was to ensure that all affected parties coordinated their efforts so that the design of whichever consular space was chosen for future operations will accommodate the projected staffing complement as well as the addition of the immigrant and special immigrant visa functions. This requirement has now been met.

As described in the 2010 inspection report, the process for visa referrals for those going for military training in the United States poses a problem for the consular section. There is no Defense attaché assigned to Embassy Kabul, and the military command, which does not fall under Chief of Mission authority, cannot formally act as a referring office. Following the inspection report's recommendation, the embassy, with the concurrence of the Bureau of Consular Affairs, put in place an informal process for referring military trainees. This system continues to function reasonably well. The consular section wisely keeps a careful eye on the referral process in light of a handful of recent cases where visa recipients have overstayed their visas.

Despite the inspection report's assumption that full issuance of special immigrant visas (SIVs) under the provisions of the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 would begin in 2010, processing has begun only for a handful of applicants. No visas have been issued. The embassy has raised concerns about the thrust of the program and asked that it be suspended for Afghans. More than 1,800 individuals have submitted applications to the National Visa Center requesting

Chief of Mission letters, the vast majority of whom are current or former employees of Department of Defense contractors or subcontractors.

The embassy opposes the brain drain from Afghanistan of rare, highly qualified individuals. It also questions the realities of the threat environment in individual cases and highlights the extensive resources needed to implement the program. The embassy's initiative was the subject of a March 31, 2011, meeting in the Department that brought together personnel from the Bureau of Consular Affairs, SCA, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the Bureau of Legislative Affairs, and the Office of the Legal Adviser. The Department, in a response being drafted at the time of this CFR, says that it is not prepared to go to Congress to ask that the law be rescinded.

**CFR Recommendation 6:** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the Bureau of Legislative Affairs, and the Office of the Legal Adviser, should fully implement the issuance of special immigrant visas to qualified individuals in accordance with the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with CA, SCA, DS, L, and H)

Parallel to the policy debate about the SIV program for Afghanistan, Embassy Kabul has laid out its requirements for additional resources to implement the SIV process, particularly assessing the veracity of the threat to applicants from remaining in Afghanistan, which is necessary before the visa application can begin. Determining the credibility of the threat is part of the Chief of Mission approval process. Applicants must receive this approval before they can apply for their SIVs. The embassy proposes a polygraph procedure to verify threat claims. The embassy and the Department have been in communication about the polygraph issue for some time. The OIG team understands that the Department is preparing a response with guidance on Embassy Kabul's questions. The ground rules for the Department to authorize polygraphs for Department employees are laid out in 12 FAM 251. The greatest number by far of potential applicants for SIVs comes from employees of other U.S. Government agencies. A meeting of the minds on this subject is a matter of some urgency since the Department has already received a very large number of requests for SIV processing from Afghans covered by the program.

**CFR Recommendation 7:** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the Bureau of Legislative Affairs, and the Office of the Legal Adviser, should determine the legality of a policy for the use of polygraphs for employees of both the Department of State and other U.S. Government agencies in ascertaining the bona fides of Afghan applicants for special immigrant visas under the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with CA, SCA, DS, L, and H)



## Resource Management

The management office during the time of the October 2009 inspection was dealing with an atmosphere of massive personnel surges, constant reinvention, and multiple construction and infrastructure projects. The management office was adept at dealing with these issues, but management control weaknesses and a lack of documentation hindered operations. While the management section remains extremely busy, the current staff members have focused on bringing policies and procedures in line with Department standards and consolidating the improvements they have made. The strong management team has significantly improved its controls over motor vehicles and overtime, created an effective arrivals and departures unit, created more transparent procedures for hiring eligible family members, and put in place a number of standard operating procedures. The embassy issued an updated LE staff handbook during the course of this CFR. The staff also has better control over R&R travel, although the cost basis for cost-constructed R&R travel was unrealistically high. This is discussed below.

The majority of Embassy Kabul's American staff members are on 1-year tours. Unlike most embassies, where LE staff remains for years with little turnover and provide continuity and institutional knowledge, Embassy Kabul is still hiring and training its LE staff. While some LE staff members have been with the embassy for 4 years or more, a large percentage have been working there for a much shorter time. The embassy has a knowledge management database to capture background information, contacts, and procedures that otherwise would be lost with the high turnover in staff. The management section makes an effort to reissue its most important policies annually but does not have any procedures to ensure that this is done.

**CFR Recommendation 8:** Embassy Kabul should reissue management policies every year, at a minimum, and post them on the embassy's intranet Web site. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

All senior employees whose spouses work at the embassy have signed a recusal memorandum, as required in the previous inspection, but the management section has yet to issue a policy regarding recusals.

**CFR Recommendation 9:** Embassy Kabul should issue a management policy detailing the requirements for recusal memoranda for senior employees whose spouses work at the embassy. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

The October 2009 inspection team formally recommended that the embassy include individual development plans for its LE staff and implement a mission-wide comprehensive training plan to prioritize the needs of its staff. LE staff evaluations now include training requirements in the individual development plans. The embassy has sent employees for training, and hopes to bring trainers to Kabul once space becomes available later in 2011. However, the embassy has yet to establish or implement a comprehensive and prioritized training plan. Embassy employees told inspectors that sufficient money has been available for training, and therefore a formal, prioritized plan has been unnecessary. With the uncertainty surrounding the budgets for FY 2012 and beyond, a comprehensive training plan will be necessary to ensure that training funds are spent wisely.



**CFR Recommendation 10:** Embassy Kabul should establish and implement a comprehensive and prioritized mission-wide training plan for locally employed staff. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

Embassy Kabul is an unaccompanied post but allows spouses who have jobs at the embassy to come to Kabul. The embassy has a robust eligible family member hiring program and works with SCA to find employment for all interested spouses. The embassy has created jobs throughout the mission, from mailroom clerks and cleared escorts to positions in general services, public affairs, and the medical unit. In summer 2011, the first eligible family member physician is scheduled to arrive. The embassy anticipates there will be 40 eligible family member employees in summer 2011. While the embassy complied with the most of the recommendations made by the last inspection team regarding this program, they have yet to develop a time line for the hiring process, as was informally recommended.

**CFR Recommendation 11:** Embassy Kabul should prepare a checklist with time lines to guide the hiring process for eligible family members. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

The October 2009 inspection team informally recommended that the embassy maintain up-to-date medical kits in all official vehicles. Despite the danger faced by embassy employees who live and work in a conflict area, embassy staff told inspectors that new medical kits have yet to be ordered or placed in vehicles.

**CFR Recommendation 12:** Embassy Kabul should provide medical kits in all embassy official vehicles and should implement procedures to check them regularly to ensure they are complete and up-to-date. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

### ***OpenNet Computers in Apartments***

Embassy American employees generally work 6 days a week, often for at least 10, and sometimes more, hours per day. Many employees work several hours on their 1 day off. They live on the compound, only a few minutes away from their offices. The embassy uses the Department's OpenNet Everywhere (ONE) program, which allows staff to access their unclassified Department emails and documents from home computers through the use of an encrypted fob. This program, which cost \$1 million to install and approximately \$600,000 per year to maintain, is available to all American staff. Employees told inspectors that while the ONE program was slow at first, now that the servers have been moved to Kabul, the speed and connectivity are sufficient for their needs. In addition, all housing has a hardwired Internet connection for personal computers, and wireless Internet is available in certain areas around the compound.

The front office proposed installing Department OpenNet unclassified computers in the embassy's 146 apartments, at an estimated cost of between \$1.2 million and \$1.5 million. Annual maintenance costs for these additional computers would cost approximately \$800,000 per year. Ten apartments already have OpenNet computers. As the OpenNet computers would only be installed in apartments and not in the containerized housing units where most employees live, this proposal would not replace the ONE program.

The embassy had received tentative approval from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Information Resource Management, provided a number of conditions could be met. SCA, however, had not provided funding. In making this request, the embassy stated in a cable to the Department that the ONE system was too slow to permit the level of communication required. The inspectors were told the ONE system had the necessary speed and that OpenNet computers would be no faster than the current ONE program the embassy is using. Installing these computers, therefore, would have been a duplication of the computer access already available to the American staff. After this issue was raised by the CFR inspectors, the embassy tested the speed of the ONE system and determined that it is as fast as OpenNet computers installed in apartments. The embassy has therefore decided to drop this proposal.

### *Travel Costs*

American employees are authorized, as part of the Afghanistan service recognition package, three R&Rs or two R&Rs and three regional rest breaks during the year. The designated R&Rs points for Embassy Kabul are London (for those who wish to remain overseas) or the United States. Dubai is the designated regional rest break point. Prior to autumn 2010, Embassy Kabul was using the highest cost, fully refundable economy, or "Y" fare, for R&R travel to the United States. In autumn 2010, in compliance with OIG recommendations, the management office began using lower cost, but still fully refundable, economy fares for this travel. There are approximately 1,000 employees under Chief of Mission authority who are eligible for R&Rs. Depending on the number of R&R trips employees take to the United States, this change saves the taxpayer between \$3 million and \$9 million per year, according to embassy calculations.

At the same time, however, the embassy did not change the fare basis used for overseas R&R travel to a location other than London, despite information that the actual costs for a round-trip ticket to London had dropped. Employees traveling to an overseas location other than London were allowed up to \$5,300 on a cost-construct basis. If the cost of the travel was below \$5,300, employees were only reimbursed for the actual travel costs. According to documents provided embassy staff, the actual roundtrip "Y" fare for Kabul-London-Kabul in September 2010 was \$4,691, or \$609 less than the cost basis. The lowest cost, fully refundable economy fare quoted in September 2010 was \$3,750, or \$1,550 below the cost-construct basis being used. A proposal to change the cost-construct fare basis was discussed in autumn 2010, according to embassy staff, but the fare basis was left unchanged. Assuming that each employee took one overseas R&R on a cost-construct basis from September 2010 through March 2011, the change to the lowest cost, fully refundable fare could have saved the taxpayers \$905,000 in those 7 months.

The embassy travel office, immediately before the start of this CFR, determined that the cost basis for overseas R&R cost construct should be approximately \$3,800. The day after the CFR team departed Kabul, embassy management issued a notice stating that the new fare basis for cost-construct R&R travel to overseas locations would be \$3,920. The notice stated that this amount would be reviewed semiannually. Depending on the number of cost-construct overseas R&Rs embassy staff takes per year, this change in the cost basis for R&R travel could save between \$1.4 million and \$4.1 million per year.

### ***Information Resource Management***

The information management office workload has increased threefold since the October 2009 inspection, growing from 598 OpenNet unclassified computers to 1,805 at the time of this CFR, while the number of classified computers has doubled. The staff has increased commensurably. The American staff has grown from 7 at the time of the inspection to 39 today, while the number of LE staff has doubled from 15 to 29 today. At the same time, the office has increased communications to nearly 70 remote sites throughout the country, implemented the ONE program described above, and established a diplomatic post office.

All but two of the formal and informal recommendations for which the information management resource office was responsible have been closed. One recommendation regarding a comprehensive contact database has been reissued in the PD section of this report. The second recommendation, which called for the development of a standard operating procedure for the procurement and installation of all information technology equipment embassy-wide, is being reissued. Embassy staff told inspectors that there are informal procedures in place to ensure that the information resources management section is aware of information technology procurements. However, there are no written procedures regarding either procurement or installation of this equipment. With most American staff members rotating out after only 1 year, written procedures are vital.

**CFR Recommendation 13:** Embassy Kabul should develop written standard operating procedures on the procurement and installation of all information technology equipment embassy-wide. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

## List of Formal Recommendations

**CFR Recommendation 1:** The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Office of the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, Embassy Kabul, and the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, should clarify with the U.S. Agency for International Development the oversight and managerial roles of the various offices and agencies within Embassy Kabul dealing with foreign assistance. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with D(N), Embassy Kabul, and F)

**CFR Recommendation 2:** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, should evaluate with the U.S. Agency for International Development the advantages of detailing one or more U.S. Agency for International Development officers to positions in the coordinating office for development and economic affairs, first and foremost as a deputy coordinator, and recruit officers for those positions. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with S/SRAP)

**CFR Recommendation 3:** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Bureau of Human Resources, should reevaluate the border coordinator position, clarify its authorities and responsibilities, and determine a more appropriate grade and organizational placement for it. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with S/SRAP and DGHR)

**CFR Recommendation 4:** Embassy Kabul should review contact management options, including those currently in use by protocol, public affairs, and other embassy sections; decide which option best meets the needs of all embassy sections; and require all embassy elements to use the same contact management system. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

**CFR Recommendation 5:** Embassy Kabul should develop the capacity in the general services office to handle non-public diplomacy audio-visual work, as well as an arrangement in the information management office for handling non-public diplomacy digital videoconferences. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

**CFR Recommendation 6:** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the Bureau of Legislative Affairs, and the Office of the Legal Adviser, should fully implement the issuance of special immigrant visas to qualified individuals in accordance with the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with CA, SCA, DS, L, and H)

**CFR Recommendation 7:** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the Bureau of Legislative Affairs, and the Office of the Legal Adviser, should determine the legality of a policy for the use of polygraphs for employees of both the Department of State and other U.S. Government agencies in ascertaining the bona fides of Afghan applicants for special immigrant visas under the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with CA, SCA, DS, L, and H)

**CFR Recommendation 8:** Embassy Kabul should reissue management policies every year, at a minimum, and post them on the embassy's intranet Web site. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

**CFR Recommendation 9:** Embassy Kabul should issue a management policy detailing the requirements for recusal memoranda for senior employees whose spouses work at the embassy. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

**CFR Recommendation 10:** Embassy Kabul should establish and implement a comprehensive and prioritized mission-wide training plan for locally employed staff. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

**CFR Recommendation 11:** Embassy Kabul should prepare a checklist with time lines to guide the hiring process for eligible family members. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

**CFR Recommendation 12:** Embassy Kabul should provide medical kits in all embassy official vehicles and should implement procedures to check them regularly to ensure they are complete and up-to-date. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

**CFR Recommendation 13:** Embassy Kabul should develop written standard operating procedures on the procurement and installation of all information technology equipment embassy-wide. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

## List of Informal Recommendations

Informal recommendations cover operational matters not requiring action by organizations outside the inspected unit and/or the parent regional bureau. Informal recommendations will not be subject to the OIG compliance process. However, any subsequent OIG inspection or on-site compliance review will assess the mission's progress in implementing the informal recommendations.

***CFR Informal Recommendation 1:*** Embassy Kabul should organize a roster of staff assistants in the executive secretariat so that no more than two individuals will be on duty at the same time.

***CFR Informal Recommendation 2:*** Embassy Kabul should utilize section officers rather than staff assistants to accompany the Ambassador on his in-country travel.

***CFR Informal Recommendation 3:*** Embassy Kabul should relocate the executive secretary to the space in the front office freed up by reducing staff assistant presence from four to two. The deputy executive secretary could remain in the current office of the executive secretariat, which will provide needed file, work, and swing space.

***CFR Informal Recommendation 4:*** Embassy Kabul should empower staff assistants to make final edits and release cables and memoranda approved by the Ambassador, the deputy chief of mission, and the assistant chief of mission.

***CFR Informal Recommendation 5:*** Embassy Kabul should include the U.S. Agency for International Development mission director in the rotation to act for the coordinating director for development and economic affairs during the latter's absence from post.

***CFR Informal Recommendation 6:*** Embassy Kabul should work with the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Bureau of Human Resources to minimize the number of stretch assignments for the senior civilian representative positions in Afghanistan.

***CFR Informal Recommendation 7:*** Embassy Kabul should review and streamline its clearance procedures for cables, including those from the field, by issuing formal guidance from the front office underscoring its informal 48-hour rule for clearance and transmittal of reporting cables, allowing drafters to consider nonresponses after that time as acquiescence, and making approvers responsible for transmission rather than recalling drafters.

***CFR Informal Recommendation 8:*** Embassy Kabul should build upon the Office of the Interagency Provincial Affairs cable tracking system by moving it to a SharePoint platform, which would allow input by, and offer visibility to, those in the field.

***CRF Informal Recommendation 9:*** Embassy Kabul should establish a mechanism for the public affairs officer to either review the employee evaluation report of the full-time public diplomacy officers in the regional platforms or provide written input to the rating officials.

***CFR Informal Recommendation 10:*** Embassy Kabul should document all small-grants committee meetings at regional platforms as well as in Kabul and should create a single database of all grants considered.

## Principal Officials

	Name	Arrival Date
Ambassador	Karl W. Eikenberry	June 2009
Deputy Chief of Mission	Earl Anthony Wayne	June 2009
Assistant Chief of Mission	James Keith	May 2010
Coordinating Director of Development and Economic Affairs	William Todd	June 2010
Coordinating Director for Rule of Law and Law Enforcement	Hans Klemm	July 2010

### *Chiefs of Sections:*

Management	Kevin Milas	July 2009
Consular	Nikolas Trendowski	July 2010
Political	Michael Adler	July 2010
Political Military	David Marks	July 2010
Economic	James Boughner	July 2010
Public Affairs	Matthew Lussenhop	August 2010
Regional Security	J. Greg Hays	June 2010
Rule of Law	Richard Driscoll	August 2010
Inter-Provincial Affairs	Dawn Liberi	August 2009
RAO	Chris Wood	December 2010
INL	Bruce Turner	July 2010

### *Other Agencies:*

Department of Agricultural	James Butler	September 2010
Department of Defense	Jay Hood	September 2010
Foreign Commercial Service	Robyn Kessler	June 2010
U.S. Agency for International Development	Earl W. Gast	June 2010
Drug Enforcement Administration	Mike Marsac	October 2008
U.S. Marshals Service	Walter Sanborn	January 2011
Federal Bureau of Investigation	Stephen Vogt	November 2010
Department of Transportation	Jan Brecht-Clark	March 2011
Department of Homeland Security	Raul Ortiz	April 2011
Department of Justice	Amy Matchison (acting)	June 2010
Department of the Treasury	William Block	August 2010
Department of Health and Human Services	Michael Lyman	March 2011
SIGAR	Monica Brym	January 2010



## Abbreviations

CDDEA	Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs
CFR	Compliance follow-up review
Department	Department of State
DS	Bureau of Diplomatic Security
IPA	Interagency Provincial Affairs
IPIT	Interagency Planning and Implementation Team
LE	Locally employed (staff)
OIG	Office of Inspector General
ONE	OpenNet Everywhere
PAS	Public affairs section
PD	Public diplomacy
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
R&R	Rest and Relaxation
SCA	Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
SCR	Senior Civilian Representative
SIV	Special immigrant visa
S/SRAP	Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

## **APPENDIX I: Status of 2009 Inspection Formal Recommendations**

**Recommendation 1:** Embassy Kabul should capture all the new positions and resources that it needs to implement its counterinsurgency strategy in the FY 2012 Mission Strategic Plan. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul, SCA, and S/SRAP held interagency staffing workshops in April and September 2010. Embassy Kabul reported on October 1 that the latest results were to be finalized by the end of November. Post later reported that staffing needs are a moving target as additional requirements are placed on post. Nonetheless, Kabul management has captured the general proposed resource requirements pertaining to counterinsurgency strategy through 2015 in the Mission Strategic and Resource Plan, and it continues to track uplift positions in conjunction with SCA and adjust resource requirements and projections as mission priorities change.

**Recommendation 2:** Embassy Kabul should reorganize the staff assistant operation so that the executive secretary manages a rotating schedule of responsibilities for the three staff assistants to include facilitating paper flow, note taking, country team follow-up, travel, and other support activities as required. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul executive secretary put into place a series of standard operating procedures, and staff assistants have been cross-trained on front office tasks. Four informal recommendations were issued in the CFR to further improve the work of the executive secretariat.

**Recommendation 3:** Embassy Kabul should streamline its clearance process, using staff assistants to make nonsubstantive changes to end products, initiating in-house tradecraft training, if necessary, to encourage better products from initial drafters, and reducing the number of clearing officers wherever possible. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul reported that it made the recommended changes, and the clearance process is improved.

**Recommendation 4:** Embassy Kabul should develop, implement, and enforce a protocol for official visitors that requires travelers to submit their preferred programs, including in-country travel, at least 72 hours before the group's arrival in Afghanistan to allow for adequate logistical preparation. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Post reported that it had the recommended procedure in place. The embassy noted, however, that, to be effective, this rule needs to be enforced among visitors coming to Afghanistan from Washington as well as at post.

**Recommendation 5:** The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should coordinate all routine high-level communications between the Department, the National Security Council, and Embassy Kabul and restrict such communications with the Embassy to between 6:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. Kabul time. (Action: S/SRAP)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* S/SRAP and SCA jointly responded that they strongly agree. Several regularly scheduled meetings have been shifted to earlier time slots to be respectful of the time difference in Kabul. This issue requires constant vigilance on the part of embassy leaders and senior officials in Washington.

**Recommendation 6:** The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should ask the Joint Staff to reschedule its routine weekly Friday teleconferences with Embassy Kabul during official Kabul working hours. (Action: S/SRAP)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable noncompliance.

*CFR Findings:* OIG closed this recommendation for acceptable noncompliance in light of the fact that efforts to persuade the Joint Staff to reschedule its weekly teleconference with Embassy Kabul have been unsuccessful.

**Recommendation 7:** Embassy Kabul should assign a team or unit in its political section to follow Afghanistan's relations with Iran and other neighboring countries on a full-time basis. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* The political section has created a two-person external affairs unit, headed by the deputy political counselor, which has responsibility for all neighboring states, including Iran. The external affairs unit works closely with the border coordinator, economic section, and political-military section.

**Recommendation 8:** The Foreign Service Institute should develop online modules in the history, politics, and culture of Afghanistan, and in reporting trade craft that can be added to the predeployment training of officers who will have political reporting and analysis responsibilities on provincial reconstruction teams. (Action: FSI)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* All personnel assigned under Chief of Mission authority to Afghanistan take a series of courses at the Foreign Service Institute that provide information on the culture, history,

and political issues of Afghanistan. The Foreign Service Institute developed a Basic Writing and Reporting Skills for Afghanistan-Bound Chief of Mission Personnel manual for officers deploying to Afghanistan, which is used during the required predeployment training courses and for any remedial work with officers already in Afghanistan.

**Recommendation 9:** The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should collect and convey the reporting needs of Washington consumers to Embassy Kabul by providing the mission with a periodic summary of key areas of reporting interest that reflect the needs of all consumers while consolidating and prioritizing needs, wherever possible, to reduce ad hoc requests. (Action: S/SRAP)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* The Afghanistan desk consulted with stakeholders throughout the Department and prepared a cable describing reporting priorities. The Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan approved the cable, and it was transmitted to the mission (11 State 26252). This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 10:** Embassy Kabul should produce a strategic reporting plan for political issues and link it to resource planning through the Mission Strategic Plan. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul has a quarterly reporting plan dated April 2011.

**Recommendation 11:** Embassy Kabul should prepare a quarterly cable summarizing key political developments and trends in addition to its daily reporting. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul prepares a cable on a rough bimonthly basis that gives an overview of political developments and trends.

**Recommendation 12:** Embassy Kabul should appoint an experienced biographics coordinator, and that coordinator should construct appropriate databases of information on key Afghan leaders and potential leaders to assist in identifying effective interlocutors. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* An officer in the political section has been designated as biographic coordinator.

**Recommendation 13:** Embassy Kabul should assign responsibility for oversight of large-scale grants for the advancement of women's rights to an agency with development experience. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul has assigned responsibility for oversight of large-scale grants for the advancement of women's rights to USAID. Despite the intention of the recommendation, the political section has retained management of a small-grants program totaling \$4.5 million in Economic Support Funds over 3 fiscal years, and a political officer has a grant warrant and training. The political section works closely with PRT representatives who can refer grantees and monitor the projects. Neither the grants officer nor the formal grants officer representative, a local employee, has been able to travel to the field to directly monitor grants outside Kabul. The CFR team was not able in its limited stay in Kabul to review actual grant documentation, including grantee reports and evaluations. The original recommendation remains closed on the basis of acceptable noncompliance.

**Recommendation 14:** Embassy Kabul should reorganize its political section into at least two units, headed by officers who can replace the deputy counselor when necessary. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul has reorganized the section into four units, covering democracy/rule of law; politics and government; reconciliation and conflict resolution; and external-multilateral-regional affairs, respectively.

**Recommendation 15:** Embassy Kabul should streamline and consolidate its planning system by reducing the number of working groups, focusing agendas on decisions to be made, and keeping formal records of all meetings that reflect agreement by all agencies on what decisions were reached. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* The national level working groups are integral to the Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan process. These 15 working groups are co-led by civilian and military personnel and are responsible for further development, monitoring, and assessment of their respective campaign objectives. Most of the working groups meet biweekly, although five of them meet weekly. The working groups keep minutes of their meetings and brief the Ambassador on a quarterly basis. The working groups feed into the executive working group, for which CDDEA serves as executive secretary. The political-military section's civilian-military planning and assessment subsection provides a planner to each of the working groups and advises on the planning and assessment processes. The inspection team concluded that the structure, while cumbersome, is necessary to achieve vital civilian-military coordination and progress toward U.S. national security goals. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 16:** Embassy Kabul should keep minutes of all regularly scheduled meetings between the Ambassador and the commander of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan, ensuring that the minutes reflect agreement by both sides on what decisions were reached. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* The International Security Force for Afghanistan takes notes for the biweekly principals' committee meetings, with a focus on decisions and action items; these minutes are now shared with the embassy. The embassy political-military section takes notes for the civilian-military executive working group meetings and shares with all participants as well as the front office.

**Recommendation 17:** Embassy Kabul should add an administrative assistant to its political-military section, using an eligible family member or other appropriate hiring mechanism, to take over the clerical aspects of civilian-military planning meetings and required Leahy Amendment vetting. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* The embassy has established the recommended position. No eligible family members were immediately available, but one has been identified and is slated to arrive in summer 2011.

**Recommendation 18:** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should implement policy decisions in accordance with acquisition and grant law and regulations, including the requirements that contract and grant changes be authorized by warranted contract and grant officers.

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul initially responded that implementation was under way. In a later update the embassy reported that “changes to grants and contracts are authorized by warranted grants and contract officers.”

**Recommendation 19:** Embassy Kabul should amend and reissue the letter of instruction from the Ambassador to the senior civilian representatives in the regional commands to bring the text into harmony with contractual obligations regarding direction and performance evaluations of other agency contractors and indicating that responsibility for direction and performance evaluations must remain with the employing agency. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul has reissued the letter of instructions from the Ambassador to the senior civilian representatives in the regional commands. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 20:** Embassy Kabul should conduct a review of the rules, regulations, and practices of all agencies with employees under chief of mission authority in Afghanistan and amend guidance as necessary so that performance evaluations are done in accordance with the appropriate rating system. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* The Ambassador's letter of instruction, dated February 28, 2011, to the SCRs clarifies the performance evaluation process for field presence personnel. While responsible for ensuring that appropriate performance evaluations are prepared for all field personnel under Chief of Mission authority, it gives them direct control only over Department evaluations. In the case of personnel from other agencies, SCR input is to be solicited and reflected in the evaluation. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 21:** Embassy Kabul should authorize activity managers and contracting officer technical representatives in the field to send technical performance reports on implementing partners and development projects directly to the corresponding agency's contracting office at the embassy at the same time that they send such reports to the interagency provincial affairs office. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* USAID/Afghanistan issued Mission Order 103-02, Delegation of Authorities to USAID Afghanistan Regional Missions, on September 23, 2010, notifying activity managers and contracting officer technical representatives to submit the reports directly to the appropriate contracting officer as well as to IPA.

**Recommendation 22:** The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, should approve and disseminate a sustainable, comprehensive rule of law strategy, to include program priorities, interagency staffing and skill needs, and a timeline. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with INL)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* The Rule of Law Strategy was approved by the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan on November 4, 2010. The embassy is implementing that strategy. It is being updated in light of the Administration's December 2010 Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review and the updated Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 23:** The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, should approve an anticorruption strategy and authorize the allocation of assistance funding to support that strategy. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with SCA and INL)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* The Anti-Corruption Strategy was approved by the Principals Committee in early September 2010. An Anti-Corruption Action Plan was approved by the Deputies Committee



later that same month. The embassy submitted the plan to Washington in January 2011 and is now in the process of implementing it. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 24:** Embassy Kabul should review the positions it requested for FY 2010 in light of the approved anticorruption strategy and assign an anticorruption officer to oversee its implementation. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* The rule-of-law and anticorruption areas have been completely restructured since the inspection occurred. Embassy Kabul created an ambassadorial-level rule-of-law and law enforcement coordinating director whose responsibilities include anticorruption. He oversees a robust coordination and program staff, including a USAID senior anticorruption adviser and numerous U.S. law enforcement agencies, who work integrally with the International Security Assistance Force and the U.S. Forces - Afghanistan.

**Recommendation 25:** The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs should immediately fill all seven of the in-country contracting officer representative positions. (Action: INL)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs had filled all seven in-country contracting officer representative positions, all of which were filled as of May 6, 2010.

**Recommendation 26:** Embassy Kabul should require that all aircraft and crew in the Embassy Air Pool adhere to the International Civil Aviation Organization crew proficiency, aircraft maintenance, and aircraft safety standards and that all personnel have appropriate security clearances. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy officials reported that all aircraft and crew adhere to the International Civil Aviation Organization requirements for crew proficiency, aircraft maintenance, and aircraft safety standards. All American crew were cleared to the Secret level at a minimum, while all non-American crew members have a public trust clearance. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 27:** Embassy Kabul should expand the border coordinator's role to include the coordination of border activities at all borders. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* The Embassy has redefined the responsibilities of the border coordinator to cover Afghanistan's borders with all six of its neighbors. However, the border coordinator has not been given authority over the activities of other embassy sections and agencies to actually achieve the



intent of establishing the position. Truly empowering the position to do so would cut across the lines of other established coordination mechanisms, adding to an already complex and heavy management structure. See CFR Recommendation 3.

**Recommendation 28:** Embassy Kabul should establish a concise public diplomacy and communications strategy to set priorities, drive program initiatives, and provide a framework to judge proposals and should disseminate this plan to all officers, sections, agencies and entities that conduct public diplomacy activities in Afghanistan. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* A copy of the referenced strategy paper (called the Blue Plan) was obtained by the inspectors. Interviews with staff confirm that this plan is being used at all levels of public diplomacy. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 29:** Embassy Kabul should clarify the role of the director of communication and public diplomacy in providing policy direction to all personnel under chief of mission authority in Kabul and in the field who are working on public diplomacy and communications issues. (Action Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* The CFR team interviewed key members of Embassy Kabul's country team and the leadership of the PD section. The team also directly observed the interactions of the director of communication within the section and across section lines and confirmed that his role is both clearly defined and that he is effective in carrying out the mandates of his position description. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 30:** Embassy Kabul should rationalize and clarify the public diplomacy staffing structure to eliminate duplication of functions and unclear lines of authority and should establish a clear organizational chart with work requirements for each position. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* Since the last embassy response, the departure of the deputy PAO for press/embassy spokesperson enabled the PAS to return to a more traditional structure with a PAO and a pair of deputies with different responsibilities. It also eliminated the confusion between the information officer and the deputy PAO for press/spokesperson. Although the structure is complicated, it is reasonable given the large staff of 44 Americans (35 Department employees and an embedded 9-person military information support team) and 23 LE staff. It avoids duplication of functions and operates effectively. The CFR team obtained an historical staffing pattern showing how the section has grown since the initial inspection, what new positions and structures were created, and who will be assigned. The team also obtained the organizational charts required by the recommendation. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 31:** Embassy Kabul should increase its use and support of the Government Media Information Center and should clearly define the position and clarify the authority of the Foreign Service officer advising the center, as well as other U.S. Government staff working there. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* The Government Media Information Center was off limits during the CFR; however, the inspectors were able to observe the participation of the center staff in coordination meetings and confirmed that PAS and USAID are both using the center as a program venue.

**Recommendation 32:** The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, in coordination with the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and Embassy Kabul, should develop and implement a staffing plan to cover all of the additional public diplomacy programs to be carried out by the Embassy and should link these new programs to the provision of additional staff in Kabul. (Action: SCA, in coordination with S/SRAP and Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* At the time of the CFR, there were 44 Americans (35 Department employees and an embedded 9-person military information support team) and 23 LE staff on board. Bringing LE staff on board is a slow process given the stringent security clearance process and the need for the mission to process a very large number of potential local employees. The expansion of the section has been largely completed. A spread sheet showing the historical and future structure of the embassy and the staffing flow was obtained by the inspectors.

**Recommendation 33:** Embassy Kabul should establish a stronger oversight system for issuing and monitoring grants to ensure that projects are completed according to the proposal, funds have been expended properly, and grants files include all the required documents. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* The mission's Stratcom section and the executive section both contain grants and contract managers. A review of the GDMS and SF- 4404 s at post confirmed that files are being properly executed and documented.

**Recommendation 34:** Embassy Kabul should request grants training for the locally employed staff handling grants. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* The senior LE staff member who works for the grants and funds executive officer completed the Department's grants training in the United States in March 2010.

**Recommendation 35:** The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, the Bureau of Human Resources, and the Foreign Service Institute, should authorize all U.S. direct-hire personnel who are designated to do public diplomacy at the provincial reconstruction teams to have targeted diplomacy training, including grants training, and provide other provincial reconstruction teams officers with some basic public diplomacy (especially media) training. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with SCA, DGHR, and FSI)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* The inspectors spoke with two of the five full-time PD officers at the regional platforms. Both confirmed that they had received appropriate training and have excellent support from the field program unit. The IPA has established a PD liaison and cooperation position that ensures that coordination between the two organizations is adequate. The field program unit is very effective in providing training, support, and advice not only to PD officers at the regional platforms but for all staff assigned to PRTs who deal with public diplomacy. Full-time PD officers in the regional platforms report (and emails confirm) that people at the smaller PRTs and district support teams who have PD responsibility direct questions to the appropriate experienced officer. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 36:** Embassy Kabul should reach out to the entire mission for nominations, project proposals, and selection committee participation for the International Visitor Leadership Program and should place more emphasis on seeking out non-English speakers. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Interviews with the officers responsible for this program and a review of International Visitor Leadership Program records confirm that the mission is reaching out wider, and that they are making effective use of single country programs that include interpretation.

**Recommendation 37:** Embassy Kabul should hire a Pashto translator for the public affairs section, and backup the translator's work by investigating the availability of private translation companies and consulting with Embassy Islamabad on cooperation in producing Pashto language materials. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* The Pashto translator hired in February 2010 was transferred to Mazar prior to the CFR, but the section has identified a new person who is in the security clearance pipeline.

**Recommendation 38:** Embassy Kabul should develop the capacity in the general services office to handle non-public diplomacy audio-visual work, as well as an arrangement in the information management office for handling non-public diplomacy digital video conferences. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* This has been reissued as CFR Recommendation 5. The general services office has begun training with the public affairs section on audio-visual requirements. The office has handled several small community events, but the public affairs section continues to handle the bulk of the embassy's audiovisual and digital video conference events.

**Recommendation 39:** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Office of the Legal Adviser, should clarify the role of the embassy photographer, including issues of supervision, payment and approval of overtime, and ownership of the photo archive. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with L)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* The inspectors obtained a copy of the photo policy. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 40:** Embassy Kabul should review, clarify, and where necessary streamline the policy on when and how the interagency provincial affairs office and other sections and agencies transmit and coordinate policy and program guidance between the Embassy and the field to enable more direct communication while maintaining limitations on mandatory taskings. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul issued guidance to the embassy sections, agencies, and field units in September 2010.

**Recommendation 41:** Embassy Kabul should request immediate clarification from the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations and the Bureau of Consular Affairs of plans to relocate the consular section and review any new space configuration to be sure that new premises can accommodate the additional staff expected in FY 2010 and the return of the immigrant visa function. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* The 2009 inspection identified confusion over future consular space in Kabul. The design of a new office annex included space for a consular section that was based on requirements approved by both the embassy and the Bureau of Consular Affairs. Subsequently, the bureau and the embassy changed their view and expressed a preference to keep the consular section in its current space, asserting the newly designed space in the annex did not meet projected staffing and workload requirements. Follow on discussions, and site visits led to the decision to move forward with the construction project as planned, including the new consular section, on the understanding that the embassy and the Bureau of Consular Affairs would choose the preferred location for the consular section locally. The embassy and bureau have now

decided to keep the consular section in its current premises. The requirement that all affected parties participate in the decision has been satisfied, and the recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 42:** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should identify one or more panel physicians and a laboratory facility in Kabul that is capable of providing reliable physical examinations and x-rays, referring to Centers for Disease Control guidelines for selecting a panel position. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with CA)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* Effective December 28, 2010, the embassy signed an agreement for the services of a panel physician to support immigrant visa processing. The recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 43:** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, Embassy Islamabad, and Embassy New Delhi, should send one of its consular officers and one locally employed staff to observe immigrant visa processing at a consular section in the region prior to initiating visa processing in Kabul and designate a locally employed supervisor from the region to oversee initial processing in Kabul. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with CA, Embassy Islamabad, and Embassy New Delhi)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* One American and one Afghan employee went to Embassy Islamabad to observe immigrant visa operations there in preparation for the start up of immigrant visa processing in Kabul. The recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 44:** The Bureau of Consular Affairs should transfer all immigrant visa processing for persons resident in Afghanistan to Embassy Kabul as soon as the initial surge of special immigrant visa applications has moved through the pipeline. (Action: CA)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Immigrant visas for individuals resident in Afghanistan are currently processed at Embassy Islamabad. In accordance with this recommendation, Embassy Kabul made a formal request to the Bureau of Consular Affairs that this function be transferred to Kabul. The Bureau of Consular Affairs confirmed in a cable its approval for this initiative to be effective May 1, 2011.

**Recommendation 45:** The Bureau of Consular Affairs should advise the Department of Homeland Security to transfer approved petitions for temporary work visas for Afghan residents to Embassy Kabul. (Action: CA)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul has now received formal approval from the Department for petition-based nonimmigrant visas to be processed in Kabul effective May 1, 2011.

**Recommendation 46:** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should develop a referral program to address the large number of Afghan trainees that the U.S. military commands propose for U.S. programs who fall outside the standard referral guidelines. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with CA)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul reported in cable 10 Kabul 6872 that the Bureau of Consular Affairs approved the post's standard operating procedures for military-sponsored nonimmigrant visa applicants. The embassy successfully implemented the program in March 2010. It continues to function reasonably well. The consular section wisely keeps a careful eye on the referral process in light of a handful of recent cases where visa recipients have overstayed their visas. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 47:** Embassy Kabul should require Foreign Service officers assigned to the two new consulates to take the portions of consular training that deal with American citizen services regulations and processes before assignment. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* The Office of Career Development and Assignments in the Bureau of Human Resources has mandated consular training for officers being assigned to the consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. This began with the 2010 assignments cycle. One individual took the training in 2010, and others are expected to do so in summer 2011. Consular visits to Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif take place once a quarter on a rotating basis.

**Recommendation 48:** Embassy Kabul should rewrite the consular section's travel plans to include quarterly oversight and training trips to the consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* The assistant chief of mission approved the consular section's request for the recommended travel. A trip schedule will be developed when the consulates become operational.

**Recommendation 49:** Embassy Kabul should identify the reason it has been unsuccessful in making the needed corrections to the inventory of on hand vehicles report and request assistance from the Bureau of Administration to accurately adjust its inventory. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Unresolved.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul, working with the Motor Vehicle Branch of the Office of Logistics Management and NEA-SCA/EX, reconciled the motor vehicle inventory in March 2010. The embassy submitted complete and accurate inventories in both 2010 and 2011. This recommendation is closed.



**Recommendation 50:** Embassy Kabul should reconcile the Inventory of On Hand Vehicles Report to document the reasons for the 95-vehicle discrepancy. (Action: Embassy Kabul)  
*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul, working with the Motor Vehicle Branch of the Office of Logistics Management and the SCA Executive Office, reconciled the motor vehicle inventory in March 2010. The embassy submitted complete and accurate inventories in both 2010 and 2011. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 51:** Embassy Kabul should recover loaned International Cooperative Administrative Support Services vehicles and return them to the embassy motor pool. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul has recovered the majority of loaned vehicles. The sections/agencies that still retain International Cooperative Administrative Support Services vehicles have ordered replacement vehicles, which have yet to be delivered. Until these vehicles arrive (estimated November 2012), Kabul will continue the loan of these vehicles as operational needs require. It currently takes up to 24 months from the day the vehicle is ordered to the day it can be used at post. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 52:** Embassy Kabul should inform agencies that have been operating loaned International Cooperative Administrative Support Services vehicles that maintenance and fuel costs for the period that those agencies have had exclusive use of the vehicles will be charged directly to the agency. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* As the funding the Department receives for Afghanistan includes monies to pay for the operations of other resident agencies in the country, including vehicle expenses, there is no need to charge these agencies for maintenance and fuel costs. Once the funding mechanism changes and other agencies are once again responsible for their own funding, the embassy should begin direct charging any agencies that still retain loaned vehicles for fuel and maintenance costs. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 53:** Embassy Kabul should cease loaning International Cooperative Administrative Support Services vehicles to Afghan government agencies. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Unresolved.

*CFR Findings:* The embassy, following guidance from the Office of Legal Counsel and Department regulations as stated in 12 FAH-6 H-522.5 h., no longer loans vehicles to Afghan Government agencies. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 54:** Embassy Kabul should schedule regular meetings of the interagency housing board throughout the year to consider assignments to apartments as well as housing appeals from employees. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* The interagency housing board has met monthly since November 2010 and will meet more frequently during the summer assignments season. The mission housing office also conducts e-votes of the board as needed.

**Recommendation 55:** Embassy Kabul should identify apartments occupied by non-foreign affairs agency personnel and propose to the interagency housing board the assignment of direct-hire foreign affairs agency personnel upon the departure of the incumbents, according to the published priority list for housing. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable noncompliance.

*CFR Findings:* All mission housing on the embassy compound is government-owned, although some leased housing is provided adjacent to the compound. The embassy housing policy details the priority for assignments to apartments and single accommodations, including containerized housing units.

**Recommendation 56:** Embassy Kabul should update and reconcile its property inventory in accordance with the projected schedule and document the reasons for the discrepancies in the 2008 inventory. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable noncompliance.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul completed and reconciled its 2009 and 2010 property inventories. While doing the 2011 inventory, the staff determined that the previous inventories were inaccurate due to errors in disposing of excess property. With the help of the Bureau of Administration's Office of Property Management, the embassy has corrected that error. At the time of this CFR, the embassy had completed the 2011 inventory and was reconciling. The documentation for the 2008 inventory was unavailable and therefore it could not be audited or documented. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 57:** Embassy Kabul should provide guidance that details the Afghan First policy while clearly stating the necessary exceptions. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul published a revision of the Afghan First policy on December 15, 2010, that states: "Exceptions to Afghan First include any procurement inconsistent with all applicable U.S. law governing USG procurement and acting within legal authorities." This policy was issued as a management notice rather than as a policy. The embassy stated that it would reissue it as a policy. This recommendation is closed.



**Recommendation 58:** Embassy Kabul should establish internal review procedures for large procurements and request contracting assistance when a procurement exceeds the embassy's warrant limits. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul established this review. All procurements above \$250,000 are handled by the Regional Procurement Support Office in Frankfurt or by the Office of Acquisitions Management in the Department. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 59:** The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should deduct an appropriate amount from the operations and maintenance contractor's payment due to the failure to train local personnel to take over the contractor's duties. (Action: SCA)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*Action Taken:* OIG transferred action responsibility to the Bureau of Administration, which responded that the contract line item numbers included in the contract for training services are optional performance requirements. Since the contractor has not been ordered to perform, he has not invoiced for training services, and the government has not paid for any training services.

**Recommendation 60:** Embassy Kabul should establish and implement an official temporary duty policy that delineates the terms, calculations, and conditions under which International Cooperative Administrative Support Services costs of official visitors are recorded and charged to the sponsoring agency. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul reported that the financial management officer has established a clear temporary duty policy regarding the terms, rates, and conditions under which ICASS costs of official visitors are collected. However, as the funding the Department receives for Afghanistan includes monies to pay for the operations of other resident agencies in the country, including temporary duty costs, there is no need to charge these agencies at this time. Once the funding mechanism changes and other agencies are once again responsible for their own funding, this procedure should be reinstated.

**Recommendation 61:** Embassy Kabul should review and close all open suspense deposit abroad accounts. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* All suspense deposit abroad accounts have been cleared.

**Recommendation 62:** Embassy Kabul should revise, issue, and implement an updated travel policy that includes the requirement for supervisory authorization, justification, and documentation. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul's post management issued a revised and updated Post Travel Policy on September 1, 2010, that includes the requirement for supervisory authorization, justification, and documentation.

**Recommendation 63:** Embassy Kabul should develop and implement procedures requiring all travel authorizations to show the authorized itinerary and authorized cost. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* The embassy lists the authorized itinerary and authorized cost on all travel authorizations. Prior to fall 2010, the embassy purchased the highest priced, fully refundable economy, or "Y", fares for R&R travel to the United States. In fall 2010, the embassy began using the lowest cost, fully refundable ticket available at the time of purchase, for an average savings of \$2,927 per trip. The embassy estimates that this change will save taxpayers between \$3 million and \$9 million per year, depending on the number of R&R trips to the U.S. each year. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 64:** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, should identify and approve cost-constructive routes for rest and recuperation travel and document all cost-constructive travel with the associated costs. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with SCA)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul identified cost-constructive routes for R&R travel in its revised travel policy. However, the cost basis was not changed until this issue was raised by the CFR team. This is discussed in more detail in the resources management narrative. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 65:** The Bureau of Resource Management, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should conduct an audit of all rest and recuperation travel; performed by Embassy Kabul employees in FY 2009 to verify that travel was based on the most cost efficient routes, that the proper cost constructive basis was used, and that all premium class travel was properly approved and justified. (Action: RM, in coordination with A)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable noncompliance.

*CFR Findings:* The Bureau of Resource Management did not concur with the recommendation as stated, because its Office of Global Financial Services is neither designated nor resourced to conduct post-specific reviews. The Bureau of Resource Management added that premium class travel will be included in its current oversight program for travel and improper payment reviews.

**Recommendation 66:** Embassy Kabul should review its current system for controlling travel within Afghanistan and establish procedures that require all official travel to be approved in advance by the chief of mission or his designee; distinguish official from unofficial travel; protect the U.S. Government from liability for nonofficial travelers; and allocate costs, including collecting the cost of trips from temporary duty employees and visitors on official travel when appropriate. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul on February, 23 2011, published a mission security travel policy to establish procedures for controlling travel within Afghanistan. The policy addresses official and nonofficial travel, and ground and air movement for civilians under Chief of Mission authority. Embassy management developed, and the Office of the Legal Adviser approved, a liability waiver for non-U.S. Government employees traveling on Embassy Air. The embassy began using this waiver during this CFR. As the funding the Department receives for Afghanistan includes monies to pay for the operations of other agencies in the country, there is no need to collect the travel costs of temporary duty employees and official visitors. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 67:** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, should establish a streamlined system for administering the eligible family member program and for addressing weaknesses including transparency, recruitment and selection of candidates, and documentation. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with SCA)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul has developed and implemented standard operating procedures to create, classify, and advertise positions and to select candidates. A checklist of required documentation is included in each eligible family member personnel folder to ensure that all required steps and documents are included, although it is not yet being used in all cases. All vacancies are advertised on the Department's Assignment Afghanistan Web site.

**Recommendation 68:** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources and the Office of the Legal Adviser, should develop, document, and implement a formal and comprehensive nepotism review process and then seek approval of the revised process from the Department. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with HR and L)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources and the Office of the Legal Adviser, has developed and implemented a standard operating procedure related to a formal nepotism review for all eligible family members.

**Recommendation 69:** Embassy Kabul, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources and the Office of the Legal Adviser, should finalize the recusal memoranda for senior employees

whose spouses work at the Embassy and issue a formal notification to appropriate mission staff. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with HR and L)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* The recusal memos, cleared by the Bureau of Human Resources and the Office of the Legal Adviser, have been signed by all senior staff whose spouses work at the embassy. A management notice was issued as formal notification to appropriate mission personnel. A management policy regarding the need for senior employees whose spouses work at the embassy to file a recusal notice is needed. CFR Recommendation 9 addresses this concern.

**Recommendation 70:** Embassy Kabul should establish and implement a mission-wide comprehensive training plan including the preparation of individual development plans for the locally employed staff and should make that plan available to American supervisors. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* This has been reissued as CFR Recommendation 10. All LE staff have work development plans. However, the embassy has yet to develop a formal mission-wide comprehensive training plan.

**Recommendation 71:** Embassy Kabul should review and modify its current departure checkout sheet to disseminate clear guidance and procedures and require all departing employees to complete the checkout process before their airline tickets are issued. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul's newly formed arrivals and departures unit has established checkout procedures for personnel and posted them on the embassy's intranet site. Due to e-ticketing, the embassy cannot hold tickets for outgoing personnel. Departure unit employees meet each departing convoy to ensure that badges, cell phones, and keys are returned to the embassy. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 72:** The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination with the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, should establish a mechanism to manage all categories of personnel assets in Afghanistan using the Department's standard automated application for post personnel. (Action: HR, in coordination with SCA)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* The Bureau of Human Resources and SCA have established a procedure so that all categories of personnel, including temporary duty employees, are included in a single document over which SCA has responsibility.

**Recommendation 73:** Embassy Kabul should involve the information management section in the Mission Strategic Plan exercise and identify specific benchmarks for the future development of information technology, as appropriate. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul included the information management section in the most recent Mission Strategic and Resource Plan exercise.

**Recommendation 74:** Embassy Kabul should develop standard operating procedures on the procurement and installation of all information technology equipment embassy-wide. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* This has been reissued as CFR Recommendation 13. While informal procedures are in place to keep the information resource management office informed of computer-related procurements, written standard operating procedures have yet to be written.

**Recommendation 75:** Embassy Kabul should work with the United States Agency for International Development to convert the Afghanistan information technology pilot plan into a formal OpenNet consolidation project plan and include new target dates. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul completed the USAID personnel transition to OpenNet in January 2011. A few remaining workstations retained access to AIDNet to allow staff access to USAID-specific programs. This recommendation has been superseded by a State-USAID agreement for a consolidated information technology platform (11 State 014838, dated February 17, 2011). This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 76:** Embassy Kabul should submit all United States Agency for International Development applications to the local change control board for review. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul reported that all major USAID applications have been vetted and approved by the change control board for use on OpenNet. In addition, all minor applications, hardware, and software items that needed review and approval have been vetted and approved by the local change control board for use on OpenNet.

**Recommendation 77:** Embassy Kabul should reorder information management priorities until the arrival of a full-time information systems security officer and perform all required information systems security officer duties in a timely manner.

*Pre-CFR Status:* Unresolved.

*CFR Findings:* A full-time dedicated information systems security officer arrived on November 7, 2010. An additional staff member acts as alternate information systems security officer, as needed. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 78:** Embassy Kabul should establish an automated recording for after-hours use that directs emergency callers to a duty officer and should cease telephone operator service after normal business hours. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Unresolved.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul disagreed with the recommendation, stating that a 24-hour bilingual operator service is vital for operating in a conflict zone. While inspectors had observed that there were very few calls to the embassy operator after 8:00 p.m. local time, OIG defers to the judgment of mission management that 24-hour bilingual operator service is essential. Recommendation 78 is closed for acceptable noncompliance.

**Recommendation 79:** Embassy Kabul should form a committee to review Department-approved contact management options and those data bases currently in use by protocol and other embassy sections, decide which option best meets the needs of all embassy sections, and require all embassy elements to use the same contact management system. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* This has been reissued as CFR Recommendation 4.

**Recommendation 80:** Embassy Kabul should develop and implement individual development plans for locally employed information technology staff to include information assurance and radio systems. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* All LE staff members in the information resource management office have individual development plans. Some, but not all, employees have received training. The embassy would like to bring a trainer to provide the Information Assurance Systems Administration training on site. However, this has yet to occur.

**Recommendation 81:** Embassy Kabul should appoint a management controls coordinator and disseminate this information in a revised designations of authorities administrative notice. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* The embassy appointed the assistant chief of mission as management controls officer.

**Recommendation 82:** Embassy Kabul should establish, implement, and disseminate an updated policy on overtime that requires complete documentation and valid justifications for the additional hours and sets up a process for a monthly management review. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* The post support unit in Charleston now handles time and attendance, including overtime, for Embassy Kabul. The embassy issued an updated overtime policy that details the documentation required. The post support unit, which provides monthly reviews of overtime, has finalized the procedures for quarterly oversight reports of all overtime payments. The first report was scheduled to be issued in May 2011. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 83:** Embassy Kabul should establish, implement, and disseminate a policy on use of representational funds, redistribution of funds during the fiscal year, and dollar limits for various types of activities. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul established and published a policy on use of representational funds on May 2, 2010. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 84:** Embassy Kabul should establish and implement procedures for representational vouchers that require clear documentation of attendees, costs, and justification for the event. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul established and published a policy on use of representational funds on May 2, 2010. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 85:** Embassy Kabul should request, and the Bureau of Administration should perform, a site visit to provide specific guidance to board members, review internal controls, and establish strengthened procedures for employee association operations. (Action: Embassy Kabul, in coordination with A)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul reported that the Office of Commissary and Recreation Affairs visited post in May 2010. Since none of the current members were on the board during that visit, the embassy has requested another support visit. This recommendation is closed.



**Recommendation 86:** Embassy Kabul should reassess the current reimbursement process and develop a system that provides for the reimbursement of the actual number of meal tickets accepted by the food services contractor. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul and the employee association developed and issued a standard operating procedure regarding meal ticket reimbursement in December 2009. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 87:** Embassy Kabul should conduct an audit of the meal ticket program that justifies administrative costs and a reasonable profit margin and establishes cost centers to assure that each cost center is self-sustaining. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Resolved/open.

*CFR Findings:* Embassy Kabul conducts monthly audits of the meal tickets, as called for in the December 2009 standard operating procedures. The association provided its unaudited profit-loss statement for the first 3 months of calendar year 2011, which shows that all separate cost centers made a profit and that no cost center subsidizes another. This recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 88:** Embassy Kabul should review the current limits on alcohol sales, establish and implement limits, and monitor sales of duty-free alcohol by the Kabul Embassy Employee Association. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Closed on the basis of acceptable compliance.

*CFR Findings:* The employee association now limits the amount of alcohol that can be sold to authorized diplomatic personnel. Sales, including the employee badge number, are recorded at the time of the sale. The rules regarding the sale of alcohol are posted in the association store.

**Recommendation 89:** Embassy Kabul should request, and the Kabul Embassy Employee Association should return, funds paid to the association for five used shipping containers fitted as retail sales space. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

*Pre-CFR Status:* Unresolved.

*CFR Findings:* Based on an opinion by the Office of the Legal Adviser, Embassy Kabul is not legally required to seek reimbursement for the shipping containers. This recommendation is therefore closed.



## APPENDIX II: Status of 2009 Inspection Informal Recommendations

### Executive Secretariat

Because of the constant change in the structure of the executive secretariat, protocol assistants and interpreters have different supervisors, although they often work on the same events and the interpreters backstop the protocol assistants. The interpreters, in particular, are not adequately mentored.

**Informal Recommendation 1:** Embassy Kabul should review the arrangements for the supervision of the protocol assistants and interpreters to ensure that all receive the same level of mentoring and supervision.

**CFR Status:** The protocol assistants and interpreters are now under the supervision of the deputy executive secretary, which affords closer supervision, regular weekly staff meetings (for better two-way communications), and more opportunities for mentoring and offering guidance.

### Political Affairs

Temporary reinforcements enable the embassy to cover the national elections without overwhelming its small political section.

**Informal Recommendation 2:** Embassy Kabul should make more use of temporary duty surge capacity in the future to cover crucial national events.

**CFR Status:** A four-member temporary duty team helped cover election preparations. Many “crucial national events” tend to be either of limited scope where it is unclear additional temporary duty assistance would add value or to emerge too rapidly to permit sufficient planning time.

A number of required reports, such as those on human rights, religious freedom, and trafficking in persons, are due at the end of the summer, which coincides with the annual officer rotation. It is unreasonable to assign the drafting of such complex and important assessments to officers who have just arrived in country, but the embassy cannot change the deadlines for the reports.

**Informal Recommendation 3:** Embassy Kabul should make the first draft of annual reports the last thing that reporting officers do before transferring out of Kabul rather than the first thing a replacement officer does upon arrival in the fall.

**CFR Status:** The political section adopted this approach for the summer 2010 transfer season, but the experience was not entirely positive. It was made more difficult when the initial drafter left Kabul before the entire process of drafting and negotiation with the Department was completed. Drafting the report gives action officers greater command over the subject matter,

which is crucial to the subsequent revision process. The section is now working to ensure complete and transparent documentation exists for information that is to be included in the drafts.

IPA coordinates PRT reporting with minimal guidance from the political and economic sections. Sometimes this results in PRT failure to put their reporting in a broader context and results in a loss of synergy between the embassy reporting offices and the PRTs.

**Informal Recommendation 4:** Embassy Kabul should require the embassy reporting sections to provide the provincial reconstruction teams with periodic guidance on which priority issues to investigate and report.

**CFR Status:** Broad reporting guidance is shared via the weekly country team reporting priorities list, which is circulated for comment in advance to each of the reporting sections.

**Informal Recommendation 5:** Embassy Kabul should develop and fund a travel plan for the political and economic sections to bolster reporting from the field.

**CFR Status:** The embassy rightfully pointed out that funding is not a constraint to travel in Afghanistan. Rather, it is the logistical complexity and burden placed upon small, isolated field units to attend to visitors. As the embassy implements CFR Informal Recommendation 2 and eliminates travel of staff assistants with the Ambassador, space will be opened up for members of the political, economic, and political-military sections to gain important context to shape their knowledge of Afghanistan and their clearance of cables drafted in the field.

One Foreign Service officer and one LE staff member spend hours watching plenary sessions of the Afghan Parliament from the visitors' gallery to gather information. This is not an efficient use of time.

**Informal Recommendation 6:** Embassy Kabul should make use of a daily summary of developments that the Parliament produces in Dari and English.

**CFR Status:** The political section's parliamentary affairs unit makes extensive use of this product in its reporting.

The political section is not currently using some management tools that could make its work easier and address the lack of experience and continuity that results from the 1-year tours.

**Informal Recommendation 7:** Embassy Kabul should develop and use an electronic system to help new political officers identify key sources, organizing it by issue rather than by individual or portfolio, and including annotations to reflect reliability.

**CFR Status:** The political section has a shared Outlook contacts file in which all officers are encouraged to add contact information. Handover notes from one political officer to his/her successor and a mandatory overlap period help maintain continuity. More broadly, the embassy, in collaboration with the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, is field-testing an

electronic knowledge management system designed to capture and preserve institutional knowledge at the officer, section, and mission-wide level.

**Informal Recommendation 8:** Embassy Kabul should require political officers to leave a handover memo for successors before departing the embassy.

**CFR Status:** Embassy Kabul has instituted this requirement.

**Informal Recommendation 9:** Embassy Kabul should invite all officers at provincial reconstruction teams who have political reporting responsibilities to consult with the political section on arrival and debrief it prior to departure.

**CFR Status:** The realities of in-country travel in Afghanistan virtually ensure consultations in the embassy for field personnel en route to and from their field assignments. Orientation briefings for personnel going to the field include representatives from many embassy sections.

**Informal Recommendation 10:** Embassy Kabul should develop a written orientation to the political section's work and use it to help new arrivals become familiar with their work more quickly.

**CFR Status:** The political section has a document that describes standard operating procedures for the section. The section's office manager is responsible for updating this before the summer turnover.

### **Political-Military Affairs**

A new fusion cell has been created to work with U.S. military and coalition forces on efforts to persuade enemy fighters to switch sides and join the coalition payroll. The embassy has not yet sorted out exactly how to clear its reporting and coordinate its advocacy with the new cell, which has been assigned the lead role in reintegration policy by NATO.

**Informal Recommendation 11:** Embassy Kabul should review its systems for communication links, reporting responsibilities, and information sharing to ensure that the work of the fusion cell is fully coordinated with U.S. policy and United Nations mandates for the disarmament and reintegration of former Taliban members.

**CFR Status:** Two Foreign Service officers are embedded in the International Security Assistance Force Reintegration Cell (referred to above as the fusion cell). A Senior Foreign Service officer serves as the cell's civilian deputy director; an FS-03 officer serves as an embedded policy advisor. These two positions ensure full information flow from the cell to the embassy; vet and clear embassy reporting on reintegration; and, coordinate with other embassy sections to ensure U.S. policy equities are effectively represented at the International Security Assistance Force/NATO.

The small strategic planning unit of the political-military section is partially staffed with temporary duty personnel and much of its work is destined for Department offices. Most of the

planning work does not depend on interaction with the Afghan Government and does not necessarily need to be done in Kabul, where the costs and security risks of maintaining U.S. employees are high.

**Informal Recommendation 12:** Embassy Kabul should review the strategic planning unit to determine whether it would be more cost effective to do the strategic planning and metrics monitoring in the Department or at another embassy in the region.

**CFR Status:** The embassy has reviewed the status of the political-military strategic planning unit and found that the most appropriate physical location for this unit remains within the mission. As the majority of this unit's work is the synchronization of mission activities both internally and with those of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, International Security Assistance Force, and the international community, effective planning could not be carried out without continuous on-the-ground physical access to personnel in the embassy, International Security Assistance Force and international organizations based in Kabul. The CFR team supports that conclusion.

### **Refugee Affairs**

It is often difficult for the refugee coordinator or the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration nongovernmental implementing partners to visit projects because of the security situation in the area. The refugee coordinator relies on secondhand reports on how the projects are advancing. Synergies with other assistance programs may be the best way to maximize bureau resources.

**Informal Recommendation 13:** Embassy Kabul should establish a mechanism to coordinate Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration Affairs and U.S. Agency for International Development projects in the same regions of Afghanistan to provide maximum synergy in those communities.

**CFR Status:** The refugee coordinator has held weekly coordination meetings with USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance since arriving in Kabul in 2010. The coordinator also holds irregular refugee coordination meetings with CDDEA, USAID, and POL. She attends the border coordination, gender, and health and education working groups to improve coordination with USAID and other sections. USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance and the refugee coordinator share information on ongoing projects, draft requests for proposals, and conducted a variety of joint meetings on humanitarian and internally displaced person issues.

The refugee coordinator and her staff have difficulty monitoring projects in conflict areas. The Ambassador can often travel to areas with his protective detail that the RSO would consider unsuitable for travel by less well-protected refugee affairs staff.

**Informal Recommendation 14:** Embassy Kabul should include the refugee coordinator or the senior locally employed assistant when the Ambassador travels to areas where there are Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration Affairs-funded projects.

**CFR Status:** Both the consular chief and LE assistant have been able to travel extensively outside the framework of Ambassadorial travel. The refugee coordinator joined one Ambassadorial trip to Gardez, and the LE staff is developing a remote monitoring strategy. See also Informal Recommendation 5 and CFR Informal Recommendation 2.

### **Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs**

The CDDEA office has several management layers that review drafting from the officers in the sections and agencies under the coordinator's responsibility. Officers in many of those agencies and sections are frustrated at having their work returned not only for substantive additions but for grammatical and semantic changes as well. This multiple clearance and redrafting process can delay products.

**Informal Recommendation 15:** Embassy Kabul should focus their drafting clearance efforts on products for consumption outside of the embassy such as reporting cables and give internal products a lighter scrub for policy consistency.

**CFR Status:** See the full discussion in the CDDEA section of this report. See also CFR Informal Recommendation 7.

### **Development Assistance**

The Ambassador reviews all USAID programs and projects, including new projects, additional funding for ongoing projects, and project extensions to ensure that they support U.S. policy priorities. The decision memorandum can be extremely detailed and cumbersome.

**Informal Recommendation 16:** Embassy Kabul should streamline the process for approving U.S. Agency for International Development programs and projects so that only essential information is included, and in the case of contract extensions, that contract performance is the key issue addressed.

**CFR Status:** See the full discussion in the CDDEA section of this report.

### **Public Diplomacy**

All or virtually all officers heading out to PRTs will eventually do some media or public diplomacy work. Some will have PD as their primary focus.

**Informal Recommendation 17:** Embassy Kabul should continue public affairs briefings for outgoing provincial reconstruction team officers and expand those briefings to staff who will be focusing on public diplomacy.

**CFR Status:** Basic guidance on public affairs for all staff going out to field assignments is being conducted by the PAS as part of the in-brief for all officers. This basic training is supplemented by more extensive sessions for officers with PD responsibilities, but the greatest

input comes from the establishment of a field program unit and the placement of officers with PD experience in regional platforms.

PAS officers lack the time to do basic contact work and develop relationships with the key Afghans in educational, cultural institutions, and media organizations.

**Informal Recommendation 18:** Embassy Kabul should take advantage of the arrival of additional public diplomacy staff to set up a regular schedule of meetings with key contacts and should use these meetings to develop contact information for the contact management database.

**CFR Status:** Meetings with key contacts remain at the mercy of the security situation, but the arrival of more staff in the PAS has enabled most offers to meet with their Afghan counterparts. The lack of a single, up-to-date contact management system, however, remains an obstacle to collecting and using contact information. This lack was addressed in a formal recommendation in the 2010 inspection report and has been reissued as CFR Recommendation 4.

The filing system in PAS is not well organized, and officers said they had difficulty finding previous records. They also said they spent a lot of time doing essentially clerical tasks.

**Informal Recommendation 19:** Embassy Kabul should hire an American office management specialist for the public affairs section to upgrade the filing system and establish better administrative procedures.

**CFR Status:** The section hired an American office management specialist who works for the coordinator for public affairs; however, the addition of a deputy public affairs officer for operations has contributed to establishing better administrative procedures.

The FY 2009 supplemental spending plan for public diplomacy includes \$1 million for 10 or more cultural preservation projects. Since these projects would likely involve sensitive cultural, historic, or religious sites, it is essential that they be done well.

**Informal Recommendation 20:** Embassy Kabul should get a cultural preservation specialist to handle the work if the proposed multiple large-scale cultural preservation projects go forward. In cooperation with the staff of the Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation, the embassy should use these projects to build Afghan cultural preservation capacity.

**CFR Status:** The modest scope of the original expectation of \$1 million was exceeded by a factor of 10 as the embassy supplemented the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs contribution from the Ambassador's Fund for cultural preservation with a supplemental appropriation. The mission has hired an archeologist as a temporary, excepted Civil Service employee to oversee a number of cultural preservation programs in Afghanistan.

PAS produces an attractive report on public diplomacy activities called the "PD Weekly" that is distributed internally within the embassy and to offices in Washington. Although it is quite popular and well received, the PD Weekly is very time consuming for the PAS staff, especially for a document that is not distributed outside the U.S. Government.

**Informal Recommendation 21:** Embassy Kabul should investigate ways to reduce the amount of time spent on the public diplomacy weekly report or get more benefit from it by using portions of it in public fora, such as the embassy website.

**CFR Status:** The production of reporting has been completely revised since the 2009 inspection. Program reporting in the PAS is extensively used and often repurposed.

The embassy Web site is not used routinely to highlight the benefits to the Afghan people of U.S. involvement and assistance.

**Informal Recommendation 22:** Embassy Kabul should highlight more positive stories about successful programs and the U.S. Agency for International Development on the embassy website.

**CFR Status:** The addition of an assistant information officer position whose responsibility is social media has meant that the section is able to highlight a range of programs in a wide variety of outlets.

### **Consular Affairs**

Consular officers have an emergency telephone that they pass among the three of them on a consular duty officer rotation. No other embassy personnel handle the consular duty. When new consular officers arrive they have no resources for the consular duty.

**Informal Recommendation 23:** Embassy Kabul should develop a consular duty manual that can be used by consular officers but also by nonconsular duty officers in the future.

**CFR Status:** A consular duty manual has been prepared. Only consular officers perform consular duty officer actions.

The American citizens services LE assistant doubles as the part-time fraud investigator. Most of his work involves responding to requests for investigation from other embassies that are processing Afghan nonimmigrant visa or immigrant visa cases. He has no systematic way of tracking and recording his antifraud work.

**Informal Recommendation 24:** Embassy Kabul should develop a system for tracking its fraud prevention and detection work in preparation for the arrival of an assistant regional security officer for investigations and the onset of immigrant visa processing.

**CFR Status:** With the arrival of an assistant regional security officer for investigations, a system for tracking its fraud preventions and detection work is now in place.



## **Consolidation**

IPA has its own management section to handle in-processing of new employees, logistics, and support operations for over 180 (soon to be 380) U.S. civilians at the PRTs.

**Informal Recommendation 25:** Embassy Kabul should examine the possible efficiencies that could be gained by consolidating Office of Interagency Provincial Affairs management support into the management section.

**CFR Status:** The IPA management support has been integrated into the embassy's management office as the field support unit. The embassy's arrivals and departures unit processes all incoming and outgoing personnel, whether based in Kabul or in the field. Both the management section and IPA told inspectors they are pleased with the outcome.

## **Motor Vehicles**

Embassy Kabul allows some employees who are not embassy chauffeurs to operate armored vehicles, but it does not have a current policy statement informing employees of their personal liability and the extent of embassy liability insurance coverage.

**Informal Recommendation 26:** Embassy Kabul should revise its motor vehicle self-drive policy following guidance in the Department of State Motor Vehicle Safety Program for Overseas Posts (issued by OBO/OPS/SHEM, dated November 2009) to establish the applicability of the policy to all agencies under chief of mission authority and provide for an active Certified Safe Driver Instructor Program for all employees operating motor pool vehicles.

**CFR Status:** All nonchauffeur staff who are allowed to drive embassy vehicles have taken the Department's Foreign Affairs Counter Threat course, which includes defensive and safe driving components. Per embassy policy, vehicles can only be used for official purposes, and all embassy personnel have blanket travel orders. Therefore, personal liability coverage is unneeded.

## **Procurement**

Embassy Kabul provides bottled water to embassy personnel even though the water in the embassy compound is potable. There is no justification in the files for purchasing and distributing bottled waters to embassy personnel.

**Informal Recommendation 27:** Embassy Kabul should include in the procurement files, justification for providing bottled water to embassy personnel.

**CFR Status:** Embassy Kabul has included the justification in the procurement file.



## **Financial Management**

There is no travel authorization or blanket travel authorization for some in-country travel since there is no travel cost. While cost may not be an issue, there could be liability issues if travelers performing official travel are not covered by a travel authorization.

**Informal Recommendation 28:** Embassy Kabul should prepare either travel authorizations or blanket travel authorizations for in-country travel in advance of travel for all travelers.

**CFR Status:** The Department's Orientation and In-Processing office in Washington provides blanket travel authorizations for in-country travel for all permanent employees. The financial management office processes blanket travel authorizations for in-country travel for local employees, as needed.

## **Human Resources**

Embassy Kabul's vacancy announcements are only advertised on one Internet Web site.

**Informal Recommendation 29:** Embassy Kabul should advertise on more than one Internet website and establish practices that foster diversity in local recruitment.

**CFR Status:** The embassy currently posts its position openings on two Web sites and is expanding to a third. The human resources SharePoint site includes a section on Equal Employment Opportunity and a policy on diversity.

The FSN Handbook was last updated in 2008. New compensation information has not been included in the handbook.

**Informal Recommendation 30:** Embassy Kabul should revise the local employee handbook and distribute it to the local staff.

**CFR Status:** Embassy Kabul published its updated local employee handbook during the course of this CFR.

The human resources section does not use its SharePoint site to advertise internal vacancy announcements.

**Informal Recommendation 31:** Embassy Kabul should advertise internal vacancy announcements on its SharePoint site.

**CFR Status:** Internal vacancy announcements are advertised on its SharePoint site.

Embassy Kabul does not have a regular orientation program for their newly hired local staff employees.

**Informal Recommendation 32:** Embassy Kabul should establish and implement a mission-wide orientation program for all their newly hired locally employed staff.

**CFR Status:** Embassy Kabul holds weekly orientation programs for all newly hired LE staff.

American supervisors do not take advantage of other types of recognition, such as local staff employee of the quarter awards, certificates of appreciation, and nonmonetary awards of minimal value.

**Informal Recommendation 33:** Embassy Kabul should establish other types of recognition for local staff employees.

**CFR Status:** Embassy Kabul uses certificates of appreciation and extra mile awards to recognize work by local employees, outside of the more formal mission awards program.

Embassy Kabul does not have a human resources checklist with time lines to guide the hiring process for EFMs.

**Informal Recommendation 34:** Embassy Kabul should prepare a checklist with timelines to guide the hiring process for eligible family members.

**CFR Status:** This has been reissued as CFR Recommendation 11.

An explanation from the post employment committee on the selection of an eligible family member is not always included in the files.

**Informal Recommendation 35:** Embassy Kabul should request from the post employment committee and keep in the files an explanation of the selection of an eligible family member.

**CFR Status:** Personnel folders for eligible family members working at Embassy Kabul include information regarding the post employment committee decision.

## **Information Management**

The OIG team noted that since Kabul is pilot testing numerous projects, it would also be valuable to test the “local connection” option suggested in a USAID Mission Director memo to the Chief of Mission. The “local connection” is in use in 38 locations and supports the sharing of the State WebPASS application, SharePoint, and other applications. There may be cost savings for all agencies.

**Informal Recommendation 36:** Embassy Kabul should test the U.S. Agency for International Development’s “local connection” option to determine if it is a viable alternative to the information technology consolidation pilot project underway.

**CFR Status:** Cable 11 State 014838 regarding the consolidated State/USAID information technology platform has negated this recommendation.

There is no established procedure to decide what information technology hardware should remain in place and be reused for the next high-level visit.

**Informal Recommendation 37:** Embassy Kabul should identify temporary office space for high-level visitors and maintain core information technology equipment in that space for future visitors.

**CFR Status:** Embassy Kabul has insufficient office space for a dedicated, high-level visitor office. The embassy believes it will have adequate space when the new temporary office space becomes available in late summer/early autumn 2011.

Telephone, radio, and computer inventories are not up-to-date.

**Informal Recommendation 38:** Embassy Kabul should update its telephone, radio and computer inventory systems.

**CFR Status:** Embassy Kabul has entered the entire information technology inventory into the Department's Integrated Logistics Management System inventory database

The information management officer was responsible for monitoring contracts in excess of \$14,000,000 and had not received the Government Technical Monitor training.

**Informal Recommendation 39:** Embassy Kabul should require that the information management officer completes Government Technical Monitor training.

**CFR Status:** The information management officer has completed the Government Technical Monitor training.

The information management staff did not have updated individual development and security awareness training.

**Informal Recommendation 40:** Embassy Kabul should require that the information management staff have updated individual development plans and complete security awareness training.

**CFR Status:** All systems users are required to complete security awareness training. If the training is not completed on time, users are automatically locked out of the system until the training is completed.

## **Health Unit**

Although medications are correctly stored and controlled, the inventory records are not well organized.

**Informal Recommendation 41:** Embassy Kabul should prepare and maintain inventory records of medications.

**CFR Status:** The health unit has updated and reorganized its inventory records of medications.

The first aid kits in some embassy official cars are missing, and there is no assurance that all the first aid kits have been checked by health unit staff.

**Informal Recommendation 42:** Embassy Kabul should maintain first aid kits in all embassy official vehicles and have health unit personnel check the kits regularly.

**CFR Status:** This has been reissued as CFR Recommendation 12.

### **Community Liaison Office**

The community liaison office SharePoint site is not updated frequently.

**Informal Recommendation 43:** Embassy Kabul should update the community liaison office SharePoint site regularly.

**CFR Status:** The community liaison office SharePoint site is frequently updated.

The second community liaison office bulletin board does not have current information.

**Informal Recommendation 44:** Embassy Kabul should update its second community liaison office bulletin board regularly.

**CFR Status:** All community liaison office bulletin boards are updated regularly.

Embassy Kabul does not have a social sponsor program.

**Informal Recommendation 45:** Embassy Kabul should establish a social sponsor program for new arrivals.

**CFR Status:** The arrivals and departures unit works with the new arrivals' work sponsors to provide this information.

The community liaison officer coordinators do not have a systematic way of gathering information from embassy personnel about activities of interest.

**Informal Recommendation 46:** Embassy Kabul should prepare a survey to elicit information from embassy personnel on activities that they would like to have sponsored by the community liaison office.

**CFR Status:** The community liaison office and the Kabul Embassy Employee Association conducted a joint survey in 2010. Another survey is planned for autumn 2011.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**FRAUD, WASTE, ABUSE,  
OR MISMANAGEMENT**  
of Federal programs hurts everyone.

**Contact the  
Office of Inspector General  
HOTLINE**  
to report illegal or wasteful activities:

202-647-3320  
800-409-9926

[oighotline@state.gov](mailto:oighotline@state.gov)

[oig.state.gov](http://oig.state.gov)

Office of Inspector General  
U.S. Department of State  
P.O. Box 9778  
Arlington, VA 22219

Cables to the Inspector General  
should be slugged "OIG Channel"  
to ensure confidentiality.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~